THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF NATIONAL FOREST LANDSCAPES, NORTHERN ROCKIES, MONTANA by Matthew Neil Fockler A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Earth Sciences MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY Bozeman, Montana May 2014 ©COPYRIGHT by Matthew Neil Fockler 2014 All Rights Reserved DEDICATION For Mary, with all my love. Also for my parents, Neil and Ellen Fockler. And to Dr. Gary Hausladen, for believing I could do this. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are several people I’d like to thank and acknowledge. First, I wish to thank all of my committee members: Dr. William Wyckoff (chair), Dr. Timothy LeCain, Dr. Jian-Yi Liu, Stuart Challender M.L.A., and Dr. Phil Bruckner. I am especially grateful to Dr. Wyckoff. Over the past years he has been a gracious and generous advisor, a true mentor, and an example of how to do your work and live your life as a professional geographer. Thank you, Dr. Wyckoff, for countless hours of your time. Many Forest Service employees contributed to this project including Shandy Lemperle at R1, Tim Light at the Flathead, Sandra French at the Lewis and Clark, and Nancy Denning in Choteau. I would specifically like to thank Kelsey McCartney at the Lewis and Clark. I would like to acknowledge Ken House and Patty McNamee at the National Archives in Seattle and Cheryl Oakes and Steve Anderson at the Forest History Society in Durham, NC. Thank you to Swenson Geoscience crowd at Augustana College and Steve Anderson in Davenport, IA. Thank you to my MT friends - Brad Snow, Jerry Jessee, Andrew Johnson, Paul Sivitz, Ryan Scanlon, Yujian Wang, Xuejiao Lin, Todd and Tara Preston, Caitlyn Florentine, Dan and Beth Zizzamia, Mike Knell, Bryan Turner, Kelli Heck, Mel Baldwin, Mort Larsen, and the Michelfelders. To Steve Nicholas - soldier on. My family has had to make many sacrifices so I could pursue my dream. Thank you Mom, Christy, Erin, Ryan, Kris, Scott, Judy, Ralph, Ron, Cara, Gracie, Julie, Loren, Murph, and Max. Mary, you more than any other deserve recognition. You have sacrificed so much and given me limitless support. I don’t even know where to begin. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................1. GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT AND CONCEPTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1 ...................................................................................................................... Introduction 1 ........................................................................................................................ Objectives 4 .................................................................................................... Research Contributions 4 ................................................................................................................ Chapter Outline 7 ............................................................................................................................... Setting 9 ..................................................................................................Conceptual Framework 19 .............................................................................................Capitalism and Settlement 22 ..................................................................................... Federal Control and Modernity 28 .............................................................................................................. Defining Nature 31 .....................................................................................................................Conclusion 34 ..................................2. THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN FRONT - PREHISTORY TO 1897 36 Geology, Climate, Flora, Fauna, and Fire in the Rocky .............................................................................................................. Mountain Front 36 .......................................Native American Geographies of the Rocky Mountain Front 44 Early Anglo-American Exploration and Settlement of the ................................................................................................... Rocky Mountain Front 51 ......................................................................................................... The Federal Forest 80 ..................................................................................................................... Conclusion 90 3. ........................................THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1897 TO 1929 93 ....................................................................................................................Introduction 93 .................................................................... The General Land Office Era (1897-1905) 94 .......................................................................... Pinchot’s Forest Service (1905-1910) 102 ................................................................. Constructing National Forests (1910-1929) 114 Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain ........................................................................................................ Front (1897-1929) 122 Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark ........................................................................................ National Forest (1897-1929) 133 ....................................................Forest Boundaries and Administration (1897-1905) 134 .................................................... Forest Boundaries and Administration (1905-1910) 147 .................................................... Forest Boundaries and Administration (1910-1929) 163 .................................................................................................... Timber Management 198 .............................................................................. Grazing and Wildlife Management 218 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED .....................................................................Recreation and Wilderness Management 251 ........................................................................... Mining and Watershed Management 261 ...................................................................................................................Conclusion 267 4. ......................................THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1929 TO 1965 269 .................................................................................................................. Introduction 269 ...................... The United States Forest Service and Federal Expansion (1929-1965) 269 Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain ........................................................................................................ Front (1929-1965) 285 Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark National ....................................................................................................... Forest (1929-1965) 297 .................................................... Forest Boundaries and Administration (1929-1965) 298 .................................................................................................... Timber Management 341 ..............................................................................Grazing and Wildlife Management 357 ..................................................................... Recreation and Wilderness Management 379 ........................................................................... Mining and Watershed Management 422 ................................................................................................................... Conclusion 438 5. ......................................THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1965 TO 2000 441 .................................................................................................................. Introduction 441 The United States Forest Service and Ecosystem Management .................................................................................................................. (1965-2000) 442 Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain ........................................................................................................ Front (1965-2000) 457 Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark National ....................................................................................................... Forest (1965-2000) 465 .................................................... Forest Boundaries and Administration (1965-2000) 466 .................................................................................................... Timber Management 516 ..............................................................................Grazing and Wildlife Management 525 ..................................................................... Recreation and Wilderness Management 541 ........................................................................... Mining and Watershed Management 569 ................................................................................................................... Conclusion 583 6. ............................................................................................................CONCLUSION 585 ............................................... Landscape Change and the National Forest Imperative 586 v TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED .......................................................................................................................Boundaries 586 .........................................................................................................Administrative Sites 590 ...........................................................................................Road and Trail Infrastructure 591 .............................................................................................................Fire Management 596 ........................................................................................................Timber Management 601 ..................................................................................Grazing and Wildlife Management 606 .........................................................................Recreation and Wilderness Management 612 ...............................................................................Mining and Watershed Management 619 ...............................................“National Forest Management is a Never-Ending Game” 623 ....................................................................................................REFERENCES CITED 628 ..................................................................................................................APPENDICES 759 ...............................APPENDIX A: HGIS Methodology and Data Base Schema 760 APPENDIX B: Lewis & Clark National Forest Administrative ............................................................Sites and Fire Control Points, 1905-1910 764 APPENDIX C: Lewis & Clark National Forest Transportation ...................................................................................Improvements, 1905-1910 766 APPENDIX D: Lewis & Clark National Forest Administrative ............................................................Sites and Fire Control Points, 1905-1910 770 APPENDIX E: Lewis & Clark National Forest Transportation .............................................................................................Improvements, 1929 774 APPENDIX F: Lewis & Clark National Forest Transportation .............................................................................................Improvements, 1938 782 APPENDIX G: Lewis & Clark National Forest Administrative .....................................................................Sites and Fire Control Points, 1938 793 APPENDIX H: Lewis & Clark National Forest Transportation .............................................................................................Improvements, 1965 798 APPENDIX I: Lewis & Clark National Forest Administrative .....................................................................Sites and Fire Control Points, 1965 809 APPENDIX J: Lewis & Clark National Forest Administrative .....................................................................Sites and Fire Control Points, 1988 812 APPENDIX K: Lewis & Clark National Forest Transportation .............................................................................................Improvements, 1988 815 APPENDIX L: Lewis & Clark National Forest Recreation .............................................................................................Improvements, 2000 827 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page ...........................................................1-1. The Crown of the Continent Ecosystem 3 1-2. The Rocky Mountain Ranger District, Lewis and Clark National Forest ...................................................................................................... 10 ....................................................1-3. The Rocky Mountain Front transition zone 11 .....................1-4. Fold and thrust-belt topography of the Rocky Mountain Front 12 ........................1-5. Human settlement complexity in the Rocky Mountain Front 13 ...................1-6. Region 1 of the USFS and the Lewis and Clark National Forest 14 1-7. .......................................Hydrographic basins of the Rocky Mountain Front 15 ...............................1-8. Major creeks and rivers of the Two Medicine watershed 16 .............................................1-9. Major creeks and rivers of the Teton watershed 18 ...........................1-10. The Chinese Wall and Continental Divide at Rock Creek 19 ....................................1-11. Major creeks and rivers of the Sun River watershed 20 .....................................1-12. Major creeks and rivers of the Dearborn watershed 21 ........................................2-1. Undulating hills typical of Rocky Mountain Front 38 .........................................................2-2. Sign memorializing the Old North Trail 46 .........................................2-3. Paleoindian pictographs in the Sun River Canyon 49 ........................................................................................2-4. Ac Ko Mok Ki map 53 2-5. .................................................................A Map of Lewis and Clark’s Track 57 .....................2-6. 19th century western Montana trading posts and military forts 59 vii LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page ................................................2-7. 19th century trails and roads across Montana 63 2-8. Native American territory following the 1851 Ft. ......................................................................................................Laramie Treaty 70 ..............................................................2-9. Blackfoot Reservation land cessions 73 ..............................2-10. Land Grant of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company 74 ............................................................................2-11. Tie Hacker camp and road 77 ....................................................2-12. Rocky Mountain Front settlements, 1900 79 .....................................................2-13. 1897 “Washington’s Birthday Reserves” 86 .............................................2-14. The Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve, 1897 87 .........................3-1. United States Forest Service administrative districts, 1908 108 ...............................................3-2. The 1910 “Big Burn” on Forest Service land 118 ..................................................................................3-3. The Sun River Project 125 ...................................................................................3-4. Diversion Dam, 2012 126 ...........................3-5. The Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve timber inventory 136 ...........................3-6. Piegan woodcutter encampment, South Fork Teton River 138 .................................................3-7. Timber mill, South Fork of the Teton River 138 3-8. Transportation infrastructure, Lewis and Clark(e) ...........................................................................................Forest Reserve, 1899 144 .......................................3-9. The Lewis and Clark National Forest, 1905-1908 149 ................................................................................3-10. Ranger Districts, 1912 151 viii LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page ..............................................3-11. Administrative site withdrawals, 1905-1910 154 ...........................3-12. Transportation infrastructure improvements, 1905-1910 160 ..................3-13. Lewis and Clark National Forest boundary adjustments, 1916 165 .................3-14. Lewis and Clark extensive survey land classification example 168 ................................................3-15. Lands classified for intensive survey, 1916 170 ..................................................3-16. Game preserves, northern Montana, 1929 172 ..................3-17. The 1910 “Big Burn” in the Lewis and Clark National Forest 175 ....................................3-18. Transportation infrastructure improvements, 1912 180 ..........................................................................3-19. Telephone Network, 1912 182 .......................................................3-20. Administrative site withdrawals, 1929 186 ..................................................................3-21. Two Shacks winter camp, 1928 189 ............................................................3-22. Transportation infrastructure, 1929 192 .................................................................3-23. Devastation from the 1919 fires 194 .....................................................3-24. “Seen Area” study, Wrong Ridge, 1933 195 ..............................................................3-25. Fire control lookout system, 1929 197 ...................................................3-26. Sample timber sale, Muddy Creek, 1925 213 ..............................................3-27. USRS withdrawals and potential timber cut 216 ..................................................3-28. Bear and Ford creek experimental ranges 224 ............................................................3-29. Ford Creek corrals and scale, 1924 225 ix LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page .........................3-30. Portion of the Sun River cattle and horse allotment, 1915 227 ................................................3-31. Stock driveway bridge, Birch Creek, 1926 230 ...........................................................................3-32. Salting, Ford Creek, 1918 230 ...........................................................3-33. Recommended stock removal, 1911 235 .........................................................................3-34. Sun River elk survey, 1917 245 ........................................................3-35. Sun River elk herd survey map, 1928 245 ..........................................................3-36. Salting the Sun River elk herd, 1927 248 ..............................................................................3-37. Grazing potential, 1929 250 .......................................................................3-38. Recreation residences, 1929 258 3-39. ....................................................Kelley’s proposed primitive areas, 1929 260 ......................3-40. Mountain Chief and Chief of the Mountains mining claims 264 .......................................................................4-1. Ford Creek CCC camp, 1933 274 ...........................................................4-2. The Pick-Sloan plan, Missouri River 281 .........................................4-3. Roads created for seismographic oil exploration 294 ...........................4-4. Minutemen ballistic missile sites, Rocky Mountain Front 296 ...........................................4-5. Lewis and Clark National Forest consolidation 299 ..................................................................................4-6. Ranger Districts, 1932 300 ......................................4-7. Transportation infrastructure improvements, 1938 309 .............................................................................4-8. Telephone network, 1938 311 x LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page ............................................................................4-9. Administrative sites, 1938 314 ..............................................................4-10. Fire control lookout system, 1938 318 .....................................................................4-11. Forest Service airfields, 1938 321 ..................................................................................4-12. The Continental Unit 327 ............................................................4-13. Transportation infrastructure, 1965 332 4-14. Damaged or destroyed transportation infrastructure, ............................................................................................................1964 flood 334 .........................................4-15. North Fork Sun River trail rehabilitation, 1965 335 ...................................................................4-16. Gates Park airfield, 1964 flood 338 ..........................................................................4-17. Administrative sites, 1965 340 .................................................................4-18. Fire control infrastructure, 1965 342 4-19. ...........................Rocky Mountain Division timber working circles, 1948 350 ..............................................4-20. Tree planting, West Fork Jones Creek, 1957 354 ..........................................4-21. Teton cattle and horse management plan, 1932 362 4-22. Cooney report on potential Sun River elk herd ...............................................................................................winter range, 1940 370 ...........................................................................4-23. Sun River Game Preserve 376 ...........................4-24. Planned and developed summer recreation tracts, 1930s 383 ..........................................4-25. Wood Creek-Ford Creek recreation plan, 1935 390 ....................4-26. Summer recreation residences, Teton Recreation Area, 1965 396 xi LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page 4-27. Summer recreation residences, Sun River .........................................................................................Recreation Area, 1965 397 4-28. Summer recreation residences, Wood-Ford .................................................................................................Creek Area, 1965 397 .......................................................4-29. Public and packer campgrounds, 1965 400 ...........................................................4-30. Summit campground signage, 1962 401 ......................4-31. Sun River, South Fork, and Pentagon primitive areas, 1936 408 ........................4-32. Total Forest Service wilderness, primitive, and wild areas 413 ...........................................................................4-33. Lincoln backcountry area 420 ................................4-34. Lewis and Clark annual fish stocking program, 1939 428 .............................................................4-35. Wilson / Sun Butte reservoir, 1953 430 .....................4-36. Flood damage on the Middle Fork of the Teton River, 1964 436 ......................................................4-37. Bank stabilization at Benchmark, 1964 437 4-38. Gabions at Pretty Prairie in the Bob Marshall .................................................................................................Wilderness, 1964 437 ...........................................................................4-39. Sun Butte reservoir, 1964 438 .............................................5-1. Clearcutting on the Bitterroot National Forest 444 5-2. Rocky Mountain Front subdivisions and .......................................................................................conservancy sites, 2000 464 ...................................................5-3. Region 1 MUSY zone management, 1967 466 xii LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page 5-4. Rocky Mountain Front land management plan .................................................................................................alternatives, 1978 471 5-5. Rocky Mountain Front land management plan .......................................................................................recommendations, 1978 473 5-6. Management areas, Lewis and Clark National Forest ............................................................................................................plan, 1986 477 .................................5-7. Geographic areas, Lewis and Clark Forest plan, 1986 478 .............................................5-8. Proposed regional structure adjustment, 1973 485 ............................................................................5-9. Administrative sites, 1988 488 ...................................................5-10. Rocky Mountain Front travel plan, 1978 493 ....................................................5-11. Proposed and actual access points, 1981 495 ............................................................................5-12. Trailhead facilities, 1976 497 ............................................................5-13. Transportation infrastructure, 2000 498 ..........................................5-14. Lewis and Clark road management plan, 1986 500 ...........................................5-15. Lewis and Clark trail management plan, 1986 502 ...........................................................................5-16. Benchmark airfield, 1966 505 .................................................................5-17. Fire control infrastructure, 1988 507 ............................................5-18. Lewis and Clark fire management plan, 1986 510 .............................................5-19. Lewis and Clark fire prescription plan, 1986 511 .................................5-20. Gates Park and Canyon Creek fire perimeters, 1988 514 xiii LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page ..................................................5-21. Prescriptive burn, Mortimer Gulch, 1996 516 5-22. Exploitable timber bodies, Rocky Mountain Front plan, .....................................................................................................................1978 520 ........................................5-23. Lewis and Clark timber management plan,1986 523 ..................................................5-24. Timber salvage sale, Teton Canyon, 2010 524 ...............................5-25. Grazing allotments, Lewis and Clark National Forest 528 ........................................................5-26. Grizzly bear management units, 1990 536 .....................................5-27. Lewis and Clark wildlife management plan, 1986 540 ........................................5-28. Lewis and Clark range management plan, 1986 542 ......................................5-29. Outfitter camps, Bob Marshall Wilderness, 1974 546 ............................................................5-30. Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex 548 ...................................................................................5-31. RARE II study areas 550 ................................5-32. Lewis and Clark wilderness management plan, 1986 551 ..........................................................5-33. Lewis and Clark roadless plan, 2001 553 .........................................................................5-34. Benchmark recreation area 557 .................................................................5-35. Recreation improvements, 2000 558 .................................5-36. Lewis and Clark recreation management plan, 1986 564 .........................................5-37. Lewis and Clark recreation settings plan, 1986 566 .........................................5-38. Lewis and Clark visual quality objective, 1986 568 xiv LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page ....................................5-39. Rocky Mountain Front oil leases and wells, 1980s 574 ........................................5-40. Lewis and Clark mineral occupancy plan, 1986 576 ...........................................5-41. Fina and Chevron oil wells and infrastructure 577 .................................5-42. Lewis and Clark watershed management plan, 1986 582 ...............................................................................6-1. Boundary at Ford Creek 588 ......................................................................6-2. Scoutana private campground 589 ....................................6-3. Benchmark and Hannan Gulch administration sites 592 .................................................................6-4. Willow Creek administrative site 593 6-5. Lewis and Clark National Forest headquarters, ...................................................................................................Great Falls, MT 593 ..........................................................................6-6. Low and high priority trails 596 ....................................................................................6-7. The Benchmark road 597 ...................................................................6-8. Road closures, Teton watershed 597 ...............................................6-9. Fire legacy in the Rocky Mountain Division 598 ..............................................................................6-10. The Benchmark airfield 599 ........................................................................6-11. Fire landscape, Teton River 601 ...........................................................6-12. Unsuccessful terracing, Ford Creek 603 .................................................................6-13. Timber salvage, Fool Creek fire 604 ...............................................6-14. Firewood cutting at Mill Falls campground 605 xv LIST OF FIGURES - CONTINUED Figure Page .....................................................................................6-15. Bisbee sawmill site 606 .......................................................6-16. Sun River Wildlife Management Area 609 ............................................................................6-17. Cattle at Nilan Reservoir 609 ..........................................................................6-18. South Fork packer corrals 611 ..................................................................6-19. Rocky Mountain Front wildlife 612 .............................................................................6-20. Wood Lake campground 614 6-21. Summer homes, Mule Creek and Bureau of ...............................................................................................Reclamation tracts 615 .......................................................................................6-22. Elko campground 617 ..................................................................6-23. Winter sports area, Teton River 618 ..................................................6-24. Entrance to the Bob Marshall Wilderness 620 .......................................6-25. Private land oil development near Dupuyer, MT 621 .................................................................6-26. Irrigation watershed landscapes 626 ...................................................6-27. The Rocky Mountain Front Heritage Act 625 xvi ABSTRACT The United States Forest Service manages over 193 million acres of American public land. Management of these landscapes is often contentious. National forests have emerged as landscapes where conflicting ideas about nature and complex value systems are displayed in tangible ways. Current research concerning public lands of the American West has recognized the necessity of attaching material, social, and landscape changes to larger theoretical and cultural structures. This dissertation informs these dialogues by exploring national forest landscape change along the Rocky Mountain Front region of the Crown of the Continent ecosystem in north-central Montana. Using the current Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark National Forest as a case study, this research reconstructs landscape change associated with Forest Service management and connects these tangible landscape changes to larger national political, economic, and cultural drivers that shaped agency policies, the national economy, and American society. Furthermore, it explores how local forest users have influenced and shaped forest management and landscape change. In doing so, it draws parallels between these changes and larger American attitudes towards nature, suggesting in this process the role played by the national forests in that larger national narrative. Finally, this dissertation provides a methodology in which these place-based changes on the land can be stored and assessed within a historical geographic information systems (HGIS) database schema. By incorporating significant archival, landscape, and HGIS methodologies, this research finds that national forest landscapes are shaped by national and local cultural trends. The Forest Service has modified its management imperative to address these changes. National forest landscapes are therefore the result of a largely informal negotiation process between the Forest Service, other federal and state agencies and authorities, the public, and the natural world. National forest landscapes are shown to be meeting points where diverse and complex social relations and value systems are transferred to the landscape. This dissertation therefore provides a meaningful set of interpretive tools and a methodology for examining how America public land resources and the ecological world are valued and understood. xvii CHAPTER 1: GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Introduction United States national forests comprise 30 percent of the American West’s public lands. In many settings, they are hotly contested landscapes - often caught between competing interests that include natural resource industries, preservation and conservation advocates, and a general public that is often deeply divided about how best to utilize these lands. Management of these lands has become increasingly contentious in recent years. These conflicts stem from real disagreement about how public lands should be managed and, more generally, the larger role they should play in American society. Adding further complexity is the fact that nature itself is an active and unpredictable agent. National forests have emerged as landscapes where conflicting ideas about nature are displayed in tangible ways. Uncovering how these lands evolved over time, the forces that have contributed to their evolution, and the unique geographies that have been created in these settings is critical to understanding the American West’s past, present, and future (Clawson and Held 1983; Cawley 1993; Hirt 1994; Klyza 1996; Starrs 1998; Nie 2008; Hays 2009). This discourse is more pressing when placed in critical ecosystems that contain both protected wild places and utilitarian landscapes - such as in the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem. The Crown of the Continent Ecosystem covers approximately 1 16,000 square miles in Montana, Alberta and British Columbia and is a significant portion of the larger Yellowstone to Yukon ecosystem (Figure 1-1). As it contains Glacier National Park, Waterton Lakes National Park, and the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex, a complex and diversified ecology, and is divided by the Continental Divide, the Crown is a suitable region to study the role of federal land managers in a diverse, complex ecosystem (University of Montana Crown of the Continent Initiative 2009). In recent years there has been a call by historians, ecologists, and geographers to more closely integrate history and geography as well as to pursue a deeper and more rigorous theoretical understanding of the western American landscape. Such an integration will allow historians and geographers alike to, as William G. Robbins states, address “substance” rather than “shadow” by attaching material, social, and landscape changes to larger theoretical structures and therefore recast the settlement and development histories of the American West in a more “plausible and enduring” light (Robbins 1994, ix) (Meinig 1978, 1986; Worster 1985, 1990; Cronon 1987, 1991, 1995; Williams 1989; Conzen 1993; Robbins 1994, 1999; Baker 2003). This dissertation demonstrates that a historical geographic study of United States National Forest landscapes can provide frameworks for understanding the role of national forests and public land in the American West. It connects the national forests, surrounding communities, and bureaucratic entities associated with the Crown of the Continent ecosystem in northern Montana with broader economic, political and cultural trends shaping the United States. Specifically, it explores how national forest landscapes are 2 representative of those trends, how they are shaped by varied cultural and local drivers, and how they reflect the United States Forest Service’s mission to conserve forest resources and manage the natural world for utilitarian, scientifically informed use. It then describes how national forest land is negotiated and represents varied and often competing ideas on the use of nature. As all national forest landscapes are created 3 Figure 1-1: The Crown of the Continent Ecosystem. Map courtesy of the Crown Managers Partnership. through collaboration – with individuals, industry, and nature – any future management decisions must be made with a collaborative and negotiated agenda in mind. Objectives This dissertation has four objectives: 1) to reconstruct landscape change in the Rocky Mountain Front region of the Crown of the Continent to the year 2000. This research also reconstructs the local United States Forest Service policies and settlement geographies that shaped those changes; 2) to connect these tangible, local events and landscape changes to larger national political, economic, and cultural drivers that shaped Forest Service policies, the national economy, and American society during this period; 3) to draw parallels between these changes and larger American attitudes towards nature, suggesting in this process the role played by the national forests in that larger national narrative and; 4) to provide a methodology in which these place-based changes on the land can be stored and assessed within a historical geographic information systems (HGIS) framework. Research Contributions This dissertation examines the evolution of management practices within a large federal bureaucracy (the United States Forest Service) as it shaped a portion of the Rocky Mountain Front in northern Montana. Moreover, it details how the Forest Service utilized the principles of scientific management, the tools of modern technology, and the structure 4 of a growing federal bureaucracy to comprehend and control the landscapes within its borders. It sees these public lands managers as key participants in a process that translated local and national economic and political imperatives into concrete policies that in turn transformed the Montana landscape in ways adapted to meet public needs. As historical geography, this analysis also gives agency to social and ecological actors and thus it integrates the story of Forest Service management with the shaping power of both the natural world and the changing cultural ideas that defined that world over time. This dissertation contributes to the larger body of historical geography research, building on the works of D.W. Meinig (1972; 1986; 1993; 1995; 1998; 2004), Michael Williams (1989), William Wyckoff (1991; 1999; 2003), Lary Dilsaver (1990; 2005; 2009), Cole Harris (1991; 1997; 2008), Thomas Vale (1989; 2005), and Paul Starrs (1998) to view landscape change of public lands as a dynamic process reflective of larger drivers and value systems. This research assesses the material landscape changes associated with national forest management - the boundaries, infrastructure improvements, administrative posts, land use patterns, and other nodes and networks necessary for control - and ties them to larger cultural, political, and economic drivers in the American West. This research also explores how local drivers and environmental geographies have influenced management and public landscape change. In addition, this dissertation contributes to a larger body of environmental history and historical geography research that adds to research conducted by William Cronon (1987; 1991; 1995), Donald Worster (1985; 1990; 1993), William G. Robbins (1986; 5 1994; 1999), Nancy Langston (1995), William Wyckoff (1991; 1999; 2003), Cole Harris (1991; 1997; 2008), Tim LeCain (2009), Thomas Andrews (2008), and Richard White (1991a; 1991b; 1995) and proposes that there is a need to conduct historical geographic research that not only illuminates landscape patterns and features but also identifies the larger social and economic drivers that shape place. This study links particular change in landscape features and land use patterns in the Lewis and Clark National Forest with shifts in American resource capitalism, modernization, materialism, and environmentalism. Ultimately, this research assesses how the United States Forest Service has modified its management imperative to meet evolving economic, political, and social trends. This dissertation also contributes to the larger literature of public lands history, building on the works of Samuel Hays (1999; 2009), William Cronon (1990; 1991; 1996a; 1996b), Donald Worster (1985; 1990; 1993), Richard White (1985; 1991a; 1995; 1999), Mark Fiege (1999; 2005), Paul Hirt (1994), Nancy Langston (1995; 2003), and James Scott (1998). It explores the way in which federal public land managers frame the natural world through a process of simplification and science-based policy formation. As federal land managers pursued their management imperative - the belief that land is managed best when technology, standardization, and rigorous scientific research is applied to land resource problems by a professional cadre of experts - decisions became further removed from local settings. In many cases, this caused local users - and environments - to react, resulting in a formal and informal negotiation process that 6 transformed national forest landscapes. This research explores how federal foresters modified and transformed their imperative to fit a dynamic society, thereby sustaining their role as experts. Finally, this dissertation provides a case study for using historical geographic information systems in social science studies. In the past decade, HGIS has emerged as a distinct subfield of Geographic Information Science. HGIS is a data management tool that allows for the storage and analysis of temporal spatial and attribute information. HGIS offers social scientists avenues to archive, visualize, query, and analyze historic geographic patterns. This research adds to a growing body of literature and practices, including works by Ian Gregory (2007; 2008), Anne Kelly Knowles (2005; 2008), Paul S. Eli (2005), and Michael Goodchild (1992; 2008), that supports HGIS as an important and effective social science visualization, data management, and analysis tool. Though multiple HGIS methodologies were implemented throughout this study, data was managed through a series of large relatable point, polyline, and polygon databases created by the author (Appendix A). This allowed for efficient database query at multiple temporal levels. Therefore, this work provides a critical framework for time-place historical geographic data management. Chapter Outline Temporally, this research explores over a century of national forest management in the Rocky Mountain Front beginning in 1897 and the imposition of federal forestry in 7 the region and much of the American West. It concludes in 2000. Dissertation chapters correspond to critical periods in national, local, and Forest Service history. Chapter 2 examines the pre-history to 1897 environmental and human geographies of the Rocky Mountain Front. The chapter also provides a special focus on the evolution of federal forestry that ultimately resulted in the 1897 Organic Act and the creation of the Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve in the Rocky Mountain Front. Chapter 3 analyzes Lewis and Clark National Forest management of the Rocky Mountain Front from 1897 to 1929. It explores the evolving philosophies, policies, and mechanisms of United States Forest Service control and the imposition of the agency’s management imperative in the Rocky Mountain Front. It also begins to address important questions of social and natural power - specifically those that address the role of local and national cultural and economic geographies in influencing federal land management decisions - during a formative period in American West and public land history. Chapter 4 continues this narrative through the Great Depression and World War II years to 1965 and explores how Lewis and Clark managers altered their management imperative to meet a modernizing region and an increasingly vocal user-base. Chapter 5 examines agency management in the Front from 1965 to 2000 as Lewis and Clark foresters work to transform their imperative from utilitarian, use-based forestry to ecosystem and ecological management. The study concludes with an overall assessment of how different landscape elements within the national forest evolved over time and how these shifts reflected broad changes in agency policy, regional settlement, and environmental conditions. 8 Setting Geographically, this research examines the 826,000-acre region of the Crown of the Continent that is currently designated the Rocky Mountain Ranger District of the Lewis and Clark National Forest (Figure 1-2). The Rocky Mountain Ranger District serves as an ideal case study to understand the evolution of national forest landscapes. For several decades, the Rocky Mountain Ranger District was the Lewis and Clark National Forest; throughout its history, the district has undergone multiple boundary changes and designations that correspond to broad national economic, cultural and environmental bureaucratic trends. These lands have been shaped both by native tribes and waves of Anglo-American settlers. The district has undergone extensive and varied extractive and amenity resource use; managing use has been challenging due to the rugged topography of the region, its fragile and varied environmental conditions, and its small, but stalwart human residents. Finally, the Rocky Mountain Ranger District exists as a significant portion of the Rocky Mountain Front, which extends along the eastern edge of the Continental Divide and the Crown of the Continent from Alberta, Canada south through west-central Montana. The Rocky Mountain Front is a “transition zone between the Rocky Mountains and the mixed grass prairie ... (that) encompasses a wide variety of wetland, riparian, grassland, and forested habitats” (Kudray and Cooper 2006, 4) (Figure 1-3). The Front is “a nationally significant area because of its high wildlife, recreation, and scenic values” (USDI BLM 1983, 46) and is a region that requires “the highest of conservation priorities” (Neudecker et al 2011, 229). 9 10 Figure 1-2: The Rocky Mountain Ranger District, Lewis and Clark National Forest. Map by author. Geologically, the Front is striking. The Northern Rockies rise abruptly from the plains, in some areas by as much as 4,000 feet, with the only entryway into the Rockies a handful of narrow river canyons. Through the limestone rampart lies a series of U-shaped north- south running valleys, the result of sedimentation, erosion, Cordilleran glaciation, and fold and thrust-belt geology (Figure 1-4). The Front contains heavily incised watersheds and rounded hills that are broken only by towering buttes capped with ancient gravels. Wetlands and sinks, depressions created by glacial retreat, dot the prairie and provide critical habitat for large game, raptors, and migratory birds. Elk, grizzly bear, deer, and 11 Figure 1-3: The Rocky Mountain Front Transition Zone. Photo by author, 2009. The Front is an ecological and human transition area. Looking at Ear Mountain located west of Choteau, MT. sheep use the Front - as do a myriad of smaller wildlife species. The Front remains home to every wildlife species described by Lewis and Clark on their journey through the region, with the exception of free-range bison. ! Humans have occupied and used the Rocky Mountain Front for thousands of years. Livestock ranches and wheat farms dot the prairie, fed by irrigation canals that originate in federal reservoirs. Small urban centers east of the mountain wall serve as nodes for trade, culture, and government services. Summer use recreation cabins are scattered around canyon mouths. State and private conservation areas, dude ranches, game ranges, and exurban settlement also occurs near the public-private land interface and add to the management complexity (Figure 1-5). United States Forest Service roads, bridges, gates, trails and administrative sites are laced through the forested landscape. 12 Figure 1-4: Fold and Thrust Belt Topography of the Rocky Mountain Front. Google Earth image with Gibson Reservoir and the Sun River Canyon in the bottom-center of the image. Accessed 18 December, 2013. The Rocky Mountain Front has emerged as home to a complex mosaic of land stewards - each with their own agendas, policies, and imperatives - that are representative of public - private landscapes throughout the American West. Nearly two million acres of the Rocky Mountain Front are managed by federal, state, and tribal agencies. Over one million acres of land are privately owned or managed by private land conservation agencies. Though the United States Forest Service is a dominant public land manager in the Front, the cultural and environmental landscapes of the Front are the result of a cumulative and ongoing negotiation between Front land managers and the human, political, and natural ecologies. 13 Figure 1-5: Human Settlement Complexity in the Rocky Mountain Front. Photos by author, 2010. Human settlement in the Front includes multiple conservation areas, dude ranches, recreation areas, and exurban settlement. In the Teton watershed. Region 1 of the United States Forest Service - sometimes called the Northern Region - is headquartered in Missoula, MT and spans over 25 million acres of public land across northeastern WA, northern ID, MT, western ND, and northwestern SD. The Lewis and Clark National Forest is one of thirteen national forests and grasslands in Region 1 and is located in west central and northern Montana with its headquarters located in Great Falls, MT. It encompasses two major divisions: the Rocky Mountain Division contains the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. The Jefferson Division contains the Judith, Musselshell, White Sulphur Springs, and Belt Creek ranger districts (Figure 1-6). The Rocky Mountain Ranger District of the Lewis and Clark is bounded to the north by U.S. 14 Figure 1-6: Region 1 of the United States Forest Service and the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Shows Lewis and Clark National Forest divisions. Map by author. Highway 2, the tracks of the Great Northern Railway, and Glacier National Park; to the west by the Continental Divide and the Flathead National Forest; to the south by the Helena National Forest; and to the east by the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, numerous state, public, and private lands. The Rocky Mountain Ranger District can be divided into four hydrographic basins (Figure 1-7). The Two Medicine River flows north-northeast from the Continental Divide and gathers water from Badger and Birch creeks, cuts through the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, until it eventually joins Cut Bank Creek to form the Marias River - a tributary of the Missouri River. Birch Creek follows the southern boundary of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation and joins the Two Medicine River in northern Pondera 15 Figure 1-7: Watersheds of the Rocky Mountain Front. Map by author. County shortly before its conjuncture with Cut Bank Creek. A weighty demand is placed on the Two Medicine watershed; Birch Creek is impounded near the boundary of the 16 Figure 1-8: Major Creeks and Rivers of the Two Medicine Watershed. Map by author. Rocky Mountain Ranger District to create Swift Reservoir - a primary irrigation and flood control reservoir (Figure 1-8). The central Rocky Mountain Front region is drained in part by the Teton River watershed. The Teton River watershed begins in the Lewis Range along the Continental Divide and flows southeast through the ranger district (Figure 1-9). The Teton is the most heavily used watershed region in the ranger district; Forest Service roads, trails, and campgrounds provide year-round access to recreation opportunities. The Teton watershed also contains some of the district’s most merchantable timber stands and pasturages. The Chinese Wall (Figure 1-10), the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex, and the Sun River Game Preserve are all accessible through the Teton watershed. The headwaters of the Sun River watershed are located on the Continental Divide at Sun River Pass. Tributaries of the Sun River head south through the heavily timbered eastern portion of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex. The Sun River turns east toward the prairie near Medicine Springs - Sun Butte and is impounded by the Gibson Dam. The Sun has a long history of use. Currently, much of the water from the Sun is used for irrigation through the Bureau of Reclamation’s Sun River Project. The Sun River Project was authorized in 1906 under the tenants of the 1902 Newlands Reclamation Act and consists of multiple diversion features including Gibson, Diversion, and Pishkun reservoirs, the Sun River and Fort Shaw diversion dams, and nine separate canal systems (Figure 1-11). The Sun irrigates nearly 93,000 aces of the Rocky Mountain Front (Autobee 1995, 1-48). 17 The Upper Missouri-Dearborn River watershed rises near Scapegoat Mountain and flows to the southeast (Figure 1-12). The Upper Missouri-Dearborn drains the eastern half of the Scapegoat Wilderness and gathers water from Smith, Welcome, Falls, and Elk 18 Figure 1-9: Major Creeks and Rivers of the Teton Watershed. Map by author. creeks. Though there are subtle differences in the geology of the Dearborn to the rest of the Front watersheds - largely concerning the presence of Belt formations in the Bean Lake region - the watershed is an example of the dominant overthrust belt faulting process that defines the region. Conceptual Framework Most broadly, this research ties the creation of national forest landscapes to the influence of capitalism, American expansion, and evolving definitions of nature. Specifically, this dissertation assesses the following propositions: 19 Figure 1-10: The Chinese Wall and Continental Divide at Rock Creek. Photo taken in 1935 by Lewis and Clark National Forest rangers (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). 1) Management of national forest land was developed largely to perpetuate extractive resource capitalist economies. This practice tethers western rural economies to national and global economic fluctuations and repeated boom and 20 Figure 1-11: Major Creeks and Rivers of the Sun River Watershed. Map by author. bust cycles. As a primary manager of these lands, the federal government perpetuates this core-periphery relationship. 21 Figure 1-12: Major Creeks and Rivers of the Dearborn Watershed. Map by author. 2) The United States Forest Service is created during an era of increasing federal control and national modernization. This impulse takes several forms including a) a restructuring of American law to meet the needs of a growing and interconnected society; b) an increased federal presence and bureaucracy in the American West; and c) the implementation of a management imperative that uses scientific investigation, technology, simplification, and professionalism to shape national forest land uses. 3) The United States Forest Service has adapted its management imperative to accommodate changing ideas about nature and public lands in American society. As a result, Forest Service landscapes reflect evolving cultural beliefs about nature. Capitalism and Settlement Extractive resource-based capitalism has dramatically reorganized the environmental, settlement, and economic geographies of the United States and the American West. Historian William Robbins describes capitalism as “the basic organizing principle for much of the global economy from the onset of the Industrial Revolution to the present” (Robbins 1994, ix). William Cronon states that the North American continent has evolved as a part of a “larger system of ... economic relationships which have been affected by such things as changing ... resource bases, the rise of the corporation, and the growth of the modern state, all within the framework of an expanding capitalist 22 economy” (Cronon 1987, 174-75). Capitalism, noted Fernand Braudel, is the conceptual framework for understanding “the basic problems and realities” of modern society (Braudel 1992, 619). Geographer D.W. Meinig (1972; 1978; 1986; 1993; 1998; 2004) connects American expansion to broad capitalist and imperial spatial systems that perpetuate core- periphery relationships and a distinct natural-resource based settlement pattern. As the United States reduced its economic and political dependence on Europe, a new nationally-based core developed on the eastern seaboard. American capital turned westward and established a complex system of urban centers that hastened the transformation of the natural world into commodities and encouraged settlement within the North American interior that was aimed at natural-resource extraction. Historian William Cronon (1991) demonstrates the transformative power of these urban centers as Chicago’s peripheral regions were molded into extractive landscapes that fed the core - a process that ultimately created “a single market, a single geography that spanned much of the interior of the continent” (Cronon 1991, 206). The imposition of global capitalism also transformed social geographies in the United States. Geographer James T. Lemon (1972) demonstrates market capitalism’s power to transform 17th and 18th century southeastern Pennsylvania into a region guided by an ideology of liberal individualism. Landscapes in southeastern Pennsylvania were shaped and social hierarchies formed based on a consuming drive for material gain over public interest. Geographer Robert Mitchell (1977) describes the way Euro-American 23 capitalism shaped environmental and social structures in rural 18th century Virginia. Early American colonists subscribed to a world view where “exchanges between man and land and between man and man were interpreted from a utilitarian, exploitive perspective” (Mitchell 1977, x). Natural resource market economics transformed surpluses into profit sources and encouraged frontier exploitation. As a result, a socially stratified hierarchy emerged that coincided with the agglomeration of commercial agricultural capital. Cole Harris (1997; 2008) examines capitalism’s complicity in reorganizing social geographies as natural resource rich regions are connected to eastern markets. Native American “lifeworlds” - a common understanding of the world around them - conflicted with and were supplanted by Euro-American market capitalism. The American West has also been transformed by capitalism. William Robbins (1986; 1994; 1999) argues that the West needs to be examined in the context of global capitalism and allows us to view “how human cultures have adapted to, manipulated, created, and reshaped their surroundings” to engage in market economics (Robbins 1994, xi). The American West, when viewed through the lens of private and federally supported capitalism, “serves as a prototype for observing urban/hinterland relations” (170). Rising demands for raw materials in midwestern and eastern United States cities “transformed the subsistence and pastoral economy of the West into integral and dependent components of an Atlantic-dominated agricultural marketing system” (72). Bernard DeVoto (1934) describes the American West as “a victim of economic colonialism, a satrapy of Wall Street” (Robbins 1986, 578). The West is a region tied to 24 the myth of American exceptionalism and liberal individualism. According to DeVoto, this “symbol is largely false; it is propaganda of the monied East” to keep the West tied to primary economic enterprises (DeVoto 1934, 359). The American West became a region organized around several discrete nuclei of cultural and capital accumulation (Meinig 1978). These centers tied the West to regional, eastern, and global industrial capital cores and they organized western economies around resource extraction. William Wyckoff (1999) ties settlement in Colorado to global recognition of “an expanding natural resource-based North American frontier that ... represented a form of capitalism closely tied to the successful development of natural resources” (Wyckoff 1999, 3). Capital-intensive investments in infrastructure enlarged these extractive economies and reinforced a power structure that “preordained dominant and dominated populations” (10). In Colorado, economic power concentrated in major nodal points such as Denver. As a region, however, Colorado remained as a periphery in relation to larger centers of eastern capital. In a similar fashion, Harris (1997) explores the effect of the 1858 gold rush in British Columbia’s Fraser River Canyon. After discovery, eastern capital poured into the region and an intensive system of roads, farms, and distribution centers were constructed to facilitate the movement of wealth from western Canada to eastern financial centers. Capitalism therefore connected British Columbia to global boom and bust economies and reorganized power relations. The United States federal government is complicit in perpetuating resource extractive economies and core-periphery imperial power structures that geographer Paul 25 Starrs says has “kept the western United States in thrall” (Starrs 1998, xvii). Wyckoff (1999) describes how Colorado was transformed by “a growing federal largesse ... as the national government grew and became more directly involved with developing and managing the resources of the western United States” (3). Gerald Nash (1985; 1999) details the dramatic changes brought to the American West by World War II and federally funded industrial development. “The West might have followed very different historical patterns had the federal government not been the dominant influence in guiding its growth ... the decision to provide strong federal leadership to undertake the expansion of the western economy was a conscious effort by eastern America to develop the youngest part of the United States” (Nash 1999, xiv). This process helped trigger growing migration to the West and resulted in the region becoming “more than ever ... a federal province” (Nash 1985, 17). Fearful that the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia would result in a second Great Depression, the federal government extended financial and legal support to western industry and created a bureaucratic leviathan to support large-scale agribusiness and western suburbanization. Donald Worster (1985) examines the effects of federally-supported development and suggests that this form of capitalism promotes centralized power regimes and converts western landscapes into resource peripheries. He describes how a “hydraulic West” was created by federally support of monopolistic industries. Wiley and Gottlieb (1982) also examine how capital investment and federal infrastructure development reorganized the desert Southwest into a region for resource extraction. Large-scale open 26 pit mining, irrigation projects, and federal investment in railroad and highway development created new urban cores within the region that later become destinations for new migrants in the West’s amenity based economy. Paul Hirt (1994) provides a thorough analysis of how the United States Forest Service utilized federal funding and a belief in intensive management and the “techno-fix” to “continually say yes to ever-increasing demands for commodities like timber while simultaneously promising to protect soil, water, wildlife, esthetics, and wilderness” (Hirt 1994, xxi). These actions perpetuated the West’s peripheral role in the national economy. Though the relative importance of the extractive economy in the West has diminished, capitalism is still a transformative force in “new western” economies. As Philip Jackson, Robert Kuhlken (2006) and William Travis (2007) assert, new western land uses diverge from traditional agricultural and resource extraction. New western regional economies are significantly driven by amenity, recreation, and tertiary service- based pursuits where “quality of life attracts people as much as jobs do” (Travis 2007, 53). The impact of these processes is significant and replicates earlier core-periphery and capital intensive relationships. Portions of the American West have undergone unprecedented population growth in recent years. Demand for suburban and exurban housing, infrastructure improvements and modernization, and associated land and water resource development has “unavoidably alter(ed) the character of small communities and the use of adjacent rural lands” (Jackson and Kuhlken 2006, 4). 