THE AFFILIATION OF POLICE WITH THE CRAFT AND INDUSTRIAL LABOR UNION MOVEMENT: COSTS AND BENEFITS

by

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ABSTRACT

Declining municipal budgets have required city bargaining officials to take a tougher position at the bargaining table. In response, some police employee organizations are abandoning their traditional state and local organizations and are turning to the larger craft and industrial labor unions for assistance.

The intent of this professional paper was first to examine the controversies surrounding the affiliation of police with the labor union movement; secondly, to test whether affiliation with national unions results in significantly higher compensation for police; and lastly, to determine whether such affiliation is a good idea or not.

In order for the controversies surrounding the affiliation of the police with the labor union movement to be fully understood, this professional paper also examines the history of police organizations and discusses how collective bargaining relates to public sector employment, and police work in particular.

A test was conducted to determine if large craft and industrial labor unions are earning more compensation for their police affiliates than local and state police organizations are winning for themselves. This test took the form of a questionnaire which solicited basic information concerning unionization, salaries, and fringe benefits. The questionnaires were distributed to a defined population of police departments within the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The returned questionnaires were analyzed and a comparison was made to determine on a state-by-state basis what type of labor organization won the best contract for police. The quality of a police contract was determined by the starting and maximum weekly wage of a patrolman.

This study found that the large craft and industrial unions did not win a better contract for police than state and local police won for themselves in two of the three selected states. In light of these test results, and the controversies surrounding police affiliation with craft and industrial unions, this paper concluded that it would not likely be in the best interest of policemen to affiliate with a craft or industrial labor union; however, it is in their best interest to organize and bargain collectively.

CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Police employee organizations are at a crossroads in anticipation of how to confront future labor negotiations. The taxpayer's revolt, combined with inflation, tighter municipal budgets and employee layoffs, has forced city bargaining officials to take a tougher position at the bargaining table. In response, some police employee organizations are abandoning their traditional state and local police employee organizations and are turning to the larger craft and industrial labor unions for assistance. The American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Teamsters are the two labor unions presently credited with organizing policemen within the labor union movement. Richard M. Ayres reports:

> As police become more and more frustrated at the bargaining table, they are turning toward affiliation with the Teamsters and AFL-CIO to gain power through intimidation, experience in bargaining, and broader financial resources by which to gain their demands.[1]

On February 20, 1979, the AFL-CIO chartered the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA).[2] At that time the IUPA had a membership of 50,000 police officers in a total of sixteen states. Other affiliates of the AFL-CIO that represent policemen include the American Federation of

State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the Laborers (LIUNA), the Service Employees (SEIU), and the Paperworkers (UPIU).

The Teamsters, this country's largest union, claims to not know exactly how many police officers they currently represent. In 1978 the Teamsters estimated that they represented approximately 225 municipalities. According to Frank, Teamster officials desire to keep information concerning police representation quiet because of the adverse effect that police affiliation with the Teamsters has upon the public.[3]

The affiliation of police with national labor unions is an important contemporary issue for both the police and the public whom they serve. This trend poses some controversial issues that could become severe political and professional problems for police officers. Therefore, it is necessary to determine if the bargaining agents for the large craft and industrial labor unions are winning a better contract for police than the traditional police organizations are winning for themselves. If the large unions are not providing a better contract for police than the traditional police unions are winning for themselves, it would be a mistake for traditional police organizations to affiliate with a large craft or industrial labor union at the possible cost of stirring up public resentment.

The purposes of this paper are: first, to discuss and analyze collective bargaining as it relates to public sector employment in general and police work in particular; second, to briefly sketch the history of police organizations and their relationships with large craft and industrial unions; third, to test whether affiliation with national unions results in significantly higher compensation for police; and, finally, to summarize by concluding whether such affiliation is a good idea or not.

End Notes

[1]Richard M. Ayres, "Conflict or Cooperation: Police Labor Relations in the 1980's," The Police Chief 46 (December 1979): 62.

[2]U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1979. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 51.

[3]Allen D. Frank, "The Wages of Frustration: When All Else Fails, Call the Teamsters," Police Magazine 1, no. 4 (September 1978): 21.

CHAPTER II

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

What Is Collective Bargaining?

The phrase "collective bargaining" was first coined by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the late 1800's, though they did not define it precisely.[1] The Webbs used the phrase to describe a collective economic strategy favored by employees whenever they felt that their collective economic strength could earn more than bargaining solely on an individual basis with their employers. This is a simplistic, yet still popular, view of collective bargaining. It is simplistic in the sense that today collective bargaining covers a wide range of issues besides just economic concerns. Furthermore, collective bargaining is an ongoing process that is much more complicated than can be perceived from the Webbs' use of the phrase.

The following legal definition of collective bargaining was taken from the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.

> To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment -- and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached. . .[2]

This definition indicates that collective bargaining has four essential components. These components include:

(1) The employer and the representative of the employees are mutually obligated to meet.

(2) The employer and the representative of the employees shall confer/bargain in good faith.

(3) The employer and the representative of the employees will confer/bargain over a wide range of conditions concerning employment.

(4) The employer and the representative of the employees shall finalize their agreement with a written contract.

The first and fourth components are self-explanatory. On the other hand, the second and third components lie at the heart of the collective bargaining process and therefore necessitate further discussion. In fact, to bargain/confer in good faith, the second component, is the very foundation of collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining relies upon an ethical commitment on the part of both the employer and the representative of the employees to maintain a flexible position on their respective demands while they seek an agreement that both sides will perceive as equitable. According to Maddox, there are basically four obligations imposed on the employer and the representative of the employees when they participate in good faith bargaining. These four obligations are:

(1) To confer at reasonable times and in reasonable places;

(2) To refrain from surface bargaining (merely going through the motions);

(3) To grant concessions to the other party; and

(4) To reach a bilateral agreement on the issues at hand.[3]

From what has been presented about collective bargaining thus far, it would be easy to assume that employers and employee representatives reach bilateral agreements with little or no difficulty. In reality, differences between employers and employee representatives often result in conflict. The following observation by Rynecki, Cairns and Cairns points out that conflict is a natural outcome of the collective bargaining process:

> Management essentially is a process of decision-making; collective bargaining essentially is a process of shared decision-making. Conflict between aggressive management (interested in implementing new and better ways of providing police services) and the bargaining process is inevitable.[4]

Since collective bargaining can limit the ability of an employer to manage, the goal for both management and labor is to reach an agreement that will balance the interests of management with the interests of labor. This equilibrium does not remain fixed, but changes within the quid pro quo relationship established between management and labor in the context of collective bargaining. When conflicts cannot be resolved, the parties are said to have reached an impasse.

