

Terror attacks and election outcomes in Europe, 1970–2017

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TERROR ATTACKS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES IN EUROPE, 1970-2017

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ABSTRACT

With only a few exceptions, previous studies on terror attacks and election outcomes have focused on a particular country or attack, limiting their generalizability. We use data on 393 legislative elections held in 39 European countries during the period 1970-2017 to estimate the effects of terror attacks on election outcomes. Terror attacks occurring shortly before an election are associated with an increase in an index of nationalist vote share.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Terror attacks are intended to influence public opinion and political outcomes, but experts are still debating their effectiveness. Previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and voting behavior have typically focused on a particular country or event, limiting the generalizability of their results.

This study explores the effects of terror attacks on 393 legislative elections held in 39 European countries during the period 1970-2017. Using data from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), we construct novel measures of party nationalism and position on the left-right spectrum. We find that terror attacks occurring shortly before an election are associated with an increase in an index of nationalist vote share. International attacks (i.e., attacks in which the perpetrating group crossed a national border) and attacks perpetrated by Islamic groups appear to be especially effective. Although our estimates provide evidence that terror attacks stoke nationalistic sentiment, they are not large enough to explain the increased support for populist/nationalistic parties since the early 2000s.

2. PREVIOUS STUDIES

The Madrid train bombings in March of 2004 have received a fair amount of attention from previous researchers. The results have, however, been inconclusive. Bali (2007) and Montalvo (2011, 2012) found that the bombings shifted votes towards the opposition, while Lago and Montero (2006) concluded that the bombings did not change “the electoral preferences of Spaniards” (p. 22).

Several studies have concluded that terror attacks increase support for right-wing parties. Berrebi and Klor (2008) and Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) provide evidence that terror attacks increase the vote share of right-wing parties in Israeli elections. Kibris (2010) examined the

effects terror attacks carried out by the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party) on the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general elections. Kibris (2010) found a strong positive association between casualties suffered by security forces and the vote share received by right-wing parties.

Gassebner et al. (2008), who analyzed elections in 115 countries, found that terror attacks increased the likelihood of the incumbent government being replaced, while Balcells and Torrats-Espinosà (2018) found that attacks carried out by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) had no appreciable impact on self-reported support for the incumbent party. Using data from Spain for the period 1977-2008, Falcó-Gimeno (2021) found that terrorist attacks that occurred immediately before national elections benefited incumbents.

Abrahms (2006) examined the histories of every foreign terrorist organization (FTO), as designated by the U.S. Department of State. He found that FTOs achieved their political goals only 7 percent of the time. Baccini et al. (2021) reached a similar conclusion using data from the United States for the period 1970-2016. Comparing failed terror attacks as a comparison, Baccini et al. (2021) found that successful attacks had no appreciable effects on presidential or non-presidential elections.¹

3. TERROR ATTACKS IN EUROPE: DATA AND TRENDS

Information on terror attacks conducted on European soil during the period 1970-2017 comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). We observe the date of each terror attack, its location, and the responsible group.

¹ See also Geys and Hernæs (2021) and Bove et al. (2021). Other studies estimate the effects of terror attacks on political attitudes as opposed to election outcomes. See Peri et al. (2021) for a brief review of these studies.

Over the past decade and a half, terror attacks have surged in the 39 European countries that contributed data to our analysis (Figure 1).² Specifically, there were 86 terror attacks recorded by the GTD in 2004; by 2017, that number had increased to 541. This surge in terror attacks reflects a worldwide trend (Ahern 2018) and has been cited as evidence that the “international war on terror” is failing (Thrall and Goepner 2017, p. 2). Of the 22,804 terror attacks in our data, 1,810 were designated as “logistically international” by the GTD.

4. TERROR ATTACKS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES

As noted above, data on election outcomes come from the MPD, which contains detailed information on the platforms (i.e., “manifestos”) of political parties in Europe and elsewhere. Specifically, based on these manifestos, the MPD categorizes 56 different political positions relating to economic, social and foreign policies as well as democracy and human rights. It also contains vote shares for each party that published a manifesto in each legislative election.