27 Any analysis of how the United States Forest Service has managed its western lands must incorporate a framework that highlights the effects of resource and amenity driven capitalism. One of the primary reasons that the Forest Service was created was to regulate the excesses of the private timber industry. The basic tenets of utilitarian federal forestry promise sustainable and predictable resource development through the implementation of science, technology, and professionalism. Therefore, federal forestry perpetuates resource extractive economies and ultimately tethers rural American West economies to national and global economic fluctuations and repeated boom and bust cycles. Increasingly, national forests also have become contested amenity and recreation landscapes. The Forest Service has had to alter its management imperatives to meet multiple demands on public lands. In doing so, it has repeatedly sought to simplify non- extractive use management by transforming amenities into commodities. Federal Control and Modernity Modernity “may be thought of as a form of social organization characterized by a heightened capacity for the surveillance and management of individuals and populations, capitalist enterprise and industrial production, and centralized control” (Harris 1997, xii). This impetus for control grew in the American West during the late 19th century as both the federal government and the capitalistic economy expanded their influence within the region. Richard Jackson (1995) and Paul Wallace Gates (1968) outline American land disposal policy and discuss how the federal government serves as the dominant landlord in the West. Through the end of the 19 th century, American land policy was supportive of 28 a Euro-American ethic of “private land ownership” which “antedat(ed) nationhood” (Jackson 1995, 253). With the onset of the modern conservation era, law and policy shifted to support public management of western land. Richard White (1990; 1991a), William Wyckoff (1999), and Gerald Nash (1999) tie the growing western federal presence with 19th and early 20th century corporate capitalism. “The Civil War ... helped set the stage for the emergence of a far more powerful central state. It created the conditions in which the West arose” (White 1990, 207). The problems of distance and isolation partially were solved through federal transportation projects that did much “to integrate the West into the national economy” (Nash 1999, 4). By the end of the 19th century, the federal landscape in the West expanded to include large-scale irrigation projects to promote agriculture, national parks to spur tourism, and forest reserves to perpetuate natural-resource capitalism. Conservation era Progressives sought to increase federal authority in the American West to protect the public from forms of corporate misuse. But, as William Robbins (1994) and Martin Sklar (1988) state, it is inexact to view the Progressives as anti-corporation. They argue that Progressive era reform was used as a means to consolidate and legitimize corporate power as a middle path between trusts and radical impulses. The result was “the (government supported) passage of capitalism from its proprietary competitive state to its corporate-administered stage” (Sklar 1988, 3). The result was a transformation of the law to support the idea of corporate liberalism wherein government regulated and alternately supported business in the popular interest. As 29 Progressive Woodrow Wilson said in 1911, “the whole world has changed within the lifetime of men not in their thirties; the world of business, and therefore the world of society and the world of politics. A new economic society has sprung up, and we must affect a new set of adjustments” (Sklar 1988, 391). With law on their side, eastern capital was able to secure national forest reservations under the terms of scientific management, further tying the peripheral West to the eastern core. Under the auspices of modernity, “nature was to be remade in such a way as to subordinate it to human purposes” (Giddens 1993). James Scott (1998) explains how federal forestry sought to simplify the natural world into an abstraction that could be transformed into commodities with utilitarian value and species that diminish economic yield. In that way, federal forestry “replaces the term ‘nature’ with the term natural resource, focusing on those aspects of nature that can be appropriated for human use” (Scott 1998, 13). Federal foresters then utilized the might of the federal largesse and scientific management to transform large portions of the American West into “a commodity machine” (21). Historians Samuel Hays (1999) and Paul Hirt (1994) outline how control and subordination of nature has become a main tenant of the American conservation movement and the United States Forest Service. The conservation movement was, “above all, … a scientific movement, and its role in history arises from the implications of science and technology in modern society” (Hays 1999, 2). In this way, the control of nature became integrated into the United States Forest Service management imperative. 30 A small group of professionals led the conservation movement with an objective to efficiently manage resources. Control of those resources was placed in the hands of professionals schooled in hydrology, mineralogy, agronomy, and forestry. Nature was scientifically managed for efficient utilitarian use. Paul Hirt (1994) describes how powerful post World War II institutional, economic, and political incentives transformed the Forest Service’s management imperative into one that utilized science, technology, and high budgetary inputs for “market oriented production and the conversion of natural forest ecosystems into timber plantations” (xxxiv). Concurrently, the agency expanded its management imperative to meet the needs of non-timber related factions. In doing so, the Forest Service relied on techno-fixes and intensive management to extend their control over increasingly complex natural and social management situations. Defining Nature A central debate in environmental history seeks to clarify the place of humans in the natural world. A study of how ideas of nature have changed over time illuminates important cultural discourses on how non-human nature is valued. Complicating this narrative are studies in political ecology that define “the ... conflicts, alliances, and negotiations” that shape public landscapes (Sutton and Anderson 2004). The United States Forest Service has continually modified its management imperative to acknowledge changing ideas about nature and an evolving definition of what are considered appropriate national forest uses. 31 Roderick Nash (2001) examines the evolution of American ideas about nature. Nash traces the changes in the concept of nature from the early Euro-American view of wilderness as hostile and wild to a view that sees nature as an Edenic retreat from the urbanized world. A fundamental theme behind Nash’s intellectual history is that the idea of wilderness has been appreciated in inverse proportion to the reality of its presence in American society; as American society became further removed from the challenges wild places presented, the greater spiritual and cultural value it placed in such settings. Historical geographer Michael Williams (1989) describes how actions that transformed nature, such as clearing forests, were rationalized as a form of redemption from the “dark and sinister symbol(s) of man’s evil ... where even a civilized man could revert to savagery if left too long” (Williams 1989, 11). As the United States reorganized and transformed its landscapes in response to the Industrial Revolution, “the concept of controlling nature and making it more useful gained strength” (12). Early American aversion to wilderness, and a desire to conquer it, offered settlers the opportunity to attend to their material needs and to bring order into a chaotic world. As William Cronon (1996) states, “Wilderness … was a place to which one came only against one’s will. … Whatever value it might have arose solely from the possibility that it might be reclaimed and turned toward human ends” (Cronon 1996, 9). The later view that nature could be controlled and harnessed for its economic value place man outside of the natural world. Progressive-era conservationists believed that nature could be understood, simplified, and transformed to meet human needs (Hays 1999). 32 Environmental historians Paul Sutter (2002), Neil Maher (2008), and Karl Jacoby (2001) explore examples of how changing notions of nature have showed the evolution of the wilderness movement. Each are successful in documenting how differing views of public land use resulted in major policy, cultural, and landscape transformations. Sutter ties the birth of the modern American wilderness movement to modernity and the material consumption of natural landscapes. The creation of the Wilderness Society - a major force in popularizing the wilderness ideal - was a reaction against the growth of automobile recreation, road building in public lands, and the growth of consumer-based leisure in the 1920s and 1930s. Maher historicizes modern concepts of wilderness by offering new ideas on the origins of the post WWII environmental movement. In Maher’s view, the environmental movement can be traced to the 1930s New Deal and to the Civilian Conservation Corps. It therefore recasts New Deal political history to show how New Deal landscape modifications and dogma influenced the American view of wild places. Jacoby reinterprets the conservation myth and describes how public lands management has class implications. The American conservation movement fostered a system wherein a professional and educated elite were given the ability to manage land. Federal forestry therefore delegitimized local knowledge and economic systems and recast local users as the ruiners of pristine wild places. Jacoby’s work therefore provides a framework for exploring social power as local users strove to gain some level of decision-making ability through much of the 20th century. 33 National forest landscapes reflect these evolving beliefs about nature and man’s ability to control and manage it. In the American West, as Richard White states, “who gets to define nature is an issue of power with consequences for the lives of working people, Indian people, and residents of areas defined as wild” (White 1999, 560-61). National forests are landscapes that “are accepted, negotiated, contested, and resisted, which is to say they are acts of social power” (Mitchell 2008, 43). National forest landscapes are positioned at the meeting point of diverse and complex social relations and value systems associated with how “nature” has been interpreted in a capitalist society. In this way, national forests are transformed into contested and negotiated landscapes that represent the complex relationships between a dynamic natural world and its varied human occupants. Conclusion American public lands are complex mosaics that ultimately display “our unwitting autobiography, reflecting our tastes, our values, our aspirations, and even our fears” in ways similar to other built and engineered landscapes” (Lewis 1979, 12). This dissertation provides a set of interpretive tools and a methodology to assess national forest landscape change in the Northern Rockies, Montana. As such, it assesses how national forest managers and users viewed and ultimately valued public lands. National forest landscapes have experienced considerable alteration over the past century. Nearly all of it was guided by individuals with deeply held convictions, backed by scientifically 34 vetted management policies, and in some cases codified into law. This dissertation illustrates how the national forests of the Northern Rockies have been transformed through this process and suggests that a rigorous examination of the formation of these landscapes can only add depth, meaning, and greater perspective to the increasingly complex public lands management process. 35 CHAPTER 2: THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN FRONT - PREHISTORY TO 1897 Geology, Climate, Flora, Fauna, and Fire in the Rocky Mountain Front Nearly 540 million years ago, the Rocky Mountain Ranger District lay, in places, at the bottom of a successive series of inland seas. The deposited sedimentary material accumulated to a total thickness of between 1,000 and 2,000 feet and is visible throughout the Rocky Mountain Ranger District as limestone cliffs and ridges. One of the Ranger District’s most distinct features, the Chinese Wall, is formed of this Cambrian limestone. Further flooding during the Mississippian Period (275 million years ago) created the group of formations collectively called Madison limestone. Throughout the Rocky Mountain Ranger District white-gray Madison limestone is much in evidence and forms the peaks of the Sawtooth Range (Deiss 1935, 95-124; Mudge 1972, B4-B11, B19; Alt and Hyndman 1995, 31-38, 41-49). At the beginning of the Jurassic, approximately 205 million years ago, the western margin of the North American continent collided with the Pacific plate, forcing the plate to subduct beneath North America. The collision fractured the continental crust, pushing immense slabs of rock eastward and creating the early northern Rocky Mountains. The crust sank into the mantle where it melted, producing basalt and granite magma. By the late Mesozoic (90 to 70 million years ago), enormous amounts of magma had risen under what is now northern Idaho and western Montana. The pressure of the molten granite caused the earth’s surface to swell like a giant bubble, causing thousands of feet of 36 ancient sedimentary rock to lift, tilt, and ultimately fracture into slabs. By force of gravity, these great slabs moved inexorably eastward, as much as 50 miles, sliding upon weaker rocks such as shale, to rest upon much younger rock formations. This process, known as fold-thrust or overthrust belt faulting, continued until at least 55 million years ago and is largely responsible for the series of successive limestone reefs of the Sawtooth Ridge, the Sun River Canyon, and Castle Reef. Precipitation falling in the fold-thrust-belt gradually eroded the weaker shales in between the slabs, eventually creating the north- south running valley systems (Mudge 1972, B36-B44; Philp 1990, 17-24; Alt and Hyndman 1995, 59-83, 115-40; Alt 2004, 41-43). Approximately ten million years ago, the climate of Montana shifted from warmer, tropical conditions to desert, creating hydrological conditions amenable to flash- flood events. Surface runoff collected in eroded channels and transported massive gravel loads to mountain valleys and onto the Great Plains. These gravels, known as Flaxville deposits, created barriers to erosive events that wore down other areas on the plains and contributed to the distinctive undulating hills characteristic (Figure 2-1) of the Rocky Mountain Front (Alt and Hyndman 1986, 19-24; Philp 1990, 25-26). Laurentide and Cordillerian glaciers significantly altered the physical geography of the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. Two million years ago the earth began to experience a series of great ice ages. In as many as twenty separate advances, glaciers scoured the peaks and valleys of the Rocky Mountain Front, eroding river courses and depositing glacial outwash along the eastern Great Plains. As the glaciers retreated, large 37 blocks of ice and till broke away from the main body and melted in place, creating depressions in the landscape. These water-filled kettles dot the plains just east of the Rocky Mountain Ranger District and provide critical habit for waterfowl, elk and deer as well as a source of reservoir irrigation water for Rocky Mountain Front ranchers (Alden 1932, 1-120; Alt and Hyndman 1986, 327-401; Carrara et al 1986, 317-25; Philp 1990, 26-34; Keller 1996, 17). 38 Figure 2-1. Undulating hills typical of the Rocky Mountain Front. Near the Dearborn River. Photo by author. Climate has historically propelled ecological change in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. Pollen analyses of Holocene environments (approximately 12,000 years ago) show the presence of vegetation indicative of a gradual warming period and increased xeric conditions, such as sagebrush (Artemisia), various types of pine (Pinus), and Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii). The gradual warming before 7000 B.P. allowed for pine species to migrate upslope throughout the Northern Rockies (Hansen 1948, 146-52; Mack et al 1983, 183-91; Barnosky 1989, 60-64; Philp 1990, 39-61; Pielou 1991, 53-74). Climate along the Rocky Mountain Front is generally cooler and drier than corresponding locations west of the Continental Divide although there is considerable variability in both temperature and precipitation corresponding to the east-west elevation gradient and its upper midlatitude continental location. Precipitation in the region is spatially variable and ranges from an average of almost 22 inches of annual precipitation in Bigfork, MT on the eastern shores of Flathead Lake to nearly 34 inches 20 miles northeast at the Hungry Horse Dam. Along the Continental Divide, precipitation can average between 70 and 100 inches annually, dropping dramatically to approximately 10 to 15 inches just east of the Rocky Mountain Front. Seventy to 80 percent of this precipitation falls in the form of snow at high elevations in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. Temperatures in the Front vary seasonally, ranging between an average high of 20 degrees F. in January and 82 degrees F. in July. Wind is often a factor on the plains east of the Rocky Mountain Ranger District; Chinook winds usually accompany dramatic 39 fluctuations in winter temperatures that can, and have, caused severe flooding and significant damage to vegetation and wildlife. On January 11, 1980, the temperature at the Great Falls International Airport rose from -32F to 15F in seven minutes as a result of Chinook winds. Conversely, at Browning, MT in January 1916, the temperature dropped from 44F to -56F in a 24 hour period (Arno 1979, 14-15; Keller 1996, 21-22; Kudray and Cooper 2006, 1-2). Climate and landscape shaped the geography of human use and adaptation of the Rocky Mountain Front. Stone Age hunters tracked and harvested large migrating mammals such as mammoths, bison, moose, and deer across the late Pleistocene period North American arctic steppe. During this period of frequent glaciation, the Rocky Mountain Front was routinely affected by Cordilleran intermountain glacial activity, affecting accessibility and limiting use. The Rocky Mountain Front is a diverse vegetative landscape including many ecological niches. Vegetation in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District is variable and is generally consistent with highland Northern Rockies vegetation regimes located east of the Continental Divide. At higher elevations (6,000 – 8,000 ft), the vegetative landscape consists of barren rock intermixed with stands of Rocky Mountain fir (Abies lasiocarpa), white pine (pinus albicaulis) and occasional, albeit scarce, stands of larch (Larix lyallii). At high elevations, fescue (Festuca) grasslands intermixed with creeping juniper (Juniperus horizontalis), kinnikinnick (Arctostaphylos uva-ursi), and scrubby cinquefoil (Daisiphora floribunda) serve as the dominant understory. Between 4,000 – 7,000 feet, 40 forests consist largely of lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta), Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii), limber pine (Pinus flexilis), and, as Front meets the prairie, large concentrations of quaking aspen (Populus tremuloides). In low elevation riparian areas, willow (Salix), red-osier dogwood (Cornus sericea), wheatgrass (Agropyron), chokecherry (Prunus virginiana), and Woods’ rose (Rost woodsii) complete the understory. Blue grama (Bouteloua gracilis) is found in large quantities on landscapes that have witnessed heavy stock grazing (Arno 1979, 13-15; Habeck 1987, 814; Kudray and Cooper 2006, 8-25). The Rocky Mountain Front and the associated Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex have been recognized as “the most ecologically complete mountain wilderness in the United States” (Keller 1996, 24). The Front represents a zone of ecological transition; a variety of forest, riparian, grassland and wetland habitats are present. Nearly all pre-anglo settlement flora and fauna (bison excluded) still occupy the Front. The Lewis and Clark National Forest provides habitat for 290 wildlife and fish species. Of that total, 41 (10 mammals, 24 birds, and 7 fish) have been listed as game species (USDA LCNF 1986, 6/8-6/14; Kudray and Cooper 2006, 1). The Rocky Mountain Ranger District provides habitat for four threatened or endangered species: the grizzly bear, the gray wolf, the bald eagle, and the peregrine falcon. The entire Rocky Mountain Ranger District is designated as occupied grizzly bear habitat. The Forest Service routinely conducts grizzly bear habitat improvement projects, such as fuel reduction on and fencing of important denning and spring habitat in the 41 District. The stability of the grizzly population in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District also allows the Forest Service to conduct critical research that forms a baseline for managing grizzly habitat nationwide (USDA LCNF 1986, 6/8; Keller 1996, 24). The gray wolf, despite eradication along the Front at the hands of federal officials and stockgrowers, has recolonized the Rocky Mountain Ranger District with packs sporadically concentrating along the Sun River, Dupuyer Creek, and Elk Creek drainages. Efforts over the past three decades by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, the Department of the Interior, and the United States Forest Service have resulted in a dramatic growth of Montana’s wolf population, enough to authorize the state’s first fair chase hunt in 2009 (USDA LCNF 1986, 6/8; Keller 1996, 24-25; Bozeman Daily Chronicle 2011, 10 July). The Rocky Mountain Ranger District is also home to a menagerie of big game species. Elk, mule and whitetail deer, bighorn sheep, mountain goat, and black bear populate the more mountainous regions; antelope and moose can be found near the plains, exemplifying the Front’s status as a meeting place for multiple bio-regions. The District is also home to hundreds of miles of fishable streams. Fish species found in the District include rainbow, cutthroat, and brook trout. Heavily used fisheries, such as the Sun, Dearborn, and Teton rivers, have been stocked to supplement native trout populations since the early 20 th century (USDA LCNF 1986, 6/9). The presence of charcoal in the paleo-ecological record indicates that fire repeatedly altered the Northern Rockies landscape. In his 1888 survey of North American 42 forests, Col. Edgar T. Ensign stated that the “destruction by forest fires (in Montana Territory) is almost beyond computation” (Ensign 1889, 101). Tree core samples suggest that the Rocky Mountain Front experienced significant fire as frequently as once in every twenty-two years. Further, the prevalence of fire supported the migration and eventual dominance of Pinus species through the Northern Rockies. Fire, as well as an increase in precipitation in the region after 4000 B.P., encouraged an increase in grasses and a decrease in Artemisia (Barnosky 1989, 64-65; Williams M. 1989, 43-48; Philp 1990, 106-85; Morris S. 1992, 80-84; Keller 1996, 19; Pyne 1997, 71-72). To prehistoric peoples, fire was likely “the single most effective transformative tool” (Keller 1996, 19). Existing in a transition zone between Cordillera and the plains, prehistoric inhabitants of the Rocky Mountain Front employed varying strategies and technologies to exploit the material economies available to them. Hunter / gatherer economies relied upon seasonal, often fluctuating “return of the land” (Harris 2008, 5) that required occasional landscape modification, such as burning, to insure greater productivity. The journals of Lewis and Clark also note several instances of native tribes using fire for communication; on July 20, 1805, near the Gates of the Mountains at the southern edge of the Rocky Mountain Front, Lewis and his men witnessed a fire building in a nearby gulch and determined “it had been set on fire by the natives as a signall (sic) among themselves on discovering us, as is their custom” (Barrett and Arno 1982, 647; Lewis M. et al 1983, 407). Recent studies have shown that anthropogenic fires were often set at lower elevation forests and grasslands and resulted in “parklike” openings within 43 the forest that encouraged food and medicinal plant growth and ungulate grazing. Native Americans in the Northern Rockies also used fire technology to facilitate travel by clearing dense understory, to drive and surround game, and to clear campsite areas of insects and camouflage that might be used by enemy tribes (Barrett 1981; Barrett and Arno 1982, 648-59; McLeod and Melton 1986, V1-V5; Philp 1990, 67-99, 112; Morris S. 1992, 79-90; Keller 1996, 19; Pyne 1997, 71-72). Native American Geographies of the Rocky Mountain Front Native Americans modified the Rocky Mountain Front landscape in complex and varied ways that sought to organize and utilize a framework of geographic knowledge for spiritual and material means. As the Rocky Mountain Front is a zone of transition from cordillera to plains, Native Americans utilized diverse strategies and technologies, of which fire was one, to maximize the region’s productivity. Tribes often relied upon annual or semi-annual trail migrations through mountain and plain landscapes to known seasonal resource procurement sites. Trails were numerous in the Front region, largely consisting of game trails, perhaps with minor human modifications that led to commodity sources, spiritual sites, and trading opportunities. In the Rocky Mountain Front, trails often ran along creek valleys, riverbanks, and bottomland terraces. The east-west running watersheds along the eastern slope of the Front allowed access to numerous native trails; the numerous prehistoric archeological sites found along the Sun and Dearborn River 44 canyons bear testament to significant and varied use (Picton and Picton 1975, 5; Malouf 1980, 1-10; Philp 1990, 90-98; Reeves 1990, 1-18). Running north-south across the Rocky Mountain Front’s eastern edge is the legendary prehistoric Old North Trail. More a trail network than a single Paleo-Indian highway, the Old North Trail ran in part from Alberta, Canada to southern Montana, following at least two main routes (Figure 2-2). Archeological investigations suggest that the Old North Trail was utilized as a human migration network at least ten thousand years ago, as the Laurentide Ice Sheet’s recession opened up the plains along the Rocky Mountain Front to seasonal migration of game, and continued as a functional system well into Anglo settlement of the region. Archeological excavations of east-west running canyons that connected to the Old North Trail, such as the Sun River Canyon, suggest that the Old North Trail was “the major trade/travel route between the (obsidian and chert) quarries (of the Yellowstone Plateau, south-central Montana, and southern Alberta) and the northern Montana/Southern Alberta area” (Reeves 1990, 15) as well as serving localized hunting, gathering, and spiritual functions (Philp 1990, 90-98). Human settlement in Montana began between ten and thirteen thousand years ago. It is theorized that the Clovis culture, so named because of distinctive fluted projectile points first found near the town of Clovis, NM, migrated southward across the Rocky Mountain Front and into east-central Montana, likely subsisting mostly on the large Pleistocene era megafauna. The presence of stone scrapers at Clovis sites, along with an absence of tools such as grinding stones support this subsistence pattern. Clovis sites are 45 rare along the Rocky Mountain Front, most likely due to the presence of glacial impediments; there are, however, significant Clovis site finds south of the Front near 46 Figure 2-2. Sign near Dupuyer, MT memorializing the Old North Trail. Evidence of the Trail can be found in several places along the Rocky Mountain Front. Photo by author. Wilsall and Townsend, MT (Frison 1991, 143-58; Greer and Greer 1994, 25; Bryan 1996, 6; Keller 1996, 34-35; 2001, 20). Ten thousand years ago, climatic shifts and the widespread extinction of many large mammal species prompted a shift in indigenous subsistence techniques. Increasingly, tribal bands focused on a smaller species of bison (Bison bison), often hunting in communal groups and utilizing the method of cornering bison at kill sites or driving them off of eroded hills or pishkuns. The Altithermal climate shift, or Holocene Climate Optimum (HCO), brought an end to glacial conditions along the Rocky Mountain Front and greatly affected the human geography of the region. Dry conditions along the plains forced indigenous populations to supplement their diets with small game and a larger variety of plant-life. Shifts in technology, such as the atlatl, stone grinding implements, and roasting pits for cooking root crops such as camas and bitterroot accompanied the HCO and allowed tribal groups to exploit a wider variety of material for consumption. Archeological records support habitation of and migration through the Rocky Mountain Front by paleoindians of this period. Along the Rocky Mountain Front, the Sun River was occupied sporadically, but consistently during the HCO. Sun River sites near present day Great Falls, MT, dating from 5,200 y.a., show significant levels of pronghorn (78 percent) and smaller animal fragments while bison comprise only three percent of bone fragments. Further analyses of Sun River Altithermal sites suggest that the Sun served as an autumnal migration point, supporting the belief that native populations spent the spring and summer months in the higher mountains and benches of 47 the Front to the west (Malouf 1958, 106-07; Greiser, Greiser, and Vetter 1985, 865-74; McLeod and Melton 1986, V-20; Barnosky 1989, 57-73; Philp 1990, 39-66, 74-78; Frison 1991, 155; Bryan 1996, 6; Keller 1996, 38-42). Rocky Mountain Front geographies underwent a rapid transformation between four and five thousand years ago as the Altithermal gave way to an extended period of wetter, cooler weather. The physical geography of the Front witnessed dramatic growth of timber and grasslands and the re-emergence of bison domination. This period of neoglaciation existed until around 3,500 y.a., before settling into present climatic patterns. For the residents of the Front, this climatic shift brought about dramatic cultural and technological changes. The evolution and domination of the bison brought about significant changes in native diets; Sun River site excavations from this period show that by 2,800 y.a., as much as 97 percent of the native carnivorous diet consisted of bison. However, this does not mean that native peoples abandoned their previous patterns of collecting and consuming plant life; significant numbers of grinding stones and roasting pits as far west as the Sun River Canyon support a continued reliance on vegetative lifeways (Greiser 1984, 43; Greiser, Greiser, and Vetter 1985, 865-74; Barnosky 1989, 57-73; Keller 1996, 43; USDA LCNF 2006b, 7-8). Around fifteen hundred years ago, a technological transition ushered in a new period for native cultures; the Late Prehistoric saw the emergence of the bow and arrow, the large-scale use of pressure flaking (and associated migrations to obsidian collection points), and an increase in large-scale, communal bison hunts, usually in the form of 48 pishkun jumps. Pottery, stone circles, pictographs, cairns, and tipi rings are also present in the Late Prehistoric archeological record. Several locations along the Front, especially in the Sun River Canyon, show evidence of Late Prehistoric occupation. Excavations in and around the Gibson Reservoir, located in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District of the Lewis and Clark National Forest, have identified numerous prehistoric sites, largely dating from the Late Prehistoric Period. Multiple pictograph sites (Figure 2-3) are present in the Sun River Canyon. Consisting of large panels painted all in a reddish ochre color, hand prints, anthropogenic figures, geometric designs, and vertical finger lines in 49 Figure 2-3. Paleoindian pictographs in the Sun River Canyon, Lewis and Clark National Forest. Photo by author. repetitive numbers, these sites are thought to represent a function relative to trail marking, message posts, statements of ownership, or requests for spiritual assistance. This association with artwork along trails is a pattern that is represented in the Late Prehistoric throughout central Montana (Philp 1990, 79-90; Greer and Greer 1994, 25-31; 1999, 59-71; USDA LCNF 2006b, 8-10). It is unclear when the native tribes present at the time of Anglo settlement began utilizing the Rocky Mountain Front. The Blackfeet Confederacy (or Nitsitapii), made up of a loose amalgamation of the Pikuini (or Piegan) tribe, the Siksika (or Blackfoot), and the Kaini (or Blood), has utilized the plains north and east of the Rocky Mountain Front since at least the 1600s, arriving in what would become south-central Canada and Montana as a result of the “domino effect created by the arrival of early European settlers on the east coast” (Bryan 1996, 6), although some archeological studies date Blackfeet habitation of the Front to around 1000 y.a. To the Blackfeet, the Rocky Mountain Front was known as “Mistakis” – the Backbone of the World, and despite uncertainty over the date of their initial migration to the Front, it is clear that by the late 1700s, the Blackfeet dominated the Front (Ewers 1944, 7-8; Picton and Picton 1975, 5; Ashby 1985, 4-6; Teton County History Committee 1988, 12; USDA LCNF 1993a; 1993b; Bryan 1996, 6-7; Keller 1996; Spence 1999, 72-76; Reeves and Peacock 2001, 70-82). In the early 1800s, explorer and fur trapper David Thompson described the territory of the Blackfeet Confederacy as being won “by right of conquest” and extending from the “foot of the Rocky Mountains, southward to the north branches of the 50 Missourie, eastward for about three hundred miles from the Mountains and northward to the upper part of the Saskatchewan” (Thompson 1916, 345). The Blackfeet occupied a region already used by a variety of tribal communities, their arrival greatly reorganizing the political geography of the Rocky Mountain Front. The Shoshoni, once the dominant horse-utilizing tribe in the region, were pushed westward to the Great Basin and marginalized, leaving the southern Front, as well as some of their horses, to the Blackfeet. The Salish (or Flathead), the Pend d’Oreille (Kalispel or Pondera), and the Kutenai (Kootenai or Kootenay) were also pushed west, beyond the Continental Divide - the Salish living in the Flathead and Bitterroot Valleys of Montana, the Pend d’Oreille in western Montana and northern Idaho, the Kutenai along the present day Kootenai River, extending into British Columbia, each occasionally utilizing the east-west running mountain valley trails to reach the Front for buffalo hunts. Other tribes such as the Cree, the Assiniboine, and the Gros Ventre (Atsina) at times allied and traded with the Blackfeet. It is believed that through these channels, the Blackfeet obtained the gun, well before Anglo settlement of the region (Haines F. 1938, 429-37; Ewers 1944, 7-14; Hewes 1948, 3-12; Malouf 1956, 45-53; Buchholtz 1976, 2-4; McLeod and Melton 1986, VII-1- VII-7; Bryan 1996, 7-14). Early Anglo-American Exploration and Settlement of the Rocky Mountain Front Early Anglo exploration, mapping, and settlement of the Rocky Mountains was an expression of a larger Euro-American move into the continental interior. Resource- 51 oriented capitalism and geopolitical expansion motivated exploration and settlement. This settlement process was an attempt to organize unknown space in new imperial geographies that Europeans and Americans could conceptualize, plan around, and ultimately exploit. However, exploration, description, and exaggeration of the American West placed the Rocky Mountains, indeed much of Montana, in a peripheral position to European and American settlement and exploitation (Meinig 1972; 1986; 1993; Allen 1975, 1-47; Harris 1997; 2008; Wyckoff 1999). By the end of the eighteenth century, the precise geography of the Intermountain West remained unclear to Euro-American explorers. Some of the earliest maps of the Missouri River, based on the reports of French explorer Marquette, show the great watercourse as a small stream, though it was described in his writings as a river “of considerable size, coming from the northwest, from a great distance” – a description sparking notions of a Northwest Passage to the Pacific (Allen 1975, 5). By the mid- eighteenth century, European governments believed that, as the French explorer Antione Simon le Page du Pratz described, that a ship could navigate the Missouri to its source and then, following a short portage, descend into the “Beautiful River,” which would lead ultimately to the Pacific Ocean. The information, based on the description of a native who had made the journey, was “the central ingredient of … geographic knowledge which, when interpreted in the light of early nineteenth-century American thought, was to form the basis of Thomas Jefferson’s image of the Northwest and the chief objective of the Lewis and Clark Expedition” (Allen 1975, 14). 52 British cartographers also sought to unveil a navigable passage to the Pacific, though much of their explorations were focused to the north from the trans-Missouri region. Instead, they focused on the Saskatchewan watershed, a portage across interior mountains “passable by Horse, Foot, or Wagon in less than half a day,” and a connecting river system that ran ultimately to the “South Sea” (Allen 1975, 18-19). Key to most British interpretations of the American West was the idea of a Continental Divide. Critical to this representation was Peter Fidler’s sketch map of the Missouri River, the Snake and Columbia Rivers, and the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 2-4). Drawn in 1801 by a 53 Figure 2-4. Ac Ko Mok Ki map. Map courtesy of Hudson’s Bay Company Archives, Provincial Archives of Manitoba. Blackfeet chief, the map covers over two hundred thousand square miles and provides an interesting look into the geographic understanding of the Blackfeet. Fidler’s map, known as the Ac Ko Mok Ki map, described some of the more prominent features of the Front, including Chief Mountain (labeled Nin nase tok que), the Two Medicine River (Na too too kase), Heart Butte (Us ke chip), possibly the Teton River (Oo ne ceese), Deep Creek (Pistin is), and the Sun River (Na-tus). Fidler’s sketch map would also become a key component of London cartographer Aaron Arrowsmith’s 1802 map of North America, a map well known to Jefferson and the Lewis and Clark Expedition (Allen 1975, 18-22, 76-83; Moodie and Kaye 1977, 4-15; Philp 1990, 198-208). As the eighteenth century came to a close, the European geopolitical chessboard very much included interior North America. “Three hundred years of reconnaissance and conquest had brought all of North America within the claims of imperial powers, and by 1800 the actual lineaments of the continent were rapidly being sketched in” (Meinig 1986, 422). The Spanish had successfully extended their influence across much of the southwest and into the Missouri Valley. The British, in part through the charter granted to the Hudson Bay Company to trade with natives, sought to define a vast region in the north as British North America. The French, following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, established a chain of trading posts, missions, and settlements along the interior waterways of North America, allying with many of the native tribes with whom they traded. Russian officials, traders, and commercial companies connected the northwest coast of North America to Eurasia. The United States had emerged from revolution as one 54 of the world’s largest states, extending from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi – a watercourse to which, by right of treaty and “Nature,” they claimed unfettered access and navigation. In 1800 and then again in 1803, the geopolitical space of the European North American interior underwent a major transformation, first with the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France in the Treaty of San Iledefonso and then the purchase of Louisiana by a United States government anxious to control the North American interior waterways and a possible transcontinental passage to the Pacific (Meinig 1986, 284-88, 422-26; 1993, 4-14; Wyckoff 1999, 29-33; Guelke and Hornbeck 2001, 264-65; Martis 2001, 154; Harris 2001, 65-88; 2008, 92-136). The Louisiana Purchase “ushered in a new era of expanding American influence across the western interior,” including Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front (Wyckoff 1999, 33). Meriweather Lewis and William Clark’s Corps of Discovery left camp near present day Hartford, Illinois in May, 1804 with the object of the mission as the exploration of the Missouri River, “& such principal stream of it, as, by its course and communication with the waters of the Pacific ocean, whether the Columbia, Oregon, Colorado or any other river may offer the most direct & practicable water communication across this continent for the purposes of commerce” (Meinig 1995, 32). Control by the United States was therefore a commercial venture as well as a geopolitical imperative. By the summer of 1805, the Corps of Discovery was within sight of the Rocky Mountain Front. On June 14, the expedition reached the confluence of the Missouri and Mah-pah-pah,-ah-zhah, (the Medicine, or Sun River). Lewis’ description of the course of 55 the Sun as located “in the rocky Mountains” and passing “though a mountainous, broken and woody country” is fitting of the Front. Based upon information derived from known geographical sources, such as Arrowsmith’s map, as well as those culled from natives, Lewis and Clark had significant reason to suspect that the route to the Columbia ran along the westernmost branch of the Missouri’s forks and that the branch was “navigable to the foot of a chain of high mountains, being the ridge which divides the waters of the Atlantic from those of the Pacific Ocean.” This ridge was still believed to be a short portage, with the Columbia, the Pacific, and the realization of the dream that was the Northwest Passage just beyond (Allan 1975, 247-50). The Corps of Discovery never did find their short crossing to the Columbia. Instead, they struggled for weeks up the diminishing Jefferson and Beaverhead rivers, crossing the Continental Divide at Lemhi Pass. Their journey to the Pacific would skirt the Rocky Mountain Front; they crossed, mapped, and tentatively explored the Teton, Sun, and Dearborn rivers. Yet the cordillera remained terra incognita and on the return trip, both Lewis and Clark were anxious to add to their map. In July, 1806, Lewis and Clark divided their party at the confluence of the Bitterroot and Clark Fork rivers; Clark’s intent was to explore the Jefferson and Yellowstone rivers while Lewis struck out across the Front, following the Blackfoot, crossed the Divide at the misnamed Lewis and Clark Pass, and then traveled down the Sun River to the Missouri (Figure 2-5). As they came out of the mountains, Lewis made note of Haystack Butte and a section of the Old North Trail (Lewis M. et al 1983 vol.8, 95-105). 56 Lewis and Clark’s expedition achieved many of its goals; first and foremost it asserted American control of the Missouri River watershed. It provided the federal government an immense amount of geographic knowledge, and Jefferson wasted no time in applying that knowledge toward geopolitical and economic ends. Lewis even recommended the construction of a fort and depot on the Clearwater River at the western foot of the Rockies as a node of power, trade, and diplomacy. The Corps of Discovery also sent samples and descriptions of the flora and fauna they encountered; especially of interest to the commercial markets of London were the reports of large quantities of fur- bearing mammals. In a letter to Jefferson, Lewis reported that the Missouri was “richer in beaver and Otter than any country on earth” (Meinig 1993, 66; 1995, 34). By furnishing information on fur resources, and thereby helping to initiate the fur trade on the Missouri, Lewis and Clark aided in linking an expanding capitalist American 57 Figure 2-5. A Map of Lewis and Clark’s Track, Across the Western Portion of North America. Map courtesy of David Rumsey Map Collection. and European market to Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front. The fur trade radically reorganized the geographies of the Rocky Mountains, imposing a “new spatial system across the Rockies” that ultimately extended American control over the Northwest, hastened the marginalization of native tribes such as the Blackfeet, and brought some species to near extinction (Wyckoff and Dilsaver 1995, 12). In 1807, Manuel Lisa, a Louisiana-born Spaniard, together with Corps of Discovery interpreter George Drouillard (and later met by John Colter, another member of the party), journeyed up the Missouri to the confluence of the Yellowstone and Bighorn rivers, constructed a trading post, and initiated the American fur trade in Montana. From the north, the Canadian Northwest Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company made entrées into the Montana fur trade. American entrepreneurs, such as the Missouri Company and the Astorian American Fur Company, also turned their gaze upon the Rockies. The impulse to commoditize pelts for eastern fashion resulted in a strategic network of posts, trails, and rendezvous sites that extended far beyond the Rockies and revolved around an annual cycle of operations that effectively constructed, supplied, and reinforced posts, managed an army of trapper- employees, processed and sorted furs for market, and shipped western furs to eastern, European, and even Asian markets. In 1821, the Hudson’s Bay Company and Northwest Company merged, the British crown granting the newly re-organized Hudson’s Bay Company a twenty-one year monopoly on fur trade in the Pacific Northwest. By 1833, content with their consolidation of the Columbia River trade, the Hudson’s Bay Company signed an agreement with the American Fur Company, each promising to keep out of the 58 other’s territory. By 1850, dozens of trading posts dotted the upper Missouri and surrounded the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 2-6) (Wishart 1979, 115-204; Malone et al 1991, 41-46; Meinig 1995, 34-124; Wyckoff 1999, 33-41). 59 Figure 2-6. 19th century western Montana trading posts and military forts. Map by author (Taylor et al 1975a; 1975b). The fur trade on the Missouri had a dramatic effect on the native tribes of the Rocky Mountain Front; the pressure to convert ecosystems from subsistence to commodity eroded tribal systems of hunting and gathering in less than a century. Early attempts to trap and trade in Blackfeet territory met with limited results; a short period of successful commerce usually ended abruptly with violence, burned forts, and an unprofitable retreat. But in 1830, the American Fur Company, with the aid of Kenneth McKenzie and interpreter James Kipp, brokered a treaty with the Blackfeet. In 1831, Fort Piegan was established on the Marias River. Two years later, the post was moved six miles further into Blackfeet territory. Well supplied and heavily financed, the American Fur Company was able to stave off competing organizations as well as global market downswings. When the Blackfeet let it be known that independent trapping in Blackfeet territory was negatively viewed, the Astorians encouraged the tribe to deliver pelts directly to the post. As a result of their increased commerce with the trading posts, as well as an increasing dependence on Anglo commodities such as fabric, guns, and perhaps most notoriously, alcohol, the Blackfeet began a gradual migration south, wintering on the northern branches of the Missouri. When the global market for beaver pelts waned in the 1830s, the American Fur Company encouraged the Blackfeet to bring bison robes instead for trade. The Blackfeet would bring dressed robes to the posts each spring, where they were baled and shipped by steamboat to St. Louis. Their increasing dependence upon Anglo trade goods, contraction of diseases such as smallpox, and the accelerated 60 slaughter of the bison dramatically severed Blackfeet ties from their former lifeways (Ewers 1944, 22-27; Wishart 1979, 115-74; Philp 1990, 245-55). Global geopolitical events in the mid nineteenth century bolstered the federal government’s claim to the Pacific Northwest and the Rocky Mountain region. The 1846 recession of British claims on Oregon Territory below the 49 th parallel and the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidlago gave the United States statutory access across the North American continent. The federal government rapidly initiated plans for increased economic development, settlement, and organization of the Intermountain West. Towards those ends, in 1853, Congress appropriated funds for a series of surveys to identify a route that was “practicable, economical, national, and equitable” (Meinig 1998, 8). Four routes were selected for survey, roughly running the lengths of the 32 nd , 35 th , 38 th , and 47 th parallels, the latter to cross much of the Montana. The surveys were to be an early example of the increasing relevance and reliance on science and engineering as a means on which to base public policy. The 47 th parallel survey, led by the newly appointed governor of Washington Territory, Isaac Stevens, divided in several groups to maximize the surveyed territory, set out in 1853 from St. Paul, MN, Fort Union Trading Post, and the Cascade Mountains. His instructions were both simple and incredibly complex; he was to “in short … collect every species of information bearing upon the question of railroad practicability” (Goetzmann 1959, 279). By the fall, Stevens’ party had reached the Rocky Mountain Front and had located five passes across the Rocky Mountains – the Marias, the Lolo, the Hellgate, the Lewis and Clark, and Cadotte’s Pass with Cadotte’s 61 preferred by Stevens. Stevens’ exploration of the Rocky Mountain Front took him along the Teton, Sun, and Dearborn rivers and allowed him to make observations on regional climate, flora, and fauna. Ultimately, Stevens’ route was not selected, but the result of his expedition had dramatic effects on Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front region; Stevens’ survey added a wealth of geographic data to the body of knowledge. Furthermore, the Stevens’ survey resulted in Montana’s first improved American road, the Mullan Road, and a linkage to the Pacific Northwest (Goetzmann 1959, 262-304; 1966, 303-31; Philp 1990, 258-60; Malone et al 1991, 72-74; Meinig 1995, 173; 1998, 4-28; Wyckoff 1999, 36-37). The creation of the Mullan Road, a military trail connecting Fort Benton on the upper Missouri and Fort Nez Perces in the Coeur d’Alene Valley of the Columbia, was emblematic of a further expression of the desire by the federal government for greater economic order in the Intermountain West. Beginning in 1859, Army engineers extended the Mullan Road east from the Palouse and into western Montana. In 1860, John Mullan, a veteran of Stevens’ railroad survey, continued the road up the Clark Fork and Little Blackfoot rivers, over Mullan Pass near Helena, and finally to Fort Benton. In 1862, Fort Benton was connected by an overland route to the east, itself a legacy of the Stevens survey; the Minnesota-Montana Road followed Stevens’ route from Minnesota to Fort Benton, each wagon train supported by United States military escort. Supply routes such as the Bozeman Trail and the Corinne-Virginia City Road connected southwest Montana, as well as the Rocky Mountain Front via the Mullan Road, to the Union Pacific 62 transcontinental railway and these linkages became major transportation and supply arteries for Montana’s burgeoning gold fields (Figure 2-7). As settlement boomed, the Corinne-Virginia City Road became a trunk line for stage routes that serviced most of Montana’s western and Rocky Mountain Front towns (Oviatt 1965, 168; Goetzmann 1966, 401-02; Malone et al 1991, 72-78). The discovery of gold transformed Montana’s human geography. The prospect of fantastic wealth lured a flood of migrants to Montana, some seeking gold, some to reap their fortune by supplying goods and services at often-exorbitant rates, and others looking for the opportunity to settle. With the great mineral rushes in California, Nevada, and Colorado flagging, prospectors filtered into the northern Rocky Mountains searching for new lodes. Sizable finds were discovered in late summer of 1862 on a tributary of the 63 Figure 2-7. 