There are many possible sources of impasse. Some of the most common are:

(1) The inability or unwillingness of the employer to grant monetary concessions.

(2) Internal conflicts among one or both of the bargaining parties.

(3) Lack of authority to bargain on the part of one of the negotiators.

(4) A large amount of animosity between the bargaining parties.

(5) Lack of experience and skill in negotiating.

(6) A feeling on the part of one or both of the bargaining parties that there is a 'principle' at stake.

(7) Unrealistic expectations on the part of one or both of the bargaining parties.

(8) Overcommitment to a position by one or both of the bargaining parties.

(9) Lack of desire on the part of one of the bargaining parties to settle.[5]

Whatever the reason for the dispute, there are a variety of procedures which they can use to resolve their conflict and reach an agreement. These impasse resolution procedures include: mediation, fact finding, voluntary arbitration and binding arbitration.

Dispute Resolution Techniques

Mediation

Mediation is the most voluntary and least effective of the dispute resolution techniques. It involves the insertion

of a neutral third party into the bargaining process. This neutral third party, the mediator, contacts each of the disputing parties separately and attempts to define the exact cause of the conflict. While doing so, the mediator reduces the number of unresolved issues that exist between the disputing parties. Obviously, the success of mediation in settling disputes relies on the ability of the mediator to persuade the bargaining parties to confide in him/her about the concessions that they are each willing to make in order to reach an agreement.

Fact Finding

Fact finding is the most commonly used form of impasse resolution machinery among nonuniformed services in the public sector.[6] The uniformed services, specifically policemen and firemen, rely more heavily upon binding arbitration than fact finding. This is because compulsory binding arbitration is a final settlement and policemen and firemen have historically been effective political lobbyists.

Fact finding, like mediation, is the insertion of a neutral third party into the bargaining process. The fact finders are responsible for researching the issues that lie at the heart of the dispute, hopefully uncovering information that will lead to the settlement of the dispute. There is an argument over whether or not fact finders should make recommendations or just uncover facts.[7] Those who

oppose allowing fact finders to make recommendations point out that parties may be unwilling to bargain over an issue if they know that this same issue will be turned over to a fact finder for a recommendation. Furthermore, once a fact finder can make recommendations, there is little to differentiate fact finding from voluntary arbitration.

Voluntary Arbitration

Voluntary arbitration, like the other forms of dispute settlement, also involves the insertion of a neutral third party into the bargaining process. The difference is that the arbitrators will make recommendations to the disputing parties, though acceptance of the recommendations is purely voluntary. Therefore, the success of voluntary arbitration weighs heavily upon the recommendations of the arbitrator and the willingness of the disputing parties to reach a settlement.

Binding Arbitration

Many states that have legislation authorizing collective bargaining in the public sector also have laws that require disputing parties to submit their differences to an arbitrator. Under voluntary arbitration the parties themselves seek an arbitrator to assist them in settling their differences. Compulsory arbitration, on the other hand, requires the disputing parties to submit their differences to an arbitrator, and the decision reached by

the arbitrator is binding upon the disputing parties. It should be noted that there are two types of binding arbitration: conventional arbitration and final offer arbitration. Conventional arbitration permits the arbitrator to work out a compromise between the disputing parties. Final offer arbitration does not permit the arbitrator to arrange a compromise but, rather, the arbitrator must choose between management's or labor's entire proposal. Sometimes, however, the arbitrator may choose between management's and labor's proposals on an issue-by-issue basis.

Now that impasse resolution procedures have been presented, it is necessary to discuss the differences between collective bargaining in the public sector and collective bargaining in the private sector.

A Comparison of Public Sector and Private Sector Collective Bargaining

Thus far, the discussion on collective bargaining has failed to distinguish collective bargaining in the public sector from collective bargaining in the private sector. The differences between the two are important.

First and foremost among the differences between collective bargaining in the private sector and collective bargaining in the public sector is the essential nature of the services. Whether the public service is law enforcement,

fire fighting, or trash collecting, the withholding of almost any public service could have disastrous effects. In law enforcement this was demonstrated with the Boston police strike in 1914 and the Montreal police strike in 1969. Therefore, most public sector employee organizations do not enjoy the residual right to strike. In contrast, labor organizations in the private sector have found the strike and threat of strike two of their greatest weapons for dealing with management after negotiations have broken down and impasse resolution measures have failed.

Secondly, collective bargaining in the public sector takes place in a political environment. On the federal level, which is characterized by the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, it is often difficult to determine who has the authority to speak for management. According to Bent and Reeves, this ". . . has institutionalized bad faith in the public sector."[8]

Furthermore, management negotiators in the public sector must also be cognizant of political pressures that can severely limit their ability to bargain. The following is a rather humorous example from New York City:

> They [the New York Police Benevolent Association--NYPBA] got their big chance to stick it to the city last summer, when lovable Mayor Ed Koch was running for governor of New York State and was entered in the Democratic primary. Furiously pantomiming Mr. Nice Guy, Ed was in no position to take a strike by the municipal unions when bargaining began--although illegal, a strike is

> always a possibility--and so he settled with the city's 'civilian' employees for a generous 15% over two years; later, the uniformed fellows got themselves 16%.9

This brings another difference between collective bargaining in the private and the public sectors to light. In the private sector, financial concessions made by management at the bargaining table can be regained by passing increased labor costs on to consumers in the form of price increases, or through productivity gains. However, in order for increased labor costs to be absorbed through price increases, the manufactured product must remain in demand in spite of its increase in price. This is because the private sector exists in an economic environment that is governed by product supply and consumer demand. Obviously, the public sector provides services and not products, and the essential nature of these services is such that the demand for them is inelastic. Moreover, while wearing the hat of a taxpayer, the consumer cannot seek the most equitable arrangement among a variety of services. The ability to pick and choose rests only with the consumer in search of products or services offered in the private sector.

Managers in the public sector handle increased labor costs through one or a combination of the following: increased taxes, shifting financial resources, reducing the work force, decreasing services, or eliminating services. Additionally, efforts have been made in the public sector to offset increased labor costs through productivity gains.

This is usually attempted by increasing the case or workload of public employees. But as Bent and Reeves point out,

> Government services are such that increased labor cost in most cases will not be offset by productivity gains commonly relied upon in the private sector as a way of holding down only labor costs.10

The last major difference to be discussed here between collective bargaining in the public sector and collective bargaining in the private sector is the scope of bargaining. As noted above, collective bargaining came to the private sector through a series of legal mandates. These mandates have voided all claims of universal management rights for private sector managers. In other words, organized employees in the private sector who engage in collective bargaining may negotiate any issue related to their employment. Organized public employees, on the other hand, only engage in limited collective bargaining because management in the public sector is recognized as having certain universal management rights, and these rights are protected through legislation.