Our analysis pertains to the 39 European countries included in the MPD.³ Manifesto information for 780 European political parties is available for the period 1970-2017. We begin by estimating the following regression model, which is at the legislative election level:

$$(1) \quad y_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(\text{Attack } 0\text{-}30 \text{ Days}_{ct}) + \alpha_2(\text{Attack } 31\text{-}60 \text{ Days}_{ct}) + \mathbf{X}_{ct}\boldsymbol{\beta} + v_c + \lambda_t + \Theta_c \cdot t + u_{ct}$$

² Appendix Table A1 lists these countries and the number of elections.

³ Appendix Table A1 lists these countries and the number of elections in the sample for each. See Appendix Table A2 for descriptive statistics and Table A3 for a list of terrorist groups that committed at least one attack 0-60 days before a legislative election in our sample.

where c indexes countries, t indexes election years, and y_{ct} is one of two election outcomes based on the MPD data. These two outcomes are:

1. *Nationalist vote share index*, equal to the percentage of nationalist sentences in each party's manifesto weighted by its vote share in a given election.⁴ This weighed average is transformed into a z-score with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
2. *Left-right voting index*, intended to gauge whether terror attacks affect the success of political parties along the traditional left-right spectrum. The MPD does not measure left-right positions, but the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), a quadrennial survey of European political parties, provides a measure of each party's overall positions on the left-right spectrum ranging from 0-10, where 10 represents the extreme right. We use the CHES data to construct a left-right score for all parties in the MPD data, which is then transformed into a z-score with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.⁵

Country fixed effects (ν_c) control for determinants of y_{ct} that were constant over time and year fixed effects (λ_t) control for common shocks to election outcomes across the European countries in our analysis. Country-specific linear time trends, represented by the term $\theta_c \cdot t$, account for the possibility that y_{ct} evolved at different rates in different countries. X_{ct} is a vector

⁴ Specifically, for each party-election combination, we calculate the percentage of sentences that, according to the MPD, negatively referred to international cooperation, positively referred to national independence or sovereignty, negatively referred to the European Community/Union or its policies, expressed support for established national ideas, made appeals to patriotism/nationalism or pride of citizenship, or argued that some freedoms should be suspended in order to protect the state. For each election, we then calculate nationalist sentence percentages, weighted by vote share:

$$\sum_i \text{Nationalist Percentage}_i * \text{Voteshare}_i,$$

where *Nationalist Percentage* is the percentage of nationalist sentences in party i 's election manifesto and *Voteshare* is party i 's vote share in the election.

⁵ The CHES only covers the period 1999-2014. We combine the CHES and MPD to construct a left-right index for the entire period under study. See Table A2 for details.

of controls for the country's urbanization rate and GDP growth rate in the year of the election.

Attack 0-30 Days_{ct} is an indicator for whether a terror attack occurred 0-30 days before an election and *Attack 31-60 Days_{ct}* is an indicator for whether an attack occurred 31-60 days before an election.

OLS estimates of α_1 and α_2 are reported in panel A of Table 1. The estimated effects of experiencing a terror attack 0-30 days before the election are positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. Experiencing an attack 31-60 days before the election is associated with a 0.297 standard deviation increase in the nationalist vote share index.

In panel B of Table 1, we report the results of modifying equation (1) to distinguish between international and domestic terror attacks. International attacks 0-30 days before an election are associated with a 0.537 standard deviation increase in the nationalist vote share index. They are also associated with a reduction (i.e., a leftwards shift) in the left-right voting index of 0.400 standard deviations (p-value = .083). Experiencing a domestic attack 31-60 days before the election is associated with a 0.367 standard deviation increase in the nationalist vote share index but is essentially unrelated to the left-right voting index.

Finally, we distinguish between terror attacks that were carried out by Islamic terrorist groups versus non-Islamic terrorist groups (Panel C, Table 1). Islamic terrorist groups that carried out attacks in our sample are shown in Appendix Table A3. Terror attacks carried out by Islamic terrorist groups 31-60 days before an election are associated with 0.560 standard deviation increase in the nationalist vote share index (p-value = .070), while terror attacks carried out by non-Islamic terrorist groups 31-60 days before an election are associated with 0.266 standard deviation increase in this index (p-value = .053).⁶

⁶ The difference between these two estimates is not statistically significant. In Appendix B, we explore the effects of terror attacks that occurred more than 60 days before a legislative election.