19th century trails and roads across Montana (Malone et al 1991, 93). Beaverhead River in southwest Montana and by the fall, the boomtown of Bannack City was home to nearly five hundred people. By spring of 1863, following a strike at Alder Gulch, a new mineral boom was underway (Oviatt 1965, 168-76; Malone et al 1991, 64-91; Keller 1996, 81-117). Mineral discoveries in southwest Montana had large-scale consequences for the Rocky Mountain Front. Until miners, shopkeepers, and settlers began their relentless advance on the northern Rocky Mountains, Montana was a geopolitical, economic, and cultural periphery; western Montana was, up until 1861, merely the eastern-most border of Oregon and Washington territories. Montana east of the Continental Divide was the western border of the ambiguous Great Plains “Indian Country” and Nebraska Territory. The rush of miners to the northern Rockies, and the need for more localized territorial control, prompted Congress to carve the enormous Idaho Territory out of the Washington, Dakota, and Nebraska territories. The geographic difficulties of legislating, policing, and taxing such a large territory forced Congress in 1864 to further subdivide Idaho Territory, creating Montana Territory (Oviatt 1965, 168; Malone et al 1991, 92-99). Mineral discoveries continued at a rapid pace through the 1860s. Rough and ready migrants carved a network of trails and roads that were often incomplete, lacked anything resembling sufficient drainage, and were as transient as the population. Packers, teamsters, and storekeepers claimed a share of the gold coming out of Rockies; freight moved westward from Fort Benton and the Missouri River and along the Rocky Mountain Front on the Mullan Road to the upstart town of Helena. Merchants from the 64 Pacific Coast, the Palouse, and Utah sought to claim a piece of the profits as well; in 1865 Washington and Oregon newspapers began a campaign for federal improvements of the Mullan Road. Though ultimately unsuccessful, this push for funds focused attention on the profits that could be made in Montana, and the need for local supplies (Daily Oregonian 1865, 5 June; Oviatt 1966, 168-76; Meinig 1995, 201-40). In the fall of 1869, Robert Vaughn settled along the Sun River, nine miles east of the Mullan Road crossing and began grazing cattle. By 1870, a livestock industry emerged on the Rocky Mountain Front; Conrad Kohrs, James Gibson, R.S. Ford, and Thomas Dunn were among the first to drive cattle to the Front to graze the bison land. With the decimation of the bison population nearly complete, cattlemen brought herds north to graze on the native grasses and pastures that grew in the mountain valleys and wide-open plains. Cattle were allowed to roam the plains freely and were only subject to communal round-ups in the spring – for branding and calf count – and in the fall to cull beef steers for slaughter. Cattlemen organized round-ups along hydrographic regions; round-ups were several day affairs involving as much as fifty hands with the expense divided among the ranchers based on the number of calves branded (Vaughn 1900, 64-71; Fletcher 1932, 1-12; Albright 1933, 195-202; Philp 1990, 276-77; Jordan 1993, 267-307; Keller 1996, 81-86; Starrs 1998). Sheep were driven to the Rocky Mountain Front as early as 1870. Centered around present day Choteau and Dupuyer, sheep were herded into large bands numbering as much as five thousand head and were tended by a hired shepherd. The herder moved 65 the band in seasonal patterns of transhumance. In June, the sheep were sheared; in winter, the sheep survived on hay grown on a home ranch or purchased from outside sources (Dupuyer Centennial Committee 1977, 205-29; Rowley 1985, 1-21; Teton County History Committee 1988, 219; Keller 1996, 87). The open range system made estimating the livestock population of the Rocky Mountain Front difficult. In 1880, Chouteau County reported 19,557 head of cattle, 4,004 sheep, and 966 horses. An 1884 census reported 100,000 cattle, 60,000 sheep, and 10,000 horses in Chouteau County. This dramatic growth is emblematic of the open range era, even though it came at a large environmental and economic cost. It is no coincidence that the rise of open range cattle across the Rocky Mountain Front reached its apex as the bison disappeared. By the late 1870s, the “commons” style use of the Front combined with the eventual bust of mineral extraction enterprises and resulted in an overstocked and overgrazed range. Unable to sell their stock, cattlemen either drove their herds to “greener pastures” or continued allowing unrestricted grazing. One reporter stated, after touring the plains outside of Fort Benton in 1883, that he “saw there the results of grazing land for free ranging … such an enormous number of cattle have been on the lands … that the grass has been eaten up and there is scarcely a probability that for many years to come of there being sufficient feed for cattle” (Benton Weekly Record 1883, 15 February, 4) (USDC 1882, 162; Philp 1990, 290; Keller 1996, 94). The winter of 1886-1887 forever changed the livestock geographies of the Rocky Mountain Front. A hot, dry summer and a poor national beef market left hundreds of 66 thousands of undernourished head of livestock to winter on the already depleted plains. By November, most of the ground was covered in snow so deep that the cattle could not feed. A cold front that saw temperatures drop well below zero followed a brief Chinook in January. The Chinook had melted much of the snow to standing water; the front turned that water into ice. By the time it was over, the winter of 1886-1887 had claimed nearly sixty percent of all the cattle in Montana – well over 360,000 head. Along the Sun, Teton, and Marias rivers, an estimated forty percent of the herds perished. The winter signaled the death knell to open range ranching on the Montana plains. Many of the large open range ranches relied upon extensive lines of credit to operate and expand their herds; once creditors called in their loans, open range ranchers, such as the Niobrara Cattle Company, were forced to liquidate much of their assets. Furthermore, the harsh realities of over-grazed ranges and extreme climates encouraged stockmen to invest in smaller herds and led to the acquisition of home ranches (Picton and Picton 1975, 12; Malone et al 1991, 165-71; Keller 1996, 97-98; Starrs 1998, 12). The expanding cattle/sheep frontier extended an Anglo-American settlement pattern that relied upon federal support in the form of cheap, easily available land, the reservation of indigenous peoples, and government subsidization of transportation systems. This pattern was an “imperious” and “relentless” geographic occupation accompanied by Anglo-American people, institutions, flora, and fauna (Starrs 1998, 4). Between 1789 and 1867, the United States government acquired its North American continental empire through a process of exploration, annexation, purchase, warfare, 67 capitalistic enterprise, and negotiation and immediately sought to distribute its land to the populace. In 1812, the General Land Office was created and tasked with the monumental task of managing, investigating, platting, and transferring almost a billion and a half acres to individuals, states, and corporations. The right of preemption, including the right of a settler to obtain public land at a fair or modest price and the surety that settlers could gain access to land that was as yet unsurveyed, was hotly debated throughout the mid- nineteenth century; finally by 1841, land, surveyed or not, was open to settlement. The 1862 Homestead Act pushed American frontier settlement to its inevitable conclusion; the Act entitled up to 160 acres of land to be entered into preemption at a price as low as $1.25 per acre and proof that the land had been improved upon. All unsurveyed land to which native title had been removed was open to settlement. The Desert Land Act of 1877 increased the allowable acreage to 640 acres at $1.25 per acre, provided the settler agreed to irrigate portions of the land within three years of preemption. The 1873 Timber Culture Act allowed the settler to substitute the cultivation of trees as proof of homestead land improvement. The 1878 Timber and Stone Act allowed for the sale of nonagricultural land to the public for timber and quarry use (Gates 1968, 59-86, 127-28, 219-47, 387-434; Meinig 1998, 163-67; Starrs 1998, 38-60; Guelke and Hornbeck 2001, 261-83; Wright 2003, 85-110; Steen 2004, 4-9). In the Rocky Mountain Front, the Homestead Act and Desert Land Act coincided with the mining boom and open range livestock era. Ranchers created home ranches on homesteaded acreage or claimed well watered, but disparate sections, effectively 68 claiming all of the surrounding land as their own open range. Mineral discoveries in southwest Montana brought population and commercial opportunity to the Front. “The traffic on the (Mullan) Road was very great during the boating season on the upper Missouri, … consequently more settlers came into the valley” (Vaughn 1900, 70). Under the Desert Land Act, sizable cattle companies along the Front preempted large acreages, thereby fueling fears that settlement would be closed to the common man. By 1881, acreage homesteaded in eastern and central Montana under the Desert Land Act was larger than in any other territory in the United States (Benton Weekly Record 1880, 20 February, 3; Butte Miner 1882, 30 August; Vaughn 1900, 64-71; Albright 1933, 195-202; Philp 1990, 276-77; Keller 2001, 21). The federal government also played a critical role in the reservation of native people. In 1851, the tribes of the eastern Montana plains, including the Crow, Shoshone, Assiniboine, and Sioux, met with United States government agents and signed the Treaty of Fort Laramie. For the federal government, the Treaty served several functions: perhaps most importantly, it delineated territorial claims for each tribe (Figure 2-8), including the Blackfeet, who were not in attendance and did not sign the treaty; it guaranteed the safe passage of Anglo settlers across native lands; it further tied the tribes to the federal government by instituting the payment of a $50,000 annuity to each tribe for a period of ten years; finally, each tribe agreed that roads, trails, and forts could be built in native territory. In 1855, U.S. Commissioner Isaac Stevens re-crossed the Rockies and, at the mouth of the Judith River, negotiated a treaty with the Blackfeet, Flathead, Pend 69 d’Orielle, Kootenai, and Nez Perce tribes that declared a perpetual peace between the Blackfeet, the United States, and with all surrounding tribes. Nearly two-thirds of eastern Montana was reserved for the Blackfeet and Gros Ventre tribes. Land south of a line drawn from Hell Gate in the Rockies to the Musselshell River was declared a commons, wherein all tribes in attendance could freely hunt bison, but could not establish permanent settlement. In return, the Blackfeet would receive $20,000 in annuities for ten years; $15,000 was to be spent annually by the United States to establish agriculture on Blackfeet land and to fund schools for Blackfeet children. By 1858, irrigation ditches had been dug along the Sun River and the Indian Agency Farm was established, signaling the 70 Figure 2-8. Map of Native American territory following 1851 Fort Laramie treaty. Map drawn by Pierre de Smet (Library of Congress). future of Blackfeet settlement in the Front (Ewers 1944, 37-41; McLeod and Melton 1986, VII-6; Teton County History Committee 1988, 12-15; Malone et al 1991, 114-17; McKay 1994, 17; Bryan 1996; Wyckoff 1999, 37). These agreements forever changed the relationship of the native people of the Rocky Mountain Front to the United States federal government. Initially, binding the Blackfeet to designated reserved lands was largely an exercise in futility; violence, aggression, and retaliation often erupted as the Blackfeet attempted to continue their known lifeways. The gold rush precipitated further conflict; prospectors migrating west often traversed the plains via steamboat, disembarking at Fort Union. From there, they went overland toward the goldfields of southwest Montana, often crossing, and hunting on the communal bison grounds designated by the 1855 treaty. Alarmed by the scale of invasion, Blackfeet raiding parties frequently attacked migrants and settlers alike. The violence culminated with the 1870 Baker Massacre - a slaughter of 173 natives, including fifty-three women and children, by the United States Army (Ewers 1944, 40-45; Malone et al 1991, 114-20; Spence 1999, 75-76; Welch and Stekler 2007, 27-29). The Baker Massacre effectively ended Blackfeet resistance to reservation life. Growing more and more destitute, the Blackfeet became increasingly tied to federal aid. Following the 1855 treaty, a management agency was established at Fort Benton from which annuities were dispersed. By 1869, when it was relocated to the Teton River near present day Choteau, the Agency was already a notorious place, rife with corruption and graft. The Agency was located on “a reservation of very superior agricultural lands ten 71 miles square on the Teton” and included “a farmer’s and agent’s house, store, hospital, school house and blacksmith shop enclosed in a substantial stockade and 24 houses for Indians outside the stockade capable of housing 500 or 600 Indians” (Montana Post 1869, 26 March). Two trading posts were licensed to locate near the Agency in an attempt to reel in the dwindling bison robe trade. The Agency remained the functional, albeit corrupt and mismanaged, center for Blackfeet commerce and control until it was abandoned in 1876 and the “very superior agricultural lands” divided and sold to Anglo settlers (Helena Weekly Herald 1883, 24 May; Teton County History Committee 1988, 17-18). In 1871 the United States government abandoned the long-held practice of negotiating with native tribes as separate nations – negotiations with nations require treaties and congressional approval. Instead, decisions relating to the disposition of native tribes were administered through executive order, thereby eliminating negotiation and in many cases, tribal differences. For the Blackfeet, this resulted in a dramatic recession of their allotted hunting land. Two executive orders issued in 1873 and 1874 by President Grant pushed the southern boundary of the Blackfeet territory north to Birch Creek and the Marias River, thereby opening up land for homestead settlement. By the late 1870s, the depredation of the bison herd had become nearly complete and malnutrition among the tribe rampant. Nearly one quarter of all Blackfeet in Montana died of starvation in the winter of 1883-1884. To settlers, stockmen, and railroad promoters, the reservations seemed massive and virtually devoid of human settlement and they pressured legislators for a reduction in reservation size and more opportunities to settle on former native 72 territory. So continued the practice of trading land and control for subsistence; in exchange for life-saving annuities, the Blackfeet accepted the session of 17,500,000 acres in 1887. In 1896, the Blackfeet ceded a strip of land on the western border of their reservation (Figure 2-9) in exchange for continued federal support (Ewers 1944, 45-53; Ashby 1985, 1-32; Philp 1990, 282-89; Malone et al 1991, 114-20, 139-44; Keller 1996, 78-80; Spence 1999, 79-82). The United States Congress recognized early that federal support for internal improvements, such as roads, canals, and railroads, was essential to the extension of Anglo-American settlement in interior regions. Providing financial assistance to private 73 Figure 2-9. Blackfeet Reservation land cessions. Map by author (Ewers 1944, 46). corporations in exchange for infrastructure construction and management was viewed as a crucial element in stimulating rural settlement and spurring economic development of the frontier. Therefore, in 1862 and 1864, the Pacific Railway Acts were passed, providing for extensive land grants to Pacific-oriented railroads. The railway would then sell the land as a means to build up traffic along their line. Along the transcontinental railroad lines, land was granted in alternate, checkerboard sections coinciding with the Public Land Survey System township and range designation along each side of the right- of-way. In Montana, transcontinental railroad land grants totaled roughly fifteen million acres, or nearly sixteen percent of total Montana acreage. The Northern Pacific Railroad (NPRR) was granted extensive lands through Montana; the NPRR was granted forty sections of land per mile of track laid through Montana (Figure 2-10). To compensate for 74 Figure 2-10. Map showing the land grant of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (Library of Congress). land previously homesteaded, preempted, or allocated to native reservations, an additional ten miles on each side of the right-of-way was granted to the NPRR as well. With its route completed in 1883, the NPRR became the largest private landowner in Montana and one of its most fervent promoters (Gates 1968, 341-86; Wood 1968; Mercer 1982, 1-15; Malone et al 1991, 172-78; Mickelson 1993; Schwantes 1993, 38-51; Meinig 1998, 4-28; Smith and Hoy 2009). Capital investment played a significant role in spurring Montana’s railroads. Mormon investors in the early 1870s, already capitalizing on trade to the gold, silver, and copper regions in southwest Montana via the Corinne Road, sought to tie that mineral wealth to the already completed Union Pacific transcontinental railroad. They organized the Utah Northern Railroad Company (UNRC) and by 1878, control in the UNRC had been secured by the governing interests of the Union Pacific. Construction pushed rapidly across Idaho and southwestern Montana, reaching Butte, MT in 1881. In addition, “Empire Builder” James Hill saw the booming silver and copper mines of Butte and the open high-line plains of northern Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front as promising investment opportunities. Between 1887 and 1893, Hill’s Great Northern Railway and the associated Montana Central Railroad connected the Butte mines and the Front ranches to the Great Lakes. To connect his line to the Pacific, Hill engaged engineer John Stevens to locate the elusive “lost Marias pass;” Stevens would locate Marias Pass in a December blizzard and the Great Northern was extended across the Continental Divide to Everett, WA. Hill’s partners, including Paris Gibson, secured large tracts of land ahead of the 75 actual track and platted, promoted, and sold townsites and homesteads alike along the route, greatly increasing the overall profit of the line as well as encouraging a substantial wave of migration to the Rocky Mountain Front (Lux 1963, 2-14; White W. 1983, 60-69; Malone et al 1991, 172-81; Roeder 1992, 4-19; Schwantes 1993, 38-51). The coming railroad brought a rush of activity to the Rocky Mountain Front. Timber for rail ties, construction shelters, and for use by the construction crews was an immediate necessity. By 1886, laborers hired by the Great Northern had located ample timber reserves along the North Fork of the Sun and Dearborn rivers. Timber cut from the North Fork near Headquarters Pass was floated down the Sun River to the Missouri. A small Indian and wildlife trail along the Sun River was extended to Gates Park. A separate road connected the tie hackers to Willow Creek, south of the Sun. Along the North Fork, the “tie hackers” and a handful of hearty squatters grazed cattle and horses, inadvertently providing Anglo place names to Sun River Canyon (Figure 2-11). Headquarters Creek, Home, Norwegian, and French gulches all owe their names to this settlement period (USDA LCNF 1992c; 1993a; 1993b; 2006b; 2008a). Between 1870 and 1890 an enduring settlement phase took hold along the Rocky Mountain front and created an assortment of small population clusters. Initial settlement was slow to develop - in 1870, the population of Chouteau County totaled 517; but by 1890 Chouteau County, population 4,741, had seen substantial growth. Homesteads were interspersed among the ranch houses and line shacks of the large cattle barons (USDC 1872, 46; 1895, 29). “Substantial log houses, the residences of hardy cattlemen and 76 ranchers, dot the Teton Valley to within ten miles of the Mountains. On the Muddy were S. Bynum, Smiley & Cowell, Austin & Black, Elliot, McCaster, Bannatyne, Fargo, Holland Bros., J. Arnold, and George Fry” (Sun River Sun 1884, 14 February). A settler named Joe Kipp built and operated a sawmill on Badger Creek in 1886-1887 to supply timber for nearby settlement on the plains (USDA LCNF 1960, 35). 77 Figure 2-11: Tie hacker camp on Headquarters Creek and the tie hacker road. Map by author (Ayres 1900; USDA FS 1912a). A collection of small towns supported the Front’s rural economies. Positioned upon well-watered bench lands, at fords and crossings, and at the confluence of creeks and rivers, these communities performed the role of localized commercial and administrative centers (Figure 2-12). Between 1867 and 1883, the communities of Sun River, Dearborn, Dupuyer, Choteau, and Augusta came into being. Some settlements, as in the case of Dupuyer and Bynum, were informal collections of settlers coalescing around the property of a prominent landowner. Others, like Choteau, were planned and platted in anticipation of future riches to be brought by the railroad. Often irrigation ditches were constructed surrounding the townships in order to spur settlement; in the summer of 1883 the Eldorado Ditch Company constructed a ditch from the Teton River to irrigate bench lands around Choteau. The Montana Land and Water Company developed a similar system to encourage settlement around the aptly named Farmington. Post offices at Dupuyer, Bynum, Belleview, Elizabeth, and Raymond helped connect the Front to the world outside of the mountains and prairie. Timber cut from the Dearborn, Sun, and Teton Rivers, was milled near Blackleaf and Augusta and used for town construction (Leeson 1885, 490-510, 754-63; Dupuyer Centennial Committee 1977, 1-18; Bynum Centennial Committee 1985, 1-60; Teton County History Committee 1988, 1-44, 77, 389; USDA LCNF 2004d; 2006b). The town of Great Falls, platted in 1883 by Paris Gibson and James Hill, became the cultural and economic center of the region. Connected via the Great Northern and Montana Central Railroads, Great Falls served as the gateway to the Rocky Mountain 78 Front. Merchants supplied the peripheral settlements with previously unavailable goods and the railroads provided more immediate access to markets around the world. By 1890 79 Figure 2-12: Rocky Mountain Front settlements, 1900. Map by author (Ayers 1900; Teton County History Committee 1988). Great Falls sustained a population of nearly four thousand people; by 1900, it more than doubled. The Rocky Mountain Front was at a turning point; the track had been laid, the resources were there, people were coming, and it was land that they wanted (USDC 1895; Philp 1990, 291-92). The Federal Forest Federal settlement policies of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century were intended to distribute land from the public domain to private ownership, thereby extending the hand of Anglo American settlement, commerce, and federal control. Land distribution policies were largely agrarian in nature; land transferred from the General Land Office via the Homestead and Timber Culture Acts required agricultural activity in order for land title to be proved. Little had been said of American forests, though many were beginning to notice the dramatic depletion of forest lands around the Adirondack Mountains and the Great Lakes. In the late nineteenth century, the public was beginning to see the lumber industry as an example of over-exuberant resource exploitation; the highly mobile industry carved great swaths out of forests and greatly destabilized watersheds and local economies alike (Glover 1986, 4-14; Williams 1989; Hays 1999, 4-30). Discussions on the rapid destruction of timber resources were reflective of the growing role of science in relation to federal exploration and policy. George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature (1864) warned of continued environmental deterioration unless 80 mankind altered its view on the material use of the natural world. Reports by the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, surveys by the United States Geological Survey and studies sponsored by private forestry associations added to the growing body of scientific and colloquial knowledge that emphasized the vulnerable nature of western forests and initiated calls for the government to preserve forests. In 1876, an appropriation to the Department of Agriculture allowed for the appointment of the first federal forester, Franklin B. Hough; Hough’s Report(s) Upon Forestry (1878) included discussions on land laws, transplanting trees, soil types and conditions, and forest resources. In 1881, forestry gained a level of bureaucratic gravitas; the Division of Forestry was created in the Department of Agriculture and Hough was named chief. Throughout his tenure, Hough repeated his belief that the government should utilize every weapon in protecting the public domain, though his remonstrations largely fell on deaf ears. In 1886, European trained forester Bernhard Fernow became the chief of the newly recognized Division of Forestry. Though Fernow had been trained in the scientific forestry management philosophy, he did not believe that the American public was ready for such a change. Instead, he believed the best use of the Division of Forestry was to provide information and technical advice to those who sought to practice scientific management on their own lands (Robbins 1985, 1-18; Hays 1999, 5-29; Steen 1991, 3-12; 2004, 4-16, 23-46). In 1882, the General Land Office reported hundreds of cases of timber depredation, totaling a half million dollars in fines; by 1886, timber trespass fines totaled 81 more than nine million dollars. Largely the result of burgeoning western settlement, the massive timber supplies required by railroad and mining activities, and a general lack of federal enforcement mechanisms, timber depredations, and to some extent the crowded western range and subsequent forest grazing practices of some livestock outfits, pushed the subject of forestry legislation to the forefront in Congress. In Montana, timber depredation resulted in a lawsuit in 1885 against the Montana Improvement Company - a lumber firm that supplied timber to the Butte mines, the Northern Pacific Railroad, and other Montana corporations. Though the lawsuit proved ineffective as a punitive action, it ultimately resulted in shining a light on the wanton abuse of Montana’s timber resources (Toole and Butcher 1968, 351-62; Robbins 1985, 1-7; Rowley 1985, 4-21; Malone et al 1991, 212-13; Steen 1991, 9-13; 2004, 17-30). By the end of the nineteenth century, the federal practice of public land disposal changed; the General Land Law Revision Act of March 3, 1891 – also known as the Forest Reserve Act - invested the President of the United States with the power to set aside public lands from settlement and preemption and invalidated the Timber Culture Act of 1873. Within a year, President Harrison set aside fifteen reserves totaling over thirteen million acres of western land. Management of these new Forest Reserves was placed under the auspices of the Department of the Interior. The Act was the result of decades of debate over the nation’s forested areas and added another level of federal involvement in the West, fundamentally altering the geographic development of the region (Wiener 1982, 1; Steen 1991, 1-3; 2004, 26-30). 82 The 1891 General Land Law Revision Act came about as Congress attempted to repeal the Timber Culture Act, claiming it a major source of western public land fraud. Though it empowered the President with the ability to set aside lands from the public domain, the Act neither provided personnel nor funding to administer and police the reserved lands, nor did it clarify to what extent the lands were to be used; in 1893, with the creation of the Cascade Reserve in Oregon, Congress placed a moratorium on the creation of more reserves until a mechanism for their administration could be determined. In December 1891, the American Forestry Association proposed that the Department of the Interior create a reserve in Montana called the Flathead and Marias River Reserve. In August 1892 the massive 4,480,000 acre reserve, spanning “the headwaters of the Flat- head river … and of the Marias, Teton, & Sun rivers” was submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for approval (USDI GLO 1892). Ultimately, it was not approved (USDA Office of Experiment Stations 1892, 434; Gates 1968, 558; Rowley 1985, 22-23). At the heart of the issue was the question of how the new forest reserves were to be used, if at all. The Division of Forestry and the American Forestry Association enthusiastically supported legislation that would re-open the reserves to sale, placing all public timberlands under military protection and returning all agricultural land in western forests to disposal. Opposition to the reserves and their federal management came largely from western sources – irrigators feared the loss of watersheds that continued cutting would bring; mine and railroad interests argued that timber sales going to the highest bidder would retard profits and limit economic growth in the West; settlers and many 83 within the federal government felt strongly sympathetic toward free timber use for homesteaders; and ranchers lamented the complete omission of any language relating to grazing rights in the reserves. In addition, opposition groups that attributed a spiritual, transcendent value to nature rather than a material, commercial one, argued that reserves should, where possible, be removed from all use other than preservation. The idea of scientific management also gained traction with forestry and irrigation associations. Scientific management made sense to an increasing body of land use reformers; its simple mathematics stated that annual timber cutting should never exceed annual growth (Fox 1985, 103-38; Rowley 1985, 22-31; Clary 1986, 3-22; Meyer 1997, 274-80; Nash 2001, 96-108; Steen 2004, 30-34; Worster 2005, 8-19). Legislation authorizing re-opening the reserves to sale repeatedly failed to pass. Instead, there was a growing sentiment toward further scientific study of the reserves in lieu of legislation; in 1896 the National Forest Commission of the National Academy of Sciences was commissioned by Congress and the Department of the Interior to survey and make recommendations on the future status, use, and management of the reserves. The Commission was a veritable who’s who of scientific forestry. Charles Sargent, the Harvard arborist and chair of the commission, had long been a supporter of federal forestry. General Henry Abbot was a retired U.S. Army Corps engineer and had been involved with the Pacific Railroad surveys of the 1850s. Alexander Agassiz, the curator of the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology, William Brewer, a botanist at Yale University and the California state biologist, and Arnold Hague with the United States 84 Geological Survey served on the commission as well. Finally, a young forester named Gifford Pinchot was given the job of commission secretary and encouraged to add his own observations and considerable passion to the survey. Naturalist John Muir would join the commission in the West (Pinchot 1998, 97-104; Steen 2001, 68-77; 2004, 30-34; Williams and Miller 2005, 32-33). Through the summer of 1896, the Commission toured forested areas in the Black Hills, Yellowstone, along the Great Northern Railway line, Oregon, and along the northern Rockies - including the Rocky Mountain Front. The examination of the Rocky Mountain Front by Pinchot and forester Henry Graves, a Yale University friend and the future Chief of the United States Forest Service, resulted in selective timber valuation studies and reflections on the role of fire in the region. As Pinchot noted, “We learned the lay of the land, and why this was the place for a Forest Reserve … The Lewis and Clark Forest Reserve came out of that trip” (Pinchot 1998, 98). Pinchot and Muir found a kindred enthusiasm, at least for the time being, in the promise of federal forestry. The Commission did not reach consensus on a number of items however. Pinchot, Hague, and others supported scientific forestry managed by a technocratic elite corps; Sargent disagreed, insisting that the military was the logical choice. Sargent also turned askance at the philosophy of scientific resource management. However, they did agree that there were forested areas in the West that needed federal protection. On the basis of their report, Secretary of the Interior David Francis advised President Grover Cleveland of the necessity of establishing thirteen new reserves, despite the objections of Fernow and the 85 American Forestry Association, which advocated a gradual reservation process to avoid bolstering western sentiment against federal control of heretofore “free” resources. On February 22, 1897 President Cleveland announced the addition of twenty one million acres to the federal forest reserve system (Figure 2-13). Among those created was the 2,926,080 acre Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve (Figure 2-14) (Steen 2001, 68-77; 2004, 30-34; Williams and Miller 2005, 37-39). Western response to Cleveland’s “Washington’s Birthday Reserves” was predictable; many saw the action as hindering the economic development of the region, “putting forth eastern solutions for western problems” and forever casting the West as a periphery, or “mere dependency” of the federal government (Rowley 1885, 28; Steen 86 Figure 2-13: 1897 “Washington’s Birthday Reserves.” Map by Judy Dersh and Ruth Williams (Lewis 2005, 40). 87 Figure 2-14: The Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve, 1897. As defined by Executive Order 833. Map by author (Ayres 1900). 2004, 33). The Commission’s study had promoted “federal forest issues to the front and center in a complex milieu that included the perceived western birthright to plunder federal land and resources, … (and) the forestry profession’s belief in the value of professionally managed public forests” (Wilkinson 1992, 123). Vociferous complaints came out of grazing interests; the National Forest Commission, strongly influenced by John Muir, had advised that grazing, especially sheep herding, be eliminated from the reserves (Rowley 1985, 22-31; Williams and Miller 2005, 37-39). Local sentiment was abjectly opposed to further reserve creation; the Montana state legislature, in conjunction with other western state government bodies, immediately passed a resolution requesting that Cleveland’s order be rescinded on the grounds that the reserves would “seriously cripple and retard … development” (Schutza 1975, 59). Others saw that the reservation question was not settled and that “the states of the whole northwest are too much interested to see such a vast extent of timber and mineral lands shut up without a protest” (The Inter Lake 1897, 26 February). Public sentiment against the Reserves in Montana was by no means universal. Naturalist and editor of Field and Stream George Bird Grinnell was “a leading voice for the preservation of wilderness landscapes” (Spence 1999, 76). In 1891, Grinnell initiated a movement to purchase the Glacier region of the Rocky Mountain Front. Worried over recurrent mineral trespass in the Front, Grinnell worked to include his “Crown of the Continent” in the 1897 Forest Reserves. George Ahern, a professor at Montana Agricultural College in Bozeman, MT, was a fervent supporter of federal forestry. Gifford 88 Pinchot credited Ahern as giving “the first systematic instruction in Forestry given in America” (Pinchot 1998, 100). Throughout the 1890s, Ahern lectured throughout Montana, rallying support for the Reserves by appealing to irrigation, livestock, forestry, and sportsmen organizations (Rakestraw 1959, 36-44). About the Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve, Ahern noted that it was “a reserve that did away with every reasonable objection” (Helena Independent 1897, 23 March) (Rakestraw 1959, 36-44; Spence 1999, 79-82). The National Forest Commission’s report failed to address perhaps the most important aspect of federal forest management: how, if at all, would the federal forest be used? Following a strident attempt by western legislators to immediately invalidate Cleveland’s reserves, Senator Richard Pettigrew of South Dakota, himself once an opponent of federal forestry, sponsored an amendment to a Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill. The so-called Pettigrew Amendment provided the first specified criteria for reserve use. Reserves protected watersheds and timber production; they excluded mineral and agricultural land. Settlers near each Reserve could file applications for free timber and stone. The Pettigrew Amendment passed the United States Senate easily as western senators feared that failure to pass would result in a forest reserve system wherein timber and water was locked away from use. No mention of grazing or free access by stockmen was made. Finally, authority for managing the Reserves was handed to the General Land Office (Rowley 1985, 30-31; Steen 2004, 34-37). 89 Conclusion Since first contact, human populations and institutions have imagined, evaluated, and manipulated the Rocky Mountain Front toward their personal, geopolitical, and material ends. Native peoples utilized the Front in a complex system that employed extensive and deeply personal geographic knowledge to meet the spiritual and material needs required of their lifeways. Early Anglo explorers sought to link the Front to a larger geopolitical realm through a process of mapping and strategizing that was an extension of a pervasive, relentless form of Anglo European capitalism and imperialism. Though exploration of the Front did not result in the discovery of the fabled Northwest Passage, it did add significantly to the body of known and supposed geographic knowledge of the region. That knowledge was used effectively to capitalize the natural resources of the region; furs, minerals, grassland, timber, and water were all converted into material wealth. Federal subsidization of the settlement processes, transportation, and the ultimate reservation of native peoples were all manifestations of clear land management philosophies that “are inherent in what we call capitalism, the basic organizing principal for much of the global economy from the onset of the Industrial Revolution to the present” (Robbins 1994, ix). What was left was an intricate mosaic of beliefs, landscape signatures, human and physical geographies, and deeply imbedded and rationalized discourses on the correct methods and ends of western land and resource management. At the moment of its reservation, the Lewis and Clark(e) was routinely used to supplement both local and corporate economies. Wagon roads constructed informally by 90 settlers led to the mouths of each major Rocky Mountain Front canyon where they eventually turned into small game trails. Locals used these roads and trails to access wood for fuel and to supply timber for town construction, posts, and poles. At least three mills operated within or near the eastern boundary of the reserve. Remnant Native American bands camped outside of the reserve boundaries and furnished the local townships with daily supplies of fuel wood. Along the North Fork of the Sun and the Dearborn, tie hackers still harvested timber for Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railroad replacement beams. Stockmen utilized the benchland and mountain valleys to summer herds of sheep, cattle, and horses. Local settlers used the reserve to augment their foodstuffs by hunting, fishing, and gathering. Some came to see the Lewis and Clark(e) as a place for recreation; by 1897 camping was gaining popularity in the reserve and a trip to the hot springs at Medicine (Arsenic) Springs was a common excursion. Though the population of the Front was relatively sparse, the Lewis and Clark(e) was a well used and modified place as federal management began (Graetz and Graetz 2004b). The Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve exemplifies the federal role in shaping settlement patterns in the West, as well as an attempt to define the American West as a region where scientific and technological management could master nature and rationalize production. Born of the American conservation movement, the forest reserve system utilized governmental authority to intervene in the unchecked resource use that had already contributed to extensive and pervasive environmental degradation in the West. Though not fully realized at the time, the reserve system also represented the 91 federal government’s tacit acceptance of the increasing authority of a technocratic elite. By 1905, scientific management for the sustained yield of forest products embodied many of the management decisions made in the reserved forests across the West. The reserves were re-imagined by the soon-to-be created United States Forest Service to meet that imperative - in the process dramatically transforming its landscapes (Hirt 1994, 27-43; Scott 1998, 1-22; Hays 1999, 1-4, 27-48). 92 CHAPTER 3: THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1897 TO 1929 Introduction ! The creation of the Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve in 1897 marked the beginning of federal forest control in the Rocky Mountain Front. The United States Forest Service was created during an era of increasing federal largesse in the American West that reflects the early twentieth century modernization of the federal bureaucracy. This chapter first provides an overview of the national institutional setting between 1897 and 1929 that resulted in the evolving philosophies, policies, and mechanisms of United States Forest Service control and the imposition of research-based scientific and sustained-yield forestry on American public lands. Though developed far from the Lewis and Clark National Forest, these policies altered the landscapes, economies, and resource use of the Rocky Mountain Front. Local settlement along the Front is also assessed; national forest management polices were crafted in part to perpetuate extractive-resource economies and have influenced settlement patterns. Finally, Lewis and Clark National Forest patterns and landscapes associated with the agency’s utilitarian scientific forestry management imperative are reconstructed and described. Furthermore, this chapter begins to address questions of social power - specifically those that focus on how local and national economic and geopolitical events, cultural geographies, and nature influenced federal land management policy. Through both formal and informal processes, the management policies of the Lewis and Clark National Forest were transformed. 93 Landscapes were created that perpetuated and reinforced a way of western life that is typical in similar western settings. The General Land Office Era (1897-1905) On June 4, 1897, President William McKinley signed the Civil Sundry Appropriations bill into law. The Sundry Bill, also called the Organic Act, became the basis for federal forest management from its inception until augmented by the 1960 Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. In function, the Organic Act created a rationale for future reserve creation and a mechanism for reserve survey and management. Future and current reserves were to be created “to improve and protect the forest within the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.” The Organic Act effectively reduced the debate over potential reserve use to that of timber and water, but at the same time it left open the possibility of other uses under the mandate to “improve and protect” the forest (30 Stat. 34-36). Through this legislation, Congress made permanent public assets out of potential private lands and asserted control over millions of western acres. Overseeing reserve management was the General Land Office (GLO) of the Department of the Interior (USDI) with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) authorized to conduct reserve examinations (Rowley 1985, 29-32; Steen 2004, 34-36; Williams 2007, 6-9; Hays 2009, 16-27). 94 Between 1897 and 1905, the GLO struggled to develop an authoritative presence and management policy for the western forest reserves. GLO rangers were responsible for massive acreages of largely unsurveyed and unknown land and were often hired only because “they lived near the forest reserves they patrolled and knew the land and local customs” (Lewis 2005, 36). These men were likely unskilled in forestry, given their posts without as much as a civil service exam, and were “typically western types of men who had been in the forefront of the settlement and development of the states on this side of the Mississippi” (Greeley 1909a, 2-3). Some were local political appointees, the products of graft and patronage; Western politicians, eager to curry local favor, often scorned GLO attempts to appoint trained foresters to the reserves. Political appointees were allowed to serve on the reserves “at the pleasure of their superiors” until 1903, after which they were required to pass rudimentary forestry examinations for employment and served “as merit employees” (Alexander 1987, 22). Forest superintendents crafted policy for an entire state or group of states. Supervisors directed the work on a reserve and hired rangers to patrol the reserves for trespass and fire and, when time and limited budget allowed, work on shelter and trail improvements. In 1901, however, the GLO shifted its organizational scheme in an attempt to decentralize forest reserve administration. Encouraged by Gifford Pinchot and the USDA Forestry Bureau, the GLO dramatically rearranged its field force, placing supervisors in direct charge of their reserves. The GLO also established a head ranger on each forest, and relegated the role of superintendents to that of inspectors who were 95 charged with checking that supervisors and rangers were properly administering forest reserve regulations (USDI 1902, 323-24; Lowell 1944, 128; Swim 1944, 175; Alexander 1987, 20-24; Hays 1999, 38). The 1897 Organic Act contained a rider authorizing the USGS to conduct a survey of each forest reserve to delineate boundaries, describe timber and mineral resources, and provide an overview of nearby settlement and potential forest use. Trained foresters were transferred from the USDA’s Division of Forestry to the USGS to provide detailed information on size, location, density, and economic viability of each reserve’s timber resources. Survey crews were tasked with determining recent fire history, inventorying dead timber available for use, documenting the extent of timber depredation that had already occurred, and evaluating the effect of deforestation on watersheds. Topographical maps displaying timber, agricultural, and mineral lands were to be created. These reports formed a baseline of information, albeit highly inferential, from which forest reserve officers could develop management policy (Ayres 1900, 27-85; Baker et al 1993, 58-59; Steen 2004, 51-52; Williams 2007, 406-07; Evans and Frye 2009, 49-50). In June, 1897 the GLO crafted a series of Rules and Regulations Governing Forest Reserves. The entire text of Rules and Regulations encompasses only fourteen pages, with four of those providing a reprint of the Organic Act. Many of the early Rules asserted the federal government’s authority to manage, police, and create policy for the forest reserves. The public had the right to use the reserves but had no right of ownership. The Secretary of the Interior could grant or remove licenses, permits, and privileges “as 96 may seem to him proper and not inconsistent with the objects of the reservation nor inconsistent with the public interests” (USDI GLO 1897, 5). Five years later the GLO issued a new manual on policies and procedures governing the reserves. The 1902 Forest Reserve Manual for the Information and Use of Forest Officers continued to outline procedures for forest management, largely focused on timber regulations, sale procedures, and trespass punishment. Heavily influenced by Gifford Pinchot, the Forest Reserve Manual reminded forest officers that their first and foremost duty “is to care for the forest, and every act, every decision … should be guided by the thought, will it improve and extend the forest” (USDI GLO 1902, 3). To the organized forestry movement, improvement meant implementing sustained-yield forest management within the reserves and promoting its use to private foresters. Progressive Era conservationists believed that scientific forestry resulted in a reordered and restructured nature that guaranteed a continuous supply of timber, sustained managed grazing, and provided a guaranteed water supply to western settlement (Ise 1920, 143-200; Langston 1995, 86-113; Pyne 1997, 219-38; Hays 1999, 27-90; Steen 2004, 22-46). European scientific forestry found an obvious place in the Progressive Era conservation movement. Its emphasis on rational, scientifically informed planning implemented with ever-improving technologies offered a path away from boom and bust resource-based economies and the inevitable timber famines that followed. Scientific forestry originated in the mid eighteenth century in Prussia and Saxony and diffused into 97 France, England, and ultimately to the United States. Scientific forestry was based largely upon an economic view of forest resources. Forests were simplified into a measure of board feet of lumber and the natural world was transformed into a commodity. Unmarketable commodities were reclassified into weeds. Predators and pests were removed. Nineteenth century German foresters created elaborate tables illuminating conditions for optimal growth of desired timber crops with which they could estimate total growth of the forest. Once calculated, foresters could determine the amount of timber that could be cut in a forest on an annual basis, thereby creating a “sustained yield” of forest products. By cutting an amount of board feet equal to the annual growth, scientific forestry was akin to collecting the interest off a secure investment. Disorderly old growth forests were cut down, reseeded, thinned, and placed on a cutting rotation that was easy to measure. Scientific forestry initiated a transformation “from a wild to a cultivated forest (that) must be brought about by the ax” (USDA FS 1908, 15). Its predictability suggested that scientific forestry could stabilize local economies, provide a never-ending resource supply, and allow for the imposition of order in an otherwise chaotic world. Control and order in the forests made it possible for rules and protocols to be applied, even by lesser-educated rangers (Greeley 1909a, 7; Clepper 1971, 108; Rothman 1994, 6-7; Langston 1995, 86-122; Scott 1998, 11-52; Hays 1999, 27-48; Steen 2004, 38). However, scientific forestry did not have an immediate impact in the United States. Most European foresters disparaged the idea that scientific forest management 98 could take hold in the American West; the forests were too wild, too full of old growth, and distances between forest and market were too great. There was little support for scientific forestry within the federal government. Few believed that federally managed forests were necessary since timber reserves seemed nearly inexhaustible. Yet, in 1876 $2000 was appropriated to create a forestry agency within the Department of Agriculture. Over the next ten years, the Division of Forestry published four volumes titled Reports Upon Forestry that surveyed the timber situation in the United States, addressed scientific forestry questions such as the effect of forest on climate and watersheds, discussed various state land laws, and lobbied for the creation of forest reserves (Ise 1920, 62-118; Miller 1992a, 287-291; Steen 2004, 3-21). Bernhard Fernow took the helm of the Division of Forestry in 1886. His role was largely advisory – all public land was under the management of the GLO. Though he never enjoyed administrative control over American forests, Fernow had a dramatic impact on the nation’s growing faith in scientific forestry. Under his guidance, the Division of Forestry published nearly six thousand pages of technical studies. Many of Fernow’s arguments were framed in the Darwinian rhetoric of the day and focused on the economic and biological theory of competition. It was the forester’s duty to ensure that the strongest, and thereby the most economically useful, trees survived. Fernow believed that scientific forestry could be successful in the United States through intensive studies aimed at greater understanding of forest processes, strong federal control of forest 99 reserves, and the use of thinning and selective cutting strategies (Fernow 1899, 238-39; Miller 1992a, 287-300; Langston 1995, 104-08; Hays 1999, 27-48; Steen 2004, 22-46). In 1898 Gifford Pinchot replaced Fernow as the chief of the Division of Forestry. Pinchot was born in Connecticut into a wealthy family that built a fortune from extensive timber and land speculation. Heavily influenced by his father, Pinchot ventured to Europe to learn the principles of scientific forestry. Upon his return to the United States, Pinchot became the resident forester of George Vanderbilt’s Biltmore Estate, managed a 40,000- acre state forest in the Adirondack Mountains, and advised the GLO on structuring a competent forestry bureau within their agency. On his fifth day in office, Pinchot requested that his title be changed to Forester - a distinction he would carry his whole life. “In Washington chiefs of division were thick as leaves in Vallombrosa. Foresters were not…I have since been a Governor, every now and then, but I am a forester all the time-have been, and shall be, all my working life” (Pinchot 1998, 137). The reasons for making Pinchot chief “Forester” were clear; Pinchot would use his considerable energy, fortune, and name to move the Division towards practical scientific forestry. In this, Pinchot saw an opportunity to become the father of a new style of scientific forestry, one that contrasted with European forestry in the amount of detail needed for action. “The old Division saw too many lions in the path,” wrote Pinchot. “It held that before it could manage a forest growth intelligently it must know first of all the biology, or life history, of all the kinds of trees which compose it … Forestry in the land of the ingenious Yankee could be built on a whole lot less information than that…What America needed to hear 100 was not why Forestry couldn’t be practiced, but how it could” (Pinchot 1998, 134) (Miller 1992b, 1-20; Rothman 1994, 6-8; Pinchot 1998, 1-132, 134; Pittman 1999, 4-7; Hays 1999, 28-36; Steen 2004, 47-71). With no forest to manage on his own, Pinchot turned to offering technical advice on scientific management practices to private forestland owners. The Division of Forestry’s Practical Assistance to Farmers, Lumbermen, and Others in Handling Forest Lands, or Circular 21, offered advice, training, survey, and working plans to private owners “with a view to bring about the substitution of conservative for destructive methods” (USDA Division of Forestry 1889, 95-96). In its first year, the Division of Forestry received 123 applications across 35 states involving more than 1.5 million acres of land. Once applications were received, Division field agents surveyed and prepared working plans that included reforestation, systems for marking and cutting to encourage a healthy, growing forest, and fire-protection plans in exchange for expenses incurred by their field crews (Pinchot 1998, 1-132; Hays 1999, 28-36; Steen 2004, 47-71). Pinchot’s plan to demonstrate scientific forestry though private industry was a success and furthered the cause of forest conservation. By 1900, forestry schools at Cornell and Yale began educating young men in scientific forestry. However, change was not happening rapidly enough. Scientific forestry’s power could only be demonstrated by its use on the massive federal reserves in the West. In 1901, a formal agreement between the USDA and the Interior Department was struck to manage the federal forests in cooperative fashion. Interior Department personnel provided boundary and trespass 101 enforcement and handled logistical tasks. The USGS controlled land surveys. Foresters in the USDA administered technical forest management plans on the reserves. This shift portended further changes, but the cooperative plan proved deficient. Even the Commissioner of the GLO admitted that “the administrative features of forest reserves are at present in a very unsatisfactory condition…such a division of jurisdiction and responsibility is not conducive to the best results. I think it would be very much better to have the matter of the location and control of forest reserves all in one bureau” (USDI 1903, 22). Unconvinced of the ability of the Department of the Interior to manage reserves correctly, and unsatisfied with a role in a triumvirate, Pinchot actively lobbied congressmen, railroad and lumber corporations, and the American Forestry Association for the forest reserves to be fully transferred to the Department of Agriculture (Anaconda Standard 1901, 28 August, 4; Pinchot 1998, 1-132; Hays 1999, 28-36; Steen 2004, 47-71). Pinchot’s Forest Service (1905-1910) On February 1, 1905, authority to manage the forest reserves passed from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Forestry. The Transfer Act was more than just the political relegation of authority to manage forest reserves; it was the statutory transfer of the ideology of scientific forestry from Europe to the United States. Gifford Pinchot led the initiative and served as the USDA’s chief Forester. Believing that “the presence of properly trained foresters in the Agricultural 102 Department, as well as the nature of the subject, makes the ultimate transfer … to that Department essential to the best interests, both of the reserves and of the people who use them,” officials within the Department of the Interior supported the transfer (USDI 1903, 22-23). Federal committees, organized under President Theodore Roosevelt’s authority and guided by Pinchot, advocated the transfer as a method of publicly supporting government efficiency. Pinchot, with the support of the American Forestry Association, the American Forestry Congress, and President Roosevelt, crafted policy outlines for a USDA-run forest service. Pinchot laid out the general utilitarian principles under which the forests should be administered in a letter written for the Secretary of Agriculture’s signature. “All the resources of the forest reserves are for use,” the letter stated “…the policy of this Department for their protection and use will invariably be guided by this fact, always bearing in mind that the conservative use of these resources in no way conflicts with their permanent value” (Wilson 1905, 3-5). As to how the reserves would deal with local variability and conflict, Pinchot stated firmly that “local decisions will be decided upon local grounds; the dominant industry will be considered first … and where conflicting interests must be reconciled, the question will always be decided from the standpoint of the greatest good of the greatest number in the long run” (3-5). Pinchot’s employees took this statement as an enduring commitment to scientific forestry (USDI 1905, 324; Pyne 1997, 190-98; Pinchot 1998, 188-212, 235-62; Roth and Williams 2003, 1-10; Steen 2004, 71-78). 103 The transfer to the USDA resulted in a significant administrative restructuring; immediately following the transfer, Forester Pinchot was charged with replacing the “obsolete Forest Reserve Service of the General Land Office” and shifting public perception away from seeing these lands as “reserved” (Pinchot 1998, 263). Pinchot suggested that the Forestry Bureau be renamed the Forest Service and the forest reserves renamed national forests to further emphasize their public nature. Pinchot also faced the monumental task of incorporating European scientific forest management into disparate political, economic, and natural landscapes. To do so, he had to organize a service that was manned by professional foresters, informed by science to manage use, based in a code of rules and procedures, and able to meet the economic needs of both local residents and the nation (Steen 1991, 69-102; Roth and Williams 2003, 1-3). Pinchot’s use-oriented scientific forestry left an imprint on the USFS that lingers to this day. His brand of utilitarian conservation – part George Perkins Marsh, part Jeremy Bentham – melded conservation with a Progressive era ideology. This approach embraced modernity to control and simplify complex natural systems. It advocated promoting the benefits of the capitalist economy. The decision to initially validate some forms of use - timber and watersheds – and not others – wildlife and aesthetic preservation - was based on market demand, political reality, and the cultural values deemed important at the time. Pinchot declared from their inception that his national forests would pay for themselves and that timber was the way toward meeting that financial goal. The promise of managed watersheds encouraged both eastern 104 conservationists and western politicians and businessmen who saw water as their key to rural and urban growth. Other uses, such as recreation, were often relegated at the time to “non-management” or “Special Use” – a label that placed the particular activity outside of regular forest management. Science, in Pinchot’s Forest Service, was a tool used to not only benefit the forest, but also society as a whole. By pursuing forestry as a science, his new service would “inform the questions of how to use the land efficiently to benefit all humans, not just a select few who used it for personal profit” (Lewis 2005, 53). By filling his service with professional foresters and technicians, he could insure that management decisions were based upon scientific study and policy removed from partisanship (Steen 1991, 69-102; Pinchot 1998, 241-318; Hays 1999, 43-48; 2009, 1-54). It was necessary to efficiently transfer the utilitarian sentiment found in Wilson’s letter (Wilson 1905) into a system of rules and regulations that could be easily implemented by forest rangers and understood by forest users. Pinchot and his cadre of trained foresters submitted The Use of the National Forest Reserves (1905) to the Secretary of Agriculture on June 13, 1905 and it was approved the next day. Though based on the 1902 Forest Reserve Manual, the “Use Book,” was a formal statement of the new Forest Service’s policy. Sized to fit in a ranger’s front pocket, the “Use Book” is a document of the Progressive era; the succinctness of its regulations and its size are testament to a desire to create federal practices that were efficient, technically informed, and conducive to both economic growth and social improvement. The sentiments found in the 1897 Organic Act were present: “Forest reserves are for the purpose of preserving a 105 perpetual supply of timber …, preventing destruction of the forest cover which regulates the flow of streams, and protecting local residents from unfair competition in the use of forest and range” (USDA FS 1905, 7). In both tone and regulation, the “Use Book” differs from earlier manuals. Pinchot was adamant that the document go far to earn local support for the agency. Whereas the GLO manual gave the Secretary of Interior the “right to forbid any and all kinds of grazing therein,” the “Use Book” stated that under this new regime, “the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to permit … grazing in the forest reserves” (Pinchot 1998, 265). Repeated throughout the “Use Book” was the sentiment that the public owned the land that was protected by the federal government, at government expense, to further local use of public resources. By stabilizing local economies and providing tangible examples of useful forest management, Pinchot hoped to alter the sometimes-strained relationship between federal authorities and local residents. The USFS also wanted to promote the tax benefits of these public lands to county and state governments. Locals would also receive preference in all matters of permit and use; of the first seven regulations, six dealt with the details of obtaining permits and free use of forest resources by local residents. By the 1930s, suggesting the growing complexity of managing the forests, the “Use Book” grew hundreds of pages and would no longer fit in a ranger’s front pocket – nor in a packsaddle (USDI GLO 1902; USDA FS 1905; 1907b; Rowley 1985, 59; Pinchot 1998, 263-72; Steen 2004, 78-81; Lewis 2005, 49-52). 106 To put the “Use Book” regulations into practice, in 1907 Pinchot reorganized the Forest Service away from the centralized GLO days, where nearly every question, observation, or call for support had to first find its way to Washington D.C. Pinchot’s forest rangers were given the authority to deal with local issues without having to confer up the chain of command; rangers were granted a level of trust and had the flexibility to make management decisions at the local level. Pinchot utilized a cadre of inspectors charged with determining how effective field rangers were in carrying out USFS policy. Pinchot ordered inspectors to be direct in their reports; forest conditions and forest policy recommendations were provided to forest supervisors in a manner that eliminated all doubt as to future administration. Pinchot organized the USFS into six inspection districts, each with a regional headquarters. These inspection districts, following further decentralization in 1908, became the basis for the original six administrative districts of the Forest Service (Figure 3-1). Accompanying the redistricting was a plan to decrease the size of national forests within the districts. Forest supervisors directed work on their forests under the check of inspection, thus alleviating district foresters from managing the paperwork of several forests. Forest rangers were responsible for their district and local forest guards reported to the ranger (USDA FS 1907a; 1907b, 3; 1908, 14; Rothman 1994, 2-11; Pinchot 1998, 281-90; Steen 2004, 74-80, 170-72). At both the district and national level, personnel were divided into Offices – the Office of Silviculture was directed to handle estimates, working plans, and sales of timber; the Office of Grazing administered stock allotments, range use, and predatory 107 animal extermination; the Office of Operation dealt with expenditures, hiring of rangers, boundary surveys, improvement construction, and special use applications. Technical questions necessary for Washington’s purview were transferred through the Office of Operation. Finally, the Office of Products was in charge of experimentation involving wood utilization and preservation, as well as publication (Greeley 1909b, 11-14; USDA LCNF 1916b; Rothman 1994, 2-11; Pinchot 1998, 281-90; Steen 2004, 74-80, 170-72). 