It is easy to understand the rationale behind legislation that restricts the scope of bargaining in the public sector. The essential nature of the public service is such that the welfare of the people could be jeopardized if controls were not established concerning the delivery of public services. One of the most prevalent controls governing the public sector has to do with the ability of

public sector employee organizations to confront an impasse during negotiations. Most public services are precluded from striking by legislation, and the police are certainly no exception.

The Implications of Collective Bargaining in Law Enforcement

The legislative duty to bargain collectively brought an end to the unilateral administrative power of police managers. Those police employees that organize and participate in collective bargaining have the ability to influence and even control changes within their work environment. This "shared decision making" has not only limited the ability of police administrators to manage the delivery of police services, it has also removed some of the accountability that the public has enjoyed over the police through elected or appointed public officials. Harvie and Lawson indicate:

> Currently, police organizations, and thus the public, have little control over the day-to-day behavior of the police officer. What control they do have seems to be eroded by present collective bargaining activities.11

Although police employee organizations were once concerned predominantly with wages and fringe benefits, this is no longer the situation. Today police employee organizations are seeking to participate with management in making decisions that were once management's sole right, such as on manpower and equipment allocations, and the recruitment,

selection and training of officers.[12] In order to protect certain administrative decisions from encroachment by labor, police managers have sought provisions in collectively bargained agreements that guarantee their ability to make unilateral decisions concerning the delivery of police services. These provisions are referred to as "management rights clauses."[13]

Although this discussion has presented the implications of collective bargaining as being unfavorable, this is misleading. The goals and objectives of a police employee organization are not incompatible with the public's need for an efficient and effective police service. For example, police administrators have attempted to use ticket production policies as indicators of efficiency -- commonly referred to as a "quota system." Police employee organizations have resisted this highly unpopular device.[14]

On the other hand, many municipalities have been placing two police officers in a squad car, at the insistence of police unions. This is in spite of an in-depth study by the Police Foundation on the San Diego Police Department which indicated that, ". . . there is virtually no difference in officer safety and effectiveness between a one-man and a two-man patrol car--though the latter costs nearly twice as much."[15] Obviously, the insistence of many police unions on two-man patrol cars cannot be perceived as being in the public's best financial interest.

It is true that collective bargaining has increased the salaries of policemen who have organized. A study by Kearney and Morgan indicates that:

> . . . for a local police force that is 100 percent organized and engaged in bargaining, average salaries should be about $70.00 per year higher and mean salaries plus benefits about $85.00 per year higher than would be the case if no unionization and bargaining existed.[16]

Of course, other public sector employees have also benefitted from the rewards of collective bargaining. A study by Ashenfelter indicated that:

> . . . in 1966 the unionization of firemen may have raised the average hourly wage of unionized firemen by somewhere between 6 and 16 percent above the average hourly wage of nonunion firemen.[17]

Besides increasing wages for policemen, collective bargaining has complicated personnel problems for police administrators. Agreements reached through the collective bargaining process contain grievance machinery, limitations on discipline and restrictions on the drafting and enforcing of rules and regulations. Police administrators must act in accordance with collectively bargained agreements as well as within all statutory requirements and civil service regulations.

The last implication of collective bargaining to be discussed here is the issue of merit. The following definition of the merit system is provided by Stahl:

> . . . a personnel system in which comparative merit or achievement governs each individual's selection, and progress in the service and in

> which the conditions and rewards of performance contribute to the competency of the service.18

Many public administrators believe that comprehensive collective bargaining arrangements, which include provisions pertaining to hiring, training, and promotions, are incompatible with the principle of merit. This belief, according to Felix Nigro, is based upon the assumption that contractual arrangements would supersede civil service legislation and undermine public personnel administration.[19]

The argument against collectively bargained agreements on the basis that they are contrary to the principle of merit is not as firm as it appears. Historically, the alternative to merit has been political patronage. Police employee organizations, like other unions, are against political patronage.[20] After all, a patronage system would eliminate tenure.

However, although police employee organizations oppose political patronage, they do promote seniority as a determinant in making personnel decisions. According to a management survey of police contracts by Rynecki et al., approximately 70 percent of the collectively bargained agreements they studied contained provisions covering seniority.[21]

In conclusion, police employee organizations have had an impact on every aspect of police work, from determining the minimum entrance requirements to retirement benefits. Moreover, they have introduced a great amount of employee

influence into decision making areas that were once management's sole right. This influence has reduced the authority that the public has had over the police through its elected officials.

End Notes

[1]Thomas A. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980), p. 27. [Hereafter referred to as Relations.]

[2]Charles W. Maddox, Collective Bargaining in Law Enforcement (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), p. 4.

[3]Ibid., p. 5.

[4]Steven A Rynecki, Douglas A. Cairns, and Donald J. Cairns, Police Collective Bargaining Agreements: A National Management Survey (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1978), p. 3.

[5]Thomas A. Kochan and Todd Jick, "The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and Empirical Examination," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (June 1978): 214, as cited by Thomas A. Kochan in: Relations, p. 277.

[6]Kochan, Relations, p. 293.

[7]Maddox, p. 78.

[8]Alan E. Bent and T. Zane Reeves, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector (Menlo Park: The Benjamin/Cummings Co., Inc., 1978), p. 81.

[9]Daniel Seligman, "Mugged Again in New York," Fortune 106, no. 13, 27 December 1982, p. 32.

[10]Bent and Reeves, p. 81.

[11]Robert A. Harvie and Paul E. Lawson, "Occupational Implications of Police Collective Bargaining," Police Studies, September 1980, p. 28.

[12]Ibid., p. 24.

[13]Rynecki et al., p. 6.

[14]Harvie and Lawson, p. 28.

[15]Alan Crawford, "Having It All," The Washington Monthly 14, no. 11 (January 1983): 39.

[16]Richard C. Kearney and David R. Morgan, "The Effect of Employee Organizations on the Compensation of Police Officers," Journal of Collective Negotiations 9, no. 1 (1980): 26.

[17]Orley Ashenfelter, "The Effect of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case of the Fire Fighters," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 24 (January 1971): 201.

[18]O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, p. 42, as quoted by Alan Saltzstein in: Public Employees and Policymaking (Pacific Palisades: Palisades Publishers, 1979), p. 2.

[19]Maddox, p. 127.

[20]Robert D. Lee, Jr., Public Personnel Systems (Baltimore: University Parks Press Co., 1979), p. 398.

[21]Rynecki et al., p. 51.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE UNIONIZATION

In order to fully comprehend the significance of police affiliation with national labor organizations, it is necessary to have an understanding of the history of police employee organization in the United States.