Taken together, the results reported in Table 1 suggest that terror attacks--especially international terror attacks and those conducted by Islamic groups--benefit nationalistic parties. There is also evidence, albeit tentative, that international attacks shift voting leftwards on the political spectrum. This latter result may seem at odds with evidence that international attacks benefit nationalistic parties, but nationalist sentiment is not exclusive to right-wing parties. While the most extreme-right parties in our sample tend to be the most nationalistic, the election-level correlation between our nationalism and left-right indices is 0.40, indicating that much of the variation in nationalism is unexplained by the traditional left-right axis.

4.1. Can terror attacks explain nationalism trends in Europe?

In this subsection, we explore whether terror attacks occurring shortly before elections can explain the observed trends in our nationalist vote share index. Specifically, Appendix Figure A1 compares the actual mean of this index to its predicted value under the assumption of no terror attacks 0-60 days before elections.⁷ Under this assumption, predicted and actual nationalism are never far apart and, in fact, seem to move in tandem until the last three years examined, when there was a surge in both international and domestic attacks. During the period 2015-2017, we estimate that the nationalist vote share index was 23.1 percent higher than it

In addition, we explore the relationship between terror attacks and vote share going to extreme parties. The results provide little evidence of longer-run effects on the outcomes shown in Table 1, but it is important to note that attacks occurring shortly before an election could be systematically different from those that occur several months before an election along some unobservable, difficult-to-measure dimension.

⁷ Following Anderson et al. (2019), counterfactual predictions are constructed using estimates from our main regression specification and generating post-estimation predictions holding the international attack variables at zero.

would have been in the complete absence of terror attacks 0-60 days before an election, suggesting that the recent rise of nationalistic parties in Europe is being fueled by terror attacks but is not entirely explained by them.

5. CONCLUSION

Our study provides a multi-country examination of the effects of terror attacks on election outcomes. Most previous studies examining the relationship between terror attacks and elections have focused on a single event or country and, as a consequence, it is not clear whether their results are generalizable. We estimate the effects of terror attacks on voting behavior in 39 European countries and 393 elections over a period of several decades.

We find that terror attacks 0-60 days before an election are associated with an increase in a nationalist vote share index. International attacks and those perpetrated by Islamic terrorist groups are associated with the largest increases in this index. Although our estimates provide evidence that terror attacks fuel nationalistic sentiment, they are not large enough to explain the increased support for European populist/nationalistic political parties since the early 2000s.

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
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Figure 1. Domestic and International Terror Attack Trends, 1970-2017



Notes: Total numbers of international and domestic terror attacks occurring in countries that contributed data to our analysis are shown. Data for the period 1970-2017 on terror attacks comes from the Global Terrorism Database.

Table 1. Terror Attacks and Election Outcomes in the Short Run


	<i>Nationalist vote share index</i>	<i>Left-right voting index</i>
Panel A		
<i>Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.174 (.129)	.061 (.135)
<i>Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.297** (.114)	.148 (.164)
N = 393		
Panel B		
<i>International Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.537*** (.136)	-.400* (.224)
<i>International Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.071 (.242)	.107 (.230)
<i>Domestic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.080 (.137)	-.169 (.147)
<i>Domestic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.367*** (.103)	.121 (.174)
N = 393		
Panel C		
<i>Islamic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.269 (.218)	.158 (.228)
<i>Islamic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.560* (.300)	.084 (.503)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.152 (.140)	.098 (.143)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.266* (.133)	.172 (.174)
N = 381		
Country + year fixed effects	yes	yes
Country-specific linear trends	yes	yes
Mean of the dep. variable	0	0

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Notes: Based on data at the legislative election level for Europe during the period 1970-2017 obtained from the MPD. We report the results of a separate OLS regression in each column of the three panels. The dependent variables and controls are described in Appendix Table A2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Turkish elections are excluded from the Panel C analysis.

Appendix A. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

Appendix Figure A1. Predicted Nationalism Vote Share Index with no Terror Attacks 0-60 Days before Election vs. Actual Mean of Index



Notes: Predicted nationalism indices are calculated under the assumption that there are no international attacks. Regressions are based on data at the legislative election level for Europe during the period 1970-2017 obtained from the Manifesto Project Database.