108 Figure 3-1: United States Forest Service Administrative Districts, 1908. The Lewis and Clark National Forest was in District 1. Map by author (Lewis 2005, 41). Implementing European scientific forestry on millions of reserved American acres proved challenging. The scale of management was unprecedented. Questions lingered over how to mark trees for cutting and once marked, how best to cut, transport, and insure their reproduction with the goal of creating sustainable yields. Pinchot initially focused on replacing the political appointees that riddled the GLO forest ranger corps with men trained in forestry practices. He championed university-level forestry programs, especially in regions surrounded by national forests - a practice that was part practical, part public relations. When a divide became apparent between the untrained field force and the college trained office staff in District 1, two rangers from each forest were picked to attend a special forestry school being developed in Missoula, MT. District forestry officials in Missoula were asked to devote a portion of their time training potential collegiate foresters. Between 1908 and 1909, District 1 Forester Greeley and his associates gave a series of lectures outlining and promoting federal forestry, proclaiming the Forest Service analogous to a publicly owned timber company; Forest Service employees were envisioned as caretakers of the nation’s wealth - a new kind of modern westerner – a scientist professional who was still comfortable in the saddle and living off of the land (Greeley 1908a; 1908b; 1908c; 1909a; 1909b; Myers 1944, 166; Pinchot 1998, 306-13; Lewis 2005, 48-51). Pinchot’s efforts to transform the Forest Service’s manpower were largely successful. GLO foresters deemed incompetent were fired. Rangers who had knowledge of the territory, a strong work ethic, and good rapport with locals were kept on as district 109 rangers. Both locals and eastern college-trained men were encouraged to enlist, although, as the “Use Book” made clear, “Invalids seeking light out-of-door employment need not apply” (USDA FS 1905, 88). Beginning in 1904, all employees were required to take a written examination that demonstrated their literacy and knowledge of necessary forestry skills such as surveying, timber scaling, land laws, and raising livestock. They were also field-tested and were required to ride, shoot, use an ax, prepare a meal in the field, and hitch a pack team (USDA FS 1905, 86-90; Spokesman Review 1910, 8 October; Cole 1944, 36-50; Koch 1944a, 92-97; Fikes 1955, 5-8; Rothman 1994, 1-11; Pinchot 1998, 306-13; Roth and Williams 2003, 1-3). Before the transfer, Pinchot countered western opposition by hiring expert staff and by invoking the power of modern scientific management. This practice did not change with the transfer; specialists in grazing, silviculture, and engineering were courted from other agencies and the private sector to form the core of the Washington D.C. administrative office. Researchers, without whom the Forest Service “would be merely an administrative organization” were attached to forest supervisors to support local policy decisions and formed the backbone of the inspection force (Steen 1998, 13). Research was devoted to timber harvest and reproduction; sample plots of virgin forest were established on several forests, timber was then cut selectively along scientific management guidelines, and the amount of young growth noted. In 1908, a coalition of foresters headed by Raphael Zon of the Office of Silvics proposed that forest experiment stations be established in each district, with the purpose of exploring silviculture and 110 maximizing forest product utilization and commoditization. At these locations, researchers could work to create definite silvicultural plans centered on the maximum sustained yield each district could produce. The first forest experiment station was established in 1908 at the Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, AZ. In 1911, District 1 inaugurated its first experimental station at Priest River, ID in the Kanisku National Forest (Daily Missoulian 1911, 3 December; Clepper 1971, 64-68, 81; Hodges and Cubbage 1986, 5-8; Baker et al 1993, 56-76; Pinchot 1998, 306-13; Steen 1998, 1-31; 2004, 137-38; Graham 2004, 1-13; Lewis 2005, 71). Continued support for Forest Service management depended largely on demonstrating the economic potential of scientific forestry. Pinchot promised his forests would pay their own way, although throughout his term as Forester, the USFS continually ran annual deficits. As Pinchot defended the economic practicality of federal forestry, vigorously arguing that national forests were still early in their evolution, his silvicultural technicians actively researched more efficient forest management products and strategies. In 1909, the University of Wisconsin, Madison agreed to house the USFS Forest Products Laboratory. Research focused on wood preservation, wood chemistry, wood technology, timber testing, pulp and paper, wood distillation, engineering, and wood pathology with the ultimate goal of finding more efficient, cost effective, and commercially attractive uses for wood. The Forest Products Lab was a success and a symbol of the modern turn in federal forestry; appropriations to the Forest Products Laboratory often outpaced field 111 science research (Baechler and Gjovik 1986, 133-49; Steen 1998, 8-12; 2004, 137-38; Zerbe and Green 1999, 9-14; Lewis 2005, 69-71; Hays 2009, 47). Negative public sentiment for federal forestry was rebuffed through claims that the USFS could directly benefit local settlement by serving as a force for modernization and local development. Pinchot demanded that all national forest money was held in local western banks, improving their cash flow and ability to extend loans. Furthermore, national forests financially contributed to urbanizing surrounding communities. In 1908, the Forest Service began paying 25 percent of its receipts from sales, permits, and use fees back to counties where the forests were located. This practice of receipt sharing compensated local governments for loss of taxable land held in reserve and promoted road-building, funded schools, and aided in the economic development of rural communities. Pinchot and later Foresters rarely failed to mention the role the Forest Service had in alleviating some of the financial burden of rural counties (Steen 2004, 77; Corn and Alexander 2012, 1-3). Despite these attempts, locals still claimed their perceived right to own public land. Roosevelt administration support for anti-monopoly policies, a core tenant of Progressive conservation, rebounded on the Forest Service as western petitioners convinced Congress that federal forest management granted monopoly-like powers to the Forest Service. On June 11, 1906, Congress passed the Forest Homestead Act, allowing homesteaders to claim up to 160 acres of national forest land suitable for agricultural settlement. Anxious for local support, Pinchot gave his tacit support to the Forest 112 Homestead Act and directed rangers to devote a portion of their work identifying suitable agricultural land within forest boundaries. Through the 1910s, forest homestead claim surveys took much of the rangers’ time and financial support, even as the Service began to realize just how little they knew about the forests they controlled (Halm 1944, 66-87; Rothman 1994, 12; Steen 2004, 79; Lewis 2005, 50; Hays 2009, 4). Pinchot’s leadership style and the trust he placed in local rangers produced an agency devoted to its leader as well as to his principles of utilitarian scientific management. It was a young bureau with nothing but young men in it and without the “Departmental inertia or red-tape inhibitions” that so clouded other bureaucracies (Koch 1944a, 94). Official training often happened in the field and Pinchot set a standard of efficiency and thrift; said long-time USFS employee Elers Koch, “Gifford Pinchot was a hard taskmaster to us young fellows … merciless with careless errors … it was a hard school, but good training for us and … we never lost our devotion and high regard for G.P.” (Koch 1944a, 94). This espirt-de-corps is one of Pinchot’s most enduring legacies within the Forest Service. Though his tenure as Forester was short, Gifford Pinchot remains the figurehead of federal forestry and a holds a hallowed place in the sentiments of most (though not all) conservationists. Both critics and supporters of later Forest Service policy either decried or hailed Pinchot’s “gospel” of utilitarian scientific forestry and “the culture of expertise that surrounded the natural resource programs of the Theodore Roosevelt administration” (Hays 2009, 54). It was a policy born of a confidence in the power of the modern world to efficiently manage and control resources. 113 At the ship’s helm was Gifford Pinchot – always enthusiastic, confident, demanding of himself and others, and at times, guilty of extreme hubris. The demands of Pinchot’s political life often left some of the more mundane, but highly necessary, tasks of forest management to others while he focused on spreading forestry’s message to the nation. Unbeknownst to everyone, the summer of 1910 would force foresters to re-examine their practices and just what they were accomplishing on these public lands (Clepper 1971; Hirt 1994; Langston 1995, 86-113; Hays 1999; 2009, 1-54). Constructing National Forests (1910-1929) Between 1910 and 1929, the USFS struggled to define its mission and management style. Within the agency, managers attempted to assess their lands and produce plans for their development and use. The agency increased its use of scientific research to support its silvicultural use of forest resources. Supported by extensive surveys that categorized forest products according to their economic value, preliminary and timber management plans were also drawn up. By 1929, similar studies were done for watersheds, recreation use, wildlife, mineral extraction, fire suppression, communications, and infrastructure improvement. Investments in basic infrastructure – ranger stations, fire lookout points, telephone lines, roads and trails – were often hampered by inadequate budgets and staffing. To cope with these enduring challenges, the USFS gradually shifted its priorities and broadened its vision of appropriate activities within forest boundaries. As a federal agency it also evolved toward a more centralized, 114 top-down model of bureaucratic control – an administrative structure that reflected the agency’s commitment to utilitarian scientific management. By the 1920s, federal forestry had truly become a national phenomenon and the United States had entered a modern world where forest products were “distributed without reference to State lines” (Graves 1919, 3). Federal forestry extended across the continent and had deeper mainstream penetration than ever before (duBois 1914; Waugh 1918, 1-43; Jardine and Anderson 1919, 1-91; Steen 2004, 103-95). Pinchot’s successor, Henry Graves, was forced to battle critics of the agency immediately upon taking office. Challenging the Forest Service in the 1910s was a widespread sentiment in local and Congressional circles that the USFS managed its lands inefficiently. Critics believed that an inappropriate amount of money had been spent on travel, clerical duties, and public relations leaving forest improvement – timber harvest and fire prevention predominantly – neglected. Congressional investigations into the USFS budget provided Graves with an opportunity to display the frugality of the Forest Service and deflect attention away from Pinchot’s earlier forestry-for-profit statement. Graves pointed out that some forests – those near large markets or with easily accessible timber bodies – were operating at a profit and he reiterated that the forests had other values, more difficult to quantify, such as watershed protection. Increasingly, surveys of forest resources contained copious mentions of all the Service was doing to manage water supplies. In doing so Graves bolstered support of the powerful reclamation lobby and protected the Service from potential crisis. However, annual scrutiny of the agency’s 115 finances by Congress hampered the ability of the early USFS to make desired infrastructure improvements, conduct needed surveys, and formulate working management plans. To insure that improvement funds were available, the USFS created special trust fund accounts that derived from timber sales and remained out of the purview of Congress. The Road and Trail Fund, for example, diverted 10 percent of timber sales for road and trail construction. Trust funds were almost always discussed by the USFS as necessary to complete projects that would contribute primarily to local use of the forests (USDA FS 1911b, 343-50; 1912b, 463-96; 1913a, 177; USDA LCNF 1916a; Ise 1920, 284-88; Wolf 1989, 1037-78; Hays 2009, 46-47, 97-100). Private land fire suppression and watershed degradation continued to complicate the federal forestry imperative. Congress was prompted to pass legislation that allowed the USFS financial, technical, and logistical control over cutover lands. The 1911 Weeks Act allowed the USFS to purchase cutover land at the headwaters of navigable streams – thereby significantly expanding national forests throughout the US - and provided matching funds to states for coordinating cooperative fire protection plans with federal agencies. The 1924 Clarke-McNary Act expanded on Weeks by bulwarking the federal- state cooperative agreements that began with Weeks, removing the restrictions that purchased lands must be a part of navigable streams, and authorizing money to support state reforestation nurseries (USDA FS 1912b, 530-38; 1920b, 221-22, 225-27; 1925b, 2-11; Graves 1919; Shands and Healy 1977; Steen 2004, 122-31, 185-95). 116 Between 1910 and 1929, local challenges to Forest Service managerial authority forced the USFS to clarify and alter large-scale management paradigms, adding to the complexity of scientific forest management. In 1911, the Forest Service’s grazing permit fee policy was challenged as unconstitutional, stating that Congress had no right to delegate its rule making authority to another agency. Prior to Grimaud v. U.S. and Light v. U.S., “squatters” on Forest Service land had little to fear by trespass; it was assumed that the Forest Service had no right to levy legal and financial consequences for rule violations. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal government, “definitely and conclusively” supporting the Forest Service’s right to not only issue permits for fees, but to make rules governing all of their lands (USDA FS 1911b, 390). Their ability to charge for grazing privileges supported, the Forest Service sought to implement fee increases in 1917 as a means to control pressure from smaller users and provide funding for carrying capacity and range studies (USDA FS 1911b; 1914b; 1914c; 1917; Rowley 1985, 67-95; Steen 2004, 88-89; Hays 2009, 25). The agency’s increasing focus on fire prevention after 1910 marked an important and enduring shift in USFS management priorities. Large, destructive wildfires swept across much of the West in the summer of 1910. The so-called “Big Burn,” a collection of blazes that roared across the Northern Rockies in late summer, demonstrated just how devastating fires could be and how the USFS was inadequately prepared to fight them (Figure 3-2). As a result, in the years that followed, the USFS made fundamental shifts in manpower, policy, and infrastructure to prevent and to more effectively battle future 117 blazes (USDA FS 1911b, 343-45, 365-67; Baker et al 1993, 109; Pyne 1997, 239-64; 2008, 1-115; USDA R1 2010, 3-10). Growing demands for recreation and aesthetic use of USFS lands also shifted agency policies and spending priorities. Though not originally on the Forest Service agenda, recreation forced itself into policy discussions between 1910 and 1929 as the number of campers, hunters, and fishermen dramatically increased on agency lands. By 118 Figure 3-2: The 1910 “Big Burn” Fires. Map shows fires on national forest land. The map does not show fire on other federal, state, or private lands (Lewis 2005, 74). 1912, National Forests in District 1 were faced with mitigating serious sanitation and congestion issues at scenically desirable locations. By the early 1920s, the USFS was consulting landscape engineers and conducting scientific studies to design recreation facilities that were “compatible with timber production and watershed protection” and capable of “systematic forest management” planning (USDA FS 1925b, 36). Wildlife and preservation advocates, both snubbed from Pinchot’s 1905 management standard, lobbied state legislatures and forestry officials for greater protection of both large game and aesthetic treasures inside USFS boundaries. Between 1910 and 1929, numerous state game preserves were created, blurring management objectives and authority schemes and complicating established range management plans. In addition, by the late 1920s, forest users seeking solitude, encouraged the Forest Service to designate portions of their forests as Wilderness. In 1929, under the guidance and influence of wilderness supporters such as Bob Marshall, the USFS passed Regulation L-20 creating primitive areas within forest boundaries and managing them to maintain their “primitive conditions of transportation, subsistence, habitation, and environment” (Kneipp 1930b) (Morrell 1944, 142-43; Shaw 1964, 65-79; Glover 1986, 1-75; Hays 2009, 33-45). World War I also had a large impact on the Forest Service organization and policy. Labor shortages developed on many forests and in local timber mills as workers left for war. Firefighters and fire guards were in short supply. The Forest Service was barely able to keep a skeleton organization in place during the war by placing men deemed essential to service on protected-from-service lists. For the timber industry in District 1, “the 119 normal market for lumber (was) more or less a thing of the past” (Preston 1918a). Meanwhile, rangers were directed to serve as an at-home intelligence service, reporting on possible alien sympathizers in local communities full of European immigrant farmers. They also compiled inventories of possible danger points such as railroad heads, bridges, and trestles. Overseas, the Forest Service put multiple forestry brigades into the field, charged with supplying the U.S. Army with all the wood it would need for trench warfare – a task complicated by the USFS mandate that their work in the war had to leave the French forests in a condition fit to provide a future sustained yield. Forest Service employees were actively recruited to join the forestry brigades and many members of the USFS hierarchy served as officers. All non-essential studies and research activities were curtailed and research focused on war-related projects including improved gunstocks, tension tests, and timber for airplane struts and supports. Congressional appropriations for war-related forestry research soared; in 1917, the Forest Products Lab had a budget of $140,000 per annum – a year later it had grown to $700,000 (Graves 1917; Silcox 1917a; 1917b; 1917c; 1917d; Olmsted 1918a; 1918b; Preston 1918a; 1918b; Rutledge 1919; Baker et al 1993, 112-13; Steen 1998 13-14; 2004, 146-47). Attempts at greater control over Forest Service matters did not end with finance, fire, or public forestry; Graves also created a research agenda that focused on a more structured and focused set of scientific questions. He wanted to “unify the various scientific activities, prevent duplication, coordinate and correlate all studies, and consider carefully all plans to make sure that the most important problems are attacked in the right 120 way” (Graves 1913b, 10). In 1912, he established a Central Investigative Committee to guide the agency’s research agenda and he created similar committees at the district level. In 1915 Graves eliminated the Inspection Branch of the Forest Service and placed all investigations and research under the newly created Branch of Research. The centralization of research achieved several goals, primary among them the recognition that research was fundamental to the Forest Service’s “main responsibility…to bring about the full use of all forest lands” (Clapp 1933a, 651-52). Centralization also encouraged research to be coordinated more effectively at the national level (Graves 1913b; USDA FS 1915a, 181-89; Hodges and Cubbage 1986, 8-11; Steen 1998, 8-10). The increasingly research-oriented nature of federal forest management created problems for the USFS as the makeup of its personnel shifted away from the jack-of-all- trades forest ranger toward an agency of technocratic specialists. Researchers relocated away from district offices to expanded experiment stations and were less available at the local level to address important forest issues. The segregation of research from local forest administration created a level of antagonism not seen within the Service before. The detached and often inconclusive nature of scientific study frustrated foresters looking for concrete answers to local management issues. The physical distance between researchers and administrators negated any realistic attempts at recapturing an esprit-de- corps. Forester Graves noted in his 1923 annual report that forest-wide “inefficiency at this point is particularly serious” and the field force as a whole was “lacking in competence, experience, … fidelity and enthusiasm” (USDA FS 1923, 294-95). Hiring 121 and training programs increased the number of technically trained foresters and grazing experts and raised hiring qualification standards. Promotion standards were revised and based on personal improvement and specialization. Ultimately Forest Service officials were forced to confront the fact that “forest research (was) revealing more clearly each year the gigantic outline of our forest problem, and had begun … to unravel the myriad technical puzzles” confronting them (USDA FS 1922b, 238) (duBois 1914; USDA FS 1920b, 223-24; 248-54; 1922b, 201-03; 1923, 294-98; 1929b, 17-19; Clapp 1933a, 655-56; Hodges and Cubbage 1986, 10-11; Steen 1998, 1-15). Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain Front (1897-1929) Between 1890 and 1920, Montana experienced a population boom that had a dramatic effect on extractive resource use and public lands management in the state. Much of this growth occurred in the central and eastern portions of the state - including the Rocky Mountain Front. High market prices for commodities, in part due to World War I and near-optimal climatic conditions, further encouraged the expansion of agricultural enterprises. Sustained growth, however, would prove to be an illusory goal; following the end of World War I, population expansion along the Rocky Mountain Front was negligible, with some counties facing a trend of steady decline (Philp 1990, 315-89; Malone et al 1991, 232-92; Wyckoff 1991, 21-35; Keller 1996, 113-41). Montana’s early-twentieth century population boom was the result of federal, private, and scientific support for irrigated and dry-farming agricultural ventures, 122 increased railroad construction, and large-scale promotional campaigns. Encouraged by John Wesley Powell’s statement that one-third of Montana could be irrigated, boosters saw reclamation as a key to encouraging homesteaders to the region. The federal government passed the Carey Act in 1894 to promote irrigated settlement and help defer the monumental costs of technical surveys, initial land and water right purchases, and construction costs. The Carey Act allowed arid-land states to take patent on up to one million acres of public land for the purpose of sale to homesteaders. Private companies were encouraged to build irrigation works to supply homesteaders with water in return for annual payments. Carey Act settlements were restricted to no more than 160 acres (Heathcote 1964, 108-17; Malone et al 1991, 232-35). In the early 1900s, the Conrad brothers of Great Falls filed a Carey Act claim to withdraw waters along the Rocky Mountain Front from Birch and Dupuyer creeks. In 1908, the Conrad brothers sold their operation and it was reorganized as the Valier Land and Water Company. In order to increase the quantity of water they were able to supply, the Valier Land and Water Company constructed a series of reservoirs – Lake Francis near Valier, MT and Swift Reservoir on the eastern border of the Lewis and Clark National Forest among the most important. By 1912, nearly 35,000 acres of Carey Act land were open to irrigation under the Valier project at a cost of $40.50 per acre. By the mid 1930s, 60,000 acres had been segregated for irrigation (Anaconda Standard 1909, 2 May; Department of Publicity 1912, 117; Leavitt 1912a; USDA LCNF 1916a; Slagsvold 1936, 6-7; Keller 1996, 104). 123 Under increasing pressure from western railroad interests, state governments, and venture capitalists, the United States Congress passed the Reclamation Act of 1902. Under the Reclamation Act, land suitable for irrigation was located by the government and offered free of charge under the 1862 Homestead Act. Among the first five reclamation projects approved in 1903 was the Milk River Project, located just north of the Rocky Mountain Front. Soon after passage of the Reclamation Act, businessmen along the Front began actively lobbying for a federal project, the greatest support coming from the city of Great Falls (Autobee 1995, 2; Hays 1999, 5-26; Rowley 2006, 91-135). True to progressive ideology, reclamation supporters sought to combine the forces of science and technology to manage available resources for economic benefit. To Paris Gibson, the founder of Great Falls, and Samuel Robbins of the U.S. Reclamation Service, federal reclamation provided an opportunity for the creation of “another Minneapolis” – a burgeoning market and railway center surrounded by a stable agricultural base. Gibson and Robbins rallied Great Falls businessmen and surrounding settlers to lobby the Department of the Interior for a project. On February 26, 1906, their efforts proved successful and the Sun River Project was authorized (USDI BOR 1909, 53-54; Malone et al 1991, 232-36; Fabry 1993, 5-20; Autobee 1995, 1-21). The Sun River Project brought a steady and reasonably predictable water supply to the Front. Construction of the Sun River Project began in 1907; by 1929, the year Gibson Dam first held water, most of the major works had been completed (Figure 3-3). Divided into the Fort Shaw District and the Greenfields Irrigation District, the Sun River 124 Project irrigates just over 90,000 acres along the Rocky Mountain Front with the lion’s share of land – 81,000 acres – irrigated in the Greenfields District. The Project stores and diverts water from the Sun River through a system of reservoirs, diversion dams, and supply canals that originate within or near the boundary of the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Nearly 100,000 acre-feet of water is stored in Gibson Reservoir and is released back into the Sun for diversion to either the Pishkun Supply Canal or the Fort Shaw Canal, which waters the Fort Shaw Division. At Diversion Dam, water is diverted along the Pishkun Supply Canal and held in either the Pishkun Reservoir or diverted to the Willow Creek Reservoir through the Willow Creek Feeder Canal. Water turned from Pishkun flows through the Sun River Slope Canal to feed the Greenfields Division (USDI BOR 1969, 5; USDI WPRS 1981, 1197; Autobee 1995, 4). The Reclamation Service frequently utilized the local populace and resources to complete the Sun River Project. To keep apace with promises to deliver water, the Bureau 125 Figure 3-3: The Sun River Project. Map adapted from USDI BOR 1973. Fort Shaw Irrigation District Greenfields Irrigation District of Reclamation hired homesteaders to help build the Willow Creek Diversion Dam – the first major structure built. Native Americans from the Rocky Boy Reservation were utilized during World War I to supplement an ever-dwindling labor supply. Contractors were required to utilize local materials, including copious amounts of lumber and stone from the Lewis and Clark National Forest, to minimize costs and to engineer structures to mirror natural features - drops and dam features, such as Diversion Dam, were intended to replicate true waterfalls in feel and function (Figure 3-4). In 1911, timber cut and 126 Figure 3-4: Diversion Dam, 2012. Water features were meant to resemble natural processes. Photo by author. milled from the LCNF by Augustan lumberman John Mayer was used to construct flumes, forms, and a camp suitable to house over two hundred men at the Diversion Dam (USDA LCNF 1916b; USDI BOR 1916, 233-34; 1969, 5; Autobee 1995, 1-22). Reclamation impacted the administrative infrastructure of the Lewis and Clark National Forest. The Reclamation Service constructed miles of wagon roads and strung telephone lines along the Sun River, increasing the forest’s connection to Choteau and the rest of the Rocky Mountain Front. Administrative sites reserved by the Lewis and Clark were claimed by the Reclamation Service and used as engineering camps. As settlement and demands for irrigated farm-sites increased during the 1910s, preliminary surveys for a large holding reservoir commenced; several sites along the North and South forks of the Sun were considered, much to the consternation of USFS personnel. In 1924, an engineering camp was established below the current Gibson Dam site that included bunkhouses, houses for the camp foreman and staff, a store, warehouse, machine shop, and recreation hall. Excavation on the dam-site began in 1926. In December 1929, water was first stored behind Gibson Dam for distribution to settlers (USDA LCNF 1916b; USDI BOR 1916, 233-34; 1969, 5; Fabry 1993, 1-46; Autobee 1995, 1-22). Dry farming – the practice of farming without irrigation – occurred simultaneously with reclamation and also had a large settlement legacy. Historically practiced in Spain, Russia, India, and western Canada, dry farming gained new stature throughout the semi-arid American plains during the Progressive era. Dry farming homesteaders were convinced that the application of modern plowing technology and 127 experimentation with scientific farming methods that retained soil moisture meant an end to climatic variation and the intensive capital input associated with irrigated farming. Ample rainfall across eastern Montana and along the Rocky Mountain Front between 1909 and 1916 supported the claims of dry farming proponents that “the rain follows the plow.” Between 1909 and 1916, eastern Montana experienced its greatest surge in population coupled with steady and timely precipitation. Boosters were happy to report that dry farmers in Chouteau and Cascade counties were harvesting up to thirty bushels of high-priced wheat per acre without the aid of irrigation. Federal legislation such as the 1909 Enlarged Homestead Act and the 1912 Homestead Act provided homesteaders greater opportunities to claim land in Montana’s dry farming regions (Hargreaves 1957, 224-27; Alwin 1982, 64; Vichorek 1987, 1-10; Philp 1990, 336-38; Malone et al 1991, 232-52; Wyckoff 1991, 25-28; Keller 1996, 100-12). The expansion of trunk and spur railroad lines across Montana also accelerated settlement. By 1909, central Montana was connected to Mid-western and Pacific markets by the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, the Burlington, and the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul railroads. All along these lines, new towns were platted to serve as markets and local centers of commerce, supply, and government. By 1914, the Rocky Mountain Front was connected by rail to the Great Northern line at Choteau and Bynum. Increased access to railroad service allowed for greater agricultural diversification in the Front – no longer must all agricultural products be driven to market on the hoof (Bynum Centennial 128 Committee 1985, 30; Teton County History Committee 1988, 28; Malone et al 1991, 232-41; Wyckoff 1991, 24-28; Keller 1996, 102-03). Railroads were also important actors in transferring unsettled land to homesteaders. To the railroad lines, settlement meant ticket sales and increased freight shipping to and from the region - a financial stream that paid dividends over time. Immediate monetary gain was made from selling land granted to the railroads or purchased in speculative deals. Railroad men like James Hill encouraged settlement through promotional campaigns designed to lure prospective eastern and European immigrants to purchase land near their lines. Throughout the early twentieth century, settlement boosterism grew at a frenetic pace. At its peak, booster-supported articles promoting both irrigated and dry farming techniques were found in nationally circulated periodicals and state-run agricultural extension reports; speakers were well placed at industry gatherings such as the Dry Farming Congress and at national expositions. Leaflets were spread throughout Europe. Railroads took an active interest in agricultural instruction and fostered a sentiment of confidence, optimism, and care. Said Hill, “You are now our children, but we are in the same boat with you, and we have got to prosper with you or we have got to be poor with you” (Hargreaves 1957, 224). Municipal and state governments engaged in boosterism as well and offered prizes and held parades dedicated to their regional bounty. According to one state produced document, “All animals flourish in Montana … horses raised in Montana are noted for their lung power, endurance, and courage … cattle flourish on the native grasses of Montana as they do 129 nowhere else. They do not require much winter feeding” (Department of Publicity 1912, 117) (Department of Publicity 1914; Maxwell 1916; Department of Agriculture and Publicity 1917; 1918; Department of Agriculture, Labor and Industry 1921; 1928; USDC 1922b, 573-87; 1922d, 197-211; Farr 1979, 16-27; Vichorek 1987, 9-19). The promotional campaigns were successful, especially when coupled with federal reclamation and homesteading programs, high commodity and land prices, and a growing optimism in the scientific and technologic ability to control the natural world. Montana’s population more than doubled from 234,329 in 1900 to 548,889 in 1920. Between 1910 and 1920, the number of farms in Montana increased by 120 percent from 26,214 to 57,677. Irrigation, both private and federal, contributed greatly to Montana’s settlement landscape; by 1920 over 1.6 million Montana acres containing nearly 11,000 farms were irrigated – 678 of these farms encompassing over 150,000 acres were located along the Rocky Mountain Front. Town-sites such as Fort Shaw, Simms, and Fairfield were planned and platted to encourage settlement, create markets and nodes of distribution, and to limit the feeling of isolation ubiquitous among homesteader families. Dry farming had a far greater immediate impact. Homesteaders, most with little or no farming experience, arrived via rail from all around the world, though most were Americans from the better-watered eastern and midwestern states. Homesteader cabins, some of them nothing more than sod, rose throughout central and eastern Montana. Dry farming practices conformed with the rectangular survey system; dry farm scientists recommended planting straight-line wind breaks and utilizing strip farming so that fallow 130 lands could accumulate moisture. By 1920, over 6.8 million acres along the Front were designated as non-irrigated farmland. From 1900 to 1909, population density along the Rocky Mountain Front increased by 87 percent; farm density – or farms per square mile – increased by 443 percent. Between 1910 and 1920, land-hungry settlers increased the population density of Teton and Pondera counties by almost 200 percent, while farm density increased by 180 percent. During the same period, average farm size, largely a function of the Enlarged Homestead Act and farm consolidation due to homestead failure, increased from 447 acres to 567 acres per farm. Urban population along the Front grew correspondingly; in 1920 Augusta, Choteau, Browning, Conrad, and Cut Bank were each home to approximately 1,000 residents. (USDC 1922d, 197-211; 1931c, 141-55; Brown 1934, 596-604; Philp 1990, 330-38; Fabry 1993, 16-17). This level of growth was not sustainable; between 1920 and 1930 many central and eastern Montana counties and urban areas experienced significant population stagnation. Augusta and Choteau together lost nearly 10 percent of their population; Teton County grew only 3.4 percent in ten years. Lewis and Clark County, home to Montana’s capital, lost 2.3 percent of its population during the same period. Over 60,000 people left Montana during the 1920s, the only state in the Union to lose population during the “Roaring Twenties.” By 1925 one-fifth of all Montana farms were in foreclosure – largely the result of extended drought. Over half of all commercial banks in Montana failed by 1926 as bankrupt homesteaders defaulted on their extensive loans. Those with capital and a diversified farming system that employed stock-raising and both 131 irrigated and dry farming, purchased foreclosed homesteads and consolidated them into massive landholdings. In Teton and Pondera counties the average farm size grew to over 850 acres (USDC 1931a, 631-60; 1931b, 115-69; Gilles 1977, 86-90; Malone et al 1991, 280-85; Wyckoff 1991, 28; Hargreaves 1993, 1-24). The reasons for this decline are varied. Global political and macro economic shifts resulted in creating a “bust” situation where there had previously been a “boom.” The harsh reality of Montana’s environmental limitations complicated settlement. Federal programs that increased land allotments, created irrigated pasturage, and supported agricultural extension programs could not completely overcome a deflated market. Agriculturists determined to make a livelihood along the Rocky Mountain Front had to make considerable adjustments, diversifying their farms and employing greater and greater levels of mechanization, fertilization, and pest control. Technological advances that allowed Montanans a level of control over their environment ultimately contributed to population loss and farm consolidation as capital and equipment became ready substitutes for human labor (Malone et al 1991, 252-315; Wyckoff 1991, 25-29). Population growth and recession in the Front placed greater demands on the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Timber from the Lewis and Clark supplied material for posts, poles, fuel, and building materials for both homesteader and town-builder alike. Cattle and sheep grazing supplemented both irrigated and dry farming. The lack of open range for summer grazing, as well as the prevalence of fencing, traffic, and the managed nature of scientific farming increased the necessity for utilizing the public forest land for 132 transhumance. Settlers retreated to the Lewis and Clark to supplement meager food supplies. Some settlers sought to stake forest homestead claims on national forest land. By the 1910s, watershed protection became increasingly important to settlers who relied upon Lewis and Clark watersheds for irrigation and urban water sources. Fire, always a present threat to Front inhabitants, repeatedly made its presence felt; from 1910 to 1929, fire repeatedly swept the Lewis and Clark (USDC 1922d, 197-211; 1931c, 141-55). Increasingly, settlers also utilized the Lewis and Clark for recreation. Local rod and gun clubs, worried that the large game in the Lewis and Clark would suffer from over exploitation, pressured the Forest Service to manage wildlife as a forest resource. Through the 1920s, Forest Service officials were forced to confront a growing trend toward automobile and trail-based recreation. By 1929, there were more than 23 million automobiles on American roads and millions of Americans utilized their cars to experience national forest landscapes. All the while, Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to organize their world within a paradigm of scientific management and sustained yields, and to more effectively link all parts of the forest with a network of roads, trails, and communication lines resembling the modernizing world in which they lived (Keller 1996, 100-12; 2001, 21; Sutter 2002, 19-48). Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark National Forest (1897-1929) The national forest imperative initiated in 1897 resulted in extensive landscape modification in the Lewis and Clark National Forest. On February 22, 1897 the Lewis 133 and Clark(e) Forest Reserve was established by executive order of President Grover Cleveland. Between 1897 and 1929, the GLO and the USFS asserted control over the Lewis and Clark(e). Boundaries of the forest were delimited, a system of administrative districts was devised, and basic infrastructure was created to facilitate management. Though initially mandated to manage only timber and watershed resources, by 1929 Lewis and Clark managers had modified scientific forestry practices to confront issues such as mineral extraction, grazing, wildlife management, and recreation, all the while seeking new and more efficient ways to control fire, pests, predators, and other unwanted environmental agents. An evaluation of these landscape changes reveals the complexity of managing public lands in the western United States and the dynamic impact federal agencies have had on the region’s land and people. Forest Boundaries and Administration (1897-1905) To inaugurate federal forest management the GLO sought to define controllable boundaries, conduct surveys, and develop a hierarchical management structure. The initial boundary of the Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve described an area containing 2,926,080 acres – a massive reserve that would today encompass large portions of the Flathead, Lolo, Helena, and Lewis and Clark National Forests. Rangers spent the majority of their duty time riding boundary lines and posting trespass notices. The GLO attempted to centralize authority in 1903 and combined the Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve with the Flathead Reserve, swelling the newly crafted Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve to 4,670,720 acres - encompassing portions of today’s Kootenai and Flathead National 134 Forests as well as Glacier National Park. In 1900, the headquarters for Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve, originally in Missoula, was moved to Ovando, MT - a more central location (USDI 1898, 84-103; 1902; 1903, 20; 1905, 323-24; Hermann 1899, 195-99; Koch 1944a, 92-97; USDA FS 1964a, 2, 6; 1976a; Baker et al 1993, 38-58; McKay 1994, 46-62). Surveys of the reserves were an important element of federal control and these subsequently led to the creation of initial forest management plans. Throughout the field season of 1899, Division of Forestry employee H.G. Ayres’ and his crew laid boundary benchmarks and systematically worked across the 4,572 square mile Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve, exploring each drainage and compiling copious notes on silvicultural, topographic, soil, climatic, and hydrographic resources (Figure 3-5). Ayres survey was extensive rather than intensive due to the size and inaccessibility of the reserves. By his own admission, Ayres’ inventory of the Lewis and Clark(e) was cursory at best; timber estimates, he stated, “are all believed to be less than the actual amount” lying somewhere between ten and fifty percent below actual numbers (Ayres 1900, 44). Ayres estimated that the Reserve held 2,644,360,000 feet board measure (b.f.) of merchantable saw timber as well as 12,869,000 cords of wood suitable for post and pile. East of the Continental Divide, roughly encompassing the area of the soon-to-be established Lewis and Clark National Forest, timber bodies were small; only 63,000,000 b.f. of Engelmann spruce, lodgepole pine, and Douglas fir lay within the Rocky Mountain Front forest range (Ayres 1900, 58-60). 135 All along the Rocky Mountain Front, Ayres noted the presence of extensive fires; Ayres estimated that as much as 600 square miles of forest east of the Continental Divide had been recently scarred by fire and had resulted in the foothills bordering the Reserve succeeding from wood to grassland. Ayres also noted that the most devastating fires in the 136 Figure 3-5: The Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve Timber Inventory (Ayres 1900, Plate III). Lewis and Clark(e), including the 1889 blaze caused by Great Northern Railway employees, were manmade and suggested that federal control of the Reserve would mitigate the effects of man-made fire. Where fire had either repeatedly or intensively passed, Ayres noted the presence of young lodgepole pine saplings. In non-burned regions, Ayres noted that overcrowding was significantly stunting sapling growth and, in a nod to the emerging scientific forestry model, he suggested that selective cutting and clearing would do much to ensure “unbroken” logging opportunities (Ayres 1900, 41-50). Ayres’ survey provided GLO foresters a glimpse into how the Lewis and Clark(e) had been used by settlers. All along the Reserve, accessible timber bodies had been “invaded by ranchmen and by others cutting for village use” (Ayres 1900, 62-63). Timber was cut high on mountain slopes, slid to an informal system of roads, and hauled to market. Townspeople from “the treeless plain” traveled informal valley wagon roads and cut timber as needed or were supplied by colonies of “halfbreed” woodcutters located on the South Fork of the Teton, the Dearborn, and Smith Creek drainages (Figure 3-6). Besides log timber, Ayres noted the presence of tie hacker camps located on the North Fork of the Sun River and Dearborn Creek, where as many as 300,000 railroad ties for the Great Northern Railway had been cut, floated down, and hauled to railroad lines. Three mills - on Dupuyer Creek, Smith Creek, and the Teton River – supplied lumber for the region (Figure 3-7). Ranches utilized the foothills and river valleys for grazing land and irrigation, especially in the southeastern portion of the Reserve near Willow Creek (Ayres 1900, 39-51). 137 138 Figure 3-6: Piegan Woodcutter Encampment, South Fork Teton River (Ayres 1900, Plate XVIII). Figure 3-7: Timber Mill, South Fork of the Teton River. Most likely McGurk’s Mill (PT_0064) (Ayres 1900, Plate XVIII). Ayres’ topographic descriptions of the Reserve emphasized the Rocky Mountain Front’s rugged, cold, wind-swept character and how it was a difficult location for agricultural settlement. What agricultural land existed was “isolated and difficult to access and subject to deep snows in winter, which would make it necessary for the rancher to put up much hay” (Ayres 1900, 39). The soil “seems fertile and productive when moist enough,” but owing to the dry, cold climate and reoccurring fires, the soil was largely lacking humus and tree litter. Despite that, Ayres noted that settlement was occurring within the Lewis and Clark(e). He noted the presence of six to eight “squatters” just south of Birch Creek. On Ford Creek, Ayres reported a ranch with approximately one thousand head of cattle and sheep and a herder’s cabin. On the Sun River, “the ranches of Wagner and Hannan are well within the reserve. Wagner has a log house, barn, and pasture fence. Hannan, on Storehouse Creek, has some 20 or 30 acres in meadow, with a house and outbuildings and several fences across the lower portion of the valley. He has some stock. Thirty of his horses were found grazing on the North Fork of Sun River” (Ayres 1900, 64). On Willow Creek, Ayres noted the stock ranch owned by James Donahue – sic Danaher – and several trapping cabins (Ayres 1900, 64-65). The Ayres survey also reflected how a growing conservation movement successfully imposed the rudiments of modernity upon a wild landscape. It placed the Lewis and Clarke inside a definable boundary, effectively laying federal claim over nearly three million acres of land. With that boundary established, forest officers began the process of addition and deletion, initiating a negotiation process with local users. The 139 survey rectified the Rocky Mountain Front into an organized cadastral survey and created benchmarks on which regional settlement could be based; four complete townships adjacent to the Lewis and Clark(e) were also described for the GLO by 1899. Physiographic benchmarks for timber, soil, water systems, and wildlife were created and re-defined in economic terms; Engelmann spruce, lodgepole pine, and balsam were transformed from trees to board feet, grass reconfigured into forage, and water and soil transformed into agricultural potential. Simply put, the survey redefined the lands of the Lewis and Clark(e) into commodities which were deemed potentially useful through scientific management within a capitalistic economic system. GLO forest administration was characterized by a centralized hierarchical structure and decisions were subject to a chain-of-command approval system. The West’s federal forests were divided into eleven centralized administrative districts, roughly organized by state boundary. A superintendent headed each of the eleven regions; superintendents were appointed as political favors and rarely had experience in managing public lands. In 1898, the director of the GLO appointed land speculator J.B. Collins as superintendent of Montana reserves; in 1903, Major F.A. Fenn replaced Collins. Each GLO district was divided into forest reserves managed by forest supervisors who were also largely products of political patronage. Gust Moser, the first supervisor of the Lewis and Clark(e), had strong Montana political ties and once served as the secretary of the Montana Improvement Company – the lumber and timber branch of the Anaconda Mining Company. Moser was a notorious figure in federal forestry; he was replaced for 140 incompetence in 1904. According to inspector Ellers Koch “it is alleged that he (Moser) and his wife used to meet rangers coming in for their monthly paychecks and mail, and that her wiles and other attractions, together with Gus’ superior skill at poker, usually resulted in separating the rangers from most of their pay” (Koch 1944c, 101). In the report documenting just cause for his replacement, Moser was called a “detriment to the service” and “an habitual drunkard” who “indulges in prolonged seasons of drunken and disreputable conduct and refuses to satisfy his honest financial obligations” (McKay 1994, 56). Adelbert Bliss replaced Moser; Koch saw him as “a nice old man, but quite incompetent” (McKay 1994, 56). Bliss served as supervisor until the 1905 when he was replaced by Page Bunker, his head ranger (USDI 1898, 84-110; Hermann 1899, 195-99; Koch 1944a, 92-97; Lowell 1944, 128-41; Neitzling 1964, 18-19; Shaw 1964, 10-16; Baker et al 1993, 38-58; McKay 1994, 46-62; Rothman 1994, 17). GLO reserves were further subdivided into loosely defined patrol districts roughly organized by major watersheds. In 1899, six rangers patrolled the nearly three million acres of the Lewis and Clark(e); by 1901, there were sixteen. A reserve ranger’s primary duty was patrolling for fire control and trespass – including marking boundaries by scoring six inch long blazes in the bark of trees at breast height at points that corresponded with Public Land Survey section corners. As time and necessity allowed, rangers were required to clear and expand pioneer and game trails. Often rangers were instructed to requisition men and materials to fight fires, confront poachers, and police timber trespassers. Each ranger was paid $60 per month for his work. Rangers provided 141 their own horses, clothing, bedrolls, and food (Hermann 1899, 195-99; Anaconda Standard 1901, 15 June; Bunker 1904; Leibig 1944, 118-25; Woesner 1944, 192; Baker et al 1993, 47; McKay 1994, 46-62). In this early period, most ranger duties focused on protecting forest resources and there was little work done to transform or develop reserve lands. Rangers were not adequately trained, supplied, or present in sufficient numbers to affect significant landscape change in the Lewis and Clark(e). GLO foresters were not required to take any exam, possess scientific forestry knowledge, or undergo training in order to be hired as a reserve ranger. Often rangers were local settlers with their own homesteads to look after; many of the Lewis and Clark(e) rangers came to the area as trappers, prospectors, or squatters on the public domain. Therefore, Lewis and Clark(e) rangers existed as intermediaries between two worlds: they represented a newly imposed federal authority imposing itself on a wild, unsettled landscape. Construction of administration sites – such as ranger stations – was less of a priority under GLO administration than it would be in the USFS. Reserve rangers were required to construct their own residences – a task done on the rangers’ own time and not as a function of federal management duties. There were no federal withdrawals for administrative site construction associated with GLO management of the Lewis and Clark(e), though in 1900 Superintendent Collins requested the appropriation of a portion of the “old Missoula brewery” to supplement the allotted space that had been granted in the land office (Anaconda Standard 1900, 12 July). Rangers often appropriated 142 abandoned homesteads, such as the Hannan Gulch site, to use as administrative nodes. Communication between administrative sites was primitive; though rangers were required to keep daily journals and file monthly reports, it took an average of ten to fourteen days for reports and work orders to make a round trip on the Lewis and Clark(e). As action often required hierarchical approval, distance and lack of communication infrastructure was often a problem (Bunker 1904; Baker et al 1993, 38-58; McKay 1994, 46-62; Miss 1994, 279). Though the Lewis and Clark(e) contained numerous local trails and wagon roads, no new transportation infrastructure was formerly completed until after the USDA transfer (Figure 3-8). Travel corridors consisted of local trails and wagon roads constructed by ranchers, timber haulers, and railroad tie cutters. Most were little more than single-track pathways that followed stream bottoms and game trails. The “tie hacker’s road” was an exception. Constructed in 1886 by Charles Biggs, the “tie hacker’s road” ran from Hannan Gulch north to Gates Park and was wide enough to allow for two timber laden wagons to pass each other. The road also included numerous skid roads extending up adjacent watersheds. Rangers frequently removed fallen timber and other obstacles from pathways, though local users were undoubtedly the driving force behind trail construction and maintenance. The transfer to the USDA brought increased appropriations for infrastructure improvement and several local trails became the baseline for a system of primary and secondary roads and trails utilized by the USFS for management. The Route Creek, the North Fork of the Sun River, the North Fork Teton 143 River Trail, and the West Fork Sun River Trail are significant example of this repurposing (USDA LCNF nd-b; nd-x; 1916a, 39-42; Ayres 1900, Part V Plate III; Shaw 1964, 74). 144 Figure 3-8: Transportation Infrastructure, Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve, 1899. Map by author (Ayres 1900). The GLO also faced the challenges of battling wildfires. Gifford Pinchot, while head of the Division of Forestry, likened fire to “the question of slavery” – the presence of fire in United States forests could be ignored for a time, but sooner or later, the problem must be met (Pinchot 1898c, 11). In an early attempt to introduce the nation to scientific forest management, Pinchot stated “(of) all of the foes which attack the woodlands of North America, no other is so terrible as fire” (Pinchot 1899a; 77). Fire was seen as harmful to the economic future and stability of resource extracting economies. Furthermore, fire had a remarkable tendency to remake forests; through the process of succession tree species such as the lodgepole pine often replaced more valuable species like white pine. Fire was a bane to scientific forestry; in one conflagration, years of silvicultural planning and management were made irrelevant. Yet, the lessons of scientific forestry transferred to Europe had little to say about fighting fire in the American West; theirs was a “unique” problem and they were left to themselves to engineer a solution (Pinchot 1899b, 393-403; Pyne 1981, 64-77; Langston 1995, 122-41). Pinchot approached the question of fire protection through science; as head of the Division of Forestry, Pinchot directed his staff to study fire’s economic cost. They determined that unchecked fire was costing the United States approximately $20 million annually. Man-made fires were the most costly. Pinchot believed that fire management was essential to utilitarian forestry (Pyne 1997, 184-98; Steen 2004, 52-60). To GLO rangers, controlling fire was a paramount task of federal management. In the GLO’s Forest Reserve Manual (1902), the primary duties of forest rangers were 145 described as “1. Protective duty, guarding against fire and trespass, fighting fires and stopping trespass” (USDI GLO 1902, 27). Superintendents were charged with obtaining “information against persons violating the provisions of the forest fire law, and … to render all necessary assistance in their prosecution” (Hermann 1899, 196). A GLO ranger’s patrol often consisted of posting fire-warning notices liberally at borders and where human activity existed in the forest (Hermann 1899, 195-99; USDI GLO 1902, 27-29; Liebig 1944, 118-25; Pyne 1997, 184-98). The actual task of fire control in GLO managed forests was monumental; no system of lookouts, guard stations, caches of fire fighting equipment, or of well- maintained trails and roads existed. When a fire was spotted, rangers proceeded to the fire with pick, ax, and shovel to attempt containment. If help was needed, the ranger trekked back to the supervisor’s office and attempted to muster men or enlist local settlers, trappers, or railroad men “who received no pay” for their services (Woesner 1944, 192). Cooperative agreements were arranged with timber and railroad companies for fire patrol; timber and grazing permits came with a rider stating that as a function of the permit, loggers and herders must immediately rush to extinguish a spotted fire or face the loss of their permit (Bunker 1904; Liebig 1944, 118-25; Clary 1986, 4-22). Fire had repeatedly made its mark in the Lewis and Clark(e). Ayres noted in his 1899 survey that “a considerable but undeterminable portion of the mountain ridges … (have) been made so by fires that have exterminated the stunted forests which were just able to exist” (Ayres 1900, 47). Railway men were most often guilty of starting fires in 146 the Lewis and Clark(e), though settlers on the forest border, Indians, hunters, prospectors and herdsmen were also responsible. East of the Continental Divide, Ayres estimated that six hundred square miles had recently burned, leaving over 500,000 cords of deadwood on the ground (Ayres 1900; USDA LCNF 1916a). Though simple, GLO fire management organization was viewed as efficient - though GLO reports of fire in the massive Lewis and Clark(e) are sparse and incomplete. Montana GLO forestry superintendent J.B. Collins stated that “with the present arrangement it is difficult for a fire to get much of a start on or near the reserves before it is discovered” (Anaconda Standard 1900, 13 July). Official documents reported that fourteen fires occurred in the Reserve in 1900, burning a total of only fifteen acres. On the other hand, newspapers reported that an extensive fire started by Flathead Indians raged through the western portion of the Reserve in more than 36 different locations. In 1901, fires increased in the Lewis and Clark(e); 92 fires were reported and burned 6,621 acres. In 1902 and 1903 fires decreased, taking 560 and 435 acres respectively. The decrease in burned acreage after 1901 was attributed to the aid of the USDA in formulating fire-protective plans, greater financial investment, private cooperation, and public awareness. On all counts, more would be needed (Anaconda Standard 1900, 25 July; 2 August 1900; USDI 1902, 327; 1903, 574). Forest Boundaries and Administration (1905-1910) The transfer of forest lands to the USDA in 1905 triggered numerous administrative changes. Between 1905 and 1908 western national forests were divided 147 into three administrative districts. In 1908 the districts were subdivided into six smaller districts that were relatively uniform in area. The Lewis and Clark National Forest - its name changed from both “Clarke” and “Forest Reserve” in 1907 - was placed in District 1 of the USFS. District 1 was headquartered in Missoula and supervised initially by William Greeley, a graduate of the University of California and the Pinchot family’s Yale School of Forestry. Bolstered by an agency-wide system of rules, personnel within individual forests were granted localized discretionary powers. While the district forester filtered directives from Washington D.C. and policy and management recommendations from inspectors and researchers, the forest supervisor was tasked with negotiating the desires of the district with the needs of the rangers in the field. The Lewis and Clark had two supervisors between 1905 and 1910: Page Bunker assumed control of the Lewis and Clark from the 1905 transfer until 1908 when he was succeeded by W.H. Daugs (USDA FS 1908, 36; Koch 1944a, 92-97; Baker et al 1993, 48-51). USFS decentralization policies altered the boundaries and administrative structure of the Lewis and Clark. In 1905, the Lewis and Clark was divided into two regional bodies – the Lewis and Clark North and the Lewis and Clark South. To better meet the timber-based economy of the region, forest headquarters was moved from Ovando to the Conrad Building in Kalispell. In 1908, the Lewis and Clark was further divided by Executive Order into several national forests, including the Lewis and Clark, Blackfeet, Flathead, Missoula, and Kootenai forests. The new Lewis and Clark boundary - one that existed in more or less a consistent size and shape for coming decades and forms the 148 geographic basis for this study – encompassed 850,729 acres and ran from the eastern edge of the Continental Divide to the plains of the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 3-9). 149 Figure 3-9: The Lewis and Clark National Forest Boundaries, 1905-1908. Boundary re- survey resulted in the justification of the eastern boarder. Map by author (McKay 1994). Headquarters for this smaller Lewis and Clark National Forest was transferred to Choteau, MT - a location that was central to railways, forest boundaries, and urban centers such as Helena and Great Falls. Augusta, south of Choteau but nearer the depot at Helena, became the site of the forest supply depot (Anaconda Standard 1908, 12 July; USDA FS 1911b, 348; 1964, 19, 22; USDA LCNF 1916b; nd-bb). Further decentralization also occurred at the ranger district level; by 1910 ranger district boundaries had been imposed on each forest representing “the standard form of organization which promises the most direct and efficient handling of National Forest business” (USDA D1 1910a, 4). Ranger district size was standardized in the early USFS, determined by topographic conditions and the character of business predominating the region. In the Lewis and Clark, four to six districts existed between 1905 and 1912, though their names, headquarters, and boundaries frequently changed. In 1907, the Lewis and Clark had five ranger districts including the Sun River, Dearborn, Teton, Dupuyer, and Lubec units. By 1912 six ranger districts existed: District 1 – HQ at Piegan Ranger Station; District 2 – HQ at Dupuyer Creek Ranger Station; District 3 – HQ at Ear Mountain Ranger Station; District 4 – HQ at Hannan Gulch Ranger Station; District 5 – HQ at Willow Creek Ranger Station; District 6 – HQ at Elk Creek Ranger Station (Figure 3-10) (Greeley 1909c; USDA D1 1910a, 1-8; USDA LCNF 1912; Fickes 1972, 1-22; McKay 1994, 63-70). District rangers were directed to conduct resource inventories and location surveys that would serve as a foundation for infrastructure placement and use 150 management plans. The process proved both time intensive and expensive and by 1909 only a general survey of every District 1 forest boundary had been completed. Ongoing forest use hampered any attempt at a comprehensive resource inventory. Timber and 151 Figure 3-10: Ranger Districts, 1915. Map by author (LCNF-GF, Historic Map Drawer). forage were readily being used without any measure of scientific planning. Some within the agency pushed for federal forest to be locked away from use until an in-depth survey was conducted and a management plan written for each forest. Objections from the timber and grazing industries kept the forests open to use, further complicating the inventory process (USDA FS 1907a; 1908, 36; 1910; 1911c; Shaw 1964, 5; Fickes 1972, 1-15; Baker et al 1993, 63; McKay 1994, 63-70). Though his duties were more defined and his methods well codified in The Use Book, a ranger’s occupation did not dramatically vary from the pre-Forest Service days. Rangers were required to “keep in direct personal touch with all of the work” in their districts and serve as a local liaison of the federal government (USDA D1 1910a, 4). Rangers often found themselves reliant upon surrounding settlers for resupply, aid in fire suppression, and company; Clyde Fickes, the ranger for the Sun River District in 1907, was forced to travel miles outside of the forest boundary along a “narrow, winding trail, across bare slide areas made by deer and elk” to the Elizabeth Post Office – little more than a family ranch house - for all mail (Fickes 1972, 11). Rangers spent the majority of their time patrolling the forest boundaries, posting fire and trespass notices, and on fire- watch. Rangers were still responsible for building and refurbishing living quarters. They struggled to clear well-used roads and to keep up with the survey demands for timber sales, administrative withdrawals, and the near constant filings for forest homestead applications (Fickes 1972, 1-22; Rowley 1985, 55-95; Clary 1986, 29-66; Baker et al 1993, 38-51; McKay 1994, 63-70; Langston 1995, 86-104). 