Early Attempts at Unionization

Records indicate that some police employee organizations actually existed prior to the Civil War.[1] However, like most public employees during this period, policemen were appointed on the basis of political patronage.[2] Therefore, because tenure lasted only as long as a politician remained in office, none of the early police employee organizations existed any appreciable length of time.

In the late 1800's the principle of hiring on the basis of merit was introduced with the passage at the federal level of the Pendleton Act (1883).[3] The enactment of similar civil service legislation on the state level in succeeding decades permitted policemen and other public employees to have tenured positions. Policemen could no longer be appointed or removed simply on the basis of their political affiliation.

The police, now secure in their positions, began forming police employee organizations, several of which have endured until today. Some of the larger police organizations formed during the late 1800's and early 1900's, that still exist today, include:

(1) New York City's Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (1892);

(2) The Erie Club in Buffalo (1894--now the Police Benevolent Association);

(3) The Rochester Police Locust Club (1907--named after the wood used in policemen's nightsticks);

(4) The Milwaukee Policemen's Protection Association (1908);

(5) An unnamed association in Washington, D.C. (1904); and

(6) The Fraternal Order of the Police (FOP), Lodge #1, in Pittsburgh (1915).[4]

These early police employee organizations were called benevolent or fraternal societies because they were created to meet the social needs of their members. Besides providing burial insurance, these societies sponsored social activities for their members' families.

Previous Attempts to Affiliate with Labor Unions

During this same period, as labor unions were coming into power in the private sector of the United States, policemen attempted to align themselves with the labor union movement, but were unsuccessful. The labor movement

declined to accept police requests for affiliation because the police had become known as an extension of management. This is easily understood since the police were used to enforce court orders requiring laborers to return to work, and to act as strike breakers. In fact, the following policy was adopted by the American Federation of Labor (AF of L) in 1897, in response to requests for the AF of L to represent policemen:

> It is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are often controlled by forces inimical to the labor union movement.[5]

Nevertheless, by the end of World War I, the AF of L could no longer resist the growing requests for assistance by the police. Police were becoming more and more dissatisfied with their work environment. The end of World War I brought high inflation.[6] This high inflation, combined with low wages, long work periods, and the awareness that wages in the private sector were rising while their wages remained fixed, again prompted the police to actively pursue affiliation with the AF of L.[7]

In 1919, the AF of L reversed its 1897 policy and began issuing charters to local police unions.[8] The AF of L accepted the police as craft workers just like carpenters, bricklayers, and machinists.[9] Thirty-seven police locals had been issued charters by September of 1919. The majority of these locals were from small or medium-sized cities.[10]

One of the thirty-seven police locals chartered by the AF of L was the Boston Social Club -- Charter No. 16807.[11] Immediately after the Boston Social Club received its charter, the City of Boston's Police Commissioner, Edwin U. Curtis, issued an order prohibiting the membership of policemen in a union, and 19 members of the police union were subsequently suspended for engaging in union activities.[12] Curtis was not against the economic and work environment changes sought by the Boston Social Club; however, he felt that he had to break the police union movement or otherwise it would set a dangerous precedent for other municipal employees. Moreover, Curtis feared that unionization would undermine management's ability to control police employees.[13]

The order for suspension precipitated a police strike on September 9, 1919. Fifteen hundred of Boston's 1900-man police force walked off the job.[14] The strike initiated widespread looting and rioting. Before the Massachusetts State Guard could end the strike, three people were killed and damages from the rioting and looting were estimated at more than one million dollars.[15]

Curtis not only broke the police union movement in Boston, he set police unionization back throughout the United States. Massachusetts' Governor Calvin Coolidge responded to AF of L President Samuel Gumper's request for leniency for the striking policemen with, "There is no right

to strike against the public safety by anyone, anywhere, anytime," echoing the sentiment of the American public.[16]

More than 1100 of the striking Boston policemen were permanently removed from the police force. Because of this, and the fact that the AF of L revoked the charters of all its local police unions, policemen who were entertaining the thought of union affiliation quickly changed their minds. It is important to note, however, that the policemen hired to replace the discharged Boston policemen received almost every one of the economic and work environment changes demanded by the union.[17]

The 1920's and 1930's were difficult times for organized labor. While the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was attempting to organize the mass production industries, the police were being used by management to protect people and property during strikes.[18] Most policemen were either not members of a police organization, or were members of an independent local association, or benevolent. The only national organization recruiting police membership during this period was the Fraternal Order of Police, which was founded in Pittsburgh in 1915.[19] Its two main goals were civil service reform and improved police pensions.[20] This made it acceptable to many police administrators. Police who sought the prestige and financial support of an outside organization, but wanted to avoid unionization, affiliated with the FOP.

While police administrators were working to keep police employee organizations independent, or affiliated only with the FOP, they developed their own national organization--the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).[21] IACP, founded in 1893, was a professional organization that encouraged technological advances and strong police management. For example, in 1915, IACP developed the fingerprint file system that is currently operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Modern Unionization

Between 1915 and 1959, labor organizations in the private sector were strengthened with the passage of the following legislation:

(1) The Railway Labor Act of 1928

(2) The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932

(3) The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933

(4) The National Labor Relations Act/Wagner Act of 1935

(5) The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947

(6) The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959[22]

Although the above federal legislation protected the right of workers in the private sector to organize and bargain collectively, the laws did not cover employees in the public sector. The development of collective bargaining in the public sector laws prompted in two ways. First, many of

this country's unionized workers had a counterpart in the public sector. For example, nurses worked in both private hospitals and public institutions. When laborers in the public sector observed their private sector counterparts making economic advances through labor unions, the public sector employees began pursuing less interference from the government in their work environment. Secondly, in 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10988, which encouraged executive branch employees to organize and bargain collectively through elected representatives. Although Executive Order No. 10988 was not comprehensive, it did precipitate the enactment of collective bargaining legislation on the state and local levels.[23]

Executive Order No. 10988 was weak in that it permitted public sector bargaining on only a limited number of issues. Furthermore, this order did not establish a governmental body to implement and oversee the change in the Federal Government's labor relations policy. Lastly, additional legislation was necessary to strengthen the process for resolving disputes between labor and management.[24]

President Nixon addressed the weaknesses of Executive Order No. 10988 in January of 1970 when he issued Executive Order No. 11491. This order created a Federal Labor Relations Council, consisting of three persons, who were charged with the responsibility of developing policy and establishing a framework of rules and regulations within

which collective bargaining would be conducted. In addition, Executive Order No. 1149 increased the scope of bargainable issues and strengthened the process for resolving disputes between management and labor.[25]

The climate for public sector collective bargaining became favorable because of federal initiatives in the 1900's; however, the main impetus towards police unionization in the 1960's was the social climate in the United States. This was a period of social upheaval for the United States that placed the police in the forefront of the turmoil. Some of the events that characterize this time period and which had a profound effect on the police include: civil rights demonstrations, Supreme Court decisions that tended to restrict police powers, a rising crime rate, a relaxation of moral principles, and peace demonstrations over America's undeclared war in Vietnam. These events, combined with low pay, poor personnel practices, the perception by the police that no one supported them, and finally, the observation by police that other public employees were making significant gains at the bargaining table, all provided the motivating force that caused the police to take advantage of their natural group cohesion and confront management at the bargaining table.