Table A1. List of Election Sample Countries

Country	No. of elections in sample
Albania	5
Austria	15
BH	8
Belgium	14
Bulgaria	10
Croatia	9
Cyprus	5
Czech	9
Denmark	16
Estonia	7
Finland	12
France	10
Germany	13
Greece	16
Hungary	7
Iceland	14
Ireland	13
Italy	12
Latvia	7
Lithuania	7
Luxembourg	9
Macedonia	9
Malta	2
Moldova	6
Montenegro	9
Netherlands	15
Norway	10
Poland	6
Portugal	15
Romania	8
Serbia	10
Slovakia	9
Slovenia	8
Spain	12
Sweden	14
Switzerland	12
Turkey	12
UK	13
Ukraine	5

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean (SD)	Description
<i>Nationalist vote share index</i>	-0.003 (1.00)	See text for explanation.
<i>Left-right voting index</i>	0.0004 (1.00)	See text and the notes to this table for explanation. ^a
<i>Vote share to extreme parties</i>	15.16 (18.70)	Percentage of vote going to extreme parties. See Appendix B for extreme party definition.
<i>Attack</i>	0.23 (0.42)	= 1 if country experienced an international attack within a month prior to election, = 0 otherwise
<i>International Attack</i>	0.05 (0.21)	= 1 if country experienced an international attack within a month prior to election, = 0 otherwise
<i>Domestic Attack</i>	0.18 (0.39)	= 1 if country experienced a domestic attack within a month prior to election, = 0 otherwise
<i>Islamic Attack</i>	0.026 (0.160)	= 1 if country experienced an attack perpetrated by an Islamic terrorist group within a month prior to election, = 0 otherwise
<i>Non- Islamic Attacks</i>	0.186 (0.390)	= 1 if country experienced an attack perpetrated by a non-Islamic terrorist group within a month prior to election, = 0 otherwise
<i>Urbanization rate</i>	68.69 (13.58)	Percentage of population living in an urban area
<i>GDP Growth rate</i>	1.66 (5.75)	GDP growth rate the year of the election
N	393	

^a As noted in the text, we used the CHES data to construct a left-right score for all parties in the MPD data, which was then transformed into a z-score with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Because the CHES only covers the period 1999-2014, we combined the CHES and MPD to construct a left-right index for the entire period under study (1970-2017) by identifying the party-year combinations common to both datasets. Then, using the matched sample, we ran a calibrating regression of the left-right measure from the CHES on all 56 position variables in the MPD. The coefficients from this regression were used to calculate a left-right index for every party in the MPD going back to 1970.

Notes: Sample means are reported (with standard deviations in parentheses). Based on legislative election-level data obtained from the Manifesto Project Database for Europe, 1970-2017.

Table A3. Groups Responsible for Attacks

Name of Group	No. of attacks in sample	Islamic terror group
1 May	1	
28 May Armenian Organization	2	
A Resistance Group	1	
Abd al-Krim Commandos	2	yes
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	1	yes
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	1	yes
Al-Qaida	6	yes
Albanian National Army (ANA)	1	
Albanian extremists	1	
Anarchist Attack Consortium	1	
Anarchist Commando Nestor Makhno Group	1	
Anarchists	10	
Animal Rights extremists	1	
Anti-Authority Group (Greece)	2	
Anti-Imperialist International Brigades	2	
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)	1	
Anti-Iran Government Exiles	1	
Anti-Muslim extremists	2	
Anti-Semitic extremists	3	
Anti-Terrorism ETA (ATE)	1	
Arab Revolutionary Army	1	yes
Armed Communist Formations	2	
Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy	1	
Armed Proletarian Squads	1	
Armed Squads for Communism	1	
Armenian Group	1	
Armenian Red Army	1	
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	3	
Army of the Republic of Ilirida	2	
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	153	
Black September	1	yes
Breton Separatists	1	
Breton Terrorist	1	
Canary Islands Independence Movement	6	
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC)	1	
Cells for Solidarity Against Authority	1	
Combat Territory Groups	2	
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners	3	yes
Communist Combat Unit	1	
Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)	2	
Communist Nuclei of Counter Power	1	
Communist Territorial Nuclei	1	
Communists	4	
Conspiracy of Cells of Fire	1	
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	1	
Continuous Struggle	1	
Coordination of Anti-atomic Power Plant Saboteurs	1	

Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	40	
Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel	3	
Corsican Nationalists	4	
Democratic Iraqi Opposition of Germany	1	
Dev Sol	12	
Dissident Republicans	8	
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution	2	yes
Erotic Anti-authority Cells	1	
Extremists	1	
Fight Xenophobia	1	
Fire Group	3	
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	22	
Fuerza Nueva	1	
Group of Popular Fighters	1	
Guerrillas of Christ the King	1	
Gunmen	1	
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)	2	
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	6	
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)	2	
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	173	
Irrintzi	1	
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	9	yes
Jihadi-inspired extremists	4	yes
Kurdish Protestors	1	
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	172	
Kurds	4	
Left-Wing Demonstrators	1	
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	1	
Loyalists	4	
Mafia	3	
Mikhail Kaltezas Anarchist Organization	1	
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)	1	yes
Muslim extremists	1	yes
Neo-Fascist extremists	1	
Neo-Nazi extremists	7	
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)	2	
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)	2	
Oglaigh na hEireann	1	
Pessach Group	2	
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	2	yes
Popular Revolutionary Movement (Italy)	2	
Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement	1	
Pro-State Militiamen	1	
Proletarian Fighting Patrol	7	
Protestant extremists	14	
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	4	
Red Brigades	13	
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)	1	
Red Guerrilla	1	
Revolutionary Nuclei	1	
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP)	2	

Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)	16
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)	1
Revolutionary Solidarity	1
Revolutionary Struggle	2
Right-wing extremists	4
Rubicon (Rouvikonas)	1
Social Resistance	4
South Moluccans	2
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)	1
Spanish International Communist Party	1
Territorial Cells for Boycotting the Elections	1
Territorial Communist Command	1
The New Irish Republican Army	2
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	1
Turkish People's Liberation Army	2
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)	1
Turks	1
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)	30
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	15
Wild Individualities	2
Youths	1
Zero Tolerance	1
Unknown	473

Total	1352
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Note: This is a list of the terror groups that carried out at least one attack 0-60 days before an election used in our primary analysis, the results of which are reported in Panels A and B of Table 1.

Appendix B. EXPLORING OTHER EFFECTS OF TERROR ATTACKS

The purpose of Appendix B is twofold:

1. To examine the longer-run effects of terror attacks as measured by attacks occurring 61-150 days before a legislative election.
2. To introduce a new outcome, *Extremism Index*. This outcome is intended to gauge whether terror attacks benefit extremist political parties. To construct it, we defined “extreme parties” as those below the 10th percentile (extreme left) or above the 90th percentile (extreme right) on the left-right index described in Section 4. Then, for each election, we calculated the total vote share going to extreme parties.

The results are reported in Tables B1-B3, below. In Table B1, our focus is on terror attacks broadly defined. The estimated effects of terror attacks 0-60 days before an election on the nationalist vote share index and the left-right voting index are very similar to those reported in Table 1. There is, however, little evidence that terror attacks 0-60 days before an election affect the extremism index.

The long-run estimated effects of experiencing an attack (i.e., the estimated effects for 61-90 days before an election, 91-120 days before an election, and 121-150 days before an election) reported in Table B1 are statistically insignificant at conventional levels with only one exception: experiencing an attack 61-90 days before an election is associated with an 8.35 increase in the vote share going to extreme parties, which represents a 55.2 percent increase relative to the mean ($8.35/15.12 = 0.552$). Because there is little evidence that terror attacks closer to the election affect vote share going to extreme parties, we believe that this estimate should be interpreted cautiously if not skeptically.

In Table B2, we examine the long-run effects of international versus domestic attacks, and in Table B3 we examine the long-run effects of attacks carried out by Islamic terror groups versus those carried out by non-Islamic terror groups. International and Islamic attacks 61-90 days before an election are associated with substantial increases in the vote share going to extreme parties. We, however, believe that these results should be interpreted cautiously given that the estimated effects of international and Islamic attacks 0-60 days before an election on the extremism index are small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels.