152 By 1908, it became apparent in the Lewis and Clark that more administrative sites were needed. Administrative sites were important loci of modernity in the national forests and they served several functions. Primarily, administrative stations were used to house rangers. They were also nodes of federal power where authority was localized, actions either permitted or punished, and the place where scientific forestry began to be integrated into every day management. Finally, administrative sites became collecting points for local, environmental, and scientific information. Between 1905 and 1910, Lewis and Clark administrative sites consisted of administrative headquarters, forest ranger district stations, and guard stations - including those associated with unimproved lookout points (Figure 3-11, Appendix B). The administrative headquarters in Choteau was selected because of its accessibility, both to the forest and to nearby populations. Ranger district stations were often selected based on the location of already-existing homesteads. Homesteads were used for various reasons: they usually had necessary pasturage and water readily available, were accessible by trail or road, and included standing structures. As some rangers were married with children, abandoned homesteads offered a sense of permanence. The Use Book stated specifically “Abandoned settlers’ improvements may often be used” (USDA FS 1905, 72). In 1906, the Forest Service stated that in the future, every intention would be made to furnish rangers with “headquarter cabins on the Reserves … as rapidly as funds will permit,” though funds were usually slow in coming (USDA FS 1906, 108). 153 Forest Service administration sites were subject to GLO withdrawal procedures; up to 1909, the USFS conducted a survey of the site and an application for withdrawal 154 Figure 3-11: Administrative Site Withdrawals, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 1905-1910. Sites represent withdrawals and not necessarily construction of a ranger station. Map by author. was submitted to the GLO. In 1909, however, it was concluded that the GLO had no jurisdiction to rule on the withdrawal of Forest Service lands. Following that decision, district foresters either approved or disallowed the “reservation” of administrative sites. Between 1905 and 1910, several forest administration sites in the Lewis and Clark were submitted for withdrawal despite a known lack of financial means to complete construction – largely to block forest homestead applications. When contested, local forest homesteaders had little success in securing a forest homestead. The Medicine Creek, Pambrun Gulch, Palmer’s Flat, and Pretty Prairie Administrative Sites are all examples of attempts to control forest homestead settlement through administrative site withdrawals. Once reserved, these withdrawals served as intermediate or undeveloped guard stations (USDA FS 1905; 1906; Spaulding 1907b; Bunker 1908a; Hays 1908a; Clack 1908c; Schoonover 1908a; Quiggle 1909; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; Sims 1986, 9-10; USDI NPS 1990a). Several administration sites in the Lewis and Clark were former homestead claims. The Forest Service was allowed to officially lay claim to abandoned “improvements” once a notice “to remove them” had been posted for a period of sixty days. For example, Lewis and Clark foresters assumed control of James Hannan’s claim along the Sun River following its 1901 abandonment; Hannan, reportedly a horse and cattle rustler, left his claim following threats by locals unwilling to harbor a livestock thief. The agency’s use of the Hannan Gulch homestead was typical; Lewis and Clark rangers utilized the homestead, outbuildings, and fenced pasture years before Hannan 155 Gulch was officially withdrawn in 1908. Furthermore, Hannan Gulch is representative of the early Forest Service policy of locating administrative sites in or near the forest as opposed to placing them close to population centers. By locating the station just inside the forest boundary, rangers had greater administrative control over easily accessible resources. Both Piegan and Elk Creek ranger stations are additional examples of this type of re-use. Piegan was deemed necessary to facilitate patrol near the Great Northern Railway line. Previous to its withdrawal, the Lewis and Clark had invested over $300 in cabin and fence improvements at Piegan. The cabin at Elk Creek was in such disrepair at time of withdrawal that ranger Price Townsend sent an urgent plea for $62.75 to purchase lumber from a local mill to make the house livable. No such money was available for adequate repairs at that time – a consistent and enduring problem for the early USFS (Clack 1908d; Dean 1908; Hays 1908b; Herring 1908; Schoonover 1908b; 1908d; Daugs 1909b; Townsend P. 1909; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; USDI NPS nd-b). Early administrative sites were also withdrawn specifically to facilitate certain economic and protective uses. The Goat Bluff administrative site was chosen at the location of the Teton/McGurk sawmill “on account of its advantageous location in relation to logging operations” (Daugs 1909c). The Lewis and Clark purchased McGurk’s mill, cabin, and stable for $20 and utilized the station to manage timber sales along the Teton River. The False Summit / Lubec administration site was withdrawn along the Great Northern Railway line for fire protection. The Lubec site was also necessary to manage a flood of oil and mineral claims in the region. Oil claims along the northern 156 boundary of the Lewis and Clark resulted in little long term use, though there was significant speculation and fraud; the cabin and pasture sought by the Forest Service had been, in fact, “occupied by one of the promoters of the fraudulent stock-selling companies operating in this district” (Bunker 1908c). The Willow Creek administrative site was also withdrawn to support the extensive range and grazing business in the area (Schoonover 1908e; Sherman 1908; Bunker 1908c; Daugs 1909c; Fickes 1944, 7). Administrative site withdrawal was not without controversy. Locals viewed the Forest Service “retarding the development” of agricultural progress and were angered by the consistent validation of the Lewis and Clark’s administrative site withdrawals (Miss 1994, 280). In 1907, the Montana state land agent formally protested the expulsion of squatters from Forest Service land. Local furor over forest homestead settlement ultimately resulted in Secretary of Agriculture Wilson re-affirming the rights of squatters to lay claim to homestead settlement on Forest Service land. This did little to dampen antagonism toward the Forest Service; their unwritten policy of trumping forest homestead applications remained in use. Furthermore, the lack of accessible land just inside the forest boundary forced forest officials to withdraw administrative sites outside of Lewis and Clark – a move that was highly protested. In an assertion of federal control, the GLO determined that as long as there was a demonstrated need land outside of forest boundaries could be withdrawn from the public domain to serve as national forest administrative sites. Between 1905 and 1910, the Birch Creek and Teton administrative sites were located outside of the forest boundaries, denying public access to agricultural 157 land bordering the Lewis and Clark (Anaconda Standard 1907, 14 May; 1910, 24 March; Clack 1908a; 1908e; Smith 1908; USDA LCNF 1913b; McKay 1994, 219-35). Conflict with the Reclamation Service also jeopardized administrative withdrawals along the Sun River and contributed to the foresters’ inability to solidify infrastructure improvement plans. By 1908, the United States Reclamation Service (USRS) had withdrawn thousands of acres along the Sun necessary to supply the Sun River Project. The withdrawal conflicted with Forest Service administration sites at Medicine Creek, Palmer’s Flat, and Hannan Gulch; though Medicine Creek and Palmer’s Flat were withdrawn to preclude forest homestead, Hannan Gulch was an important control point for the Lewis and Clark. The entire southern portion of the Hannan Gulch withdrawal and all improved structures fell within the Reclamation Service’s “first form” withdrawal – land needed directly for irrigation works. The Lewis and Clark requested “that immediate action be taken to secure from the Department of the Interior the release from reclamation withdrawal” of the area containing the ranger station and outbuildings (Bunker 1908b). After much discussion, the USRS removed their objection to the Hannan Gulch withdrawal and restored the tract to the public domain; its release and the Forest Service’s official withdrawal of Hannan Gulch were timed to occur simultaneously to exclude “any intervening rights which might otherwise attach” by forest homesteaders (Fitch 1908). The Pretty Prairie administrative site also bordered a potential Reclamation reservoir. Delays in reservoir site selection hampered efforts to improve Pretty Prairie and no significant improvements could be made at Pretty Prairie until the Gibson Dam was 158 completed in the 1930s (Spaulding 1907a; Guthrie 1908; Bunker 1908b; Daugs 1908a; 1908b; Fitch 1908; USDI NPS 1990a). Lack of financial support hampered attempts to construct more-permanent road, trail, and communication improvements in the Lewis and Clark. Nationally, the Forest Service constructed thousands of miles of trails and strung hundreds of miles of telephone wire during Pinchot’s era, however little occurred in the Lewis and Clark. In 1908, the Lewis and Clark was allotted $2,800 for all infrastructure work. A plan was laid to construct six miles of trail on the Dearborn River. Since trails in the Lewis and Clark often were subject to spring floods, foresters recognized the need to engineer highline trails away from incised and eroded valley bottoms. However, the cost and technical difficulty of constructing highline trails made such routes improbable and often rangers were forced to repair or make due with damaged routes. Though individual forest units attempted to construct trails according to a local standard conforming to available resource and use, there was no uniformity to trail and road engineering in the USFS before 1915. Trail length and permanence was a function of environment, weather, and available money (Anaconda Standard 1908, 12 July; USDA FS 1908, 27; 1909; 1910; 1915a, 7; USDA D11912b; Fickes 1972, 23-24). Despite financial restrictions, a handful of trails were engineered by the Forest Service to support management (Figure 3-12). The Moose-Furman, the Mortimer Gulch, and Deep Creek trails were improvements on local pathways and were incorporated into an early system of fire and timber use trails. The Deep Creek trail was constructed into 159 the Lewis and Clark interior to access merchantable timber stands. Alongside the North Fork of Deep Creek, a livestock trail was constructed in cooperation with stockmen. Some, such as the Hyde Creek trail, were specifically engineered to support an economic 160 Figure 3-12: Transportation Infrastructure Improvements, LCNF, 1905-1910. Map by author. function; the Hyde Creek trail was built to a greater width than other trails, averaging twelve feet wide, to facilitate livestock movement (USDA LCNF nd-s; nd-cc; nd-ll; nd- mm; 1916a, 48-49; 1948g; 1992a; 1999). Between 1905 and 1910, the Forest Service placed a considerable amount of financial, organizational, and administrative support behind fighting fire. Convinced in their ability to control fire, the USFS crafted a total-control fire policy despite severely limited resources and infrastructure that was little more conducive to efficient management than in the GLO era. To Pinchot, the United States simply could not afford to allow fire its rampant course of destruction; “probably the greatest single benefit derived by the community and the nation from forest reserves,” said Pinchot, “is insurance against the destruction of property, timber resources, and water supply by fire” (USDA FS 1905, 63). With the transfer, the Forest Service “assumed a central institutional and intellectual role in fire programs at all levels of national life” (Pyne 1981, 67). Cooperative attempts to manage fires on private lands continued as they had in the GLO days; in 1907, Pinchot stated that 75 percent of private and industrial foresters had adopted Circular 21 fire protection plans. Between 1905 and 1910, the Forest Service ramped up its efforts to understand fire as a problem of forestry; the Service conducted research into fire history looking for predictive tools to better control fire entry and duration (Pyne 1981, 64-77; 2008 1-29; Steen 2004, 52-56; Lewis 2005, 79-81). The USFS understood the economic reality of fire. Money for fire control was spent on tools, trail and infrastructure improvements, and manpower. Fire suppression 161 was difficult to budget; even a moderate fire quickly consumed a district’s budget and often money was diverted from other planned uses to pay for fire control. Forest Service officials agonized over how to pay for fires that originated in or crossed through private lands. Cooperative agreements between the Forest Service and industry provided a small level of relief. Fire guards were hired by both the Forest Service and the railroad. Rangers were allowed to pursue fires on private lands and draw on railroad finances. In 1908, the federal government provided a measure of financial surety to the USFS. The United States Congress passed the Forest Fire Emergency Act, which authorized the Forest Service to spend whatever available funds were necessary to combat wildfire. Though not a blank check, the Forest Fire Emergency Act gave the Forest Service some fiscal flexibility to fight forest fires (Billings Daily Gazette 1908, 4 August; 1909, 25 June; USDA FS 1908, 11-13; Price 1909; Anaconda Standard 1909, 8 August). Fighting fire in the Lewis and Clark between 1905 and 1910 did not differ much from how rangers battled flames in the GLO-managed days, despite the administrative site withdrawals and trail improvements. Rangers patrolled large distances looking for curls of smoke and, when a fire was spotted, the ranger either contained the fire with shovel and ax or retreated to a ranger station, settlement, or lumber camp to procure help. Rangers fought large fires by clearing fire lanes of timber, debris, and brush and lighting backfires. Forest rangers also fought to prevent fire with propaganda and by posting notices and campfire rules throughout the forest (Anaconda Standard 1905, 8 September; 1907, 29 September; Billings Daily Gazette 1909, 15 August; USDA D1 1911). 162 By 1908, the Lewis and Clark began creating systematic plans for fire control tied to administration site and trail construction. Though no phone lines had been strung in the Lewis and Clark – appropriations for that luxury were given to the timber-rich forests with greater economic potential – foresters began planning a communications network that could connect district ranger stations to the forest headquarters in Choteau. At the heart of these plans was the ranger on patrol. Rangers patrolled the Lewis and Clark following organized routes that often included traversing high ridges and mountain peaks to unimproved lookout points. It was estimated that in 1907, before the division of the Lewis and Clark, a ranger had to patrol approximately 120,000 acres in fire duty. In the Lewis and Clark National Forest, 1908 and 1909 were calm fire years and foresters were in large allowed to conduct their improvement work as planned, completing a series of administrative withdrawals and trail improvements (USDA D1 1911; McKay 1994, 128-38; Pyne 1997, 236). Forest Boundaries and Administration (1910-1929) From 1910 to 1929, the Forest Service continued to strive for greater control and understanding of their landscapes. Due in part to the destructive “Big Burn” wildfires of 1910, the USFS began to emphasize far greater systematic and uniform procedures for survey, planning, construction, and maintenance. This focus on efficiency was also a function of a modernizing federal system and further added to the Forest Service’s reliance on policies supported by science. The trend toward more uniform federal forests affected boundary designation and management infrastructure. 163 Though it had only a minor impact on the Lewis and Clark during this period, the USFS stressed forest consolidation and control over private land within the forest boundaries. In 1912, the Lewis and Clark contained over eleven thousand acres of alienated land. By 1918, that total had risen to over fifteen thousand acres, largely due to withdrawals to the Reclamation Service and the Sun River Project. In 1912, 1,600 acres of non-forest land east of the Lewis and Clark near Dupuyer and Sheep creeks were returned to the public domain by executive order for “public good” promotion (Knox 1912, 1753). In 1922, the agency contemplated adding approximately seventeen sections to the forest on the Dearborn River in T 18N, R 7W, but ultimately decided against the modification. Private ownership of portions of the land complicated the agency’s attempt toward consolidation. By the mid 1920s, most boundary questions in the Lewis and Clark - excluding 5,440 checkerboard acres deeded to the Northern Pacific Railroad via land grant, located largely in T 17N, R 7 and 8W MPM – had been settled. In 1926, Lewis and Clark foresters inventoried Northern Pacific Railroad land within the boundaries in preparation for future consolidation. The survey assessed the timber, grazing potential, and accessibility of acreages and quantified them in economic terms. The overall area of the Lewis and Clark did not change again until the 1930s (Figure 3-13) (Hays 1910; USDA FS 1918a; 1929a; 1932a; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1926b; Hurtt 1922). Distance, accessibility, and cost efficiency prompted portions of the Missoula and Flathead national forests to be temporarily transferred to the Lewis and Clark. In 1914, the headwaters of the Flathead River – then known as Big River – were handed to Lewis 164 and Clark foresters in order to facilitate grazing access. Grazing had not been previously allowed in the area; following range studies – and due to settlement pressure on the 165 Figure 3-13: Lewis and Clark National Forest Boundary Adjustments, 1916. Map by author (USDA FS 1912a; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1929a). Rocky Mountain Front – the Big River area was opened to grazing. It was simply easier for stockmen to enter the forest from the east and rangers to manage land from the Dupuyer administration site. However, grazing was removed from Big River in 1917 due to conflict with wildlife over winter forage and management of the region was transferred back to the Flathead. In 1915, approximately four townships were also transferred for temporary administration from the Missoula National Forest. Though the transfer was intended to be short-lived, the area remained under Lewis and Clark administrative control until 1922 when it was determined that sufficient access to the region was now available from the Missoula (Fenn 1914; Spaulding 1914g; 1914h; Silcox 1915a; 1915b; Townsend C. 1916; 1917; Townsend P. 1916a; Warner 1917; Myrick 1922b). The most significant boundary questions addressed by the Lewis and Clark between 1910 and 1929 came from outside of the forest limits and resulted in its first forest-wide extensive survey and the in-forest creation of designated wilderness and wildlife protective areas. Public agitation for greater facility in forest homestead settlement prompted the United States Congress to pass an agricultural appropriations act in 1912 that allocated money to the Forest Service for an extensive and intensive inventory of all national forest land. Previous to 1912, the process for forest homestead application was often time consuming and costly, especially for the perpetually cash- strapped Forest Service. “June 11 th work” - surveying forest homestead claims - took rangers away from patrol and management duties and delayed infrastructure construction. In District 1, it was estimated that between 1906 and 1912 surveying and administering 166 “June 11 th work” took more man-hours than any other duty. The rugged topography and corresponding access issues limited the amount of homestead patents in the Lewis and Clark. Homesteads were clustered at the forest boundaries, near existing transportation infrastructure - the majority of forest homesteads in the Lewis and Clark were located adjacent to the Great Northern Railway - and along stream valleys (Figure 3-13). Despite the sizable input of time and money, by 1912 only 733 acres of the Lewis and Clark had been classified. The 1912 appropriations were aimed at discontinuing that scatter-shot approach to inventory; by the end of the decade nearly every section of land managed by the USFS had been systematically inventoried and its agricultural value determined (USDA D1 1911; USDA FS 1912a, 484-86; 1913a, 144-48; USDA LCNF 1916b; Fitzwater 1944, 58; Halm 1944, 66-87; Swim 1944, 181; Rothman 1994, 12). The “extensive” and “intensive” inventories of the Lewis and Clark began in July 1914 and were completed in 1916. Much of the forest had never been mapped; since 1904, only a “small part at the southern end” had been surveyed (USDA LCNF 1916b). The USFS realized that what constituted a “minimal agricultural unit” varied by forest and ordered each forest to determine its own acceptable acreage. Following a protocol drafted by the national office, Lewis and Clark rangers surveyed homesteaders that lived and farmed near the forest boundary and recorded the types of crops and herds grown, size of homestead, and yearly cost of operation. Most homesteaders stated that it would be impossible to attempt to make a living on anything less than 160 acres – and some suggested double that amount. However, the Lewis and Clark designated a minimum land 167 area of 120 acres for settlement, of which 100 must be suitable for crop production and at least 20 for hay (USDA FS 1913a, 144-48; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). Lewis and Clark examiners recognized that the mountain and valley topography of the forest precluded more traditional survey techniques and methodically worked up each watershed estimating and classifying timber, soil, topography, climate, agricultural, and forest value. In Choteau, foresters researched the title to alienated land in each watershed. Where a possible homestead-eligible site existed, foresters made special visits to intensively examine the tract. Information was officially recorded in Public Land Survey System township, range and section coordinates and located on current maps (Figure 3-14) (USDA FS 1913a, 144-48; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). 168 Figure 3-14: Example of the Lewis and Clark Extensive Survey Land Classification Map, 1916. The yellow color designates grassland. The aqua color designates timberland with less than five thousand b.f. per acre of timber. The green color designates timberland with more than five thousand b.f. per acre of timber. The grey color signifies barren land. The brown color designates brushy landscapes (LCNF 1916b). Of the 828,024 acres in the Lewis and Clark, 22,960 were deemed suitable for intensive examination due to their potential for agricultural viability; 22,240 of those had already been withdrawn by the Reclamation Service for the Sun River Project, leaving only 720 acres in the Lewis and Clark potentially open to homestead settlement. Under intensive examination, 672 of these acres were deemed to be non-agricultural in character; the remaining land was listed as available for settlement (Figure 3-15). The 22,240 acres tied to the Sun River Project were surveyed and underwent soil analysis; all were considered non-listable and segregated from settlement (USDA LCNF 1915a; 1915b; 1916b; 1918a; 1920). Though the basic land classification inventory resulted in the simplification of the complex forest ecosystem, it served as a basis for many of the initial Lewis and Clark working and management plans. In each of the thirty-six PLSS “units” surveyed, land type for each was classified as either “Timber,” “Burned Over,” “Grassland,” “Barren,” or “Brushland.” Timbered land was assessed by its economic potential and divided into Heavy Merchantable and Light Merchantable categories. Lewis and Clark rangers were also instructed to assess timber value in terms of watershed protection. Soil type was given cursory examination where suitable agricultural land was found (USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). Between 1910 and 1929, officials on the Lewis and Clark reworked the internal forest boundaries to incorporate primitive-area wilderness and wildlife protection into their management imperative. This occurred for several reasons including the expansion 169 of settlement east of the Lewis and Clark, the national resurgence of sentiment supporting aesthetic enjoyment of wild places, and institutional competition with the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. Though the appreciation of aesthetic beauty 170 Figure 3-15: Lands Classified for Intensive Survey, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 1916. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). and wildlife recreation had been important to the early conservation movement, it had been deemed by utilitarian scientific forestry as non-commercial and difficult to incorporate into forest plans. Yet, increasing development of both federal forests - through the extension of systematically planned roads and trails - and adjacent lands allowed greater access to national forest landscapes. The Forest Service was forced to plan for wilderness and wildlife use. In 1929, the agency designated a new form of boundary inside national forests; Primitive Areas offered an “opportunity to the public to observe the conditions which existed in the pioneer phases of the Nation’s development, and to engage in the forms of outdoor recreation characteristic of that period” (USDA FS 1930a). Between 1929 and 1934, three primitive areas were created in the Rocky Mountain Front (USDA FS 1930a; Shaw 1964, 65-79; Rothman 1989, 141-61; Steen 2004, 154-56; Sutter 2002; Hays 2009, 86). In 1913, following half a decade of petitioning from sportsmen groups, rod and gun clubs, and wildlife advocates to remove cattle grazing from the upper Sun River, the Montana State Legislature created the Sun River Game Preserve inside the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Wildlife management was designated as a state right and was not a part of the national forest management imperative. Therefore, the Preserve was managed by the state, although the Lewis and Clark still held provenance over the territory inside the Preserve and had the right to manage the land for utilitarian needs. By 1923, two more preserves – Twin Butte and Spotted Bear – were created in or bordering the Lewis and Clark (Figure 3-16). By state law, cattle grazing was denied within preserve 171 boundaries and with the expected growth of elk and deer herds, pressure mounted for the Forest Service to eliminate grazing in all non-preserve portions of the forest. By 1915 the USFS issued a call for a national wildlife plan. The Lewis and Clark, armed with current 172 Figure 3-16: Game Preserves, Northern Montana, 1929. Map by author (USDA FS 1929a; McKay 1994). inventory data and a plan to conduct massive wildlife, grassland, and biologic studies in the preserves, created an informal working plan for managing wildlife and grazing in the same forest (Silcox 1911a; USDA D1 1912b; USDA FS 1913a, 172; Bean 1914; Spaulding 1914f; 1915b; Graves 1915, 236-39; USDA LCNF 1916b). No regional event had a greater impact on the Forest Service than the 1910 “Big Burn.” The Forest Service emerged from the conflagration with wildfire control as its paramount obligation to public lands management. Though in 1905 the Use Book had stated that foresters had “no more important duty than protecting the (national forests) from forest fire,” the “Big Burn” traumatized the agency and challenged their technical capacity to administer their lands (USDA FS 1905). It tested the federal commitment to funding fire control; calls within the agency for more trails, administrative sites, and telephone lines were answered by allocations of over $1.1 million for nation-wide infrastructure improvements. Ultimately, the “Big Burn” forced the USFS to add fire to its research program and escalated agency desires for greater systematization, planning, and urbanization within forest boundaries (Greeley 1910; USDA FS 1911a, 369; USDA D1 1911; 1912a, 4; Pyne 1981, 68; 1997, 243-94; 2008; Steen 2004, 173-89). The practical toll of the 1910 fires on District 1 was tremendous; the fire complex directly impacted the Kootenai, Nezperce, Clearwater, Kanisku, Pend Oreille, Blackfeet, Flathead, Lewis and Clark, Cabinet, Coeur D’Alene, St. Joe, Lolo, Bitterroot, and Missoula national forests. Three million acres of timber burned in District 1 at an estimated loss of over $10,000,000. The fire killed 78 temporarily hired forest guards. 173 Most of them died within two days of each other. The 1910 fires were responsible for a dramatic reduction in timber sale receipts - as much as 75 percent - throughout the early 1910s and District 1 was highly motivated to sell fire-burned timber at a reduced rate, further lowering prices in an already flooded market. The Lewis and Clark was on the eastern edge of the conflagration and it too experienced significant burns (Figure 3-17). Preliminary estimates placed the total area of the Lewis and Clark burn at 66,560 acres, including the entire headwaters of the South Fork of the Two Medicine and at least one large area of prime merchantable timber. Over 30,000 acres along the forks of Birch Creek, 4,500 acres at the head of the West Fork of Teton River, 10,000 acres on Deep Creek, and an undetermined acreage along the North Fork of Sun River also burned (Butler 1910; Rockwell 1910; USDA FS 1911a; USDA LCNF 1911a; USDA D1 1911; 1912a; Woods 1944, 195-200; Baker et al 1993, 51-53; McKay 1994, 131-36). The USFS experimented with methodologies that brought scientific research and efficiency studies of fire control into utilitarian scientific forestry. “Firefighting,” wrote William Greeley, “is a matter of scientific management, just as much as silviculture or range improvement” (Greeley 1911a, 165). In 1915, following the publication of Systematic Fire Protection in the California Forests (1914), the USFS established a Division of Fire Control at the national headquarters level and designated the Priest River Station in District 1 as the center of fire research in the Service. Systematic Fire Protection described more efficient ways to combat fire by assessing fire management practices in an attempt to gain a level of “mathematical certainty” and standardization in 174 fire control operations. Logistics-based research was pursued and equipment and load size for packhorse transportation was standardized. In Missoula, a central emergency tool and supply warehouse was established. Research in District 1 examined forest fires as a 175 Figure 3-17. The 1910 “Big Burn” in the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1911a). function of economics. Between 1910 and 1914, money for protection improvements was distributed evenly to the forests in District 1, based on land area; but by 1914, the decision was made to base distribution of funds on “a scientific study of the fire protection factors” that assessed the economic risk and protection value of each forest (USDA FS 1914c, 15) (duBois 1911; 1914; USDA FS 1912d, 503; Graves 1914; USDA D1 1914a; 1914b; Greeley 1920, 38-39; Pyne 1981, 68-71; 1997, 260-72). As a result, the USFS was forced to consider alternatives to its total control fire policy. The agency examined both “let-burn” and “light-burn” techniques as alternatives to suppression. Let-burn fire management allowed remote fires in non-vital economic regions to burn. Light-burn fire control policies prescribed burning for fuel-laden areas. Both had scientific and economic validity, but by 1920 the Forest Service had established nationwide fire control standards that were based on agency research. Light-burning and let-burn alternatives were formally rejected and the no fires policy supported. “Settling” backcountry areas was paramount to fire control; each forest was directed to evaluate how long it took to attack a fire once it had been spotted, and to focus its improvement work on developing infrastructure and procedures that lowered the “elapsed time” during which fires often grew from being controllable to conflagrations. By 1926, the USFS expanded forest appropriations for “presuppression expenditures” – largely infrastructure improvements and increased patrol based on damage appraisals – and directed forests to redouble their efforts in attacking fires quickly and efficiently (duBois 1911; 1914; 176 USDA FS 1912d, 503; Graves 1914; USDA D1 1914a; 1914b; Greeley 1920, 38-39; Pyne 1981, 68-71; 1997, 260-72; 2008; Williams 1989, 481-87; Flader 1999, 1-19). District 1 sought opportunities for industry and local cooperation in fire suppression. Some were preventative in nature; following the Big Burn, a cooperative agreement between the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific railways required that the companies begin clearing their rights of way of all flammable material. The railroads were ordered to clear adjacent strips between 100 and 200 feet in width from their tracks and then allowed to keep the timber harvested free of charge. Other cooperative agreements were promises of aid; in later years, the Forest Service and railroads combined forces with state agents to attack fires that threatened state and private land near Montana national forests (Greeley 1910; USDA FS 1914d; Stockdale 1923; 1930b). Infrastructure development was integral to fire management; foresters in the Lewis and Clark constructed a detailed fire management plan that included an outline of the communications, trail, lookout point, and administrative site system. Improvement projects were ranked according to importance, allowing “every district Ranger (to have) a definite outline for the construction of trails, cabins, fences, and other projects, so that they will be immediately transferred to improvement work without any lost motion” (USDA D1 1912a). The financial struggle faced by the Forest Service to build trails, roads, and permanent ranger’s quarters was alleviated some in the years following the Big Burn. Fire protection was seen as insurance; permanent improvement work in “the development of roads, trails, and telephone lines, will make it possible to accomplish 177 … twice as much work with one man as is now possible” and eliminate the fire threat to the timber, range, and watersheds of the Forest Service (USDA D1 1911). In 1913, the Roads and Trails Fund was created to allocate 10 percent of all income from timber sales to road and trail construction (USDA D1 1911; Hays 2009, 98-99). Fire management plans also incorporated ecological, human use, and historical data. This information was used to plan patrols and assign manpower. The Lewis and Clark included maps in their plan that showed forest type and cover, location of settlements and possible labor supply points, and an economic assessment of fire liability based on the results of previous fires. Ranger districts were directed to increase preventative measures aimed at eliminating fire hazards in historic use areas before a fire began and rangers redoubled efforts to draft campfire rules, post fire laws, and dispose of timber slash. Heavy backcountry grazing was encouraged as a means to reduce fuels and place stockmen on the fire line. Each ranger district overhauled patrol systems. Manpower was reassigned based on the relative economic vulnerability of each district. Patrols were divided into a “fixed patrol force” and a “blanket patrol force;” the fixed force was stationed in areas where fires were more likely to occur, along the North Fork of the Sun River for example. The blanket force was made up of men stationed at lookouts, administrative sites, packers, and reserve fire fighters (duBois 1911; 1914; USDA FS 1912d, 503; Graves 1914; USDA D1 1914a; 1914b; Pyne 1981, 68-71). Following the Big Burn, the systematic completion of a trail and communications system was the most urgent task of the USFS; for the time being, the development of 178 business and resources was seen as far less important. Nationally, the Forest Service promoted road, trail, and telephone construction as the key to effective fire control and assured the public that every effort was being made to engineer ways to speed forest firefighters to fire lines. Foresters distinguished between primary trails – those that were “fundamental to safety and efficiency under existing conditions” – and secondary trails – those intended for resource development (USDA FS 1912b, 530). All funds and work was to be directed initially toward primary trails and telephone lines; in 1912, 80 percent of District 1 improvement funds were spent pursuant to those goals (USDA FS 1911a, 399; 1912b, 529-30; Leavitt 1911a; USDA D1 1912a; 1912b; Hamilton 1923). By 1912, the Lewis and Clark had completed a fire protection plan that highlighted immediate trail and telephone construction and had engineered a preliminary trail and road system (Figure 3-18, Appendix C). The majority of the primary system trails in the Lewis and Clark were created north of the Sun River watershed. This occurred for three reasons: 1) the timber bodies north of the Sun were considered the most accessible in the Lewis and Clark 2) before 1916, ranger districts north of the Sun handled the greatest amount of timber, grazing, and special use permits in the Lewis and Clark and faced fire control pressures from the Great Northern Railway 3) federal investment in the Sun River Project dictated heavy patrol in the region. Their pathway selection was consistent with trails built between 1905 and 1910 and several were improved local use trails following incised stream valleys. The North Fork Sun River trail utilized portions of the Tie Hacker’s road. The southern portion of the Lewis and Clark 179 was accessed primarily through the Dearborn trail; it extended along the Dearborn River to the Scapegoat Mountain lookout point and survey triangulation station. A secondary 180 Figure 3-18: Transportation Infrastructure Improvements, LCNF 1912. Map by author (USDA FS 1912a). trail ran off of the Dearborn west toward the Continental Divide; the Whitetail Creek trail connected the Dearborn and the Carmichael region of the Missoula National Forest via Whitetail Creek and that thoroughfare was used primarily as a sheep drive (Anaconda Standard 1908, 12 July; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1948g; 1980b). Telephone line construction in the Lewis and Clark began after the “Big Burn” and served as a modernizing force in the forest. Before 1911, no phone lines existed in the forest and “the safety of the timber require(d) ... (the) utmost efforts be put to the supplying of this lack” (Leavitt 1911a). In District 1, constructing a telephone system was considered of primary importance and by 1912 over 2,200 miles of telephone line had been strung throughout the region. Lewis and Clark rangers were advised that most permanent ranger stations should be connected to the supervisor’s office at Choteau before telephones were extended to the backcountry. By 1911, a small system of telephone lines connected Choteau with nearby administrative sites; that year the Teton administrative site at the border of the Lewis and Clark was built. A secondary line was extended up the Teton River to the future West Fork Teton administrative site (Figure 3-19). A line was also strung in cooperation with the Reclamation Service from Choteau to the USRS camp at Diversion Dam that was utilized by the rangers at Hannan Gulch and Beaver Creek administration sites. Plans were made to connect the town of Augusta to stations in the southern portion of the forest (USDA LCNF nd-v; nd-w; 2004b; 2008b; Leavitt 1911a; USDA FS 1911a; 1912a; 1912d, 529; Townsend P. 1911; USDA D1 1910a; 1912b; USDI BOR 1916, 233-34; Coats 1986, 1-17; Autobee 1996, 13-18). 181 Telephone lines in the Lewis and Clark were strung with a mind towards rapid development rather than durability. Inexpensive single-wire lines were hung from trees at 182 Figure 3-19: Telephone Network, LCNF, 1912. Telephone lines are simplifications. In reality, lines conformed to property boundaries and physical geography. Map by author. “such points as could be easily reached by patrolmen in the (backcountry) where without telephones it would be necessary to make a long, difficult trip in order to secure help” (USDA D1 1910a). Preliminary lines were largely strung along existing trails in key places that accessed fire patrol routes and unimproved lookout sites. In some cases, telephone lines were constructed in areas where substantial amounts of economically viable timber existed; trails, such as the Washboard Reef trail, were built alongside those lines in part for telephone line maintenance. The process was both time and cost intensive; packers brought rolls of wire in on mules, stopping every half-mile to cache a spool for construction crews. Many of the early Forest Service lines were developed by entering into barter-like telephone contracts with ranchers, farmers, loggers, and the Reclamation Service living in or near forest boundaries. Forest users were allowed free timber use to construct telephone poles through their property and free use of agency phone lines on the condition that they serve as per diem fire patrol personnel and grant forest officers use of the lines for official business; one such agreement was made with homesteader J.R. Young in 1911 to connect the Teton administrative site to Choteau. By 1912 it had become clear throughout District 1 that the cost of maintaining lines in a region prone to tree-fall, wildfire, and extreme weather events was onerous. Alternate communication systems such as using carrier pigeons and the heliograph – the use of reflective sunlight and Morse Code - were explored to little success (USDA D1 1910a; 1912b; Townsend P. 1911; USDA FS 1915b, 75-80; USDA LCNF 2008b). 183 The initial rush to build a communications network following the “Big Burn” resulted in a push towards efficiency and the systematization of telephone planning and construction - adding further to the urbanizing effect telephone use brought to the Lewis and Clark. Lines were organized into “main trunk” and “spur” lines (Coats 1986, 2). Main lines connected supervisor offices to ranger district headquarters; spur lines tied ranger district headquarters to lookouts and peripheral administration sites. By 1916, the Willow Creek, Ear Mountain, Hannan Gulch, and Lubec administration sites – all ranger district headquarters – were connected to Choteau by trunk lines. Circuits, lines, manuals, and schematics were patterned directly on ones used regularly by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Districts employed telephone engineers to develop construction blueprints and tie them in to fire management plans. In District 1, telephone engineer R.B. Adams gained near-legendary status for his skill at planning communication systems and tree-line construction. Adams developed a portable, handheld phone that could be clipped into a phone line in the backcountry as well as a high frequency signaling device known as a “Howler” that allowed a ranger to leave his cabin on patrol and still know when he was receiving a call; both were in wide use in the Lewis and Clark by the early 1920s. His 1923 manual titled The Telephone Trouble Book was adopted by the entire agency as a ranger field guide to efficient and systematic phone-line installation and repair. Following World War I, Adams was the first to recommend that the Forest Service adopt wireless radios in lieu of further telephone construction and recommended that each forest in District 1 conduct an economic 184 examination of each telephone line to determine where radios could best be used (USDA FS 1915b, 75-80; Adams R.B. 1923a; 1923b; Gray 1982, 1-17; Coats 1986, 1-10). Between 1910 and 1929, administration sites were reserved or expanded in the Lewis and Clark to facilitate fire control, use management, and business development (Figure 3-20, Appendix D). As critical nodes of control, they were a major component to the larger modernization of the forest. Priority for improvements was given to larger, permanent stations near the forest borders and population centers. Increasing settlement on the Front, more diverse use of the forest, and the impress of modernity all contributed to this shift. The location of every administration site was examined in the wake of the fire to determine its “relation to the administrative organization, the fire and improvement plans, and to the possibilities of forest management” (USDA D1 1912a). Primary ranger stations were located at or near the boundary of the Lewis and Clark and designated to receive main trunk telephone lines. In 1911, the Ear Mountain administrative site was withdrawn outside of the Lewis and Clark boundary despite the fact that Pambrun administrative site had previously been withdrawn nearby. Ear Mountain was designated a “central station” in the Lewis and Clark fire plan (Leavitt 1911d). It was necessary to have Ear Mountain in working order in rapid fashion, despite the fact that the majority of improvement funds were being used for trail and telephone line construction. The foresters were forced to think of alternatives to building at Ear Mountain and the cabin and barn were moved to Ear Mountain from Goat Bluff administration site and a main trunk telephone line connected to Choteau. Other early primary stations in the Lewis and 185 Clark were at Piegan, North Fork Dupuyer, Beaver Creek/Hannan, Willow Creek, and Elk Creek (Clack 1908c; Daugs 1909c; Graves 1911b; Leavitt 1911d; 1911e; USDA D1 186 Figure 3-20: Administrative Site Withdrawals, LCNF, 1929. Map by author (USDA FS 1929a). 1912a; USDA LCNF 1912; 1916a; Jefferson 1916; Primelle 1916c). The Lewis and Clark fire management plan stressed systematic and efficient resupply. To meet those needs, administrative sites were withdrawn in the backcountry region of the forest. Some - Gates Park, Benchmark, Badger Creek, West Fork, and Pretty Prairie – were developed as summer use only ranger or guard stations. Camp Wellman and Wrong Creek existed as non-reserved fire camps for much of the 1920s, though Wrong Creek was officially reserved in 1924. Summer guard stations and fire camps served as supply caches and temporary housing for the fixed and blanket patrol force. The Ear Mountain, Piegan, and Willow Creek administrative sites were all expanded to meet fire and management logistical needs; each underwent a secondary withdrawal to add pasturage needed to supply strategically located pack animals (USDI NPS nd-a; Shick 1911; Leavitt 1912b; 1913d; USDA FS 1912a; 1929a; USDA LCNF nd-d; nd-ss; 1913a; 1916a; 2002b; Adams J. 1912; 1913; Jefferson 1913; 1914a; Spaulding 1913a; Johnston 1915; Primelle 1915; Houston 1916; USDI NPS 1990b). Administrative sites were also withdrawn to facilitate forest use, develop business, and as base camps for backcountry scientific surveys. The Heart Butte administration site was withdrawn in preparation of the opening the Blackfeet Reservation to non-tribal settlement and a corresponding increase in forest timber, grazing, and recreational use. The Heart Butte withdrawal was larger than the 160-acre maximum dictated by the Forest Service; the large allotment was permitted because winter pasturage for government horses was needed though unofficially it was allowed as a protection against forest 187 homesteading. The Benchmark, Pretty Prairie, and Badger Creek sites were also located near backcountry grazing allotments and served “as quarters for the cow herder(s) looking after the stock interests” (USDA LNCF 1916a, 60). The cabin at Benchmark was built in 1922 in part to regulate undesignated camping and fishing. In 1914, the Lakeside administration site was withdrawn to manage backcountry timber sales around a proposed – and ultimately unbuilt - Sun River Project reservoir. Most of the summer-use backcountry cabins were used to facilitate inventory and survey; the Two Shacks cabins and Pretty Prairie, for example, were used in winter to count the Sun River elk herd (Figure 3-21) (Adams J. 1913; Leavitt 1913d; Woods 1913; Jefferson 1914b; Streit 1915; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1990a; Adams R.B. 1923a; USDI NPS 1990a). The pressure to hold administrative sites in reserve decreased following the forest homestead inventory in 1916. As such, several administrative sites were abandoned and returned to the public domain – though since most had been declared unsuitable for agriculture in the inventory, they were still restricted from being settled. Furthermore, the fire management plan dictated that administrative sites be planned with a larger connected network in mind; stations at Ford Creek, Teton, Pambrun, and Goat Bluff did not fit within the system or had been made redundant and were therefore abandoned. Piegan station was abandoned as well and sold off under the Forest Homestead Act. The desire for irrigated agriculture resulted in site closures. Birch Creek was “almost entirely covered by flowage waters of the (Swift) reservoir” and released (Leavitt 1912a). To make way for the Sun River Project, the Lewis and Clark released the Medicine Creek, 188 Palmer’s Flat, and Beaver Creek sites; the Reclamation Service used both Medicine Creek and Beaver Creek before the Gibson Reservoir was flooded (Bien 1909; Quiggle 1909; Hays 1912; Leavitt 1912a; Dwinelle 1915; Jefferson 1916; Parrott 1916; Primelle 1916b; 1916c; 1916e; Townsend P. 1916b; USDI NPS 1990a). In the mid 1920s, Lewis and Clark foresters also approved their first set of administrative site improvements in an attempt to transform the older, non-standard ranger stations from “buildings that are ... in many cases very similar to the log cabins of the more shiftless negroes in the South” into “substantial, weatherproof structures” recognizable apart from private recreation and homestead cabins (Gurley 1920, 17; Flint 1929, 4). To allow for more efficient and higher quality construction, the Forest Service directed districts to develop plans standardizing future building. In 1923, District 1 189 Figure 3-21: Two Shacks Winter Camp, 1928. Two Shacks was a remnant site from the “tie-hacker” days in the Rocky Mountain Front (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). engineers began creating standardized blueprints, complete with material-needed lists for barns, ranger stations, lookouts, and fireman guard cabins. By the late 1920s, several Lewis and Clark administrative sites, including Hannan Gulch, Wrong Creek, and Willow Creek had undergone improvement. Lewis and Clark rangers at the sites were responsible for conducting the repairs – and, despite standardized plans, the improvements suffered because rangers were not skilled builders. As a result, the Lewis and Clark began to discuss hiring rangers “selected for skill in building” to work solely constructing improvements (Flint 1929, 4). (USDA D1 1923; 1924; 1928a; 1928b; 1928c; 1928d; 1928e; USDA LCNF 1928c; 1928d; Flint 1929). National forest trail and road development were also systematically restructured. In 1915, the Forest Service published its first handbook on trail and road construction. The purpose of the manual was direct; early agency trails had been constructed without standards and “in accordance with the exigencies of the situation or the point of view of the builder.” It was necessary “to establish a uniform classification of trails on the National Forests in accordance with their use, ... to establish standard specifications for each class, ... (and) to describe approved methods of location, construction, and maintenance” (USDA FS 1915c, 7). The type and frequency of use, as well as location, determined a trail’s classification. Class A “primary” trails were main trails that followed the dominant stream valleys and necessitated conversion to wagon roads without “material alteration of route or grade” (USDA FS 1915c, 8-9). Primary trails were trunk trails and a necessity for effective forest management. Class B “secondary” trails 190 followed major waterway tributaries and, though important for regional use, were seldom used as a through route. Class C “ways” trails were branch or spur trails hardly wide enough for a mounted man with a pack (USDA FS 1915c). By 1929, the trail and road system in the Lewis and Clark had dramatically expanded in size and character (Figure 3-22, Appendix E). Nearly every major entry- point on the forest’s eastern boundary contained a wagon or automobile road, though few could be maintained deep into the Lewis and Clark. Primary trails existed along the main Lewis and Clark waterways including the heavily timbered Sun, Dearborn, Teton, and Two Medicine rivers. Some primary trails, such as North Fork Sun River and Rock Creek trails, connected the Lewis and Clark with the Flathead and Helena national forests. Through the early 1920s, Lewis and Clark foresters utilized its primary trail system for range management and fire protection in these other forests. Secondary trails were largely located in historically high use areas of the forest near the eastern boundary such as in Mortimer, Blacktail, and Green gulches. These secondary trails often saw considerable public recreation use. Many radiated off of improved roads and were accessed by a growing automobile culture. Secondary roads in the Lewis and Clark were often designated in high grazing regions – such as in Elk Creek and Charmichael regions of the forest - where livestock interests provided a measure of fire control and cooperative trail maintenance. A third type of trail, know as ways trails, served as alternate “public” entrances and were improved local trails near the eastern forest boundary. They also provided access to forest homesteads in the northern portion of the forest. Ways trails 191 served an administrative purpose as well. They were short backcountry routes to unimproved lookouts and important elements to the Lewis and Clark’s fire detection plan. 192 Figure 3-22: Transportation Infrastructure, LCNF, 1929. Map by author (USDA FS 1929a; USDA LCNF 1948g). Road and trail expansion necessitated several related infrastructure improvements. Increased forest traffic brought on by settlement, road construction, and greater use of the automobile forced the Lewis and Clark to consider constructing a bridge across the Sun River at Hannan Gulch. During high water periods, the Sun River was often unfordable at Hannan Gulch; to facilitate access, the Forest Service strung a basket and pulley system over the river. People were loaded into the basket and winched across the span. Foresters debated the cost-benefit of constructing the bridge, predicting that population increases on the Rocky Mountain Front necessitated construction of administration sites closer to urban centers – making the Hannan Gulch station obsolete. Though there was considerable sentiment in the agency against constructing the bridge, foresters consented to its construction bowing to the “unavoidable” public criticism the agency would receive “if it continues to try to get along without a bridge” (Shoemaker 1923). By 1929, a bridge capable of supporting automotive traffic across the Sun at Hannan Gulch was in place (Fenn 1916; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; Beatty 1917a; 1920; Flint 1923; Shoemaker 1923; USDA FS 1929a). The fire situation improved in the Lewis and Clark directly following the Big Burn - a reality that had as much to do with favorable climatic conditions as it did with fire management. However, District 1 and the Lewis and Clark’s fire protection plans were tested repeatedly throughout the 1910s and 1920s with the worst fire years occurring in 1914, 1917, 1919, 1921, 1926, and 1929. District 1 made a practice of comparing each successive bad fire year to the Big Burn and almost uniformly declared 193 that all were better than 1910 due to improvements and greater understanding of fire behavior. In 1919, over 1.3 million acres burned across District 1; in the Lewis and Clark, fires sparked by lightning and drought raged through the Benchmark area well into the Sun River Game Preserve (Figure 3-23). Public outcry caused by fires in the Preserve prompted the Lewis and Clark to construct the Wall trail to facilitate access to the Continental Divide and cross-boundary fire management. Fire control inspections between 1920 and 1926 rated the Lewis and Clark as excellent; during that period the average annual loss amounted to around 120 acres – most of which occurred in the 1921 fires (USDA FS 1912d, 449; 1913a, 158-60; USDA D1 1915; Flint 1922a; 1922b; 1922c; 1923; 1929; Koch 1944d, 104-06; Pyne 1997, 256; USDA LCNF 2002f). Following the 1919 fires, the Lewis and Clark initiated a new round of fire lookout construction and unimproved lookout point surveys. Location of lookout points 194 Figure 3-23: 1919 Fire Devastation, Lewis and Clark National Forest. Fire near the Continental Divide at White River Pass. Photo courtesy of LCNF (LCNF-C, Rocky Mountain Ranger District Photo Binder). were selected based on the idea of “seen area,” which quantified the amount of area seen as a mathematical figure known as percent of vision (Figure 3-24); the percent vision quotient was often used in determining the location of the lookout tower and point construction. By 1929, both permanent lookout points, some with fixed constructed cabins and towers, and unimproved lookout points connected by trail and temporarily manned with planned ranger patrols, extended through the backcountry of the Lewis and Clark. The practice of caching large quantities of fire equipment along backcountry trails 195 Figure 3-24: “Seen Area” Study, Wrong Ridge, LCNF, 1933, (USDA FNF 1933). came to an end; large tool caches were instead relocated to population centers such as Choteau and Lubec near labor supplies. Small fire crews were kept in fire cache camps and backcountry seasonal stations such as Camp Wellman, My Lake, and Benchmark (Figure 3-25, Appendix D) (USDA LCNF nd-d; USDA FS 1912a; 1929a; duBois 1914, 49; USDA D1 1915; Flint 1922a; 1923; 1929; USDA FNF 1933; Koch 1944d, 104-06; Gray 1982, 23-25; Pyne 1997, 256). The difficult fire years of 1926 and 1929 encouraged the District to examine new technologies that expanded fire management beyond administrative borders. By 1927, Missoula-based pilots in the U.S. National Guard flew fire reconnaissance flights across the region. The District conducted wireless radio experiments to ascertain the efficacy of air-to-ground and lookout-to-administrative site communication. By 1929, District 1 began incorporating a selection of administration sites and lookouts into a multi-forest communications network to assist in fire detection and control. Later known as the “Continental Unit,” these Forest Service facilities were equipped with radios, telephones, and were designated as supply points for backcountry fires. The “Continental Unit” extended throughout the backcountry of the Lewis and Clark, Flathead, and Missoula (Helena) national forests and included such Lewis and Clark administrative sites as Gates Park, Pretty Prairie, Prairie Reef, and Benchmark. By the 1940s, the Continental Unit was used to coordinate both radio communication and airplane patrols to facilitate fire control (USDA LCNF nd-d; USDA FS 1912a; 1929a; duBois 1914, 49; USDA D1 1915; Flint 1922a; 1923; USDA FNF 1933). 