Police employees not only began to bargain through elected representatives, they also engaged in job actions such as "blue flu," work slowdowns, work speed-ups, ticket

blizzards, picketing, the threat of strikes, and actual strikes.

Despite all the reasons for which police employees sought to organize in the 1960's and 1970's, as of 1977 only 53.2 percent of all the full-time police employees in the United States belonged to an employee organization. In contrast, 72.9 percent of the full-time firemen and 64.2 percent of the full-time teachers were affiliated with an employee organization.[26]

There are several reasons that fewer police employees organize for the purpose of collective bargaining. First of all, the Boston Police Strike, mentioned earlier, has had a long-lasting and profound effect on the establishment of police employee organizations. Secondly, unlike some of the other public sector employees, the police do not have their own national union with which to affiliate. Thirdly, the police regard themselves as a quasimilitary organization, and therefore may not tolerate union affiliation because it is viewed as a source of rival authority.[27] Lastly, some police organizations have been successful in controlling their work environment through their use of political power, and did not need to formally bargain over such issues as wages and working conditions.

As seen in Chapter I, the latest development in police labor relations is the affiliation of many police organizations with the large craft and industrial unions.

The Controversies Surrounding the Affiliation of Police with Labor Unions

The American public does not support the affiliation of its police with national labor unions.[28] This viewpoint is shared by some police officers. In fact, the IUPA, mentioned earlier, was established by former members of the International Conference of Police Associations (ICPA), which dissolved over the issue of affiliation with the AFL-CIO.[29]

One of the main reasons the American public does not support police affiliation with labor unions is the negative reputation that the Teamsters Union in particular has created for itself by having its officials involved in corruption and organized crime. After all, in 1958 the AFL-CIO expelled the Teamsters after numerous investigations of corruption were launched against high ranking Teamster officials.[30] Since 1958, Teamster officials have been able to maintain their organization's "bad-guy" image by frequently appearing in the news media in reference to allegations of corruption and connections with organized crime.

However, the "bad-guy" image held by the Teamsters is exactly what has prompted some more militant police organizations to affiliate with them. Furthermore, just as some employee organizations have employed the mere threat of a strike as leverage against management during contract

negotiations, some police organizations have used the mere threat of affiliation with the Teamsters in order to force city bargaining officials to accept their demands.

Although the threat of affiliation with the Teamsters has worked periodically, it has also backfired on occasion. For example, the City of San Diego [California] Policemen's Association actually paid Teamster negotiators $190,000 to represent them at the bargaining table after San Diego's bargaining officials refused to alter their original contract offer.[31] However, the Association's efforts were not rewarded because San Diego's bargaining officials refused to sit at the bargaining table with the Teamster negotiators.

In contrast, policemen in St. Petersburg, Florida, were also confronted with bargaining officials who would not bargain past their initial contract offer. However, when the St. Petersburg Policemen's Association threatened to affiliate with the Teamsters, St. Petersburg's bargaining officials became flexible and offered to raise their original salary increase offer by $1,000.00.[32]

Besides the questionable reputation of Teamsters, there are other important reasons why the public is against police affiliation with large industrial or craft unions. Foremost among these is the fear that the police will engage in job actions similar to those tactics employed by workers in the

private sector. The most severe job action available to those in the private sector is the strike.

Within the past ten years, many police employee organizations in America have engaged in a strike or "blue flu" type job action. Cities have been able to endure these job actions by having contingency plans that involve supervisory officers and police personnel from neighboring jurisdictions. These strikes have not created the civil disturbances that were associated with the Boston Police Strike of 1919. In fact, a study by Edwin H. Pfuhl, Jr. indicates, "Simply stated, police strikes appear to have neither a significant nor a systematic impact on rates of reported crime."[33]

Today, some public officials are making statements quite contrary to Governor Coolidge's famous remark about the 1919 Boston Police Strike, mentioned earlier. Wisconsin's Governor Anthony Earl believes that all public employees, including the police, should have the right to strike.[34] Governor Earl and his supporters would accept strikes by police in order to eliminate binding arbitration, which is felt to result in too great an expense for property taxpayers.

It is important to note that there is no evidence to support the assumption that a police employee organization that is affiliated with a labor union is more or less likely to engage in a strike than a police association, which is

simply a local organization of police employees, that selects several of its own members to represent the entire organization at the bargaining table. Of course, a municipality that has a police employee organization, regardless of its affiliation, is more likely to endure a job action by the members of its police force than a municipality where the police employees are unorganized.

Besides fearing job actions by the police, the public, and especially city officials, view the affiliation of its police employees with labor unions as an increased threat to local control. As mentioned earlier, an increasing trend among police has been to focus contract negotiations upon sharing management decisions rather than just pursuing compensatory objectives.[35] Bargaining with local police employee representatives over management decisions is seen as different from bargaining with an organization that is national in scope, well experienced in bargaining, and having an abundance of financial resources on which to rely. Therefore, it is easy to understand the reactions of both St. Petersburg's and San Diego's bargaining officials when they were each confronted with the prospect of negotiating with Teamsters' negotiators.

Many police officers share the public's displeasure over the affiliation of police employee organizations with labor unions. Moreover, these less militant officers raise additional concerns over this recent trend. Utmost among

these concerns is the belief that the police are members of a profession and should therefore maintain a professional organization that is not affiliated with general laborers.

There are many definitions of a profession. The following definition by former United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis best distinguishes a profession from other occupations:

> FIRST: A profession is an occupation for which the necessary preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill.
>
> SECOND: It is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for one's self.
>
> THIRD: It is an occupation in which the amount of financial return is not the accepted measure of success.[36]

Those law enforcement officers who feel their occupation qualifies as a profession are likely to confine their employee organizations to police associations. Police association advocates also claim that only policemen desire to help other policemen. In other words, a labor union with thousands of general laborers as members, spread across the country, can hardly be concerned with the affairs of a 20-officer police force in southern Illinois. This unsubstantiated claim is reinforced by the group cohesion that exists naturally among policemen.