Table B1. Terror Attacks and Election Outcomes in the Long Run

	<i>Nationalist vote share index</i>	<i>Left-right voting index</i>	<i>Extremism index</i>
<i>Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.185 (.144)	.096 (.121)	2.17 (2.27)
<i>Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.296** (.121)	.165 (.179)	2.24 (3.37)
<i>Attack 61-90 days before election</i>	.157 (.152)	-.133 (.225)	8.35*** (2.60)
<i>Attack 91-120 days before election</i>	-.083 (.092)	-.104 (.111)	1.80 (3.12)
<i>Attack 121-150 days before election</i>	-.144 (.123)	.058 (.154)	-1.60 (2.38)
Country + year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
Country-specific linear trends	yes	yes	yes
Mean of the dep. variable	0	0	15.12
N	393	393	393

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Notes: Based on data at the legislative election level for Europe during the period 1970-2017 obtained from the Manifesto Project Database. We report the results of a separate OLS regression in each column of the table. The dependent variables and controls are described in Appendix Table A2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level.

Table B2. International vs. Domestic Terror Attacks and Election Outcomes in the Long Run

	<i>Nationalism index</i>	<i>Left-right voting index</i>	<i>Extremism index</i>
<i>Domestic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.090 (.149)	.180 (.134)	3.288* (1.813)
<i>Domestic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.359*** (.112)	.157 (.186)	-.434 (1.921)
<i>Domestic Attack 61-90 days before election</i>	.255 (.168)	-.132 (.199)	3.986* (2.020)
<i>Domestic Attack 91-120 days before election</i>	-.074 (.100)	-.075 (.118)	-2.000 (2.196)
<i>Domestic Attack 121-150 days before election</i>	-.166 (.129)	.086 (.171)	-1.565 (2.511)
<i>International Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.631*** (.140)	-.368* (.210)	-1.483 (2.643)
<i>International Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.147 (.288)	.063 (.256)	4.107 (7.153)
<i>International Attack 61-90 days before election</i>	-.093 (.141)	-.248 (.458)	8.900** (3.922)
<i>International Attack 91-120 days before election</i>	-.249 (.171)	.105 (.159)	1.453 (6.153)
<i>International Attack 121-150 days before election</i>	-.023 (.142)	-.247 (.231)	1.627 (2.667)
Country + year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
Country-specific linear trends	yes	yes	yes
Mean of the dep. variable	0	0	15.12
N	393	393	393

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Notes: Based on data at the legislative election level for Europe during the period 1970-2017 obtained from the Manifesto Project Database. We report the results of a separate OLS regression in each column of the table. The dependent variables and controls are described in Appendix Table A2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level.

Table B3. Islamic vs. Non- Islamic Terror Attacks and Election Outcomes in the Long Run

	<i>Nationalist vote share index</i>	<i>Left-right voting index</i>	<i>Extremism index</i>
<i>Non-Islamic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.180 (.161)	.110 (.136)	1.061 (2.595)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.233 (.139)	.181 (.197)	3.410 (3.376)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 61-90 days before election</i>	.175 (.167)	-.158 (.256)	7.839** (3.215)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 91-120 days before election</i>	-.100 (.112)	-.049 (.109)	2.950 (2.733)
<i>Non- Islamic Attack 121-150 days before election</i>	-.135 (.139)	.105 (.174)	-.787 (3.090)
<i>Islamic Attack 0-30 days before election</i>	.389** (.190)	.119 (.190)	6.779 (4.438)
<i>Islamic Attack 31-60 days before election</i>	.516* (.297)	.223 (.543)	-5.912 (8.731)
<i>Islamic Attack 61-90 days before election</i>	-.347 (.278)	-.019 (.341)	11.170** (4.489)
<i>Islamic Attack 91-120 days before election</i>	-.120 (.296)	-.280 (.386)	-3.459 (10.994)
<i>Islamic Attack 121-150 days before election</i>	-.052 (.227)	-.379 (.393)	-3.556 (11.431)
Country + year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
Country-specific linear trends	yes	yes	yes
Mean of the dep. variable	0	0	15.51
N	381	381	381

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Notes: Based on data at the legislative election level for Europe during the period 1970-2017 obtained from the Manifesto Project Database. We report the results of a separate OLS regression in each column of the table. The dependent variables and controls are described in Appendix Table A2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Turkish elections are excluded from this analysis. Additional Islamic terror groups included in this analysis but not listed in Table B3 (i.e., groups that committed attacks between 61-150 days before a sample election) are as follows: Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Black September II, Palestinians, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