196 As the 1920s came to a close, the Lewis and Clark was connected through a series of trails, administrative stations, and telephone lines – all tied together under a 197 Figure 3-25: Fire Control Lookout System, LCNF, 1929. Map by author (USDA FS 1929a). coordinated management plan. However, the Lewis and Clark still faced significant infrastructure and fire control difficulties. Despite greater coordination, planning, and infrastructure, the Lewis and Clark remained vulnerable to a large “blow-up” fire. Periodic drought conditions – like those the forest experienced in the late 1920s – and annual high wind events greatly concerned the agency. Despite coordinated plans and a fire detection system, foresters noted that fire control on the Lewis and Clark was hampered by a “skeleton force” that had difficulties reacting quickly and efficiently to lightning fires in the more remote regions of the forest (Flint 1929). Future forest communications were jeopardized by the pending completion of the Gibson Dam. The company that constructed the Gibson Dam owned the telephone line that connected the Sun River administrative sites with Augusta and intended on eliminating the line following the Dam’s completion. The agency was forced to purchase the line, re-wire it to fit standard plans, and reroute it along a less “circuitous route” (Lockhart 1930d) (Adams R.B., 1926; Flint 1929; Lockhart 1929b; 1930c; 1931b; Corey 1930a; 1930b). Timber Management Between 1897 and 1929, the GLO and the Forest Service struggled to craft a uniform and effective timber policy that answered Progressive conservationist environmental concerns, met the needs of a dynamic local and national economy, and could be supported by science. Progressive era conservationists saw the forest reserve system as a mechanism to shift large quantities of national timbered lands from private to public control. The policy shift was a reaction to the denuded landscapes, silt-filled 198 rivers, and abandoned town sites left after corporate logging interests had come, cut, and gone. Scientists warned of an economically crippling “timber famine” should the exploitation continue. Between 1891 and 1897, small amounts of timber were cut at the edges of Reserves; local settlers were allowed to take up to $100 worth of timber for personal use. In 1893, the first year this free use system was used, the GLO only granted timber harvest rights to 91 individuals nationwide – 25 in Montana (USDI GLO 1893; Wiener 1982, 2-6; Clary 1986, 3-28; Hays 1999, 27-48). Along the Rocky Mountain Front, settlers and native tribes routinely harvested timber from the most accessible canyons for sale or individual use. In 1886, loggers hired by the Great Northern Railway built a wagon road beginning near Hannan Gulch and extending up the Sun River. Led by Charles Biggs, the “tie hackers” cut timber for the Great Northern Railway along Headquarters and Biggs creek and floated it down the North Fork of the Sun. Between 1886 and 1899 it is estimated that the tie hackers cut nearly 200,000 railroad ties and 25,000 cords of fuelwood. In 1890, a timber operator named Jones built a tie camp at the mouth of Jones Creek; Jones operated his tie camps at least until 1912. In his 1899 survey of the Front, H.B. Ayres estimated that another 100,000 ties had been cut along the Dearborn and used on the Helena branch of the Great Northern. In the northern portion of the Front, large quantities of timber had been cut for settlement, bridge timber, and railroad construction camps. Three small timber mills existed on or near the future boundaries of the Lewis and Clark(e) – on the South Fork Dupuyer, South Fork Teton, and Smith creeks. Each of the mills, owned at the time by 199 Alex Yule, McGuirk, and White respectively, were actively involved in harvesting their own timber and processing it into rough lumber for local supply (USDA LCNF nd-x; 1916a; 1948g; 1960, 35; 1998a; 1998e; 2004d; 2006b; 2008a; USDI GLO 1893; Ayres 1900; Daugs 1909c; Shaw 1964, 74; Wiener 1982, 2-6). Despite fears of “timber famine,” both the GLO and the Forest Service allowed timber harvests. The Organic Act functionally limited the range of possible forest management objectives to timber production and watershed protection. Therefore, in 1897 the GLO instituted a cumbersome and ineffective permitting process that allowed both industry and settlers to apply for federal timber. Timber could be cut in any location on GLO forest reserves. Most sales originated through public petition wherein the applicant provided the GLO with descriptions of the cut boundary, character of the country, agricultural and mineral disposition of the land, the amount, type, and diameter of timber standing, and an estimate of board feet and value of the timber. Following the receipt of the petition, GLO rangers were charged with an examination and appraisal of the sale. Stumpage values were based on “like” local sales – even if none had occurred. As no systematic procedure existed for conducting appraisals, it allowed for high levels of corruption. Following the appraisal, timber sales often were delayed as much as 18 months as the contract moved through the GLO hierarchy. Following sale approval, loggers had one year to complete the sale – an often insufficient period considering the time necessary to construct roads, flumes, railways, and mills to move and process the timber (USDI GLO 1897; Wiener 1982, 2-6; Baker et al 1993; Hays 2009, 37-39). 200 Most timber sales in the Lewis and Clark(e) occurred west of the Continental Divide, although timber was also removed along major drainages east of the Divide and processed at the existing mills. Along the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek approximately 300,000 b.f. of timber had been cut “in the basins,” floated to the mill, sawed “and sold rough for $16 per thousand” (Ayres 1900, 63). Nearly 1,000,000 b.f, of lumber and 6,000 cords of posts and poles were cut by 1900 on the Teton. Another 1,000,000 b.f. of lodgepole pine and spruce was milled on Smith Creek. Throughout the GLO management period, the majority of timber harvested from the Lewis and Clark(e) was through small sales or free use. In 1901, only one large-sale petition was received by Lewis and Clark(e) supervisors – for 15,000,000 b.f. – and it was rejected. By contrast, 191 applications for free use were placed and all were granted, totaling nearly 1,700 cords of timber. Petitions increased and by 1903 five were approved for 320,000 b.f. Nearly 600,000 b.f. of timber was granted through free use to supply increasing settlement. By 1905, lumbermen were cutting over 1,700,000 b.f. in the Lewis and Clark(e). Sales were unplanned and subject to little scientific study. Large-block timber sales were encouraged in the “principal body of accessible timber on the reserve” along the Great Northern Railway line to clear fire danger and encourage settlement along the railroad (Koch 1905). Timber sales lagged east of the Continental Divide; only three small sales occurred in 1905 along the Front. The “Clack” – the South Fork Dupuyer mill – and “McGuirk” – the Teton mill – sales were “rather too low in comparison with what timber is bringing on 201 other reserves” (Koch 1906). Each brought less than $1.00 to $1.25 per thousand b.f. (Ayres 1900; USDI 1902, 618; 1903, 576; Koch 1905, 1906). In 1905, the Forest Service began using timber extraction to implement their brand of utilitarian forestry. Scientific forestry was based on the premise that through the rational implementation of science and technology, managed forests could produce predictable and sustainable resource yields. To Gifford Pinchot and the early USFS staff, the national forests were a hard-to-manage collection of old-growth trees, deadfall, and hillsides covered with species of mixed age, type, and quality. Old-growth timber was non-productive; it did not grow wood fiber as rapidly as younger trees and was susceptible to disease and blow down. To place the national forests on a firm footing of scientific forestry, the USFS developed management strategies intent on liquidating its timber supplies. Though it seemed counter-intuitive, the USFS attempted to fight timber famine through large-scale logging. Once cleared of old growth, the national forests could be replanted with a controlled and planned timber crop (Wiener 1982, 2-21; Clary 1986 29-66; Langston 1995, 86-113; Hays 1999, 27-48; 2009, 1-54). The first step toward placing the national forests on a scientific footing was to conduct timber surveys and determine quantity, value, and type estimates for each stand. Tasked with transforming “chaotic, decadent old growth into a forest of young, vigorous, competitively superior trees,” foresters struggled to conduct efficient surveys; lack of trained manpower, infrastructure, and a standardized estimation methodology greatly affected the timeliness and usability of early timber cruises (Langston 1995, 114). 202 National pressure to provide evidence that the national forests were being used and not reserved limited timber surveys to only those areas where proposed cuts existed. As a result, timber inventories did not proceed in a systematic manner, thereby negating early attempts at long-term planning. Furthermore, surveying for sale-purposes forced foresters to classify trees in economic terms. Early timber surveys recognized only present and potential economic value. An inspection of a 1906 Lewis and Clark sale on the South Fork of the Teton exemplifies this sentiment: “the utilization of the timber is unusually complete...and particularly unsound logs being cut, that many mills would not handle at all...Reproduction in the region seems very difficult to secure except in the case of the worthless subalpine fir which is in possession of the old cuttings” (Koch 1906) (Kinney 1907; Clary 1986, 41-46; Langston 1995, 114-56; Scott 1998, 11-22). The 1905 “Use Book” created a system of rules that further encouraged timber sales. It broke the bureaucratic logjam involved in timber sale authorization; any ranger could make sales of up to $20 worth of dead or downed timber, thereby eliminating hierarchical approval. Forest supervisors were allowed to permit sales up to $100 of live or dead timber; sales valued over $100 required the Forester’s signature, though they were almost always granted following the district forester’s recommendation. To encourage the timber industry to commit to necessary infrastructure improvements, the agency extended the allowable period of sale to five years. Finally, timber cut on most of the national forests could be exported outside of state boundaries (USDA FS 1905; 1907c; Wiener 1982, 2-21; Clary 1986 29-66). 203 Despite the regulatory shift, timber sales did not occur on the level necessary to propel the national forests toward efficient scientific management. The agency’s long- term objective conflicted with the timber industry’s desire for short-term investment and immediate profit. Industry balked at the agency’s demand that timber sales were both selective – a certain percentage of viable growing stock needed to be left following a sale – and nondiscriminating –loggers had to take all types of timber contained in a sale including poor quality, diseased, and less-marketable tree types. Loggers rejected agency requirements that stipulated that timber slash – branches, “tops and lops,” and brush –was to be piled and safely burned. Furthermore, the USFS required that yearly harvest goals be met despite the five-year sale completion deadline. Timber industry spokesmen complained that such requirements kept sale prices artificially low and infringed on their right to withhold product from the market during economic downturns. The logging industry was also angered by timber sale prices, which were variable, open to interpretation by newly trained rangers, and rarely based on actual market conditions. Often, the young agency was forced to accept industry criticism in order to get compliance; prices were regularly lowered below market level to create a profit margin for buyers, ostensibly to cover the expense of infrastructure construction and slash disposal. The USFS also “solved the (pricing) problem” by employing industry lumbermen to train agency foresters in proper scaling and estimating techniques (Woolsey 1907; Wiener 1982, 2-21; Clary 1986, 29-66; Langston 1995, 86-113). 204 The agency’s large-scale silvicultural plan also angered local interests. Western legislators complained that the agency was complicit in contributing to industrial monopolies by encouraging large sales. Local lumber mills could not compete with heavily capitalized companies and for many, five-year sales were not sufficiently profitable to warrant the upfront infrastructure costs. The USFS countered by setting maximum and minimum stumpage rates for each forest; in this plan, the maximum rate allowed for a small, local sale was the minimum price for large-scale projects. On forests near fledgling or struggling communities, local sales of any size were encouraged; in cases where local lumber companies needed a more-permanent supply of timber, supervisors were directed to allow timber contracts to run “in excess of five years” (USDA D1 1910a) (Clapp 1908; Graves 1912; Wiener 1982, 2-21). By 1908, the increasing pressure to place the national forests under scientific management pushed the Forest Service to conduct more efficient and goal-oriented timber inventories. A 1907 agency study stated that the annual consumption of timber in the United States was “four times as great as the annual (growth) of our forests” (Kellogg 1907, 4). As such, the Forest Service believed that placing the national forests on scientifically supported sustained-yield plans was more necessary than ever. Reconnaissance was organized systematically; in District 1, crews recorded 40-acre wide tracts on topographical maps that showed age, density, tree volume, and the amount of merchantable logs in each stand. Following the survey, estimators determined the quantity of timber that could be harvested in ten and twenty-five year periods while 205 ensuring healthy forest reproduction. Finally, these estimates were organized into management plans. At the heart of these plans was the “working circle” – a management region wherein marginally uniform timber, soil, and water estimates could be made. Working circles were organized by economic “market blocks,” though some foresters recommended that watersheds naturally created efficient working circles. Market blocks were organized around meeting timber needs in a local, competitive market; once local needs had been met, the Forest Service had a duty to sell surplus timber to the general market within its working circle (Kellogg 1907; Clary 1986, 41-46). The same budgetary constraints that limited infrastructure improvement in the Lewis and Clark also hampered the timber survey. Though funds were available, forests with larger market blocks and easily sold timber enjoyed priority survey status. The Lewis and Clark conducted cursory estimates that, by their own admission, were most likely “somewhat high” (Daugs 1909a). The estimate stated that over 235,000,000 b.f. of merchantable saw timber existed in the Lewis and Clark, excluding the Dearborn River and the Welcome, Smith, Falls, and Skunk creek watersheds. The Lewis and Clark was unable to approve a working circle plan until the completion of the 1916 congressionally funded forest homestead survey. The Four Rivers Working Circle encompassed all of the Lewis and Clark National Forest and incorporated the communities and markets of the Rocky Mountain Front. The plan indicated a total volume of nearly 310,000,000 b.f. of merchantable timber existed within the working circle on 410,000 acres of productive timberland. Sustained yield was calculated by marking 1 percent of standing timber for 206 harvest per year. Therefore, 3,100,000 b.f. of timber could be harvested in the Lewis and Clark annually and sustainably. The working plan estimated the annual growth of the timber at 20,000,000 b.f. (Daugs 1909a; USDA LCNF 1909; 1916b; 1960; USDA D1 1910a). Timber sales in the Lewis and Clark between 1905 and 1910 were light, even for the time period. Small sales predominated, mostly along easily accessible drainages. In 1908 – the first year the Lewis and Clark solely existed east of the Continental Divide - 1,638,300 b.f. of timber was cut. Nearly a third of the cut was obtained under free use granted to settlers. Almost 800,000 b.f. were small purchases of posts, poles, and cordwood for heating. Lewis and Clark foresters were continually urged to open new sales to local industries by promoting the future economic boom associated with the Sun River Project and dry farming. Early in 1910, before the “Big Burn,” Forester Graves recommended that 5,000,000 b.f. be harvested from the Lewis and Clark by the end of fiscal year 1911 in order to adjust for the dearth of previous cuts (Daugs 1908b; USDA FS 1908; 1909; 1910; Graves 1910; USDA D1 1910a). The 1910 fires burned over three million acres in District 1 and prompted the Forest Service to institute policy changes aimed at rapidly clearing dead and dying timber from the landscape. Forest Service administrators were shocked by the devastation and motivated by the opportunity to place forests under scientific management; large quantities of old-growth timber had been effectively disposed of, though most of it remained on the ground. The lack of a systematic inventory in the Lewis and Clark 207 caught foresters off guard; the fire had raged through the Two Medicine area and no one was exactly sure how much timber had burned. Initial estimates claimed that 80,000,000 b.f. of merchantable spruce and lodgepole pine had been killed on the South Fork of the Two Medicine alone (Butler 1910; Rockwell 1910; 1911; Leavitt 1912d). Administrators felt “morally obliged” to make use of burned, yet marketable, timber despite the possible negative economic impacts such a flood of timber could have on local mills (Steen 2004, 110). District Forester Silcox ordered each forest in District 1 to rapidly promote and process large-scale timber sales in an attempt to liquidate approximately 100,000,000 b.f. of burned timber. Early in 1911, Lewis and Clark foresters began aggressively promoting burned timber sales. Sales were advertised in national trade journals and informational packets were sent to capitalized timber industry companies throughout the United States proclaiming “the South Fork of the Two Medicine Burn offers an excellent logging chance in the most accessible body of timber in the region.” The timber was situated in an expanding market “with a down grade freight haul all the way.” Two Medicine mills would have “a distinct advantage” in supplying the region over mills in western Montana because of the “shortness of haul and consequent lower rates” (USDA LCNF 1911a). The Lewis and Clark offered to complete any landscape engineering – such as blasting small river cataracts to facilitate log drives – necessary to complete the sale. The forest also promoted a smaller sale in the C. Lee Basin that “could be driven down Badger Creek through the Blackfeet Indian Reservation 208 and into the Marias River” (Butler 1910; Rockwell 1910; 1911; USDA FS 1911, 361; 1912; USDA LCNF 1911a). Small contracts continued to dominate Lewis and Clark timber sales and foresters placed their hopes on securing at least one large burned timber sale. In an attempt to push dead timber sales, District 1 directed each forest to refuse sale of green timber “in the fire-killed timber belt until the fire-killed material has been disposed of” (USDA D1 1912b). Steady business in burned timber was granted to local mills; both the McGuirk mill on the Teton and the White mill on Beaver Creek secured timber permits to “continue cutting until the end of the season, with new sales to supply it” (Leavitt 1911c). Native American “wood-haulers” and “parties of very little capital whose operations benefit the Forest” were encouraged to “bunch” sales under one name to avoid any bureaucratic red-tape (Silcox 1912; Lanka 1912). Local schools were offered all the burned timber they could use. A sale of burned timber was made on Muddy Creek and the prospect of a new mill on the Sun River was encouraging. Burned timber applications by C.H. Foster and J.M. Hyde promised removal of 900,000 b.f. In fiscal year 1911, foresters estimated that over 700,000 b.f. was cut in the Lewis and Clark; predictions for fiscal year 1912 stood at over 4,110,000 b.f. (Leavitt 1911b; 1911c; 1911f; 1912d; 1912e; 1912f; 1912g; Stuart 1911; Lanka 1912; Mason 1912; Silcox 1912; USDA D1 1912b). It took nearly a year to secure a large sale on the Two Medicine. In November of 1911, H.W. Reed applied to purchase 5,000,000 b.f. of timber on the South Fork of Two Medicine River. Reed declared his intentions to construct a mill on site and process his 209 timber inside the forest boundaries and utilize sidings at Summit and Arklow to ship rough lumber to Spokane. Despite the urgent need to harvest burned timber in the region, the size of the Reed-Murray sale concerned foresters used to promoting small, local sales; foresters questioned whether the sale should be broken up and portions offered to other interests. In the end, Reed was granted the entire sale; the size of the sale was “very pleasing ... not only from the standpoint of disposing of the fire killed timber but because it (gave them) a crew of considerable size near the Great Northern Railway for use in fire danger” (Leavitt 1911f). In 1912, Reed increased his application to 25,000,000 b.f. (Leavitt 1911b; 1911c; 1911f; 1912d; Rutledge 1911; Stuart 1911). Economic and logistical shortcomings doomed any prospect Lewis and Clark foresters had of liquidating large portions of “Big Burn” timber. Small-operators, mostly local homesteaders with little capital, struggled to move self-harvested timber to the Front; the Great Northern required that freight to these points be prepaid, a fact that “brought some hardship on the local operators” (Leavitt 1913a). In 1912, it became apparent that the loading facilities on the Great Northern Line were incapable of moving large quantities of timber from their sidings. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient processing facilities near the burned timber bodies resulted in a surplus of untreated post and pole material. Reed was unable to convince the Lewis and Clark to reduce payment on the contract to such an extent as would facilitate the construction of new sidings. By 1913, Reed unsuccessfully attempted to raise finances to fund the sale through stock; to help fortify his claims, Reed asked the Lewis and Clark supervisor to withhold maps that 210 contained information on the amount of b.f. on the ground. The lack of any real progress removing the burned timber, and complaints by loggers of non-payment and coercion by the “manager ... with a gun strapped on him” resulted in Lewis and Clark foresters recommending that the sale be canceled and all attempts should be made to “interest other parties” (Cox 1914; Leavitt 1913b). Though there was no shortage of outfits that “could be interested in the Two Medicine,” no large-scale sale occurred largely because few timber industry officials felt that “Reed & Murray (were) inclined to deal fairly with those whom they are attempting to interest in their proposition” (Haines 1913). In late 1914, the contract was cancelled and the majority of burned timber left to rot (Leavitt 1912d; 1913a; 1913b; 1913c; Haines 1913; Cox 1914; Spaulding 1914e). Through the end of the 1920s, the Forest Service continued its pursuit of standardized procedures, a uniform silvicultural policy, and working management plans. By the mid-teens, many Forest Service officials had begun to believe that the agency’s pricing and silvicultural policies were hampering the attempt to place forests under scientific management. Public, industry, and forester complaints about the rigidity of the agency’s appraisal and stumpage pricing policy motivated the Forest Service to create timber sale guidelines that formalized the appraisal process and still allowed for some local variation. In 1914, the Forest Service published its first timber value appraisal manual. The manual provided a framework for foresters to evaluate and commoditize tree stands by assessing the quality of timber specific to local market needs, investment in necessary infrastructure, and site-specific logging and transportation problems. Though it 211 simplified the timber sale process and guided the foresters step-by-step through the appraisal process, it also created greater flexibility by removing flat stumpage rates for all species; in an attempt to encourage removal of “inferior” species, the manual encouraged foresters to regard each species on its own merit and market demand. In 1922, the manual was updated and foresters were allowed to recommend alternate stumpage rates – as long as all “principles outlined in (the) instructions” had first been followed (USDA FS 1922a) (USDA FS 1914a; Wiener 1982, 13-26; Alexander 1987, 59-68). Crafting a uniform silviculture policy in District 1 was also complicated by the variety of timber quantity and type within the region. The District made policy recommendations for harvesting specific tree types for stand improvement; less desirable types such as Douglas fir and larch were to be clearcut while white and yellow (ponderosa) pine were to be cut selectively. Stand improvement was the basis for any timber sale, though forests were expected to be active timber-sellers; each forest was put on “a revenue basis” that tied monetary allotments to receipts (USDA D1 1912b). Heavily timbered forests hurried to “get the wood out” while others like the Lewis and Clark - less endowed and challenged by market size and distance - struggled to carve out enough of a timber industry to meet agency goals and scientific management paradigms. By 1915, the Lewis and Clark began a process of abandoning large private sales in lieu of small sales more apropos to the Front and its mills. Sale prices and silvicultural requirements – usually the percentage of timber that must be removed – were increasingly based on market conditions rather than “ideologically based 212 prescriptions” (Alexander 1987, 63). World War I and federal reclamation brought about stabilization in the timber market and transformed the timber industry into a “network of stable regional enterprises engaged in long-term production” (Clary 1986, 68). By the mid 1920s, Lewis and Clark foresters amended cutting restrictions to meet local economic and silvicultural need; large sales were surveyed and advertised in blocks that allowed mills to place bids on part or all of the sale (Figure 3-26). In cases where the silvicultural needs of the forest superseded agency guidelines, foresters were allowed to amend cut and marking instructions. Lewis and Clark foresters often allowed lesser sized 213 Figure 3-26: Sample LCNF Timber Sale, Muddy Creek, 1925 (Myrick 1924a). and disease infected trees to be cut rather than die unused (USDA LCNF 1917b; Myrick 1924; Koch 1925; Wiener 1982, 13-26, 33-36). In the early 1920s, each forest in the District made extensive silvicultural surveys and made tree type estimates; the surveys were given a high priority and were conducted at a relatively large expense to the District. The purpose of the survey was to create a body of data to form a baseline “preparatory to subsequent intensive estimates and appraisal work when immediate sale is in prospect” (Stuart 1920). To place the survey on a more efficient and systematic plane, the Forest Service Branch of Engineering sent crews into the forests ahead of survey crews to place control points. Forests with heavy timber bodies were surveyed first; “due to the small volume of S-Sale business on (the Lewis and Clark) and the improbability of any large sales developing within the next few years” the inventory on the Lewis and Clark was delayed (Clark 1920c). In 1921, a timber survey was conducted on the Lewis and Clark; it was estimated that 304,600,000 b.f. of timber existed in the Four Rivers Working Circle – 75 percent of that was Englemann Spruce. Extensive surveys were planned in 1922, 1923, and 1924 on the forests with the largest timber demand in anticipation of greater settlement and urban development (Yule 1920; Carter 1921; Koch 1921; Morrell 1921a; Smith 1921a; 1921b; Stockdale 1921; Willey 1921c). Timber extraction for the Sun River Project construction greatly supplemented Lewis and Clark silvicultural numbers during the 1910s and 1920s, though the process was not without its difficulties. Under the Reclamation Act of 1902, the Reclamation 214 Service withdrew over 22,000 acres of land in the Lewis and Clark for water storage (Figure 3-27). The USRS obtained a free use permit for much of the timbered land in the North Fork of the Sun River from the confluence of the South Fork of the North Fork to Gates Park to furnish timber for forms, construction camps, corduroy roads, and diversion flumes. In an attempt to secure needed funds and furnish a local market with steady employment, Lewis and Clark foresters initially proposed that the entire area be logged off by local millers and sold to the Reclamation Service at a contracted price that “secure(ed) a revenue for the Forest Service and at the same time furnish(ed) the Reclamation Service with timber at a figure which ... would be below what it would cost them should they put in their own mills and obtain the timber free from the Forest Service” (Silcox 1911b). The Reclamation Service objected to this plan and insisted on free timber and the ability to deal directly with contractors. The Forest Service was forced to concede to the USRS and could only require that Lewis and Clark foresters be allowed to stipulate rules and regulations for cutting to insure implementation of scientific management policies. Local mills were used to construct both Diversion and Gibson dams and the associated reclamation camps (USDA LCNF nd-e; 1915a; 1915b; 1916a; 1916b; 1918a; 1920; 2006b; Silcox 1911b; Gorman 1986). Construction associated with the Sun River Project complicated Lewis and Clark timber sales. The North Fork of the Sun River was heavily timbered and, owing to the ability of loggers to float logs down the Sun to mills and market, an attractive timber-sale location. However, the Reclamation Service repeatedly asserted its claim to “use it all in 215 the construction of the dams or work connected therewith” (Bruce 1911, 3). Timber above the planned reservoirs – and thereby outside of the USRS free use permit – was 216 Figure 3-27: USRS Withdrawals and Potential LCNF Timber Cut. Map also shows location of Diversion and Gibson dam features and the major Sun River channels. Map by author (Leavitt 1912f; Smith 1933). also blocked from sale; the USRS repeatedly denied Lewis and Clark requests to use the reservoirs as mill ponds or to construct flumes and booms to divert logs around Reclamation infrastructure and back into the Sun River. Intent on getting the timber out from under the USRS, Lewis and Clark foresters conducted extensive economic and silvicultural surveys to explore ways that the heavy timber bodies of the Sun could be exploited. Finally, it was decided that the added cost of constructing the necessary infrastructure - $15 to $16 per thousand b.f. – priced the venture out of the market. Much of the timber in the North Fork of the Sun remained uncut into the 1940s (Bruce 1911; Greeley 1911b; Silcox 1911c; Girard 1912; Leavitt 1912f; USDA LCNF 1918b). Free use timber continued to comprise a large portion of Lewis and Clark silvicultural harvest, especially during the greatest periods of homesteading on the Rocky Mountain Front. In 1915, the Lewis and Clark issued 252 free use permits to homesteaders for a total of over 1,000,000 b.f. – much of this was burned timber along the forest boundaries. Though portions of the forest remained inaccessible, the construction of wagon roads by the USRS and increased trail construction by the USFS facilitated harvest and resulted in “a considerable amount of free use material taken” (USDA LCNF 1916a, 65-66). Free use tapered off following the end of homesteading activities on the Front (USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; 1960). The lack of consistent and large scale business opportunities, reforestation difficulties, and changing agency budgetary guidelines resulted in Lewis and Clark foresters recasting their timber management prospects in more reasonable terms. A 1918 217 economic analysis of the Sun River Market Block identified that only 4 percent of the timber used in the region came from the Lewis and Clark; the majority of this “native” wood – 89 percent – was firewood. Over 70 percent of the wood products used in region originated in western Montana and northern Idaho. Though regional growth was predicted, the report concluded that timber could be supplied “with lumber from Kalispell and other outside timber-producing regions at a lower figure” than from the Lewis and Clark and recommended that no attempt be made to increase timber production (USDA LCNF 1918b). Management working circle plans continued to support smaller timber contracts that allowed local mills to continue sustainable harvests. The rush to place the Lewis and Clark under scientific management tapered somewhat as reforestation efforts produced negligible results. In 1912, trees planted in the Lewis and Clark by direct seeding had only an 11 percent chance of growth. Lewis and Clark foresters eventually recommended that reforestation efforts be abandoned and the forest should be allowed to turn over to “a higher use” (USDA LCNF 1916a, 47). Released from receipt-based budgetary constraints, Lewis and Clark foresters increasingly defined the value of their management imperative as critical to watershed management, grazing, and wildlife management (Leavitt 1911a; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; 1918b; 1960). Grazing and Wildlife Management The Forest Service’s grazing policy also emerged within a scientific forestry model that promoted full utilization of forest resources. Range planning, management, and administration were classified in economic terms; forage that was not used was 218 considered wasted. Between 1897 and 1929, grazing was a highly controversial and politicized forest use – especially following the emergence of state-run wildlife conservation agencies and continued fears over the impact of range degradation on watersheds. Though the Forest Service continued to pursue answers to policy questions through science-based practices, economic, cultural, and political pressures heavily influenced agency range policy. Often the agency was forced to compromise with local issue-based groups. Ultimately, the Forest Service also was forced to expand its definition of “resources” to include wildlife within its management plans and utilitarian philosophy (Rowley 1985, 22-95; Langston 1995, 201-46; Hays 1999, 49-65; 2009, 25-30). Between 1891 and 1905, western stockmen and Progressive-era conservationists agitated over the reserve policy that statutorily eliminated commercial grazing in the federal forests. In 1894, the first administrative statement on grazing was issued by the Department of the Interior. It prohibited “driving, feeding, pasturing, or herding of cattle, sheep or other livestock” on federal reserves (Coleville 1898, 10). Western stockmen protested the exclusion, organized into associations, and actively encouraged trespass. The GLO lacked administrative control of the reserves and were largely unable to discourage herders from utilizing federal forage. Conservationists played on the irrigation movement’s fears and emphasized the destructive impact of grazing – especially sheep – on watersheds. In the 1896 National Academy of Sciences Report on Forestry that heavily influenced the 1897 Organic Act, grazing and fire were equated as the chief threats to public forests (Ise 1920, 128-29; Rowley 1985, 22-54; Hays 2009, 25-30). 219 Whether or not grazing would be allowed in the GLO reserves was a continual question following the passage of the Organic Act. Though no concessions were made to the grazing lobby in the Act, the Pettigrew Amendment granted the Secretary of the Interior the power to regulate and manage the reserves as he saw fit. Less than a month later, the GLO issued regulations that allowed cattle and horse grazing on all reserves. Following some debate, sheep grazing was allowed on Washington and Oregon reserves. Citing the importance of sheep grazing to local western economies, the GLO entertained the idea of issuing sheep grazing permits in reserves that had traditionally been home to sheep grazing. But in 1899, the Department of the Interior withdrew the sheep grazing “privilege” from all reserves, claiming abuse. Two months following the revocation, pressure from western congressmen forced the GLO to reinstate sheep grazing in select reserves. By 1902, GLO and Forestry Bureau officials began to favor regulated grazing in the reserves over its prohibition (USDI 1903, 322-23; Rowley 1985, 22-54). The Lewis and Clark(e) Reserve was utilized by stockmen years before the advent of federal forestry and continued to be grazed through the GLO period. Cattle grazed accessible river valleys in the open range period of the Rocky Mountain Front. Sheepherder cabins were located throughout the Reserve and were remnants of early, and largely unauthorized, grazing. By the turn of the century, large numbers of sheep grazed around Falls Creek. Sheepmen enjoyed a brief period of permitted grazing in the Lewis and Clark(e) in early 1899; the GLO authorized 75,000 head to local grazers, although only 19,000 were actually grazed. On March 22, 1900, sheep were entirely excluded from 220 the forest. A limited number of cattle and horses had always been permitted to graze the Lewis and Clark(e). In 1901, 6,743 head of cattle grazed the Reserve under permit and by 1903, nearly 10,000 cattle legally grazed the Lewis and Clark(e). Permits were forest- wide; they did not authorize particular grazing allotments or periods (Ayres 1900, 65; USDI 1903; USDA LCNF 1916b; 1988b; Youngs 1916a; Picton and Picton 1975, 12). Between 1905 and 1929, the USFS attempted to bring control to the range through the application of utilitarian scientific forestry and the efficient and full use of resources. Pinchot saw the extension and modification of the GLO permit system as the key to Forest Service control, monitoring, and regulation. The 1905 Use Book listed three classes of hierarchical grazing permits. Ranchers whose holdings were adjacent to forest boundaries had priority over those who owned non-adjacent ranch property but were local to the region, and over transient and large-scale herders who could not make claims of local ownership. All permits were commensurate to ownership of enough property to successfully winter the grazing herd. Rather than submit the permit process to open bidding – such as timber – or to supervisor approval, the agency placed permit allocation in the hands of local stockmen’s associations. In doing so, the agency gained a level of acceptance with western politicians and re-affirmed their commitment to allow public forest resource use. The size of stock operation also affected permit priority; the USFS attempted to democratize its permit policy by awarding allotments to smaller ranches (USDA FS 1905, 20-21; 1908, 23; Greeley 1909a, 21; Hays 2009, 68-69). 221 Though initially effective in regulating national forest grazing, the Forest Service’s permit policy resulted in the agency and users defining forest health in purely economic terms. The Forest Service was adamant that proper range control depended on charging grazing fees to permittees - a practice that departed from GLO practices and was initially discouraging to homesteaders and local stockmen. Though inexpensive compared to grazing on private land – the fee schedule allowed cattle and horses to graze at 20 to 35 cents per head and sheep from 5 to 8 cents per summer season in 1906 – the agency’s fee structure received criticism from stockmen. Once stockmen began paying for forage, permits themselves became commodities; though the Service denied stockmen the right to sell permits, banks often used permit status in loan approvals. Hypersensitive to the financial needs of the vocal grazing associations, Forest Service officials were heavily influenced by the economic prosperity of local stockmen. When prices and demand were high, the agency often allowed more animals on the range than it had previously. To encourage greater local economic stability, the Forest Service combined fee increases with permit extensions. In 1923, the agency met tough economic conditions with a marginal fee increase accompanied by an extension in permit length from five to ten years (Rowley 1985, 55-94; Hays 2009, 67). The Forest Service pursued the goal of full utilization of range resources by conducting systematic evaluations of range condition. Though most early foresters lacked the training and expertise to analyze the ecological health of the range, these evaluations formed the basis of grazing working plans and boundary designations. Range studies 222 were used to determine the “carrying capacity” – or the quantity of stock that could be allowed on a grazing unit while still maintaining its integrity – of the range. Capacity studies were costly and time-consuming. Therefore, foresters attempted to find ranges that were representative of the forest for intensive survey. Much like a timber cruise, carrying capacity studies began with an initial reconnaissance of an area. In 1908, Albert Potter of the USFS Grazing Branch developed a methodology for carrying capacity appraisal that quantified soil type, ungulate species, relative forage value of different forest plant-life, climate, and grazing practices into a figure known as “animal months;” “animal months” became the standardized unit for discussing grazing in the Service (Rowley 1985, 55-94; Langston 1995, 201-46). Carrying capacity studies began in 1910 on the Lewis and Clark and continued through 1929. In 1914, representative carrying capacity studies were initiated on the Bear Creek cattle and horse range. On Bear Creek, the agency conducted an intensive reconnaissance and classified the available forage. The grazing herd was weighed coming onto and off of the range and it was determined that, on average, ungulates of this class and on this range required 4.57 forage acres per head per season. However, the capacity studies at Bear Creek were discontinued in 1915 and the results of the study were considered inconclusive. The lack of a dependable and scientifically trained on site forest officer dedicated to grazing limited the usability of the findings. Few natural and constructed barriers existed on Bear Creek and cattle crossed the South Fork of the Sun River several times throughout the grazing season. Therefore, in 1916 intensive carrying 223 capacity studies were moved to Ford Creek (Figure 3-28). The Ford Creek Experimental Area provided a more suitable study site. In conjunction with the Augusta Livestock Association, the Forest Service was able to construct corrals, weighing scales, and drift fences (Figure 3-29). In 1918, the Lewis and Clark detailed E.V. Storm to take charge of managing the area. Quadrat sample plots were laid out and palatability studies to determine plant growth rates and consumption rates were conducted. By the 1920s, 224 Figure 3-28: Bear and Ford Creek Experimental Ranges. Map by author (Youngs 1915; 1916a; USDA LCNF 1924). foresters were conducting deferred and rotation grazing studies at Ford Creek to determine the efficacy of seasonal range rotation and delayed range entry on forage regeneration. The results were used to create grazing working plans throughout the forest (Adams 1914; Youngs 1915; 1916a; USDA LCNF 1924; 1925b; 1928b; 1928c; 1929; 1935a; 1935b; 1935c). Lewis and Clark foresters directly managed grazing by manipulating stocking rates within a framework that was subject to local and national economic shifts. In 1909, sheep were authorized to return to the Lewis and Clark due to “the persistent action of certain stockmen in the community” (USDA LCNF 1916b). Settlement promoters touted sheep grazing as an affordable and useful practice for homesteaders. Lewis and Clark foresters encouraged stockmen to graze sheep on unused cattle range, although the range was potentially valuable to wildlife for winter forage. The inaccessibility of the range and 225 Figure 3-29: Ford Creek Corrals and Scale, 1924 (USDA LCNF 1924). deflated market prices for wool and mutton complicated this transition and pushed stockholders towards cattle. In 1912, following cursory carrying capacity studies, Lewis and Clark opened up new sheep allotments to coincide with a 40 percent increase in wool prices in Great Falls. The result was a 2,200 percent increase in sheep grazing on the Lewis and Clark between 1911 and 1912. Stocking numbers of both cattle and sheep increased far above carrying capacity levels in response to wartime demands for meat and wool, only to fall in response to the post-war depression and cessation of homestead settlement on the Rocky Mountain Front. At its height in 1919, the Lewis and Clark grazed over 46,000 head within its borders; a decade later the forest only permitted 20,000 head (USDA FS 1911a; 1912d, 519; USDA D1 1912a; USDA LCNF 1916b; 1937d). Lewis and Clark foresters divided their territory into grazing divisions and allotments (also called units). Both divisions and allotments were organized largely by watershed, although there has been considerable historical variability (Figure 3-30). Divisions and allotments were grouped into ungulate use; cattle and horse grazing was combined into C&H allotments, whereas sheep and goat grazing comprised S&G allotments. By 1912, concerted efforts were made to educate forest supervisors in District 1 on how to “divide their forests into natural units and to distribute the units between the different kinds of stock or different groups of owners” (Kneipp 1912). C&H divisions were primarily laid out on the lower and better-covered ranges. S&G ranges were usually located on the more elevated and weed-filled ranges. By the end of the 1920s, the Lewis 226 and Clark had 28 C&H allotments (including those needed by commercial packers) and 22 S&G allotments (Kneipp 1912; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1917a; 1923; 1927b; 1928b; 1928c; 1929; 1935a; 1935b; 1935c). The Forest Service began officially recognizing stock associations in 1907 and actively encouraged their formation. The agency utilized local stock associations to manage permit allocation, to cooperate in infrastructure improvement, and to craft and enforce grazing rules that were necessary to meet local grazing and agency needs. The Service freely used the associations as middlemen between federal forest managers and individual stockmen. By doing so, they created a legacy of public comment and 227 Figure 3-30: Portion of the Sun River Cattle and Horse Allotment, 1915. The symbol (x) show drift fence construction (LCNF 1935a). participation in forest management. Forest management plans contained detailed instructions on the role that specific grazing associations were expected to play in defining range management infrastructure. Lewis and Clark foresters frequently requested that associations contribute financially toward drift fence construction in lieu of a reduction in grazing permit fees. In 1914 and again in 1922, the Augusta Livestock Association was required to contribute as much as $60 towards drift fence construction on the Ford Creek allotment. Associations and permittees were often in charge of distributing salt along their range in reference to agency salting plans. In 1913, the Forest Service broadened the authority of stock associations by allowing them to “adopt and request the enforcement of special rules designed to secure better management (of) the stock on the (local) range” (USDA FS 1913a, 168). Once approved by the district forester, these rules were binding on all local stockmen. In the Lewis and Clark, these requests often revolved around infrastructure improvements and use or range entry dates, though they were also used to lobby for greater economic stability for stockmen through permit extensions and fee reduction (USDA FS 1908; 1911a, 390; 1912d; 1913a; USDA D1 1912b; USDA LCNF 1935c; Graves 1913a). Range improvements on the Lewis and Clark consisted of drift fence and stock driveway construction, salting implementation and water improvements. The agency viewed drift fences as essential components in “full utilization of the range resource” and were common on the forest (USDA FS 1912d). Drift fences were used to prevent migration from one allotment to another, to funnel stock into underutilized ranges, and to 228 keep stock away from overgrazed, sensitive, or potentially dangerous forage. Drift fences on the Lewis and Clark were usually inverted V-shaped frames strung together by four strands of wire and were variable in length - though most did not extend beyond 0.33 miles. By 1912, the Lewis and Clark increased its investment in drift fence construction and encouraged cooperative aid from permittees in hauling the wire. Each range management plan contained instructions for drift fence construction and repair (USDA LCNF 1935a; 1935b; 1935c; 1935d). Stock driveways were essential for moving herds on and off of pastures. Driveways often utilized portions of Forest Service trails but frequently diverged from planned trails to provide stock with access to water and forage. Driveways were often wide to facilitate stock movement and frequently contained bridges to keep river- crossings, erosion, and potential stock loss to a minimum (Figure 3-31). Salting was of vital importance to Lewis and Clark range management; salting was an effective tool in controlling herd migration toward underutilized forage and away from over-grazed pastures. Permittees were usually required to haul salt and follow a range management plan to insure proper dispersal of the herd. Downed logs were hollowed out and used as salt-troughs, although constructed troughs were also hauled onto the range (Figure 3-32). Water improvements were sporadic and took the form of spring and small reservoir development (USDA LCNF nd-h; 1916a; 1925b; 1928b; 1928c; 1929; Townsend C. 1914; USDA D1 1912a; 1913; 1914a; 1915; USDA FS 1912d; Youngs 1916a). 229 230 Figure 3-31: Stock Driveway Bridge, Birch Creek, LCNF, 1926 (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). Figure 3-32: Salting, Ford Creek, 1918 (Storm 1918). As early as 1916, Lewis and Clark foresters understood the economic relevance of grazing on their forest. In the 1916 extensive survey, foresters cited numerous examples of opportunities to expand grazing in the forest and ranked grazing second - behind water for irrigation – in the list of reasons for the forest to exist. Settlement on the Rocky Mountain Front brought a dramatic increase in “demand for National Forest range” and “the dependence of the stockmen (of the Front) upon National Forest range (was) well established and permanent” (LCNF 1916b). Before the 1920s population crash, grazing appeared to be the paramount industry along the Front, adding an estimated $300,000 in total revenue to stockmen (Spaulding 1915b; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). Yet, not all were happy with the intensity of grazing on the Lewis and Clark. Homesteaders felt marginalized by stock associations and long-term permits that limited the amount of available range to newcomers. Some without stock relied on the forest for big game as a supplement to their food stores. Furthermore, as early as 1910, hunters and homesteaders began to notice that grazing was affecting big game herds. Recreationists also lamented the loss of big game range to cattle and sheep. Together, these groups worked to force the Forest Service to curtail grazing in the Lewis and Clark and recognize the presence of wildlife in their management imperative. While wildlife protection played an important role in defining the early Progressive conservation movement, it was largely left out of forest reserve legislation and the early Forest Service management scheme. Over-hunting and settlement pressure decimated wildlife populations in many areas of the country. In the late 19 th century, 231 sportsmen sided with the forest reserve movement in an attempt to protect habitat and watersheds for fish and game. Yet, wildlife protection was absent from the 1897 Organic Act and the Secretary of the Interior did nothing to add wildlife into the GLO management scheme. Upon becoming Forester, Gifford Pinchot also rejected the notion that utilitarian and scientifically managed national forests should serve as wildlife refuges, despite occasional requests from rangers that “more protection should be given to game ... from the yearly destruction caused by the Indians” (Kinney 1906b). Though not officially directed to do so, Lewis and Clark rangers occasionally made it their duty to confront hunting parties they feared were taking too much game and used their authority as fire marshals to force such groups to disperse (Kinney 1906b; Liebig 1944; Reiger 1992; 2001; Langston 1995, 234-46; Hays 2009, 33-34; 74-79). Early Forest Service wildlife management conformed to utilitarian practices and focused on predator eradication and issuing special use permits to trappers. Stockmen were the main beneficiaries of the agency’s wildlife policies. Rangers on patrol had a duty to destroy animals harmful to livestock. Between 1910 and 1913, Forest Service rangers in Montana killed 97 bear, 16 mountain lions, 228 wolves including 146 wolf pups, and 1097 coyotes. The Service also made a practice of hunting lynx, wildcats, and spreading poison on grazing allotments to remove prairie dog infestations. In an attempt to “civilize” the state, the Montana legislature authorized payment of high bounties on predators; Forest Service rangers were allowed to supplement their salaries by turning in pelts to state game wardens. Trapping fur-bearing animals in the Lewis and Clark was a 232 profitable enterprise. Rangers attempted to regulate trapping by issuing special use permits to trappers. Trappers routinely worked the majority of watersheds in the Lewis and Clark, especially Benchmark, Hoadley, Green Fork, Welcome, Elk, Arsenic, and Willow creeks (Ayres 1900; USDA D1 1910b; USDA FS 1911a, 396; 1912d, 533-23; 1913a, 170; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1995b; Flint 1922a; 1922b). The authority to manage wildlife in the United States was vested in the states. Montana hired its first game warden in 1889 and began issuing bag limits on fowl and large game in the 1890s. In 1895, the state legislature created the Montana Game and Fish Commission to serve as the authoritative agency in charge of enforcement, licensure, and scientific study. In its beginnings, the Game and Fish Commission was a highly politicized agency – game wardens were often political appointees and lacked any ecological understanding. The Commission conducted little research and its agency was notoriously mismanaged. Furthermore, they had no power to alter hunting seasons to meet changing conditions. That right remained with the Montana state legislature – which met every two years (Mussehl and Howell 1971; Brownell 1987, 1-74). Early in its existence, the Forest Service was forced to reconsider its stance on wildlife. In 1907, elk migrating out of protected habitat in Yellowstone National Park began to cross into the Gallatin National Forest in southwest Montana. In pursuance of full range utilization, Gallatin forest managers proposed extending sheep grazing into areas the Yellowstone herd frequented. Opening the new lands to sheep grazing was vigorously protested by the state game warden; though the protest “was not very 233 seriously considered” by the Forest Service (USDA D1 1912a). Sportsmen’s clubs teamed up with game authorities and a small assortment of wildlife preservationists to publicize the plight of the Yellowstone elk herd in the Gallatin National Forest; a letter published in Outing magazine proclaimed that elk were starving in the region due to the Forest Service’s full utilization of grazing land policy. Agency officials became increasingly concerned with the negative press they were receiving and began discussing the formulation of a management policy for wildlife (USDA D1 1912a; USDA FS 1912). The brewing conflict between wildlife preservationists and stockmen over range forage rights came to the Lewis and Clark in 1910 and forced the agency to respond repeatedly to criticism over their management philosophy. Overhunting had critically damaged the elk herds along the Rocky Mountain Front; in 1910 it was estimated that there were no more than 300 elk in the Lewis and Clark. Local sportsmen groups responded by petitioning the Forest Service to remove all cattle grazing from the upper Sun River watershed. Sportsmen also pressured state legislators to create a game preserve inside the Lewis and Clark for the protection of elk. District Forester Silcox was weary of negative press and an appearance of lack of control so soon after the 1910 fires. He recommended that the Lewis and Clark close areas on the North Fork of Sun River to all stock (Figure 3-33). This was not as dramatic a proposal as it initially seemed; the area was ungrazed by stock at the time and no permittees were affected. Silcox was also aware of the state’s intention to create a game preserve in the same area and that grazing would be outlawed by the legislature. In 1913, the state of Montana created the Sun River Game 234 Preserve in the Lewis and Clark National Forest. The Preserve contained the territory lying west of the North and South Forks of the North Fork of the Sun River and was bounded to the west by the Continental Divide and the Flathead National Forest. No 235 Figure 3-33: Recommended Stock Removal, 1911. Map by author (Silcox 1911a). commercial grazing or hunting was allowed on the Preserve (Silcox 1911a; Great Falls Tribune 1913, 14 February; USDA FS 1913a, 172; Spaulding 1915d; USDA LCNF 1916a, 51-52; 1916b; Rush 1924; Picton and Picton 1975; USDI NPS 1990a). The creation of the Sun River Game Preserve in the Lewis and Clark tested the agency’s authority to manage the region. State game wardens refused to allow Forest Service officials to enter the Preserve while armed. They also required Lewis and Clark rangers to apply for and purchase state trapping permits while on predator control duty. Lewis and Clark rangers were allowed to retain their firearms only following an intervention by the Montana State Attorney. Requests to drive stock on Birch Creek across portions of the Preserve en route to grazing allotments in the Flathead National Forest were denied by game wardens, despite an understanding that re-routing the stock around the Preserve added days to the drive and could result in stock loss and forage consumption (Adams C.H. 1913a; DeHart 1913a; 1913b; Silcox 1913; Spaulding 1913b; 1914a; 1914b; 1914c; 1915b; Lanka 1914). Through the 1910s and into the 1920s, the Lewis and Clark met public criticism of their grazing policy through negotiation and stock reduction. Soon after the Preserve was created, Lewis and Clark foresters proposed a range swap with the state. Agency range studies showed that a section of land in Patrick’s Basin was unutilized by cattle and, due to its topography, was fitting land for elk winter habitat. The Forest Service proposed that Patrick’s Basin be traded for range in Bear Creek, which had a carrying capacity of 250 head of cattle and would not be utilized by elk. The arrangement was 236 initially approved and Bear Creek, due to its “virgin” status as grazing land, was made the Lewis and Clark’s first range experimental area. However, the Forest Service ultimately closed Bear Creek off to all stock in 1919 under continued public criticism. By 1929, the Lewis and Clark had removed some or all stock grazing from the Arsenic Creek, Route Creek, and Hannan Gulch drainages and the Big River/Cox Creek region of the Flathead National Forest (Adams 1913b; 1914; DeHart 1913c; 1914; Rutledge 1913; USDA LCNF 1916a 56-58; 1916b; 1921; Beatty 1919; Rush 1924). Compromise and the secession of grazing did not alleviate the conflict and local petitions for further wildlife protection resulted in several boundary changes. Counts conducted by the Forest Service showed that the elk herd was growing dramatically; the herd had increased from 300 in 1910 to 1,550 in 1913. In 1914, sportsmen in the southern Rocky Mountain Front petitioned the state to create a preserve for the protection of deer. In 1917 the Twin Buttes Preserve was created on Lewis and Clark land that had long been open to cattle and sheep grazing. In 1921, similar action resulted in the Blackleaf Preserve being created for the protection of migratory waterfowl. In 1923, petitioners from Kalispell – with the support of the Forest Service – succeeded in creating a second elk habitat preserve in the headwaters of the Flathead River. The Spotted Bear Game Preserve bordered the Sun River Preserve to the west. Perhaps more importantly to the Forest Service, Lewis and Clark County officials did not allow elk hunting within their borders, in effect creating a massive super-preserve within the Lewis and Clark National Forest. The lack of natural predators – state and Forest Service predator eradication 237 management had been especially successful – and the loss of hunting allowed the herd to propagate at unusually high rates and effectively limited the ways foresters could manage the elk herd (Bean 1914; Adams 1915; Spaulding 1914f; 1915a; 1915b; 1915c; USDA LCNF 1921; Rush 1924; Smith 1924; Picton and Picton 1975, 13-19). Local sportsmen’s associations and Rocky Mountain Front residents continued to petition the Lewis and Clark for further stocking reductions. In 1915, foresters were confronted with a petition “praying for the removal of all stock from the North Fork of the North Fork of Sun River and (a) limit (to) the grazing of stock on the entire Lewis & Clark Forest” and the removal of drift fences (Spaulding 1915c). Stockmen’s associations claimed their right to graze on public land. Forced to mediate the dispute, the Forest Service called a meeting with the various interests under the “auspices of the Choteau Rod and Gun Club” (Spaulding 1915c). Most of the petitioners did not attend the meeting and the Forest Service ultimately decided to continue grazing, supporting the growing Rocky Mountain Front homestead movement. Petition requests to pull down drift fences were “so ludicrous that it is laughable” and were denied (Simpson 1916). In true utilitarian forestry fashion, the agency also recommended that investigations into elk range carrying capacity were needed (Bean 1914; Adams 1915; Spaulding 1914f; 1915a; 1915b; 1915c; Simpson 1916; USDA LCNF 1921; Picton and Picton 1975, 13-19). Though managing wildlife as a resource was not a part of the Forest Service’s imperative, Lewis and Clark foresters determined that an “informal working plan” dealing with the growing herd was necessary. Carrying capacity tests conducted in 1914 238 and 1915 determined that the elk herd was growing and that up to that point they were fairing well with “absolutely no signs of losses due to starvation” (Youngs 1916b, 9). Yet, the studies noted that the combination of state and county legislation and natural boundaries – elk migrating from the Flathead River across the Continental Divide into the Sun River often were trapped east of the Divide by fall snows – had resulted in abnormal propagation rates in the Sun River region. The Forest Service needed to consider the possibility of further grazing reductions or face herd starvation and the negative local and national public backlash so feared by the agency (Youngs 1915; 1916b; Simpson 1916). The Lewis and Clark’s “Informal Working Plan” was less of a management plan than a declaration of forest conditions. Though the herd was in good shape at the time, the rate of “abnormal expansion” could continue for no more than two or three years before the herd began to eat themselves out of winter forage. The ticking clock could be extended marginally if the 2,500 head of cattle grazed under permit on the North Fork of the Sun were removed, though ultimately “the competition for feed between the cattle and the elk must lead to heavy losses in both and the elk forced out upon the plains east of the Forest, there to come into competition with the ranchers, their guns and their dogs” (Spaulding 1915b). Placing the situation in economic terms, the working plan proclaimed the necessity for increased grazing in the Front to meet the growing need for pasturage, food, and income derived from wool in the dry-farming districts to the east. Livestock grazing in the Lewis and Clark brought annual revenues totaling nearly $300,000 to Rocky Mountain Front communities as compared to $800 in hunting permits 239 – and even more could be made if portions of the elk range that were suitable to cattle were opened up to grazing. Through the working plan, Lewis and Clark foresters rejected any further loss of grazing land and suggested that the solution lay within the state of Montana’s responsibility to account for the economic needs of its citizenry; the Sun River Preserve therefore needed to be opened to hunting, abolished altogether, or undergo boundary readjustment (Spaulding 1915b). The elk situation in the Lewis and Clark contributed significantly to the Forest Service’s decision to find a place for wildlife in the scientific forestry paradigm and include it in the agency’s management imperative. In 1915, Chief Forester Graves made a national case for removing wildlife management from state control and placing it under federal jurisdiction. “The greatest opportunity for the protection and perpetuation of wild life in the United States,” said Graves, “is afforded by the National Forests” (Graves 1915, 236). Federal scientific management offered wildlife protection a solid and professional foundation wherein wildlife could be developed into a sustainable resource. Graves, disagreeing with Pinchot’s approach, stated that “wild life is largely a forest product (and) should be regarded as a public resource, to be protected and systematically developed...the intelligent fostering of the valuable wild life of the forest is and has always been one of the objects of forestry” (Graves 1915, 236). The addition of wildlife to the national forest imperative would allow for maximum utilitarian productivity of the forest; stock could graze lowland pastures in the summer, leaving high mountain forage and browse to elk, deer, and moose. In 1920, Graves placed the Montana elk situation on 240 a national platform and reiterated the stability federal forestry could bring to wildlife management (Graves 1918; 1920). The Forest Service authorized regulations in 1921 placing wildlife management and protection within the agency’s imperative. As state fish and game legislation still largely controlled wildlife management, Regulation G-30 first made it the duty of all foresters to “cooperate with the State ... officers in enforcing local (game) laws” (Morrell 1921). Foresters were directed to prepare formal five-year working plans for fish and game resources and make recommendations regarding working with game preserves, hunting seasons, and grazing. Highly conscious of public opinion, the Forest Service directed rangers that “wherever the management of an area for game production conflicts with other uses, it is necessary that we appreciate the public demand for the preservation and increase of game. (The) failure to properly protect game may cost us the confidence in our ability to properly safeguard such interests” (Morrell 1921, 4). Furthermore, foresters were urged to encourage game enthusiasts to adopt the association model that had effectively diffused early western tension towards federal forest grazing. Finally, it was argued that district-wide cooperation should be encouraged between the Forest Service and state game agencies. In 1921, the state of Montana and District 1 agreed to work cooperatively in protective work; in return the state agreed to forgo the creation of any future preserves or sanctuaries on Forest Service land until “full discussion between the State Fish and Game Commission and the District Forester” is conducted (USDA D1 241 1921, 2). The District 1 cooperation agreement became a model for the entire agency (Morrell 1921; USDA D1 1921). Despite cooperative attempts, Lewis and Clark foresters struggled throughout the latter 1910s and 1920s to balance the needs of local stockmen and an increasingly national pro-wildlife lobby. Without predation, the Sun River herd continued to grow; by 1926 the Forest Service estimated that there were 3,900 elk in the Lewis and Clark National Forest - the largest herd in the state. The growth of the herd made it difficult for Lewis and Clark range managers to effectively coordinate and implement grazing working plans. Variable weather conditions, periodic drought followed by wet springs, and repeated wildfires in the late 1910s complicated the situation; agency officials noted that the elk were causing extreme range degradation in cattle ranges due to their consumption of young spring shoots and their over-cropping of winter forage. In search of forage, the herd annually migrated off of the Preserve and onto permitted range allotments. As a result, the cattle ranges along the Sun River, Big George, Blacktail, and Mortimer gulches, as well as Wood and Ford creeks, were overstocked by as much as 90 percent. Meanwhile, the Forest Service was keenly aware of the declining economic situation in the homesteading communities east of the Rocky Mountain Front. Individual stockmen repeatedly called for greater access to Lewis and Clark pastures to alleviate their financial burdens. Some ranchers even offered to feed elk in the winter if they could only have national forest grazing rights for their herds in the summer months (Byrnes 1919; Townsend C. 1919; Hendron 1923; Myrick 1925; 1926c). 