Lastly, one of the responsibilities of a police officer during an organized strike is to ensure that the strike is

conducted in a peaceful fashion; that is, without harm to person or property regardless of whether the person is aligned with management or labor, or if the property is owned by management or labor. Furthermore, the police ensure that those employees desiring to work can do so without being harmed by other striking employees. This delicate role for the police officer may be jeopardized by the police officer's affiliation with a trade or craft union, possibly the same union that is representing the striking employees. How will a police officer respond if a striker commits an act that would likely result in his or her arrest when the striker and the police officer are members of the same union, especially if the striker's local union chapter actively supported the police officer's local during the police officer's latest contract negotiations?

The concerns raised by both the public and many police officers are quite valid. Considering these concerns in light of the recent trend toward police affiliation with large craft and industrial labor unions makes it necessary to ask: Are the labor unions making greater gains at the bargaining table than police unions; and, if so, are these gains significant enough to ignore the above concerns?

End Notes

[1]Tim Bornstein, "Police Unions: Dispelling the Ghost of 1919," Police Magazine I, no. 4 (September 1978): 26.

[2]Henry A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 13.

[3]Robert D. Lee, Jr., Public Personnel Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1979), pp. 15-16.

[4]Juris and Feuille, p. 15.

[5]Bornstein, p. 26.

[6]Robert O'Block, "The Movement for Police Unionization," The Police Chief XLV, no. 6 (June 1978): 56.

[7]Juris and Feuille, p. 16.

[8]Bornstein, p. 26.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Juris and Feuille, p. 16.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Charles W. Maddox, Collective Bargaining in Law Enforcement (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), p. 9.

[13]Gerda Ray, "Police Militancy," Crime and Social Justice (Spring-Summer 1977): p. 42.

[14]Bornstein, p. 26.

[15]O'Block, p. 57.

[16]Maddox, p. 10.

[17]Ray, p. 47.

[18]Bornstein, p. 27.

[19]Juris and Feuille, p. 16.

[20]Ray, p. 42.

[21]Ibid., p. 43.

[22]Thomas A. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1980), p. 27.

[23]Ibid., p. 65.

[24]Maddox, p. 13.

[25]Ibid.

[26]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Governments III, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 2.

[27]Bornstein, p. 27.

[28]Allen D. Frank, "The Wages of Frustration: When All Else Fails, Call the Teamsters," Police Magazine 1, no. 4 (September 1978): 24.

[29]U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 51.

[30]Frank, p. 22.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Erdwin H. Pfuhl, Jr., "Police Strikes and Conventional Crime," Criminology 21, no. 4 (November 1983): 498.

[34]"Excerpts from Gov. Earl's News Conference on Mediation-Arbitration and Public Employee Strikes," Wisconsin Police Journal 10, no. 1 (January 1984): 1.

[35]Steven A. Rynecki, Douglas A. Cairns, and Donald J. Cairns, Police Collective Bargaining Agreements: A National Management Survey (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1978), p. v.

[36]Maddox, p. 130.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF UNION AFFILIATION ON POLICE COMPENSATION

The last chapter has shown that the affiliation of police with large craft and industrial labor unions has certain ramifications for the police and the public whom they serve. Some of these included: affiliating with a labor organization that is infamous for its association with organized crime; placing the good will most policemen have established with the public in jeopardy by affiliating with national labor unions when the public is not supportive of such an alliance; and, lastly, requiring many policemen to compromise their belief that police work is a profession rather than an occupation.

In light of the above issues facing the police and the public, it is necessary to determine if the large craft and industrial labor unions are earning more compensation for their police affiliates than local and state police organizations are winning for themselves. If the large craft and industrial labor unions are not winning a much better contract for police than the police are winning for themselves, it would obviously be an unwise decision for a police employee organization to affiliate with a large labor union.

Procedure

The study undertaken here relied upon a questionnaire that solicited basic information concerning unionization, salaries and fringe benefits from a sample of midwest police departments. (A copy of this questionnaire and its accompanying cover letter are provided in the appendix.) The questionnaires were mailed to all police departments in municipalities with populations between 5,500 and 10,000 people in the three states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. A random sample of the police departments in this population range was not attempted for the following reasons:

(1) The union affiliation of the various police departments could not be determined prior to the return of the questionnaires. Therefore, if a random sample had been attempted, it is possible that the random selection of the departments would have resulted in no representation of some police employee organization affiliates.

(2) This study depended upon the cooperation of the police departments in the targeted population groups to properly complete and return the questionnaires. Since substantially less than 100 percent of the targeted population

group was expected to cooperate, the study had to target as many departments as possible.

(3) By attempting to study the entire population of departments within the targeted population size, the study omits a complicated statistical analysis of the results which would normally be necessary in order to determine if the results gained from the random sample could be due to chance.

Police departments representing populations anywhere between 5,500 and 10,000 people were targeted by this study in order to eliminate the effect that a large industrial city of 100,000 or a million people would have in the results of this study. Cities of this magnitude have a much larger tax base from which to draw police salaries and, more importantly, there are very few of these cities to compare. Likewise, cities below 5,500 in population were also not included in this study. These cities could have had an adverse effect upon the results of the study in that they may not have had a police department. Furthermore, it would not be likely to find a one or two man police department with an employee organization, or to expect an employee organization representing a one or two policeman department to have much impact on the policemen's wages.

This study also restricted the population size of the cities in order to control the expense of mailing the questionnaires. It should be noted that each questionnaire was mailed along with a return addressed and stamped envelope. This procedure was partially responsible for the willing participation of most of the police departments within the targeted population size.

Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin were selected as the states from which to draw the police departments that represented the targeted population size. This study confined its interest to these three states for several reasons. First, additional states would have greatly increased the expense of the study, while the three states selected provided ample opportunity for interstate comparison. Secondly, the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin are all located in the midwest, which prevents this study from being adversely affected by regional differences. Third, Frank indicates that the Teamsters are particularly strong in Michigan.[1] Since the premise of this study is that large labor unions provide a "sweeter" contract for police than state or local police employee organizations provide for themselves, it was appropriate to target an area where large labor unions were popular.

Lastly, the individual responsible for the study undertaken here is himself a police officer in the state of Wisconsin. The results of this study would therefore have

the most meaning and hold the most interest for him because they are derived from a region with which he is most familiar.

With the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin selected, and the police departments representing cities with populations between 5,500 and 10,000 targeted,[2] the next step was to actually identify the cities and mail the questionnaires to the respective police departments. The 150 cities within the designated population range were located in The National Directory.[3] Each questionnaire was subsequently sent directly to the Chief of Police and 64 percent of them were returned.

