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Item The influence of anxiety, age, and retrieval demands on memory(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2021) Whillock, Summer Rain; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Michelle L. MeadeThe present dissertation sought to determine if anxiety and hypervigilance can be activated outside the confines of specifically threatening stimuli by examining different situational pressures such as age and retrieval demands. In both experiments, participants studied categorized word lists and were randomly assigned to complete an initial recall test under free, forced, or warning (Exp. 2) recall instructions, followed by a second test under free recall instructions, and a final recognition test. For older adults, forced recall influenced the relationship between trait anxiety and memory such that heightened levels of trait anxiety were associated with greater correct recall and lower false recognition. In contrast, for younger adults, free recall influenced the relationship between memory-specific anxiety, hypervigilance, and memory such that heightened levels of memory-specific anxiety and hypervigilance were associated with lower levels of correct recognition. Further, warning recall influenced the relationship between memory-specific anxiety and memory in young adults, such that heightened levels of memory-specific anxiety were related to greater correct recall at test 1. Across two experiments, results show that it is possible for situational pressures to influence the relationship between anxiety and memory in the absence of specifically threatening stimuli. Additionally, the relationship between anxiety and memory depends on age, the type of anxiety being measured, and the retrieval demands of the task.Item The search for moderation: does anxiety enhance the unconscious thought advantage?(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2017) Whillock, Summer Rain; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Ian M. HandleyWhen people face a large amount of information on which to base a decision, common sense suggests that they should slowly and deliberatively think about that information. However, Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) suggests that a slow yet unconscious mechanism can process complex information and output decisions that rival, and perhaps exceed, the quality of decisions that result from deliberative thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). However, this idea is controversial and research into UTT reveals that an unconscious thought advantage (UTA) over conscious thinking is small and manifests unreliably (Nieuwenstein et al., 2015; Strick et al., 2011). The aim of this thesis was to identify and test a potential moderator of the UTA. Logically, situations that hinder conscious thought but leave unconscious thought relatively unaffected should enhance the UTA. The Attentional Control Theory (ACT) offers one such situation, that anxiety compromises conscious processes that rely upon attentional control and working memory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Because conscious thought relies heavily on working memory relative to unconscious thought, experiencing anxiety may lead the two thought processes to diverge. Specifically, anxiety should negatively influence conscious thought but not significantly influence unconscious thought. In the present study, participants viewed information about roommate candidates and made judgments after a period of either distraction or focused deliberation, while under calm or anxious conditions. Results did not support the hypothesis that the experience of anxiety would increase the UTA; participants performed comparably in the conscious thought and unconscious thought conditions. Further, participants in the conscious thought condition performed better under anxious compared to calm conditions. Exploratory analyses and future directions are discussed.Item Assessment of Unconscious Decision Aids Applied to Complex Patient-Centered Medical Decisions(2015-02) Manigault, Andrew Wilhelm; Handley, Ian Michael; Whillock, Summer Rain"Background: To improve patient health, recent research urges for medical decision aids that are designed to enhance the effectiveness of specific medically related decisions. Many such decisions involve complex information, and decision aids that independently use deliberative (analytical and slower) or intuitive (more affective and automatic) cognitive processes for such decisions result in suboptimal decisions. Unconscious thought can arguably use both intuitive and deliberative (slow and analytic) processes, and this combination may further benefit complex patient (or practitioner) decisions as medical decision aids. Indeed, mounting research demonstrates that individuals render better decisions generally if they are distracted from thinking consciously about complex information after it is presented (but can think unconsciously), relative to thinking about that information consciously or not at all. Objective: The current research tested whether the benefits of unconscious thought processes can be replicated using an Internet platform for a patient medical decision involving complex information. This research also explored the possibility that judgments reported after a period of unconscious thought are actually the result of a short period of conscious deliberation occurring during the decision report phase. Methods: A total of 173 participants in a Web-based experiment received information about four medical treatments, the best (worst) associated with mostly positive (negative) side-effects/attributes and the others with equal positive-negative ratios. Next, participants were either distracted for 3 minutes (unconscious thought), instructed to think about the information for 3 minutes (conscious thought), or moved directly to the decision task (immediate decision). Finally, participants reported their choice of, and attitudes toward, the treatments while experiencing high, low, or no cognitive load, which varied their ability to think consciously while reporting judgments. Cognitive load was manipulated by having participants memorize semi-random (high), line structured (low), or no dot patterns and recall these intermittently with their decision reports. Overall then, participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 (thought condition) by 3 (cognitive-load level) between-subjects design. Results: A logistic regression analysis indicated that the odds of participants choosing the best treatment were 2.25 times higher in the unconscious-thought condition compared to the immediate-decision condition (b=.81, Wald=4.32, P=.04, 95% CI 1.048-4.836), and 2.39 times greater compared to the conscious-thought condition (b=.87, Wald=4.87, P=.027, 95% CI 1.103-5.186). No difference was observed between the conscious-thought condition compared to the immediate-decision condition, and cognitive load manipulations did not affect choices or alter the above finding. Conclusions: This research demonstrates a plausible benefit of unconscious thinking as a decision aid for complex medical decisions, and represents the first use of unconscious thought processes as a patient-centered medical decision aid. Further, the quality of decisions reached unconsciously does not appear to be affected by the amount of cognitive load participants experienced.