The next step was to gather the returned questionnaires and analyze the data. However, before presenting the results of this analysis, it is necessary to first discuss some of this study's shortcomings. First, there are several variables that may influence police salaries besides unionization. Kearney and Morgan found that crime rates, population size, and the present wage for the private sector were also determinants of police wages.[4] This study did not research the crime rate or the present wage for the private service sector of the cities selected in the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. However, the study did seek to compare only cities of similar population sizes within a specific geographical area. Therefore, the cities selected among the three aforementioned states should be

homogeneous enough to offset the effect of the other variables mentioned by Kearney and Morgan.

Secondly, this study compared the weekly wages of patrolmen in order to determine the quality of their contracts. Monetary compensation is, of course, an important issue in contract negotiations; however, it is necessary to note that a police contract involves many other provisions that would be difficult to compare on a dollars-and-cents basis. In other words, it is possible that some of the responding police departments that had low weekly wages may have had another provision in their particular contract that, in their estimation, was more important than an increase in monetary compensation.

Although the aforementioned shortcomings do cast shadows on the results of this study, they do not negate the results entirely. However, without an understanding of the shortcomings, the results that are presented in the following section would not be viewed in their proper perspective.

Results

The following table, Table 1, reflects the distribution of the 150 questionnaires among the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Of course, the number of questionnaires mailed to each state was determined by the number of cities within the established population parameters.

Table 1. Distribution and Return of Questionnaires.

State	Number Mailed	Number Returned	Percentage Returned
Illinois	63	41	65
Michigan	48	29	60
Wisconsin	39	26	67
Total	150	96	64

A solid majority, 64%, of the targeted 150 police departments returned completed questionnaires. Furthermore, many of the responding police departments expressed opinions on this subject matter even though their opinions were not specifically requested.

The next step in the examination of the returned questionnaires was to determine which employee organizations were represented in each of the three respective states. Table 2 reflects the type of affiliation for employee organizations represented in the returned questionnaires from the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

In Table 2, police employee organizations that were either locally organized or affiliated with a statewide police employee organization were grouped under the Local/State heading. Those police employee organizations that were affiliated with craft or industrial labor unions were grouped under the Craft/Industrial heading. Because the

Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) was a frequently listed police employee organization on the returned questionnaires, Table 2 provided a special heading for employee organizations affiliated with this organization. The last group,

Table 2. Type of Affiliation of Employee Organizations of Responding Police Departments.

Type of Affiliation	Number of Departments	Percentage
Illinois:		
Local/State	4	10
Craft/Industrial	3	7
Fraternal Order of Police	6	15
No Employee Organization	28	68
Total	41	100
Michigan:		
Local/State	5	17
Craft/Industrial	10	34
Fraternal Order of Police	13	45
No Employee Organization	1	3
Total	29	99*
Wisconsin:		
Local/State	19	73
Craft/Industrial	6	23
Fraternal Order of Police	0	0
No Employee Organization	1	4
Total	26	100

*Because component percentage figures are given to the nearest whole number, it is not always possible for their sum to equal 100%.

No Employee Organization, represents those police departments that have no organization to represent their respective police employees.

It is interesting to note that 68% of responding police departments from the state of Illinois report that they do not have an organization that represents police employees. On the other hand, in the states of Michigan and Wisconsin, only 3% and 4% of their responding police departments, respectively, claim to not have an organization to represent police employees. According to the 1977 Census of Governments, the most recent statistics available, 54% of all full-time police employees belong to an employee organization.[5] It would appear that the state of Illinois is behind the national average and the states of Michigan and Wisconsin are far ahead of the national average; however, it should be noted that the 1977 Census of Governments does include police departments that represent much larger cities than are under observation here.

Now that the distribution of the returned questionnaires has been examined, it is necessary to discuss the monetary compensation gained through the collective bargaining process by each of the various employee organizations. This discussion is based upon the information provided by responding police departments from the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The starting weekly wage of a patrolman and the maximum weekly wage of a

patrolman were the two indices utilized in this study to compare the monetary compensation that various police employee organizations achieved through the collective bargaining process. Of course, as was previously shown in Table 1 for the state of Illinois, some police departments do not have police employee organizations and this provides an interesting basis for comparison with the departments that are organized.

Table 3 displays the mean weekly wage for the starting patrolman and the mean weekly maximum wage for the patrolman.

The results from the state of Illinois appear to support the notion that contracts won by large labor unions are better than those won by local or state police organizations. The craft and/or industrial unions were successful in achieving greater monetary compensation for both indices in the state of Illinois. Moreover, the disparity between those police employee organizations either locally affiliated or affiliated with a statewide police employee organization and those police employee organizations affiliated with either a craft or industrial union was $18.00 for the starting weekly wage and $26.00 for the maximum weekly wage. Although this disparity appears substantial, it is not as significant as the disparity between the local and/or state affiliates and those departments without an employee organization. Here the disparity

was $13.00 and $40.00, respectively, for the two indices. The FOP achieves the greatest monetary compensation for its affiliates in the state of Illinois. Furthermore, the mean maximum wage shown for the FOP in Illinois was the highest among the three states.

Table 3. Comparison of Weekly Wages for Patrolmen in Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

Type of Affiliation	Starting Wage	Maximum Wage	N
Illinois (Least Organized):			
No Employee Organization	$317	$426	28
Local/State	304	386	4
Fraternal Order of Police	371	479	6
Craft/Industrial	323	412	3
Wisconsin (Medium):			
No Employee Organization	$240	$277	1
Local/State	362	419	19
Fraternal Order of Police	N/A	N/A	0
Craft/Industrial	343	387	6
Michigan (Most Organized):			
No Employee Organization	$357	$487	1
Local/State	387	468	5
Fraternal Order of Police	328	426	13
Craft/Industrial	310	387	10

The results from the states of Michigan and Wisconsin conflict sharply with the results from the state of Illinois and do not support the notion that contracts won by large

labor unions are better than those won by local or state police organizations. The highest mean starting wages and mean maximum wages for the states of Michigan and Wisconsin were achieved by local and state police organizations. The disparity between local and state police organizations and craft and industrial affiliated police organizations in Michigan and Wisconsin was substantial. The starting weekly wage for a policeman affiliated with a craft or industrial labor union in Michigan was $77.00 lower than his or her counterpart who was affiliated with a local or state police organization. This disparity increased to $81.00 for patrolmen earning the maximum wage in the state of Michigan. The FOP was associated with a higher starting wage and a higher maximum wage than the craft and industrial police union affiliates. The differences here were $18.00 and $38.00 for the two indices, respectively. However, the FOP was substantially behind local and state police organizations with a starting weekly wage difference of $58.00 and a maximum weekly wage difference of $42.00.

The results from the State of Wisconsin indicated that the starting weekly wage was only $19.00 higher for local or state police organizations than for craft or industrial affiliated police organizations. Likewise, local and state police organizations earned on the average $31 for their senior patrolmen over what craft and industrial labor unions achieved for their senior policemen affiliates.

Whereas it appears that this study did disprove the notion that contracts won for police by large craft or industrial labor unions were any sweeter than those contracts won by local or state police organizations for small cities in two of the three states examined, it must again be stressed that this finding was based solely upon monetary compensation; and monetary compensation provides only a partial picture of a police contract. Furthermore, other variables that have been found to influence police compensation were somewhat ignored in conducting this study. However, these shortcomings do not entirely negate the above findings.

End Notes

[1]Allen D. Frank, "The Wages of Frustration: When All Else Fails, Call the Teamsters," Police Magazine 1, no. 4 (September 1978): 22.

[2]"U.S. Population -- Places of 5,000 or More with Zip and Area Codes," The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1980 (New York: Newspaper Enterprises Association, Inc., 1980).

[3]The National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators and Correctional Institutions (Milwaukee: The National Police Chiefs and Sheriffs Information Bureau, 1980).

[4]Richard C. Kearney and David R. Morgan, "The Effect of Employee Organizations on the Compensation of Police Officers," Journal of Collective Negotiations 9, no. 1 (1980): 25.

[5]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Governments 3, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 2.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This research project has fulfilled two objectives. The first objective was to explore the issues surrounding the affiliation of police with the labor union movement--the controversial trend in law enforcement that affects both the police and the public whom they serve. The second objective involved an actual comparison of police wages in order to prove or disprove the premise that large craft or industrial labor unions are winning a better or "sweeter" contract for police than local or state police organizations are winning for themselves.

The discussion of the controversial issues involved with police and labor union affiliation was preceded by a historical accounting of the police union movement. The history of the police union movement provided the background that was necessary in order to place the issue of police and labor union affiliation in the proper perspective. It was shown that the Boston Police Strike of 1919 resulted from an early attempt of police to align themselves with the labor union movement. Furthermore, this early attempt had disastrous ramifications for the police union movement. In

fact, the ghost created by this event still haunts the police union movement today.

The historical perspective on police union affiliation was preceded by a discussion of collective bargaining. One of the main impetuses for unionization in the public sector has been the advent of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining was first enjoyed by workers in the private sector. When public sector employees observed their private sector counterparts receiving significant gains in wages and fringe benefits through collective bargaining, public sector employees began to seek the ability to bargain with management over such issues as wages and benefits.

It was shown that collective bargaining is a process of shared decision making. In other words, management can no longer make unilateral decisions when the employees have organized, elected representatives, and gained protection through collective bargaining legislation. This process of shared decision making has many implications for the public sector, especially in reference to law enforcement. This is easily understood because management in the public sector consists of individuals who are either elected or appointed to serve the public, and once these individuals lose their ability to act unilaterally, the public has subsequently lost a degree of control over its services.

With a detailed history of the police union movement, and the implications of collective bargaining in law

enforcement established, a discussion of the controversies surrounding the affiliation of police with the labor union movement was presented. This discussion identified the concerns raised by both the public and police over this issue. The public stands to lose control over its law enforcement services to the labor and craft unions. This is disturbing because of the fear of such job actions as "blue flu" and strikes. Moreover, the Teamsters Union, which has been very active in organizing policemen with the labor union movement, has a well deserved reputation of being corrupt and influenced by organized crime.

Besides the objections raised on behalf of the public, some police have themselves voiced opposition to the affiliation of police with the labor union movement. These policemen feel that only policemen really care about and understand the concerns of policemen. Furthermore, police opposing this trend believe that they are professionals, and as professionals they should confine the membership of these employee organizations to only policemen.

Tighter municipal budgets and employee layoffs have forced many police employee organizations to seek affiliation with one of the large craft or labor unions. These police employee organizations hope that the large craft and industrial labor unions will provide more muscle at the bargaining table.

The study undertaken here focused on the premise that large craft and industrial labor unions will win a better contract for police than state and local police organizations win for themselves. Police departments representing cities with populations between 5,500 and 10,000 within the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin were selected to determine if the premise was correct.

These police departments were sent questionnaires that solicited information concerning wages and fringe benefits. Only the weekly wage for a starting patrolman and the weekly wage for the highest paid patrolman were utilized for comparison purposes. This comparison revealed that only in the state of Illinois did policemen that affiliated with large craft or industrial unions fare better than local or state police organizations. Interestingly enough, even those police departments that were not organized, and did not participate in collective bargaining within the state of Illinois, fared better than local or state police organizations.

Although two of the three states failed to support the premise that large craft and industrial unions win a better contract for police than state or local police organizations, it was necessary to point out that police contracts cover a variety of issues besides simply wages. In other words, some of the responding police departments that indicated low weekly wages may have had some type of fringe

benefit in their contract that would compensate for the low weekly wage.

In light of the issues surrounding police affiliation with craft and industrial labor unions, and the observation that only one state out of three reflected higher weekly wages for policemen affiliated with the craft and industrial labor unions, the decision to affiliate with a craft or industrial labor union would not likely be in the best interests of policemen. Lastly, those policemen who are presently unorganized should organize and bargain collectively with their employers. This study has shown that police employee organizations that participate in collective bargaining receive a higher weekly wage than those that do not participate in collective bargaining.

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APPENDIX

COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE

1601 College Avenue, Racine, Wisconsin 53403
(414) 637-5041

May 23, 1984

I am a patrolman with the Racine Police Department and a graduate student at Montana State University. In order to fulfill the requirement for the degree of Master in Public Administration, I must complete a thesis and to do so, I need your assistance.

Attached is a questionnaire that requests information on police compensation and police union affiliation. The information you provide will be used to determine what effect, if any, trade union affiliation has upon police compensation.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance in my project by completing the questionnaire and returning it in the enclosed envelope.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Kurt S. Wahlen

Enclosures

QUESTIONNAIRE

(1) Does your Police Department have an organization that represents police employees? (yes or no) _____

(2) What is the name of this organization? _____
_____

(3) Does this organization conduct formal contract negotiations with the city? (yes or no) _____

(4) Is this organization affiliated with a trade union? (yes or no) _____

If so, which one? _____

(5) What is the entrance salary for a police patrolman? (40 hr./wk.) _____

(6) What is the maximum salary for a police patrolman? (40 hr./wk.) _____

(7) What monetary fringe benefits, such as retirement, health insurance, life insurance, dental insurance, etc., does the city provide and how much does each of these contributions cost the city for an individual police employee per year?

(a) Retirement _____

(b) Health Insurance _____

(c) Life Insurance _____

(d) Dental Insurance _____

(e) Educational Incentive Pay _____

(f) _____ _____

(g) _____ _____

(8) What is the mean or average weekly salary for a police employee? _____