242 Local sentiment overwhelmingly supported game protection – although most also were amenable to “a limited number of stock” (USDA LCNF 1926). Proposals by the state to add land to the Preserve or to lease large blocks of Forest Service grazing land for the elk failed. Lewis and Clark foresters repeatedly addressed claims of hunters, guides, and settlers who witnessed elk starving in the forest. One complaint in 1918 stated that Lewis and Clark management was complicit in overgrazing the range and ordering rangers to deny elk starvation. Wary of public backlash, the agency asked local outfitters and rangers to testify on the condition of the herd and the internal practices of the agency; all stated that the range was full but the herd was wintering well and that the agency operated from a standpoint of truth in science and did not seek to obscure the critical nature of the situation. Any overgrazing was a result of the “war-time policy to assist in meat production” (Beatty 1918b). Forest management was repeatedly petitioned to remove all grazing from the Sun River. As drought conditions worsened along the Front, settlers saw continued stock raising as detrimental to the local populace. The Sun River elk herd was a ready source of sustenance for struggling homesteaders whereas grazing only supported a few (Beatty 1918a; 1918b; Neal 1918; Slaughter 1918; 1919; Barnes 1919; Woods 1919; Martineau 1920; Pitman 1920; Jakways 1921; Johnston 1921; Smith 1922; Rush 1924; Myrick 1926a; 1926b; 1926c). The agency responded in kind; removing grazing from the Sun would destroy the economic basis for the Rocky Mountain Front and render “several hundred thousand dollars” the federal government spent “in irrigating these lands” wasted (Smith 1925). 243 The failure of the Forest Service to honor its grazing commitment could compound the economic catastrophe that was brewing and result in further bank failures (Kelley 1930b). In 1919, Lewis and Clark Forest Supervisor B.W. Clark stated that the elk problem on the Lewis and Clark was the forest’s key challenge and the one “about which we know the least” (Clark 1919). Foresters addressed the situation through routine range and game inspections that mirrored the carrying capacity studies favored by grazing managers. Studies were conducted to determine elk herd numbers, distribution, condition, and winter-feed with the intent of coming to “some conclusion if possible to provide adequate forage for them” (USDA LCNF 1925a). Surveys were conducted throughout the Preserve and adjacent watersheds. Though difficult, surveys were always conducted in the winter; snow accumulation aided rangers in tracking herd movement (Figure 3-34). Rangers traversed watersheds searching for elk and noted the condition of the herd and winter forage; data were then transferred to maps and working plans (Figure 3-35). In the early spring, the count was repeated in order to determine how the herd had wintered and its potential foaling increase. The agency also routinely engaged “expert” advice from academics outside the agency – a rare occurrence at this time in Service history – to better understand elk forage requirements (Simpson 1916; Youngs 1916b; Clark 1919; 1920; Rush 1919; USDA LCNF 1917a; 1921; 1922; 1925a; 1926; 1927a; 1928a; Hendron 1923; Trueman and Thol 1923; Smith 1924; Morrell 1925; Moir 1929b; 1929c). The elk carrying capacity studies resulted in a management policy that guided the agency through the 1920s. No further reductions in grazing were made because they 244 245 Figure 3-34: Sun River Elk Survey, 1917 (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). Figure 3-35: Sun River Elk Herd Survey Map, 1928. Black numbers indicate actual elk counted. Yellow numbers are estimated elk numbers. Blue numbers indicate bighorn sheep counted. Red numbers indicate deer counted. The violet, circled numbers are snow depth (USDA LCNF 1928f). could only result in greater increases in elk numbers. No additions to Preserve boundaries were allowed. The agency determined that the forest was capable of sustaining an elk herd of 2,500 head. Counts in the late 1920s placed the herd at nearly 4,000. To manage the herd sustainably and as a forest resource, Lewis and Clark foresters began to actively lobby for an open hunting season on elk and the resumption of elk hunting in Lewis and Clark County. The Forest Service would continue counting the herd; once the herd reached its carrying capacity, the annual increase would be harvested – much like timber. Using moderate propagation rates, the Forest Service believed that 600 elk could be harvested annually and still maintain the herd at 2,500 head. The increased harvest benefitted local settlements by providing greater opportunities for game and by supporting the growing tourist and recreation trade along the Front. To show a good-faith attempt in planning for greater hunting on the forest, the agency reduced commercial grazing on Hannan and Arsenic gulches for “tourist” and hunting guide horses to graze (USDA LCNF 1921; 1925a; 1927a; Jakways 1924; Morrell 1924; Myrick 1926c). The Forest Service attempted to engage the public in cooperating to reduce the elk herd to sustainable numbers. Through a series of meetings with sportsmen’s groups, stockholders, state game wardens, and locals, the agency was able to gain a level of cooperation in support of extending the elk season. Most agreed that it unwise to keep the power to regulate the length of game seasons in the hands of the state legislature. Most also agreed to support extending the elk season through November and into December; only the Great Falls Sportsmen’s Association dissented in favor of raising money to 246 purchase foreclosed farmland outside of the forest for winter range (Myrick 1926a; 1926b; Lockhart 1927c; 1927d; 1927e; 1928; Great Falls Tribune 1928, 5 October). The Forest Service constructed a series of infrastructure improvements to manage the herd. The boundaries of the Sun River Preserve were so well posted by Lewis and Clark rangers that hunters complained that there were more signs in the wild than in town. The agency, in cooperation with local stock associations, constructed a series of drift fences near the main access points to the Sun River Preserve. Drift fence construction had little effect on winter elk migrations; snowdrifts often buried the rail and wire fences and the herd was free to migrate at will. However, they were marginally effective in keeping cattle held in adjacent allotments from drifting into the Preserve – though throughout the 1920s there were repeated complaints of cattle grazing inside its boundaries. Perhaps most effectively, Lewis and Clark foresters cooperated with the state in salting the Preserve to keep the elk off of the depleted winter range. Initial studies in 1926 showed that salting was effective in keeping 60 percent of the herd in the Preserve and the salting practice was continued (Figure 3-36) (Simpson 1916; Youngs 1916a; 1916b; USDA LCNF 1922; Smith 1925; Moir 1926b; Lockhart 1927a; Martin 1927). Foresters also sought alternate methods to secure winter forage for the herd. Following the fires of 1919 – which left large portions of the herd’s winter range depleted of browse – the Lewis and Clark sought to immediately make administrative withdrawals on “all of the lands upon which it is believed hay could be raised, on the North Fork of the Sun River, not included in the Reclamation withdrawal” in order to provide hay for 247 the herd. The agency also attempted to transplant Sun River elk to other parts of state; in 1918, foresters contemplated driving a portion of the herd north to Glacier National Park 248 Figure 3-36: Salting the Sun River Elk Herd, 1927 (LCNF 1927a). where it was estimated that a herd of 10,000 could “easily be retained in the park without interference” (Bailey 1918). Following the creation of the Spotted Bear Preserve in the Flathead National Forest, forest mangers attempted to drive elk herds over the Continental Divide by salting passes. They also discussed using “strategic hunting” to drive the elk from certain drainages in the Preserve to the Spotted Bear (Beatty 1919; Myrick 1925; Smith 1925; USDA LCNF 1925a). However, none of these options provided any realistic mechanism to control the herd. By 1928, the herd numbered over 4,200. The hunting season was extended marginally, though little impact was made on the main body of the herd. The herd migrated yearly out of the Preserve through the main watersheds and grazing allotments leading to the Front, and onto private drought-stricken homesteader lands. The winters of 1927-1930 were severe, even for the Front; each year rangers counted over 1,500 elk wintering on private land outside of the forest boundary. In 1928 forestry officials in a single survey counted 2,261 elk outside of the forest boundary. The Sun River and Ford Creek ranges were completely utilized (Figure 3-37); rangers were amazed that “so many big animals could subsist in this region on such short feed” (USDA LCNF 1925a). Unwilling to relinquish further grazing rights in the middle of an economic depression, the Forest Service fell back on its standby policy and continued to conduct range surveys and advocating for a longer hunting season. In 1929, citing a lack of working legislation to help them manage the herd, Lewis and Clark foresters began to look at possibilities of securing land through withdrawal outside of the forest boundaries to serve as agency 249 managed elk wintering habitat. Though wildlife management had been integrated into utilitarian scientific forestry, foresters were unable to implement an effective working 250 Figure 3-37: Grazing Potential, LCNF, 1929. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1929c). plan capable of pleasing local sportsmen and recreationists and at the same time meeting the economic and material needs of stockmen (Lockhart 1928; Anderson 1940). Recreation and Wilderness Management Despite the fact that one of the primary motivating factors behind creating forest reserves was for the protection of their intrinsic beauty and the opportunities they offer for recreation, federal foresters initially denied the importance of both recreation and wilderness protection because they were seen as non-utilitarian. By the mid 1910s, the Forest Service was forced to fold recreational use into their federal forestry imperative and redefine it as a valuable resource. In doing so, the agency exerted control over public use and funding of the national forests. In the late 1920s foresters were faced with mounting public pressure to establish primitive wilderness areas. By 1929, recreation was fully a part of the national forest imperative and tentative plans for wilderness were formulated in the Lewis and Clark. The national movement to preserve forestlands that resulted in the preservation of the Adirondacks in New York, of Yellowstone in Montana and Wyoming, and of Yosemite in California played a large role in creating the federal forest reserves. Preservationists such as John Muir garnered support for President Cleveland’s 1897 “arbitrary reservation of 21,000,000 acres of forest” and conservationists such as Teddy Roosevelt added his significant political and public support to the reserve movement (Gilligan 1953, 38). To many, the terms “reserve” and “park” were synonymous. However, by the early 1900s it became clear that the GLO Forest Reserves were not 251 parks and instead would be managed for commercial and economic use. In 1905, Gifford Pinchot was clear in his denial of recreation and aesthetic enjoyment of the national forests; recreation was anti-utilitarian and an intellectual and managerial roadblock to sustained yield scientific forestry (Gilligan 1953, 8-81; Williams 1989, 411-24; 1995, 24-243; Steen 1991; 2004, 22-46, 69-109; Hays 1999, 27-48, 122-46; 2009). However, political pressures forced the Forest Service to reconsider its stance on recreation. Even before the passage of the Organic Act, hunters, fishermen, campers, and hikers used western forests for recreation. Through the 1910s, increases in settlement and population adjacent to national forests, a greater prevalence of privately owned automobiles, and improved in-forest transportation infrastructure provided greater access to the forest. Early in the 1910s, foresters reported that unplanned recreation was causing significant sanitation problems and contributing to fire danger. “Pleasure seekers,” said Forester Graves in 1913, “are the greatest source of fire danger” in the national forests (USDA FS 1913a). Furthermore, hunters and other recreationists that utilized pack animals were coming into conflict with stock and wildlife. By the mid 1910s, Lewis and Clark foresters identified several popular and problem-plagued recreational areas near the boundary of the forest including the watersheds of Badger, North Fork Dupuyer, Middle Fork Teton, Arsenic, and Elk creeks. In 1916, foresters estimated that 935 people – 500 campers, 400 hunters and fishermen, 15 automobile travelers, and 20 hikers - used the Lewis and Clark strictly for recreational purposes. In the late 1920s, a series of campground improvement plans standardized campground construction in the Lewis and 252 Clark (USDA FS 1912d; 1913a; USDA LCNF 1916a; Morrell 1923; USDA D1 1929b; Wolff 1929a; 1929b; Tweed 1989, 1-15). Federal agency politics and the ever-present battle for funding also influenced the Forest Service’s ultimate decision to add recreation into its management paradigm. At the heart of this conflict was the management of the nation’s national parks. Though Pinchot had originally denied the existence of non-utilitarian forest preservation in his national forests, he believed strongly that the Department of Agriculture should manage national parks rather than the Department of the Interior. By 1910 there was a concerted effort to develop a distinct National Park Service (NPS) inside the Department of the Interior. In 1916, the National Park Service was created. With public sentiment swinging toward preservation rather than utilitarian conservation, the National Park Service initiated the transfer of portions of several national forests into the Department of the Interior and made them into national parks. The NPS claimed the right to manage all exceptional public lands for recreation; as the Forest Service was strictly utilitarian – by their own system of rules and regulations – recreation land needed to be turned over to the Department of the Interior and the NPS (Rothman 1989; Tweed 1989, 5-6; Steen 1991; 2004, 152-62; HHM Inc. 2006; Dilsaver and Wyckoff 2009). Concerned with the loss of millions of acres and their management dollars, the Forest Service looked for ways to stop the NPS and found it by fitting recreation into utilitarian scientific forestry. In 1916, Assistant Forester E.A. Sherman published an article stating that though national forests have great economic importance as suppliers of 253 material forest products, “their value as playgrounds for the public will in time come to rank as one of the major resources” (Sherman 1916a, 115). In another article, Sherman proclaimed that in some cases, the “highest use” of some national forest land is “non-use” – an early call for wilderness protection in the Forest Service (Sherman 1916a; 1916b; Rothman 1989; Tweed 1989, 5-6; Steen 1991; 2004, 152-62; HHM Inc. 2006). To legitimize recreation within the utilitarian scientific forestry model, the Forest Service initiated a highly publicized recreation research inventory. In 1917, landscape architect Frank A. Waugh was commissioned to tour each of the Forest Service districts in order to make planning recommendations. The results of Waugh’s survey were conclusive from a Forest Service perspective; recreation on agency land had a legitimate economic value to the nation – Waugh estimated that Forest Service recreation use equated to roughly $7,500,000 - and that the Forest Service must be allowed to manage recreation separate from the NPS in order to place the forests under more “intelligent management” and complete use (Waugh 1918, 5). Waugh stated that recreation must be assimilated into national forest management plans and that recreation and landscape professionals must oversee planning efforts, as few in the Service understood how to manage recreation in a utilitarian forestry model. Following the end of World War I, the Forest Service hired landscape architect Arthur Carhart to design early recreation plans. By 1924, however, the Service ended its practice of hiring trained landscape architects and the job of recreation planning was handed to local foresters (Waugh 1918; Rothman 1989; Tweed 1989, 6-7; Steen 1991; 2004, 152-62; HHM Inc. 2006). 254 In 1924, District 1 issued guidelines on how to create forest management plans that included recreation. The directive stated that each forest should place a priority on setting aside specific tracts of land for recreational uses – such as the creation of a planned campground – and develop them accordingly. Despite this, management attempts to control campers and hunters on the Lewis and Clark were piecemeal through the 1920s. Though recreation assumed an important role in the Forest – demonstrated by the ongoing battle waged by local sportsmen on behalf of the Sun River elk herd – Lewis and Clark foresters concerned themselves with manipulating fire and grazing plans to meet recreation needs. Grazing allotments in the Sun River Canyon were curtailed in order to allow hunters to feed their horses. Fire crews were routinely stationed near popular camping spots in the forest and, in an attempt to make campers aware of role they played in lighting forest fires, Lewis and Clark foresters began in 1923 to require campers to obtain campfire permits. In the mid 1920s, Lewis and Clark foresters began discussing whether or not timber should be cut to the edge of roads frequented by automobile tourists. Comprehensive recreation management plans were not completed for the Lewis and Clark until the 1930s (Beatty 1918a; USDA LNCF 1921; USDA Press Service 1921; Flint 1922a; 1922b; 1922c; Flint 1929). The Forest Service also sought to manage the recreation impulse through the regulation of summer residence cabins and homes. Since the GLO period, forest managers had allowed non-agricultural forest residences – hotels, mills, and sanitariums - to be constructed inside forest boundaries. The 1905 Use Book added provisions that 255 allowed for the issuance of summer residences under the special use permit status. However, few acquired residence special use permits before 1915; most of those on the Lewis and Clark consisted of isolated fur trappers cabins and hunting lodges in the Benchmark and Sun River drainages. The first purely recreational residence permit issued in the Lewis and Clark was in 1913 for the Perry cabin in the Sun River Canyon. The Choteau Sanitary Club also erected a spa at Arsenic Creek in the early 1910s. In 1912, Forester Graves pointed to the special use permit program as a method by which the Forest Service was meeting the public’s growing recreation needs (USDI GLO 1897; 1902; USDA FS 1905; 1912d; Tweed 1989, 2). The public was reluctant to invest in summer recreation residences on an annual permit basis; the Forest Service had not yet garnered a level of trust and, on the Lewis and Clark, the emerging wildlife and grazing issue added a sense of uncertainty to the process. In 1915, the agency passed the Term Occupancy Act, which enabled forests to issue 30-year special use permits for seasonal recreation residences. The Act stabilized residence recreation in the Lewis and Clark and placed it on utilitarian terms that fit within the agency’s management imperative. As early as 1916, Lewis and Clark foresters were anticipating recreation home-site construction around the unfinished Sun River Reclamation dams; “Several inquiries (had) already been made for special use permits to occupy summer homes on the shore of the reservoir after completion. A tract of land will be set aside for this purpose as soon as the site has been definitely chosen” (USDA LCNF 1916a, 64). Between 1915 and 1925, only ten summer residence homes were constructed 256 in the Lewis and Clark. The relative lack of large nearby population centers, the rough topography, and the forest-wide instability brought about by the Reclamation Service withdrawals on the Sun River and the game preserve likely limited the number of people willing to invest in recreation (USDA LCNF 1916a; Waugh 1918). However, Lewis and Clark foresters followed Waugh’s (and Carhart’s) advice and began to plan for recreation residences. The agency felt that it could allow recreationists in the forest by confining residence construction to allotted areas – later called tracts. By the late 1920s - and the completion of Diversion and Gibson Dams - Lewis and Clark foresters began surveying several sites along accessible waterways for developed summer home tracts. Along the Sun River, the majority of tract development was held off until the completion of the Gibson Dam. In 1924, foresters surveyed the Middle Home Gulch Tract – a small residential area containing five lots; the first permit for Middle Home Gulch was issued in 1929 (Figure 3-38). Between 1920 and 1929, eight special use permits were issued in the Arsenic Creek region – this area would later be organized as the Arsenic Tract (USDA LCNF 2002c; HHM Inc. 2006). By the mid 1920s, the Forest Service also began to consider non-developed wilderness recreation as a possible addition to their management imperative. Increased road and summer home construction and utilitarian national forest activities combined to create an increasingly developed landscape. Public pressure began to shift toward creating areas on public lands that were “primitive” in nature. Though the Forest Service emphasized a scientific and technocratic management philosophy, it began to realize an 257 opportunity. National forests could offer the public a type of primitive recreation, devoid of automobiles, hotels, and consumption that was difficult to find in national parks. In 1919, Arthur Carhart shook the agency when he denied several applications for summer recreation residences around Trapper’s Lake, CO and instead crafted a recreation plan that left the area roadless. In 1922, Forester Greeley stated that “wilderness use could be a major aspect of recreation policy” (Steen 2004, 154). He couched his comment by stating that the Service was hesitant to designate large regions of their forests as unusable due to the difficulties in predicting future resource needs. Despite those fears, Greeley directed district foresters to map out possible wilderness areas under their management. 258 Figure 3-38: Recreation Residences, LCNF, 1929 (HHM Inc. 2006). Each area needed to be free from commercially exploitable timber and be suitable to controlled grazing. Some leading preservationists, such as Robert Sterling Yard, predicted that the Service would ultimately bend to public pressure and accept wilderness within utilitarian forestry (Gilligan 1953; Sutter 2002; Steen 2004, 152-62; Hays 2009, 86). In the middle 1920s, the Forest Service began to modify their management imperative to fit the needs of wilderness recreation, despite some internal antagonism against its inclusion. In 1924, the Forest Service created its first designated wilderness area in the Gila National Forest in Arizona. In his 1926 annual report, Greeley recognized the validity of wilderness as a forest use – as long as it did not interfere with “other obligations and requirements of national forest administration” (USDA FS 1926b). The agency conducted studies into wilderness reserve and primitive area management as well (USDA FS 1926b; 1926c; Marshall 1928; Gilligan 1953; Steen 2004, 152-62). In 1929, the Forest Service designated a new form of boundary inside national forests; Primitive Areas offered an “opportunity to the public to observe the conditions which existed in the pioneer phases of the Nation’s development, and to engage in the forms of outdoor recreation characteristic of that period” (USDA FS 1930a). Though no formal boundary designations would be made until the 1930s, Lewis and Clark foresters planned a large primitive area that included all of the South Fork of the South Fork of the Sun River above Benchmark, all of the Sun River Game Preserve, and “most of the Spotted Bear Game Preserve,” thereby creating a wilderness area of more than 400,000 acres (Lockhart 1929a). In late 1929, District Forester Evan Kelley made a rough sketch 259 of possible primitive areas located in and around the Lewis and Clark (Figure 3-39) (Koch 1929; Lockhart 1929a; Kelley 1929; USDA Forest Service 1930a; Smith 1933). 260 Figure 3-39: Kelley’s Proposed primitive areas, 1929. Map by author (Kelley 1929). Mining and Watershed Management Mining and watersheds were tied intricately together during the early federal forest deliberations. Mining and agricultural proponents believed that open commercial logging on western watersheds jeopardized the irrigation movement and negatively impacted mineral extractive opportunities. Mining and irrigation lobbies helped early Progressive conservationists pass the 1891 and 1897 forest reserve acts. The 1897 Organic Act gave prospectors the right to stake mining claims and obtain patents within the reserves as easily as they could do on other public lands. It also identified watershed protection as a primary reason for federal forest management (Clepper 1971, 14-30; Hays 1999, 4-48; 2009, 31-33; Steen 2004, 29). Federal forest mangers had little control over mining inside their borders. As a result, the Forest Service has struggled at times to fit mining in with existing management plans. Federal mining law is based on the 1872 Mining Act and states that all mineral deposits on public lands are open to exploration, exploitation, and purchase. Any United States citizen may lay claim to either a placer or lode claim on public land. Placer claims are limited to 20 acres per person – although a group of miners may combine their claims up to 160 acres. Lode claims are tied to the location of the ore body or vein; miners can claim 1,500 feet along the vein and up to 300 feet on either side of the center of ledge where the vein is exposed. The 1897 GLO Rules and Regulations Governing Forest Reserves, the 1902 Forest Reserve Manual for the Information and Use of Forest Officers, and the 1905 “Use Book” state that mining will not be prohibited anywhere on 261 the reserves. Forest Service policy stated that the claimant could use all timber, water, and forage on a mining claim to support the extraction process (USDI GLO 1897; 1902; USDA FS 1905; 1913f; Miss 1994, 173-211; Fulbright 1996, 128-33; Hays 1999, 37). Allowing relatively easy access to timber, water, and forage rights opened the Forest Service to fraud. People attempting to get control of timber or to construct dwellings, hotels, and homesteads on Forest Service land repeatedly applied for mining patents. Through the 1910s, “mining laws afford(ed) the greatest cloak for land frauds in the National Forests, and (were) more commonly misused than the other laws” (USDA FS 1913a, 139). In the Lewis and Clark, oil claims in the northern portion of the forest were particularly susceptible to fraud; promoters frequently claimed an oil discovery, patented the claim and sold stock to local investors. The well would soon become non- productive and the claim was “transferred, abandoned, re-located and re-named” (Bunker 1908c). The agency made it a priority to limit mineral land fraud in the 1910s, despite repeated attacks by national mining interests. To control fraud, agency rangers were required to repeatedly examine mining claims. Often, claimants constructed rudimentary improvements and then left the site; two or three years later, the claimants would state that the mine was not producing and sell patented claim to a timber mill who would clearcut the acreage and abandon the claim. Lewis and Clark foresters developed a method to prove fraud; on inspection, foresters wrote their names and a date on a piece of firewood. They then placed the firewood inside the claimant’s stove. When the claimant attempted to vacate the claim, foresters returned to the site and produced the unburned 262 log as proof that the site had not been developed (USDI 1902, 10-11; USDA FS 1912d, 475; 1913a 139; Halm 1944, 77; Clepper 1971, 62-64; Pyne 1997, 232). Mining activity had little imprint on the Lewis and Clark before 1929, though there was interest in mining the region. In his initial survey of the Lewis and Clark(e), H.B. Ayres dispelled any hope that traditional placer and lode mining might prove profitable in the Reserve stating that “quartz is nowhere abundant” (Ayres 1900, 37). The Great Northern Railway prompted natural resource speculation along the Rocky Mountain Front. Copper mining interests from southwest Montana pressured the United States to purchase the “ceded strip” region of the Blackfeet Reservation in 1896; in 1898 the region was opened to individual mining claimants. A small oil boom occurred in the present-day Glacier National Park in 1892 when prospectors were alerted by kerosene- smelling bear hides for sale by local tribesmen at Tobacco Plains. In 1900, a group of speculators out of Butte, MT filed claim on the area near Kintla Lake. The Butte Oil Company drilled wells and struck some oil, though never a large enough pocket to make the venture profitable. In 1903, the same year the region was added to the Lewis and Clark(e) Forest Reserve, oil was discovered east of the Continental Divide near Swiftcurrent. A short-lived boom occurred, but by 1912 all of the claims had lapsed and been declared void. Other oil mines – filed as placer claims – were patented on the Two Medicine between 1909 and 1910, though all were cancelled by 1920 (USDA LCNF 1916b; Ball 1917, 27-59; Darrow 1955; Boberg 1984; DeSanto 1985; Fulbright 1996, 120-21; Spence 1996, 29-49; Keller 2001, 28). 263 The most significant mining claim in the Lewis and Clark was located on Lange Creek in the Sun River Canyon (Figure 3-40). The Mountain Chief and Chief of the Mountains claims were filed in 1906 for the production of malanterite - a mineral possessing “medicinal qualities” (McCain 1907a). Malanterite was a combination of aluminum, iron, magnesium, and sulphuric acid that was obtained by scraping off lime silicates from the rock face. Malanterite was bottled as a powder or in solution and sold along the Front for $1.00 per ounce. “Several hundred tons of this mineral” was taken off of the mountain face before 1910 (Cory 1907). The mine ceased production in the mid 264 Figure 3-40: Mountain Chief and Chief of the Mountains Mining Claims. Map by author (Fulbright 1996). 1910s due to market considerations. As late as 1921, foresters issued a free use timber permit to construct a cabin at the site though it is unclear if the mine continued to produce past that date (Horsky 1906; Cory 1907; McCain 1907a; 1907b; USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b; Bateman 1921c; Swim 1921; Fulbright 1996). Watershed protection held a primary role in federal forest creation, though almost immediately overt watershed protection became secondary in the Forest Service’s imperative in favor of more overtly utilitarian uses such as timber and grazing. Gifford Pinchot’s desire to establish grazing as an agency prerogative resulted in policy that put stock on the land and watershed protection in the needs-more-research category of Forest Service administration. In 1911, the Forest Service established the Wagon Wheel Gap Experiment Station in Colorado to study the effect of forest cover on streamflow and water quality. Through the 1920s, numerous reports were produced by the agency on forestry’s effect on water, though little of it filtered down into policy and onto the national forest landscape (Langston 1995, 207-12; Hays 2009, 12, 31-33). However, watershed management on the Lewis and Clark held a position of greater importance than it did nationally. The lack of a significant timber industry in the Lewis and Clark and the real possibility of grazing allotment reductions for wildlife protection encouraged Lewis and Clark foresters to recognize watershed protection as the forest’s primary purpose. The agency estimated that water originating in the Lewis and Clark could irrigate over 369,000 acres – even more with expanded water reservation. The Sun River Reclamation Project, the Valier Irrigation Project, and the growing Rocky 265 Mountain Front population through the end of the 1910s all pressured the agency to mitigate water pollution and erosion. Lewis and Clark foresters were concerned that widespread erosion would occur following the 1910 Big Burn. Foresters promoted burned timber sales to clear the land rapidly and allow for erosion-reducing cover regeneration. Lewis and Clark foresters found that erosion was a “constant” in certain locations of the forest; foresters initially gave up attempting to mitigate erosion along the tributaries of the Marias River as repeated man-made fires along the Great Northern Railway kept the region bare of cover (USDA LCNF 1916a; 1916b). The growing presence of forest recreation users forced Lewis and Clark managers to confront water pollution and effluvia originating in their forests. Special use recreation cabins and unplanned spike camps polluted the Lewis and Clark watersheds with enough waste that forest inspectors were detailed to sites to create sanitation plans and make recommendations on the proper placement of trash pits and outhouses. One outhouse on Arsenic Creek was described as “a disgraceful fly incubator” not more “than 8 feet from the creek.” Several sites resembled another Arsenic Creek cabin where “no provision whatsoever has been made for sanitation and ... garbage (was) flung from the front door of the cabin toward and into the creek which furnishes the domestic water supply of at least three other users a short distance downstream” (Flint 1922a). Lewis and Clark foresters frequently rescinded special use permits for water pollution and ultimately attached riders to recreation permits that made the user responsible for maintaining water purity (USDA FS 1913a, 160-61; Waugh 1918; Flint 1922a; 1922b; 1922c; Hays 2009). 266 Conclusion By 1929, the Lewis and Clark National Forest had already undergone a large- scale transformation at the hands of federal foresters. Landscape transformation was governed through a series of scientifically and research informed management plans that sought to facilitate full utilization of the forest’s resources. Foresters constructed a network of infrastructure improvements that made eastern boundary regions accessible to the public through roads, telephone lines, and permanent administration sites. The network extended through much of the backcountry of the Lewis and Clark by 1929 and included improved and rudimentary trails, fire lookouts and caches, and unimproved guard posts. The Forest Service’s original land management goal to economically bulwark local settlement through the perpetuation of forest resources was partially met. In doing so Forest managers attempted to support a resource-based cultural geography. However, Lewis and Clark managers struggled to meet agency economic goals and still ecologically maintain the landscape; local and national economic pressures placed grazing and timber harvest requirements on foresters that were difficult to meet and greatly affected by the natural world and changing local opinion. As Lewis and Clark foresters looked ahead to the 1930s, they did so in acceptance of a greatly expanded definition of utilitarian forestry and knowing that several problems existed on their forest. The agency struggled with ways to increase paying uses – grazing and timber – in order to alleviate the growing economic depression that had already 267 greatly affected the Rocky Mountain Front. The Sun River elk problem had reached no real conclusion and threatened to compound the plight of struggling homesteaders. The completion of the Gibson Dam and increased public traffic in the forest was pushing Lewis and Clark managers towards a greater role for recreation. Fire also remained an ever-present threat and despite rigorous attempts towards its control, still loomed large. Though all of this, Lewis and Clark land managers continued to pursue management plans based on research and sustained yield forestry. 268 CHAPTER 4: THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1929 TO 1965 Introduction Profound national changes shaped the Lewis and Clark National Forest during the turbulent middle decades of the 20th century. The Forest Service maintained their emphasis on managing public lands through the application of science, technology, and a belief in their role as experts. But managing national forest landscapes to meet the “greatest good” mandate became increasingly complex as local and national demands for forest access, products, and recreation increased. At the same time, the agency searched for ways to fortify their budgets amid shifting patterns of federal support. As interest in public landscapes grew, the Forest Service attempted to simplify their management imperative by standardizing processes, shifting boundaries, and crafting national management criteria. This simplification process sometimes backfired on the agency. Public constituencies sought variations in agency plans and a greater voice in the decision-making process. The agency responded by incorporating divergent views of the forest into their management imperative. National forest landscapes along the Rocky Mountain Front were transformed as a result of this informal negotiation process. The United States Forest Service and Federal Expansion (1929-1965) The Great Depression was a period of transformation for the United States. It resulted in greater urbanization and an expanded federal presence in American economic 269 and social life. The Hoover administration called for federal austerity and championed laissez-faire economics over government intervention to ease the country’s financial woes. Federal agencies were subjected to across-the-board budget cuts. The Forest Service cut manpower and curtailed research and infrastructure-improvement programs. Ranger districts were enlarged in an effort to eliminate positions and stretch an already depleted budget. Similarly, several western national forests were consolidated to achieve more “efficiency in organization” (USDA FS 1931b; 1932c; Cole 1944, 49; Brinkley 1995; Cohen 2003; Meinig 2004). Despite initial budgetary constraints, the Forest Service emerged from the Great Depression with a reinvigorated belief in the utility of the agency’s expanding multiple use policy. The agency utilized the economic downturn to promote the cause of federal forestry. Nationally, lumber production sharply declined in 1926 and continued to spiral downward until the early 1940s and World War II mobilization. The agency blamed the depressed timber market on reckless private forestry harvesting practices. Conservationists touted the stabilizing effects federal forestry had on rural economics. As the Depression worsened, federal foresters renewed their call for a greater role in managing private timberland (USDA FS 1931b; 1932c; Silcox 1937; Lewis 2005, 95-103; Swanson 2011, 52). That call was codified in the 1933 Copeland Report. Titled A National Plan for American Forestry, the Copeland Report was highly critical of private forestry. It called for an extension of public ownership and intensive public regulation of private timber 270 cutting practices. To this end, the Forest Service asked Congress to annually appropriate $50,000,000 in land acquisition funds. The Copeland Report also proposed dramatic extensions of the same federal/state cooperation already practiced in fire control to include cooperative eradication of forest insects and diseases, erosion, and flood control. The result, so believed the USFS, would be “a better ordered and better balanced economic and social development than laissez-faire individualism has been leading to” (USDA FS 1933c, 2). Ultimately, the Copeland Report fell far short of its intended goal of an integrated public/private national forest policy. The deepening Depression caused the bill to stall in Congress. Yet, the National Plan for American Forestry did introduce the concept of multiple use management to the federal appropriations committee. Throughout the Depression, the agency used the Copeland Report to elicit Congressional funds for integrated use management (US Congress 1933; Baker et al 1993; Steen 1998; 2004, 199-202). Internally, foresters were deeply worried about how the Depression would affect the federal forestry cause. Users petitioned the agency to reduce or eliminate permit fees. Forest officers were advised not to alter use fees, though special attention was directed to “avoid imposing restrictions or requirements” on forest users that “may involve additional expense to them” (Rutledge 1933). All districts were required to make every attempt to conduct their work with economy as a buffer against potential negative public sentiment. In some cases, the agency was authorized to use special funds to provide relief 271 to unemployed, married men. In addition, men with dependents who could prove they were unable to find work were hired in 1931 and 1932 as temporary laborers and fire guards (USDA FS 1931b, 8-12; Sherman 1932; Kelley 1933a). Many Americans during the Depression lost faith in modern industrial capitalism and looked to the federal government for relief and reform. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election in 1932 inaugurated a shift in both the perceived and real federal dominance of American life. Roosevelt’s Depression-era recovery and reform programs – called the “First” and “Second” New Deals – sought to use the federal government’s regulatory power and financial might to bolster American capitalism, transform depressed rural communities into connected, modern places, and to further the ideology of mass consumption by providing the public with greater means (Brinkley 1995; Cohen 2003; Meinig 2004). Though different in scope and intent, the “First” and “Second” New Deals both relied on and centralized federal planning to mediate the negative effects of the Great Depression. Reflecting this belief, Roosevelt’s “Hundred Days” organized a methodology for relief and reform. Most New Deal programs relied heavily upon federal power, largesse, and planned bureaucratic coordination. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) established a national agricultural policy and sought to combat low agricultural prices through production control. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) created a public works program and a system of federally supervised industrial programs intent on spreading wealth by mitigating cutthroat competition. The Civilian Conservation Corps 272 (CCC) was an employment and public works program for young American males. (Brinkley 1995; Schlesinger Jr. 2003, 1-23). As early as 1933 conservationists realized the potential revitalizing effect federal forestry could have on western communities ravaged by drought and depression. To some, this meant socializing the nation’s industrial timberlands, imposing cutting and planting regulations on private forestry, and “revitaliz(ing) the forest movement in relation to human beings” (Silcox 1937). To the Roosevelt administration, federal forestry offered a ready-made framework to initiate New Deal relief programs. By March 1933, Roosevelt had outlined a program that would “contribute at once to conservation and to relief by sending jobless men to labor in the forests” (Schlesinger Jr. 2003, 336-37). Roosevelt utilized the Labor Department to recruit unemployed young men and authorized the War Department to manage work camps. Work projects in Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were coordinated with the Departments of Interior and Agriculture. By early summer 1933, more than 300,000 men were at work implementing projects in United States national forests and parks (Stockdale 1933a; USDA FS 1939a; Salmond 1967, 3-26; Steen 2004, 196-221; Maher 2008, 17-41, 77-113). Between 1933 and 1942 – when the CCC was discontinued – over 2.5 million young men were put to work in America’s forests, fields, and parks. Laborers usually enrolled for a period of six to twelve months. Men had to be United States citizens, in good physical shape, unemployed and unmarried, and between the ages of 18 and 25. In 273 return for their labor, enrollees received bed, board, and an allowance of $30 per month – of which at least $25 had to be allotted to a dependent. Enrollees were expected to labor eight hours a day, five days a week. In their free time, enrollees were offered training programs and education opportunities commensurate with necessary on-the-job skills and conservation (Otis et al 1986; Maher 2008, 77-113). The Forest Service had to rapidly organize work and lodging for thousands of young men, most of whom had never seen the American West or experienced rural labor. Early CCC camps were constructed with temporary structures (Figure 4-1). By 1934, camps that allowed year-round occupancy were constructed using prefabricated structures and uniform plans. Most camps were built to house 200 men and included barracks, a mess hall, recreation and education buildings, and administrative facilities. The 274 Figure 4-1: Ford Creek CCC Camp, 1933 (LCNF-C). government authorized the use of “spike,” “fly,” or “side” camps to facilitate work in remote locations and to achieve greater efficiency. Spike camps were little more than temporary settlements meant to house a small number of enrollees for a period of no more than a few weeks. They were used extensively in western national forests where rugged terrain made daily transportation difficult (USDA R1 1935b; Otis et al 1986; Baker et al 1993, 136-38; Maher 2008). Local district rangers managed all enrollee labor on Forest Service land. The Forest Service immediately put CCC enrollees to work implementing “thousands of ... previously planned projects ... that would be suitable in character ... for being conducted from 200-man camps of inexperienced youths” (USDA FS 1933c, 5). For the first time in its thirty-year existence, the Forest Service had the manpower necessary to implement a variety of infrastructure projects. Forest Service rangers hired local, out-of-work craftsmen to serve as crew foremen. Conservation Corps work projects concentrated on transportation infrastructure maintenance and construction, forest fire control, and structural and landscape improvements. In 1933, it became standard policy that all agency improvements be built, if possible, using CCC funds and labor rather than ranger district funds (Koch 1933a; Otis et al 1986; Baker et al 1993, 136-38). By the end of the Great Depression, the Forest Service looked like a much different agency than it had in the 1920s. Increased federal subsidies had transformed the agency into a more top-down hierarchy that reflected New Deal era reorganization, consolidation, and planning. In 1936, the Forest Service headquarters grew from eight 275 oversight divisions to twenty-three. Each division took on greater planning and policy- making authority. Use-based departments were housed in one group – an attempt to coordinate planning and promote efficiency. The presence of the multiple other divisions operating outside of the administration group demonstrated an attempt to meet growing multiple-use demands placed on the Forest Service (USDA FS 1935b; 1936b; Steen 2006, 196-218). Forest Service landscapes were profoundly altered during the Great Depression. Forest Service conservation projects under the CCC were wide-ranging, diverse, and greatly expanded the agency’s ability to incorporate multiple uses into its imperative. New Deal conservation was highly publicized by the Roosevelt administration. As a result, the general public was more aware of the forests and their resources. Conservation Corps labor was effectively used to create facilities to meet the ever-increasing demand for national forest recreation. They constructed thousands of miles of hiking trails, hundreds of campgrounds and picnic areas, and stocked national watersheds with over one million sport fish. They also contributed to Forest Service conservation efforts by engaging in reforestation efforts, soil conservation, reservoir building, and range rehabilitation. Thousands of national forest fire lookouts were constructed by CCC crews. They also strung miles of telephone line, cleared fire-breaks, and provided the agency with readily available firefighting crews (Salmond 1967; Otis et al 1986; Steen 2004, 196-221; Maher 2008 43-76). 276 World War II was another turning point for the Forest Service. The war was “a time of transition from the older custodial era to the new developmental, managerial era,” ultimately positioning the agency as a middle-man between the federal government and industry (Baker et al 1993, 156). The federal government injected millions of dollars into raw material-based industrial production. Wood was immediately classified as a critical war material – wood was needed for bridges, ships, docks, airplanes, field stations and barracks, to produce nitroglycerin, turpentine, and dynamite. The Forest Service worked in collaboration with the War Production Board (WPB) to increase timber production on agency lands. President Roosevelt stated that “unusual action (was) needed to maintain the output of forest products at a high level as an essential aid in the prosecution of the war” (Roosevelt 1943). At the behest of the WPB, the Forest Service demanded each forest conduct immediate surveys of war-related products including pulpwood – a product not previously identified as a federal forest product. The surveys showed a lack of accessible softwood construction lumber, forcing the WPB to freeze commercial sale of lumber. For the duration of the war, lumber was virtually non-existent in American markets. To meet the increased demand, the Forest Service “turned from an emphasis on protection to production” (Baker et al 1993, 159). Between 1939 and 1945, Forest Service timber sales increased 238 percent – nearly all of it intended for the war effort. National forests began to take “an increasingly important place in supplying the Nation’s forest products” (USDA FS 1945a, 11). To get the timber out, the agency incentivized the Forest Service timber harvest by offering local mills non-competitive bid contracts that 277 guaranteed profits (USDA FS 1942; Boyd 1943; Watts 1943; Hirt 1994, 44-50; Steen 2004, 246-55; Hays 2009). Wartime financial and manpower constraints, coupled with the dramatic shift to resource production, limited the agency’s ability to manage forests along sustained yield, multiple-use guidelines. Forests were placed on a “war basis” (USDA R1 1942b). The majority of Forest Service funds and manpower were funneled into wartime production activities. As rangers were reassigned and local young men sent to war, labor was increasingly difficult to find. The agency was forced to hire older men and young boys to conduct infrastructure maintenance, work as truck drivers, and serve as fire dispatchers. Women were hired in many forests and served in fire lookout outposts. To bridge the gap, the agency housed and employed conscientious objectors and Axis prisoners of war. Despite their best attempts to supplement meager labor pools, the agency was forced to reduce many of their pre-war maintenance, infrastructure, and multiple use management practices. Forest planting was curtailed, as were wildlife and range studies, watershed rehabilitation projects, and recreation improvements (USDA FS 1942; Webb 1942a; 1942b; 1943b; Choteau Acantha 1943, 12 August; 1944, 1 June; USDA R1 1943; Baker et al 1993, 156-57; Hirt 1994, 44-50). Foresters were concerned about the long-term impact that federally supported industrial timber harvests were having on future growth stock. Chief Forester Lyle Watts stated that there was “no doubt that forest capital and hence forest productivity (were) being impaired by the war” (USDA FS 1943b). As the war came to an end, the agency 278 was faced with the daunting task of planning how post-war federal forests were going to repair damage unfettered logging had done to the national timber inventory (USDA FS 1945a; 1946b; Hirt 1994 44-81; Steen 2004, 246-66). As the war came to a close, the Forest Service reorganized its management model into one that replicated New Deal and World War II bureaucracy. The New Deal and World War II years convinced agency officials that organizational expansion was necessary to get ahead of the rapidly modernizing world. They were fearful that cooperation with other federal agencies threatened their imperative and could result in decreased budgets. This was a double-edged sword; the Forest Service wanted funding and legitimacy, but larger budgets and greater visibility opened them up to more public and Congressional scrutiny and forced the agency to realign its focus from local forests and planning process to more centralized control. Among other bureaucratic elements, the agency created a new Division of Land Use at both the national and regional level to coordinate USFS operations and planning with private foresters, state land managers, and other federal agencies. The goal of the new Division was to encourage local forest rangers to create and implement national plans in anticipation of increased demand for Forest Service resources. The infusion of federal dollars that originated in the Great Depression and accelerated during World War II did not end with the war’s cessation. The federal government emerged from the war “not only as the region’s chief landlord but also as its chief financier” (Malone and Etulain 1989, 220). Department of Defense dollars flooded 279 the West – a product of the Cold War – and created regions that were nearly dependent on defense industry employment. In 1963, the Department of Defense awarded $79 million in contracts for supplies, services and construction on military sites in Montana alone. In that same year, Montanans received over $54 million in military payroll. Rural western states also received millions of dollars to construct the Interstate Highway system; thousands of miles of interstate roads were built – with the federal government paying between ninety and ninety-five percent of the bill. The government pursued federal reclamation and rural electrification schemes modeled after the New Deal Tennessee Valley Authority project throughout the West. The proposed Missouri Valley Authority resulted in a somewhat smaller, but still regionally important Pick-Sloan Plan which funded multiple dams along the Missouri River system (Figure 4-2). Western farmers faced uncertain global markets and turned to federal subsidies, commodity price supports, and federal loan programs (USDC 1966; Nash 1985; 1999; Malone and Etulain 1989, 219-63; Jackson 1995; Lewis 2001). The post World War II West was transformed by unprecedented urban and suburban growth – in part fueled by increased federal funding, greater mobility for business and recreation, and an expansion of consumption by the middle class. Lured by federal defense and industrial-support spending, millions of migrants flooded the post- war West. The ubiquitous automobile and thousands of toll-free, taxpayer-funded federal roads spurred economic growth, social change, and greater mobility for recreation, industrial-scale agriculture, and suburbanization. Western land speculators received state 280 and federal tax breaks to construct new buildings to feed suburban demand and prompted the expansion of edge nodes and suburban satellite cities (Nash 1985; 1999; Lewis 2001; Hayden 2003; Conzen 2010). For the Forest Service, the post-war period also brought about great change. Sustained economic prosperity escalated demands for national forest uses. In response, the agency created a management methodology they believed capable of accommodating multiple competing claims for the same land. The agency welcomed the growing demand on their resources as it further legitimized the agency and secured funding from other federal conservation agencies. But by doing so, the Forest Service was forced to mollify 281 Figure 4-2: The Pick-Sloan Plan for the Missouri River Basin. Map indicates major and minor dams (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1992, 233). competing interest groups and “acknowledge the validity of everyone’s claims and try to satisfy demands to the greatest degree possible” (Hirt 1994, 80). Suburbanization and a sustained period of economic prosperity placed potentially unsustainable demands on the Forest Service to supply timber to the country. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Forest Service transformed itself into an agency that “dedicated itself to market-oriented production and the conversion of natural forest ecosystems into timber plantations” (Hirt 1994, xxxiv). Most congressional budgetary appropriations were tied to timber production and rationalized as a Cold War carrot that demonstrated the economic and material superiority of the United States. Indeed, the agency viewed itself (and increased production) as “one of the strongest forts against the many ‘isms’ which we all fear ... Production ... will insure the perpetuation of our democratic free enterprise form of government” (USDA R1 1952b). To get the timber cut out, the agency abandoned its attempts to force cooperative federal forestry practices on the private timber industry (Hirt 1994; Hays 2009). By the 1950s, a newly energized group of conservation advocates began to use the Forest Service’s sustained yield philosophy to challenge increasing levels of timber harvesting. While World War II had accelerated national forest timber cuts, it slowed the growth of non-utilitarian uses. Conservationists questioned the relatively low numbers of range and forest rehabilitation projects completed and the neglected recreational infrastructure. To conservationists, the agency had failed to meet its multiple use management goals. Following the model laid out by grazing and wildlife associations, 282 single-interest organizations appealed to the agency for greater involvement in local and national forest management planning. In the mid 1950s, the agency recommended that each of its constituent forests organize forest advisory councils comprised of local interest groups and forestry officials (Hirt 1994; Hays 2009). As the environmental movement gained momentum in the 1960s, conservationists pushed the Forest Service to redefine its multiple use mandate. Throughout the 1950s, interest groups made several attempts to secure statutory rights for uses not codified in the 1897 Organic Act. With timber’s domination of the resource economy, most of these failed - although support grew with each attempt. In 1958, the Forest Service threw its support behind the multiple use legislation; agency leaders worried that unless the Forest Service got ahead of multiple use legislation, special interest groups would write its terms and dictate agency policy. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 reasserted Forest Service autonomy in its “struggle to retain full discretionary control over national forest management” by allowing the agency to define the terms “multiple use” and “sustained yield” within the agency’s management imperative (Hirt 1994, 190). The definition of “multiple use” allowed the agency to continue as the arbiter of management practices it deemed suitable to “best meet the needs of the American people” (US Congress 1960). The definition of sustained yield contained language about “renewable resources” and “impairment of the land,” but also guaranteed the “maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output” of forest resources (US 283 Congress 1960). Unclear to all was how the agency could integrate high-levels of output and full utilization (Hirt 1994, 171-92; Steen 2004, 278-307; Hays 2009). Through the early 1960s, the Forest Service struggled with effective implementation of its multiple use mandate. The full utilization plan required high levels of federal subsidies, increased and specialized manpower, and an aggressive research program geared toward engineering technological fixes for as-yet-unknown situations. The agency developed long range plans to achieve high-level multiple use management. In the late 1950s, the agency gathered data from individual forests on potential resource utilization, management needs, and costs as a first attempt at coordinating its national- level management program. This initiative examined short- and long-term options and focused the agency’s ability to utilize forest resources as a revenue producer (USDA FS 1959). After 1960, the agency required each forest to immediately craft multiple use plans at the ranger district level. Each plan discussed needs, coordination, and how research was adapted to ready the district to meet future needs. Each district was instructed to demonstrate effective multiple use practices. National forests were reorganized into productive units that grew “more and better trees,” integrated watershed needs with uses that “involve manipulation of plant cover,” developed wildlife and recreation resources that “will be sufficient to keep abreast of ... tremendously increased demand,” and efficiently increased protection of forest resources from insects, disease, and fire (USDA FS 1960a, 1). The agency had theoretically adapted their management 284 imperative to fit the economic and social demand for multiple use (USDA FS 1959; 1960a; Hirt 1994, 193-215; Steen 2004, 308-23). Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain Front (1929-1965) Settlement patterns in Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front between 1929 and 1945 were representative of a period of economic and demographic stagnation that began in the 1920s and continued through World War II. In the early years of the Great Depression, Montana’s conservative state government sided with the Hoover administration against state-funded aid. As a result, most Montanans eagerly accepted federal New Deal funds. From 1933 to 1939 the federal government spent over $520 million in aid and loans in Montana. Through World War II, Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front became an increasingly federalized landscape (Malone et al 1991, 280-313; Wyckoff 1991). Yet, Montana did not undergo the same level of economic and demographic growth that other western states experienced. Historically, Montana existed in a boom and bust economic cycle where material wealth relied on resource extractive industries. By the 1930s, the initial settlement and resource exploitation phase was complete. Those who remained did so through a process of “adjustment and accommodation” to the realities of Montana’s difficult economic and physical geographies (Wyckoff 1991, 28). Furthermore, technological innovation increasingly substituted capital investment in 285 laborsaving machinery that replaced labor with mechanical power, thereby limiting economic opportunities for the laboring class (Wyckoff 1991). Montana also experienced a sustained period of drought that complicated dry farming settlement. The drought was unrelenting in many Montana counties east of the continental divide; the years 1931, 1934, 1936, and 1937 were particularly difficult. The drought complicated established agricultural and federal management regimes. Waves of grasshoppers – especially heavy along the Rocky Mountain Front – compounded the problems caused by the drought. Rangers and CCC workers were repeatedly tasked with lacing the range with grasshopper poison. Occasionally, farmers along the Front lost cattle to the eradication efforts; cattle and sheep ate poisoned grasshoppers along with forage (Streeter 1932; Choteau Acantha 1938, April 14; 1940, March 28; Wyckoff 1991). The population of Montana rose less than eight percent between 1930 and 1945. In comparison, the population of the United States grew over fourteen percent during the same period. Eastern counties in the state saw the greatest population loss - in some cases up to fifty percent. Counties along the Rocky Mountain Front saw corresponding population stagnation. For example, between 1930 and 1940, Pondera County lost nearly four percent of its population (USDC 1931a; 1943; Wyckoff 1991). Agricultural settlement in Montana declined by twelve percent between 1930 and 1940. Between 19345 and 1940, seventeen percent of Montana’s farms went bankrupt. Glacier County, on the northern edge of the Front, lost 26 percent of its farms between 1935 and 1940 and Pondera and Lewis and Clark counties saw declines greater than ten 286 percent. Farm size in the Front grew during the 1930s, though overall farm value dropped. Farmers who remained solvent utilized federal loans to acquire neighboring land. In Pondera, Lewis and Clark, and Teton counties, farms grew by an average of fifteen percent between 1930 and 1940 while losing 21 percent of their value. Farmers defaulted on capital improvement loans forcing multiple Rocky Mountain Front banks to default or be liquidated by the New Deal government. Both the Power Bank and the First National Bank of Choteau were liquidated due to mortgage default (Choteau Acantha 1932, 14 April; 1934, 18 January; 1934, 17 May; USDC 1942). The increased federal presence in the Rocky Mountain Front tempered the effects of the Great Depression. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) provided direct cash benefit payments to Front farmers to restrict crop-growth in an attempt at price controls. Between 1933 and 1937, the AAA injected between $4.5 and $10 million annually into the state’s agricultural economy. During the worst years of the drought the AAA instituted a federal livestock-buying program and organized deferred grazing on public and private Rocky Mountain Front rangeland. The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) provided low interest refinance loans for Montana farmers. The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) paid farmers and ranchers to utilize conservation plans that prevented soil erosion, maintained soil fertility, and promoted efficiency through technology. Lewis and Clark foresters worked closely with the SCS to conduct a rangeland grazing reconnaissance and determine the carrying capacity of public and private range. Lewis and Clark foresters utilized aerial photography to create SCS carrying capacity maps. 287 Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) laborers also worked on selected local farms in soil conservation efforts (Choteau Acantha 1936, 16 July; 1936, 15 October; 1937, 23 July; Gilles 1977, 99-112; Malone et al 1991, 296-303). Federal financial aid was also spent on modernizing the Rocky Mountain Front. Beginning in 1935, the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) began extending loans to farmer cooperative groups to build rural electrification systems – between 1935 and 1939, the number of electrified farms in Montana more than doubled. The REA organized electrification projects along the Sun River Irrigation Project settlements, in Pendroy, Farmington, Bynum, and near other Rocky Mountain Front settlements. The REA distributed funds to the Sun River Electrification Association to construct substations and infrastructure to deliver power to association stockholders (Choteau Acantha 1935, 1 August; 1936, 2 April; 1936, 22 October; 1938, 27 January; 1939, 2 February). The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), Works Progress Administration (WPA), and Public Works Administration (PWA) hired skilled and unskilled workers to construct public works projects. The PWA and WPA contributed to several Rocky Mountain Front projects including airports at Great Falls and Choteau. New Deal funds were dedicated to expanding irrigation facilities along the Sun River Project – an effort to alleviate drought conditions and modernize the region’s water storage and transport system. Between 1935 and 1940, the PWA, United States Reclamation Service, and CCC worked to extend the Project’s canal system and reservoir capacity. For example, federal laborers constructed miles of laterals, widened canals, and 288 raised the intake spillway on the Gibson Dam (Choteau Acantha 1934, 22 February; 1935, 22 August; 1937, March 11; 1938, 24 March; Malone et al 1991, 296-303). Lewis and Clark foresters worked to integrate locals and new federal and state agencies into its management plans. Rocky Mountain Front ranchers repeatedly appealed to rangers for increased and cheaper access to forest rangeland. Forest administrators tried unsuccessfully to forestall lowering grazing rates stating that a cut in fees would also cut the annual 25 percent payment to each county. Foresters hired local men for relief fire and trail work; in 1933, President Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Cooperation authorized the Teton Ranger District to hire 30 local men to repair and extend the Teton Canyon road. As the Depression deepened, Lewis and Clark foresters accepted federal funds and manpower to complete long-planned forest conservation projects. Through the 1930s, CCC camps at Ford Creek, Choteau, Augusta, and in the Little Belt Mountains were used by Lewis and Clark foresters for trail construction, timber and range rehabilitation, recreation and communications infrastructure repair, and fire protection. Spike camps were frequently located in nearly every major watershed along the Rocky Mountain Front. Foresters requested that a CCC camp be established in Teton Canyon but were ultimately denied (Choteau Acantha; 1932, 10 March; 1932, 8 September; 1933, 30 March; 1935, 17 January; USDA LCNF 2010). World War II came early to the Rocky Mountain Front - Choteau resident Harfield Rosengren was reported killed in action at Pearl Harbor - and brought with it significant economic and demographic change. The Front experienced high grain and livestock 289 yields through the war years. Montana crop yields in 1942 and 1943 were among the highest on record. Prices remained high through the early 1940s, supported by Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease policy and other wartime demands. Demand for Rocky Mountain Front agricultural commodities grew so high that farmers rapidly purchased abandoned allotments, outfitted them with federally supported improvements, and began cropping. Labor was in short supply. Front farmers called for Axis-power POWs and internees to be shipped to Montana to work on farms and extend federal conservation projects. In 1943, Teton County also brought 33 Mexican laborers to the region to work on local farms (Choteau Acantha 1942, 7 January; 1943, 29 July; Furdell 1998, 67). Montana industry also improved during the war years. Local timber operators used CCC infrastructure improvements to access timber pockets in the Teton and Dearborn canyons. Lode claims near Benchmark were re-examined and “many leases (were) filed (in Teton County) for exploring for iron ore deposits” (Choteau Acantha 1945, 19 July). Oil exploration along the Front returned in the late 1930s with companies purchasing abandoned farms and leasing fields from cash-strapped farmers. By the end of the war, oil well leases extended along the Rocky Mountain Front from Augusta northward into Alberta, Canada. Speculators in the 1930s were more of the “wildcat” variety, but by the end of the war capitalized and federally supported oil corporations controlled Rocky Mountain Front oil leases (Choteau Acantha 1938, 2 June; 1939, 25 May; 1944, 13 April; 1944, 3 November). 290 Defense spending impacted the Rocky Mountain Front, though not to the extent that other western regions experienced. Industry in Butte and Billings received some federal defense contracts, but little military manufacturing occurred in the state. In 1942, the United States Army Air Corps constructed East Base – later called Malmstrom - Air Force Base. The base served as a migration pull; the population of Great Falls increased from 29,990 in 1940 to 35,000 in 1943. Malmstrom was the primary staging point for World War II Lend-Lease airlift flights to allied Russia and the base gained importance during the Cold War (Malone et al 1991, 308-09; Furdell 1998, 63-75). Tourism also emerged as a significant industry in the Rocky Mountain Front during the period. Tourism booms in the late Depression years were attributed to a coordinated and enlarged national advertising program organized by the Montana Chamber of Commerce. Cities, counties, and organizations were encouraged to contribute money to the state advertising campaign. Rocky Mountain Front tourism promotion touted the recreational opportunities of the Lewis and Clark. Local dude rancher associations coordinated public relations excursions to Chicago, Minneapolis, and the east coast. Foresters from the Lewis and Clark coordinated sessions on the recreational opportunities of the Lewis and Clark and participated in discussions with dude ranch associations, the state, and city officials (Choteau Acantha 1938, 10 March; 1938, 7 July). Montana rode a wave of post war prosperity through the early 1950s. Industries related to timber, energy, tourism, and the federal sector expanded through the middle 1960s. However, two of Montana’s mainstay economies – agriculture and mining – 291 witnessed notable declines during the post war period. Continued federal aid to farmers, oil exploration, and an expanding interest in environmental amenities fueled moderate economic, demographic, and urban growth along the Rocky Mountain Front. Post World War II urbanization was reflected in the marginal six percent population growth Montana experienced between 1940 and 1950. During the same period, rural settlement in Montana declined by five percent as mechanization replaced farm labor and urban employment grew. The trend continued through 1960; Montana’s population grew by more than fourteen percent between 1950 and 1960 and for the first time in its history, Montana was more urban than rural. Great Falls experienced a dramatic population boom – a 41 percent increase from 1950 levels - as military funding for Malmstrom Air Force Base and the oil refining industry brought residents to the area. Population grew marginally in the Rocky Mountain Front counties and most growth was in urban areas (USDC 1943; 1952; 1961). Post war market demand drove Rocky Mountain Front agriculturalists to modernize and continue to rely on federal aid. Rocky Mountain Front farmers sought federal price supports, accepted payments in lieu of federal crop adjustment measures, and formed cooperative agricultural soil conservation agreements with state and federal agencies. Incentive payments were crucial tools in farm modernization and expansion. Throughout the 1960s Soil Conservation District supporters continued to promote the benefits of becoming “partners with Uncle Sam” (Choteau Acantha 1963, 11 July). Participation varied along the Front with changing market prices and environmental 292 conditions. Price supports kept earnings above market conditions; wool growers along the Front received, for example, an incentive payment of $43.20 for every $100 of shorn wool sold during the 1959 marketing year (Choteau Acantha 1961, 13 July; 1962, 5 July; Malone et al 1991 318-21). Selected resource-based extractive industries grew in the post-war boom. Timber demands fueled impressive growth in the heavily forested regions of western Montana. Along the Front, the timber boom was less dramatic than it was in the western portions of the state; Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to keep up with established Forest Service sustained yield quotas. Lewis and Clark lodgepole pines were shipped across the state and used as telephone and power poles. Marginal Lewis and Clark timber was actively marketed to the pulp industry (Ferguson 1946d; USDA FS 1946a; USDA FS 1946b; Meagher County News 1949, 9 November; USDA LCNF 1987b). Heavy post war demand and steadily rising prices spurred extensive oil exploration along the Front. General Petroleum drilled at Blackleaf and conducted seismographic tests within the national forest. Lewis and Clark foresters constructed access roads throughout the northern region of the Rocky Mountain Division to allow seismographic testing (Figure 4-3). In several cases, the Forest Service converted fire control and grazing trails into roads for seismographic testing. Union Oil requested permission from Lewis and Clark foresters to run a seismographic survey in the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Lewis and Clark foresters denied the proposal citing that “it would be simply opening the door to oil and gas development if the Company obtained very 293 promising results from its seismographic work” (Sieker 1955a) (Choteau Acantha 1947, 29 June; 1959, 7 May). 294 Figure 4-3: Roads created for seismographic oil exploration. Map by author (USDA LCNF nd-cccc). Tourism and amenity consumption economies grew in relevance across Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front. “After the war, Montana became an increasingly important destination for tourists, hunters, fishing enthusiasts, retirees, and residents who valued the accessibility to outdoor activities and a high quality of life” (Wyckoff 1991, 31). Tourism officials estimated that by the 1963, more than $130 million dollars was spent annually in Montana by tourists. Along the Rocky Mountain Front, tourism continued to evolve into a network of wildlife guides, packers, and dude ranchers. Both locals and forestry officials were forced to reorient themselves to this new wave of forest consumer (Choteau Acantha 1963, 23 April; 1963, 17 October). Federal employment along the Front grew through the 1960s. Federal conservation agencies expanded their bureaucratic largesse to meet the demands of a modern post war society. Highway construction brought work to the Front and greatly increased its connection with the rest of the state. Cold war military growth also impacted the Rocky Mountain Front. In 1960, the Rocky Mountain Front was selected to house multiple flights of Minutemen ballistic missiles (Figure 4-4). Air Force personnel touted the positive economic impact of housing the missiles on the Front. Malmstrom Air Force Base was expanded to house the missile wing (Choteau Acantha 1960, 6 October; 1961, 27 April; Wyckoff 1991, 31). Federal water reclamation engineers continued environmental control efforts along the Front. Droughts continued to affect the region – 1959 and 1960 were especially difficult years. Lewis and Clark foresters coordinated with scientists from the Soil 295 Conservation Service to conduct cooperative snow and water surveys of the major Front watersheds in an effort to create a predictive profile for the upcoming agricultural season (Choteau Acantha 1960, 28 July; 1961, 12 January; Malone et al 1991, 318-21). Federal reclamation work also revolved around flood control. Flooding in 1943, 1948, and 1953 prompted Army Corps engineers to recommend construction of a flood control project outside of Choteau. The Bureau of Reclamation used the 1953 flood to revive a plan to construct a dam in the North Fork of the Sun River valley inside of the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Widespread opposition by wilderness activists, livestock interests, Montana Fish and Game, Lewis and Clark foresters, and the Montana Wildlife federation delayed the decision on the dam. Floods in 1964 caused approximately $4.35 million dollars in damage in the Front and “gutted” both Teton and 296 Figure 4-4: Minutemen Ballistic Missile Sites, Rocky Mountain Front (Choteau Acantha 1960, 10 November). Deep Creek canyons (Choteau Acantha 1964, 18 June). In response, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation planned an extensive flood control project on the Teton River and revived discussion of an expanded reservoir in the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Choteau Acantha 1943, 17 July; 1948, 10 June; 1948, 24 June; 1953, 13 August; 1965, 11 February; 1965, 13 May). Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark National Forest (1929-1965) The Lewis and Clark National Forest underwent significant landscape modification during the middle decades of the 20 th century. Increased federal funding and resource demand, modernization, and public access required Lewis and Clark foresters to recalibrate local management plans to meet a dynamic national forest imperative that utilized science, technology, and authority to craft standardized planning templates. Fire remained an ever-present landscape feature in the Lewis and Clark; foresters radically transformed the region’s infrastructure to meet national fire protection plans. Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to meet national timber demands for maximized production. Livestock and wildlife interests continued to clash over forage and winter range. Timber and fire control roads made the formidable topography of the Lewis and Clark more easily accessible to the public for recreation. There was also a reinvigorated interest in petroleum exploration and dam creation in the Lewis and Clark. At the same time, the wilderness movement grew steadily during the middle decades of the 20 th century and wilderness activists sought ways to expand roadless landscapes around the Lewis and 297 Clark’s primitive areas. Lewis and Clark foresters expanded their imperative to meet these demands and crafted landscapes they believed suitable to control the natural environment, meet public demand, and fit within agency standards. Forest Boundaries and Administration (1929-1965) Significant boundary changes shaped the size and makeup of the Lewis and Clark National Forest after 1929, reflecting larger agency mandates to consolidate and centralize forest management. In 1932 the Lewis and Clark National Forest was merged with the Jefferson National Forest. The former Lewis and Clark (and the focus of this study) was renamed the Rocky Mountain Division - the former Jefferson National Forest was renamed the Jefferson Division (Figure 4-5). The southern tip of the Lewis and Clark was also transferred to the Helena National Forest. Ranger districts in the Rocky Mountain Division were consolidated into the Teton and Sun River districts. Ranger District headquarters for the Teton was placed in Choteau. Hannan Gulch served as district headquarters for the Sun River District until 1940, when it was transferred to Augusta. Headquarters for the Lewis and Clark was moved from Choteau to Great Falls (Figure 4-6) (Wolff 1931; Fickes 1937b; USDA FS 1935; USDA LCNF nd-bb; 1966). Internal boundaries were also adjusted in reaction to changing definitions of use. In 1929, United States Forest Service regulation L-20 allowed foresters to create primitive areas within Forest Service lands. Between 1931 and 1939, over 950,000 acres in the Lewis and Clark and bordering Flathead National Forest were designated into three primitive areas. By the late 1930s, internal Forest Service debates over the effectiveness 298 of L-20 regulation and an ongoing funding battle with the Department of the Interior pushed the agency to strictly define allowed primitive area uses. In 1940, following the death of Forest Service employee and wilderness recreation advocate Robert Marshall, the boundaries of the three primitive areas were consolidated and renamed the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Gilligan 1953; McArdle 1957; Shaw 1964). Lewis and Clark foresters continued to produce detailed maps and surveys of forest and regional resources. In the early years of the Great Depression, the agency used re-survey as a tool to bring cutover private land under federal control. New Deal funding provided opportunities for Lewis and Clark foresters to explore new forms of technology. 299 Figure 4-5: Lewis and Clark National Forest Consolidation, 1932. Map by author. Beginning in 1936, foresters experimented with aerial mapping along the South Fork Primitive Area in the Flathead National Forest and on the Sun River Primitive Area in the Lewis and Clark. “Reliable drainage map(s)” were created of the area for the first time (USDA R1 1936h). Photographs were taken from low altitude flights and location 300 Figure 4-6: Ranger Districts, 1932. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1930b). checked by using set triangulation stations. Aerial mapping on the Lewis and Clark continued through the late 1930s. Maps created during this period were frequently shared with other federal agencies such as the AAA and SCS. Following World War II, the use of aerial mapping expanded as wartime information technology was utilized in land management. Lewis and Clark foresters regularly utilized aerial photography through the 1950s and 1960s to assess flood damage, timber stands, and vegetation status (USDA R1 1936b; Sawhill 1939; Ferguson 1946b; Baker et al 1993). Lewis and Clark National Forest managers weathered the economic storm of the Great Depression in two critical ways – both attempted to bring clarity, simplification, and order to complex forest landscapes. Following the 1910 Big Burn, foresters participated in planning infrastructure systems able to support their management imperative. Yet, lack of adequate funding and manpower – especially prevalent in forests lacking large bodies of merchantable timber – had prohibited Lewis and Clark foresters from gaining a satisfactory measure of environmental control. New Deal funding changed that; Lewis and Clark foresters eagerly accepted budgetary and manpower infusions and set about implementing long planned road, trail, communications, fire control, and administrative site improvements. In doing so, Lewis and Clark foresters enforced their management authority – their imperative – in the public eye. Demands on forest reserves increased following World War II and Lewis and Clark foresters were forced to find new funding methods to continue infrastructure development. Foresters struggled to create infrastructure improvements that met the 301 needs of multiple interest groups which often competed for the same resources. Local agency officials attempted to satisfy everyone by expanding their management imperative to encompass the Forest Service’s original goals, meet the economic and resource needs of Cold War America, and accommodate increased interest in non-extractive national forest uses. To do so, the agency participated in a negotiation process that translated popular visions of the forest into a discourse that fit within their imperative. Intensive management – deemed necessary by the agency to meet its expanding imperative – brought more of the forest under the gaze of scientific authority and public scrutiny. Backcountry fire control was a primary objective of Forest Service infrastructure improvement. Previous fire control plans had failed to eliminate all destructive wildfires from Forest Service landscapes. Backcountry fires threatened the nation’s dwindling timber supply, degraded watersheds, wildlife and grazing pasturages, and negatively impacted local tourism efforts. Fires were particularly bad in 1929; in Region 1, fires ran across the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests and into Glacier National Park. Fires along the Dearborn River in the Lewis and Clark were complicated by the presence of the Northern Pacific Railroad private land grant checkerboard (USDA FS 1930d; USDA LCNF 1930a; 1930d; 1932b; Lockhart 1930a). As a result of the 1929 fires, Forest Service personnel considered multiple fire control policies including let-burn and let-go scenarios for backcountry fires. Though their management imperative dictated that fires should be controlled to conserve timber, watershed, and grazing resources, agency officials worried about the cost-effectiveness of 302 backcountry fire control. Many backcountry timber pockets were unreachable – and therefore unmarketable by current technological standards – to the timber industry. The cost to control fires in the backcountry seemed insurmountable. Yet, through the 1930s the Forest Service began to implement a policy of total fire control in all national forest areas. Foresters argued that the national forest imperative dictated that there was no such thing as low value land; land that currently could not be harvested could someday, through technological advancement, be integrated into federal forest conservation and the national resource economy. By denying let-burn alternatives, the agency committed to an infrastructure overhaul that greatly exceeded its manpower and financial reality. At the heart of the total control mandate was the ability of agency crews to identify and attack fires quickly and efficiently. Following the difficult fire years of 1931 and 1934, the Forest Service augmented its total control policy; Forest Service fire policy stipulated that all wildfires should be suppressed by 10 A.M. of the morning after they were spotted. To meet this lofty goal, the Forest Service turned to federal New Deal funding and relief manpower, and connected an expanded system of roads, trails, telephone lines, lookouts, airfields, and fire caches to large pools of money, planned patrols, and an army of readily available fire crews (Pyne 1997, 260-94). Fire control plans were developed for both ranger districts in the Rocky Mountain Division. Lewis and Clark foresters based their plans on Region 1 fire studies conducted at the Northern Rocky Mountain Experiment Station. Fire studies identified road 303 building, properly spaced lookout construction, increased communication networks, and access to heavy machinery and efficient resupply in order to “keep ... burned area within limits that will insure a satisfactory sustained yield of forest products” (USDA R1 1937b). Following the 1929 fire season, Region 1 foresters centralized fire supply by creating the Remount Depot northwest of Missoula. The Remount Depot contained heavy machinery and plow units utilized by fire crews to entrench firebreaks. Rations were packed for fire crews and stored at Remount for distribution (Choteau Acantha 1932, 14 April; Hornby 1936; Fickes 1944). Forest fire plans also relied heavily on fire science conducted under Harry T. Gisborne at the Northern Rocky Mountain research station. Under Gisborne, the Forest Service conducted numerous studies on timber flammability, moisture content, humidity, and ground cover. Gisborne’s research in the early 1930s resulted in the Forest Service establishing a Fire Danger Meter that integrated numerous types of data – wind direction and velocity, moisture content, number of people in the area, land clearing and brush burning, predicted lighting storms - into a single number. Foresters could then modify fire plans to hedge against potential blow-ups. Gisborne’s Fire Danger Meter allowed foresters to post danger notices to the public in terms that they could understand; a fire danger rating of one indicated no appreciable danger while a rating of six meant that there was extreme fire danger in the region. By 1935, Gisborne’s Fire Danger Meter became a key element in the Forest Service’s adoption of the 10 A.M. policy. Weather stations and “inflammability stations” were placed throughout Region 1. In the Lewis and 304 Clark, the Gates Park Ranger Station was used to test Gisborne’s rating system (Hornby 1936; Koch 1936b; Choteau Acantha 1936, 21 May; 1937, 17 June; Hardy 1983). Standardization in planning and construction increased throughout the 1930s. The agency began a two-stage infrastructure prioritization process. First, forests that had the greatest need were identified and provided with extra funds. Decisions were then made on a forest level as to the level of necessary infrastructure development. Roads were classified into two classes; forest highways were roads that joined the forest to the public road system and served as the forest’s main arterial connection. Forest development roads were managerial infrastructure “necessary for the use, development, and protection of national-forest resources.” Trails were classified as primary, secondary, and ways trails and meant to “serve chiefly protection needs” (USDA FS 1930d, 49). Following a planning period, Lewis and Clark foresters decided that road development was necessary in the Rocky Mountain Front / prairie interface and would be extended only into the backcountry when funds and technology allowed development. In the backcountry, a system of trail infrastructure was designed for fire control (USDA FS 1935a; USDA LCNF 1940; Choteau Acantha 1941, 2 January). Financial cutbacks early in the Great Depression hampered road and trail creation in the Lewis and Clark. In 1930, Congress appropriated millions of dollars to the Forest Service for development of forest highways and development roads, but little of that saw its way to the forests of north-central Montana. In 1931, fires in the Teton Ranger District along Waldron Creek – an area that had previously burned in 1917 - claimed the lives of 305 five local relief firefighters and the cost of fighting the fire exceeded the District’s entire annual budget. Worried that continued drought would exacerbate fire damage, Congress appropriated $650,000 in relief expenditures to Region 1 which were “distributed chiefly in improving efficiency of fire control” (Choteau Acantha 1932, 15 September). Despite supplementary funds, road and trail building in the Lewis and Clark fell far behind schedule and total control seemed increasingly elusive; only 42 of the 65 miles of planned trail construction had been completed by the end of 1932. Planned construction of the Benchmark Road connecting the southeastern border of the forest to the South Fork of the Sun River was delayed due to financial and boundary conflicts with a proposed, but as yet undesignated, Sun River Primitive Area. Roads that connected Benchmark to Gates Park and the North Fork of the Sun River were also proposed, planned, and abandoned (USDA FS 1930d, 49-52; 1931b; Choteau Acantha 1932, 10 March; 1932 24 November; 1933, 4 May; Willey 1932b; Hammatt 1933). Forest fire plans evolved nearly every year throughout the 1930s and 1940s though the main aspects of infrastructure improvement remained consistent. Trails, lookouts, communications networks, fire danger measurement systems, and airplane landing strips were crucial to backcountry control. Lewis and Clark foresters routinely conducted seen area studies from improved and unimproved lookout points and practiced moving fire fighters along trail combinations in order to find the most efficient routes. Fire dispatchers were centralized at Choteau, Lubec, Augusta, and Gates Park and coordinated information was gathered at regional lookouts in order to better locate men 306 and materials throughout the forest. Forest plans also identified local individuals who could be counted on for fire-work, stores where goods and materials could be obtained without question, and local truck and pack stock owners that could be contracted for goods and manpower transport (Hornby 1936; USDA LCNF 1938a; 1938c; Choteau Acantha 1938, 5 May; 1939, 13 July; USDA R1 1940d; Ferguson 1941b). True infrastructure transformation came once Lewis and Clark foresters were able to allocate federal relief funds and manpower. Emergency Conservation Corps workers were stationed in Teton and Ford Creek canyons; relief workers cleared timber and constructed the initial roads up Teton Canyon and into the Benchmark region. Spike camps originating at Ford Creek were distributed at Benchmark and along Beaver Creek to construct trails, repair forest telephone lines, and remove potential fire hazards. By the end of 1933, “a good road to the Bench Mark ranger station” existed where “formerly there was little more than a trail” (Choteau Acantha 1933, 28 September). Eager to utilize as much relief money as possible to further infrastructure improvements, Region 1 foresters directed that all forest supervisors should give their strongest priority to construction work that utilized Emergency Conservation funds as “it is probable that many years will elapse before we again will be in a position to undertake any material new construction program” (Stockdale 1933b). Fearful that federal money might dry up, foresters pushed Emergency Conservation workers to rapidly complete roads. The result was roads that did not live up to Forest Service specifications. In the years to come, these 307 roads had to be redesigned and reconstructed, sometimes at great cost (Choteau Acantha 1933, 30 March; 1933, 27 April; Stockdale 1933b; 1933c; 1933d). Lewis and Clark foresters focused federal funds and labor - increasingly from the Civilian Conservation Corps – into completing previously designed fire management plans, thereby expanding their reliance on federal spending to complete infrastructure improvements. In 1934, fires raged along the Teton near McGuirk’s Mill and along Headquarters Creek. CCC crews were used to fight the blaze – a crown fire that burned over 300 acres of accessible and marketable timber. Assistant Lewis and Clark Supervisor Adoplh Weholt was nearly killed in the action when he was hit by a falling tree. In response, regional forester Evan Kelley demanded that immediate effort be given to completing landing fields, lookout towers, patrol points, telephone lines, and administrative pasturages – all included in the region’s fire control plan. Other non-fire related improvement tasks were set aside. As long as federal funds and manpower were available, foresters were to use them to implement their total control fire management plan. Trail systems deep into the Lewis and Clark backcountry that had long been considered too costly to engineer were rapidly completed. Conservation Corps crews extended trails out of the Teton Canyon, through the Sun River Canyon, to numerous fire lookouts, and ultimately along the Continental Divide at the Chinese Wall (Figure 4-7, Appendix F) (Choteau Acantha 1934, 9 August; 1934, 6 September; 1936, 19 March; 1938, 23 August; 1941, 8 May; Kelley 1934; USDA FS 1938b; USDA LNCF 1938e). 308 Through heavy utilization of CCC labor, Lewis and Clark foresters were nearly able to complete the road and trail system dictated in their fire management plan. With money and labor in ready supply, foresters re-evaluated the road and trail infrastructure 309 Figure 4-7: Transportation Infrastructure, 1938. Map by author (USDA FS 1938a). system and created a list of infrastructure needs. Hastily constructed roads such as those along Benchmark were re-engineered and improved. New roads were constructed connecting the Willow Creek Ranger Station to the Gibson Dam, Hannan Gulch, and the Sun River at Beaver Creek, from the main communications depot at the Ear Mountain Ranger Station to the Great Northern Railway terminal outside of Choteau, and from the Hannan Gulch bridge to just north of the Gibson Reservoir. Road construction for purposes other than fire protection was also undertaken; foresters realized the potential of the Benchmark, Sun River, and Teton Canyon roads for allowing recreation access and timber development (Choteau Acantha 1932, 15 September; 1935, 17 January; 1937, 1 July; Fickes 1937a; Kelley 1937d; Thieme 1937). Expansion of the communications network coincided with road and trail development. The reality of extending telephone wire in a forested and fire-prone region demanded high levels of both money and labor. Through the 1930s, CCC laborers annually repaired, modernized, and in some cases extended the telephone system. Despite the difficulties and high cost, the Lewis and Clark had completed a fairly extensive telephone communications network by 1938 (Figure 4-8). Telephone lines connected the forest headquarters at Great Falls to key transfer points and then were strung into the backcountry. As early as 1932, telephone lines extended over the Continental Divide and connected Lewis and Clark fire-watchers with those in the Flathead National Forest. The Ear Mountain Ranger Station remained a critical communications juncture, as was the Bureau of Reclamation and Forest Service line at Gibson Dam. Telephone lines were 310 strung up steep and often treacherous hillsides to connect fire lookout towers to the network. Telephone work crews often performed multiple duties – when not stringing 311 Figure 4-8: Telephone network, 1938. Map by author (USDA FS 1938a). line, crews doubled as a fire protection force, constructed and cleared trails, and assisted with administration site and landing field improvements (Choteau Acantha 1935, 13 June; 1936, 15 October; 1941, 18 December; Apgar 1936; Fickes 1937a; USDA LCNF 1938d; 1941a; Ferguson 1941f). The 1936 fire year was a difficult one for Lewis and Clark foresters. Drought conditions prompted foresters to post strict no smoking and ax, shovel, and bucket rules throughout the forest. Foresters requested the Choteau, Great Falls, and Augusta movie theaters to screen Forest Service educational films on the damage of human caused forest fire. Conservation Corps crews were pulled off of trail and telephone line duty and stationed at key spots where fire danger and public recreation coexisted. Despite these precautions, fires raged throughout the Lewis and Clark – in Benchmark, near the northern border with Glacier National Park, on Cow Creek, in the Teton, and by Ear Mountain. Some of the fires were caused by dry lightning strikes. Several fires were the result of careless tourists, hunters, and recreationists. Fire fighters used radio communication to stretch overworked fire detection and observation crews. Conservation Corps crews from all over the region were employed in fighting fire on the Lewis and Clark (Choteau Acantha 1936, 16 July; 1936, 23 July; 1936, 6 August; 1936, 3 September; 1936, 15 October; USDA R1 1937c; 1937d). Lewis and Clark foresters were well aware of the significant cost and manpower commitment associated with extending and maintaining telephone lines. Federal funding tied to total fire control encouraged the agency to experiment with new technologies. 312 Earlier experiments with utilizing short wave radios on fire lines revealed that radios worked well when receiving messages, but that the rugged topography and densely wooded environment of the backcountry forest interfered “very materially with transmission” (USDA FS 1931b, 35). Foresters subsequently examined the usability of a combination radio and telegraph transmission set and voice messages were received at a central station and answers transmitted via Morse code. Successful field tests in the 1936 fire season resulted in the incorporation of short wave radios into the 1937 Lewis and Clark fire plan. The fire plan called for general use of portable and semi-portable radiotelephones for maintaining constant communications with forest headquarters in Great Falls. Seven portable radio kits – some weighing up to 150 pounds – were located at Gates Park and Lubec ranger stations and were designated for field use. A permanent receiver was located at Choteau and contact with Great Falls was then made through telephone communication. Observers scouted fires from the air and communicated position and strategy to a fire boss on the ground (Apgar 1936; USDA R1 1936j; 1936k; 1936l; Choteau Acantha 1937, 3 June; 1937, 17 June; 1937, 1 July; USDA LCNF 1937a; Missoula Sentinel 1942, 8 May). Pursuit of total fire control required an expansion and reorganization of administrative sites in the Lewis and Clark. Backcountry intermediate administrative sites were constructed with federal funds and labor to facilitate summertime and fire-season management (Figure 4-9, Appendix G). Backcountry intermediate stations also served as key nodes for wildlife, watershed, and wilderness recreation patrols. Intermediate 313 administration sites constructed using emergency government funds included ranger stations at Welcome Creek, Indian Point, Cabin Creek, and Deep Creek. Intermediate 314 Figure 4-9: Administrative Sites, 1938. Map by author (USDA FS 1938a). stations were also subject to a system of prioritization; stations closest to the Rocky Mountain Front / prairie interface and to population centers were improved. New cabins, bunkhouses, and granaries were built at Gates Park and Pretty Prairie ranger stations. As a result, the Lakeside/Riverside Ranger Station was discontinued. Also, the expanded use of the forest by recreation visitors pushed Lewis and Clark foresters to modify their public image through administrative site overhauls. The Elk Creek, Ear Mountain, Blackleaf, and Lubec stations all received new sheds, offices, yards, and driveways. Foresters discussed discontinuing use of the Willow Creek Ranger Station due to general disrepair. However, Willow Creek Ranger Station was spared for fire control; a CCC spike camp was moved to Willow Creek to improve fencing and pasturage fit to serve as winter horse pasture for both the Rocky Mountain and Jefferson division (USDA LCNF nd-j; 1937c; 1938b; 1990b; USDI NPS nd-a; Harris 1930; Lockhart 1930h; Choteau Acantha 1933, 14 September; Fickes 1937a; Kennedy 1938; Ferguson 1941g; Wiles 1941). As they did with other projects, Lewis and Clark foresters used federal funds and labor to reorganize their administrative infrastructure. The consolidation of the Jefferson and Lewis and Clark forests did more than just double the effective size of the Lewis and Clark – it centralized both management staffs in one office in Great Falls. An inspection in 1937 revealed that Lewis and Clark employees were subject to deplorable working conditions; office space was “entirely lacking” and all work “must be accomplished under the utmost difficulty from the standpoint of interruption and interference” (Fickes 315 1937b). Funds were immediately allocated to move Lewis and Clark headquarters into remodeled offices within the Great Falls federal building. A similar situation occurred in Augusta where rangers had been renting limited space. Continuing the trend of more centralized control, permanent administrative facilities were moved closer to population centers and ultimately out of the forest altogether. In 1940, rangers used federal funds to purchase a plot of land fronting Broadway and Manix streets in Augusta and utilized CCC labor to build the new headquarters for the Sun River Ranger District. As a result, Hannan Gulch Ranger Station was downgraded in status to a backcountry intermediary station (UDSA LCNF nd-bb; USDI NPS nd-b; Fickes 1937a; 1937b; Great Falls Tribune 1938, 30 March; Ferguson 1939d; 1939e; USDA R1 1939b; 1940c). Administrative site improvement and construction was simplified by a regional standardization construction plan that reflected the increased federalization of national forest landscapes. Following the lead of the CCC and their prefabricated camps, agency engineers crafted blueprints that standardized the look, construction materials, and functionality of ranger station improvements. Station construction plans allowed backcountry administrative sites to be constructed using local, on-site materials. Stations that served a greater public function had to use milled lumber – also sourced and milled locally – thereby serving both an administrative and public relations purpose (USDA R1 1935b; 1936a; 1939b). Fire lookout houses were critical midway points between administrative sites and the backcountry landscape. Lookouts also served as the key to the Forest Service’s early 316 detection total fire control plan. Early in the Great Depression, Lewis and Clark foresters identified lookout patrol points that could be improved. Limited finances, however, prohibited construction. With the first emergency relief funds, lookout construction was authorized (Figure 4-10, Appendix G). Improved and standardized lookouts were constructed at Half Dome, Beartop, Deadman’s Hill, and Mount Wright. Conservation Corps crews connected the lookouts to the forest infrastructure system through trails and tree-line telephone cable. The public recognized how important lookouts were to early fire detection; following the difficult fire years in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Teton County Planning Board pushed Lewis and Clark foresters to construct two more lookouts in the Teton watershed. The agency consented to constructing lookouts on Lonesome Ridge and Family Peak but failed to complete them due to World War II funding and manpower withdrawals (Choteau Acantha 1932, 29 September; 1932, 24 November; 1933, 14 September; 1936, 19 March; 1940, 13 June; 1940, 12 December; 1941, 8 May; 1941, 18 December; Cramer 1940; Ferguson 1941d; USDA LCNF 1992b; 1997b). Airfield development was the final necessary infrastructure improvement to implement a fire policy of total control. Airplanes were as yet untested as a fire spotting and control technology. Instead, foresters saw great opportunity in utilizing aerial transport for fire reinforcements and for resupply. In 1930, the regional agency headquarters issued directives to Lewis and Clark foresters on airstrip development; airstrips should be located in regions topographically suited to facilitating loaded 317 transport planes and that were “immediately tributary to or central to a large, remote territory, subject to lightning fires” (Stockdale 1930a). Forest Supervisors were asked to develop a list of potential sites and were promised funding for sites that met development 318 Figure 4-10: Fire Control Lookout System, 1938. Map by author (USDA FS 1938a). standards and could be developed rapidly. Lewis and Clark foresters designed plans to construct airfields at Pretty Prairie, Gates Park, and Cabin Creek; these sites would tie into strips at Gooseberry and Spotted Bear in the Flathead National Forest, thereby creating an effective air control network for the backcountry region along the Continental Divide. Despite initial optimism, cost overruns and a significant lack of suitable manpower limited effective work on the strips. Funding cuts in 1932 made Lewis and Clark foresters face the possibility that landing field development could not be completed in their region (Wehold 1931; Choteau Acantha 1932, 10 March; 1933, 28 September; 1933, 5 October; Jefferson 1932b; Smith 1933; Willey 1933c). Lewis and Clark administrators were determined to continue work. They stationed a permanent firefighter at Gates Park, moved a plow to the station, and instructed him to level and clear the Gates Park field when he wasn’t on fire duty; his wife was responsible for manning the telephone and alerting him to fires in the area. In lieu of standardized Forest Service airstrip plans, Lewis and Clark foresters turned to local aviators to provide information on proper strip characteristics and other suitable locations. Small amounts of local relief funding became available and foresters hastened to put it to work on the Gates Park airstrip project; they even contemplated spending a portion of the money on floating heavy machinery across Gibson Reservoir to speed the project along. By the end of the season, however, little actual work at Gates Park had been completed and foresters began to realize that total control projects in forests like the Lewis and Clark – those that were 319 not heavy timber producers - would not be completed unless a new stream of funding was secured (Jefferson 1932b; Stockdale 1932; Willey 1932a; 1932c; 1932e). Funding became available in 1933 through NIRA and other New Deal agencies. Lewis and Clark administrators rushed to complete the airstrips at Gates Park and Pretty Prairie. A complementary strip outside of Augusta was also begun (Figure 4-11). Foresters stationed CCC spike camps near each of the fields; laborers worked on plowing, clearing, and leveling the field when they were not busy fighting fires. Lewis and Clark foresters continued to utilize local knowledge to effectively modify the airstrips; both Gates Park and Pretty Prairie strips were extended due to local instruction. In 1935 the first airplane landed at Gates Park and by 1937 Pretty Prairie was ready (Choteau Acantha 1933, 14 September; 1934, 6 September; 1935, 25 July; Morrison 1933; Taylor 1933; Willey 1933c; Martin 1936a; Fickes 1937a; Kennedy 1938). Continued backcountry fires and technological experimentation encouraged the Forest Service to expand airfield infrastructure in the later years of the Great Depression. By the mid 1930s, airplanes were used with greater frequency to resupply ground fire troops. Fearful that increased use could result in crashes, Lewis and Clark superintendent W.B. Willey directed district rangers to identify and submit reports on possible emergency landing fields in or outside of the forest boundaries. Potential fields were identified and surveyed in Augusta, Conrad, Browning, Glacier Park, Round Park, Wrong Creek, Circle Creek, and on the Lower Badger. Work began on emergency fields at Augusta and Circle Creek but lagged due to changing airplane technology and 320 regulations. Region 1 foresters continued testing the utility of short wave airplane communication and began using aerial photography to update fire protection plans and inflammability ratings. Regional foresters also conducted bombardment experiments by 321 Figure 4-11: Forest Service Airfields, 1938. Map by author (USDA FS 1938a). utilizing aircraft to drop water on fires; these experiments were ultimately abandoned, as water-laden planes were unwieldy and ineffective. By 1940, a smokejumper training facility was developed at Region 1 headquarters in Missoula, MT (USDA R1 1936i; 1980b; Koch 1936b; Martin 1936a; Willey 1936; Preston 1937; Wiles 1937a; Duvendack 1938; Missoula Sentinel 1941, 4 January). Managing airfields created difficulties for Lewis and Clark foresters. Though they relied on information from local pilots in improving their fields, local use of the airfields prompted a small level of conflict – especially at Pretty Prairie. Pretty Prairie airfield was located inside of the Sun River Primitive Area and therefore restricted to administrative use. Trespass was a common and largely unpenalized occurrence at Pretty Prairie. Motorists claimed that allowing airplanes to land inside the Primitive Area and not allowing automobile recreation amounted to “unfair discrimination” (Hammatt 1932). Foresters agreed to prosecute trespass at Pretty Prairie in order to keep a uniform non- mechanized travel doctrine in place. Occasional trespass at Pretty Prairie continued and was used to test the legality of the non-mechanized travel policy (Ferguson 1940a). Airfield maintenance proved challenging for Lewis and Clark foresters; the harsh physical geography of the Rocky Mountain Front and dynamic technological changes forced the agency to make costly annual improvements. Airstrips were developed in the few available open fields in the Lewis and Clark – pastures that served as critical elk wintering habitat. Field development did not deter elk from wintering on the airfields; as the snow melted, the elk turned up the fields making them unusable. Elk-proof fencing 322 was extended around the fields and corrugated iron culverts placed at entrances to deter the elk. Rodents at Gates Park were also a problem; foresters instituted a regular poisoning program to control prairie dogs at the field. Also, difficult weather conditions on hot summer days at Gates Park made afternoon landings at the field “more adverse than in nearly any other landing field in the Region” (Lindh 1943). Foresters responded by clearing 800 feet of timber from the south end to allow aircraft enough room to gain altitude. The rolling topography was a problem, especially once the Forest Service began utilizing heavier cargo planes for resupply. Heavy equipment needed to level the airfields was assembled at the Belt Creek CCC camp and transported to the fields. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Lewis and Clark foresters had to repeatedly detail work crews to drag and re-roll strips – work had to occur in sometimes brief windows between winter and the fire season and prompted foresters to hire local hands to facilitate quick field preparation (Kennedy 1939; Gaffney 1940a; 1940b; Ferguson 1940b; 1940c; 1940d; 1941b; 1941e; 1941f; 1941h; Howard 1941; Thieme 1941; 1942; Smith 1954a). The 1940 fire season was one of the worst on record in the Lewis and Clark. Two years of drought had dried the forest to tinder and foresters were quick to issue no smoking, shovel, ax, and pail regulations throughout the forest. By mid-July, fires raged at several points on the forest; by the end of August, fires had spread throughout the Flathead backcountry and across the Continental Divide to the Badger, Teton, and Sun River watersheds. Lewis and Clark foresters fought the fires with CCC enrollees from Belt Creek, agency personnel, and local volunteers and “flunkies” (Choteau Acantha 323 1940, 25 July). As many as 800 men were used to contain the Hungry Man fire west of Dupuyer. At the time, the lightning caused Hungry Man fire was described as “probably the worst in the history of the Lewis and Clark National Forest” (Choteau Acantha 1940, 29 August). A massive man-made fire on the Teton watershed followed the Hungry Man; crews coming from mop-up duty on the Hungry Man were immediately detailed to the Teton. Though stretched thin, administrators of the Lewis and Clark fire plan were able to meet the crisis thorough application of federal funds and manpower (Choteau Acantha 1940, 4 July; 1940 5 September; USDA LCNF 1962c). World War II took away the means to fight fire on a total control basis, though it did nothing to eliminate the goals of total fire control. In 1942, Congress made a series of special appropriations to intensify fire protection in critical areas – the Lewis and Clark was not recognized as critical. The modest infrastructure improvement funds that were available came only as a result of connecting the agency’s lookout system to a part of the Army’s national air-raid system. Lewis and Clark foresters had relied upon CCC men for fire patrols; as enrollees began to leave the region – and Region 1 employees vacated their positions for military and other wartime posts - foresters struggled to find local citizens to continue their backcountry lookout surveillance system. Lewis and Clark foresters hired local underage men and women to man lookouts, cook in fire camps, man phone lines, and serve as emergency truck drivers. Men deemed unfit for military service and conscientious objectors were used to patch together the rapidly deteriorating telephone communications system and keep the airfields open. Conscientious objectors 324 formed the core of Region 1’s smokejumper corps during the War years. Airfields fell into various states of disrepair during the war; by 1944, both Gates Park and Pretty Prairie were nearly unsuitable for loaded landing. Little or no work was done on administration sites and recreation areas. Agency officials utilized German internees to construct bridges on the Teton (Ferguson 1942a; 1944; Stephenson 1942; USDA FS 1942; Thieme 1944; USDA R1 1943; 1944a; 1980b; Choteau Acantha 1943, 25 November; 1944, 13 July; USDA LCNF 1945a; 1945b; Pyne 1997, 260-94). Fire management continued to shift towards greater centralized control during the war years. The agency had gained experience in the logistical aspects of trans-boundary firefighting in the devastating 1940 fires and began to explore options that reduced manpower, but provided a potentially increased level of fire control. By the early 1940s, Region 1 foresters were beginning to view fire control from a trans-boundary perspective. Airstrips allowed for men and supplies to be moved rapidly across formidable natural boundaries. Lookouts in the backcountry were connected across forest boundaries and routinely reported fires in neighboring forests. In 1941, a smokejumper crew of eight men was stationed at Big Prairie Ranger Station in the Flathead National Forest; they were tasked with jumping into all backcountry fires in the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests. By 1945, the smokejumper corps were an integral part of Region 1’s fire management plans, significantly reducing the number of ground troops needed to fight backcountry fire. Jumpers were stationed at nearly every airstrip in Region 1 and when 325 not jumping, were required to work on much needed infrastructure repair (Choteau Acantha 1940, 25 July; 1940, 22 August; 1941, 22 May; Smith 1954b; USDA R1 1980b). By the mid 1940s, the agency was convinced of the utility of fighting fire from the air. The Lewis and Clark was selected to “give the air idea a test” and in 1945 reduced the amount of manpower relegated to manning lookouts and fire patrols (Choteau Acantha 1945, 10 May). Instead, the Johnson Flying Service out of Missoula patrolled the region; if smoke was seen pilots used short wave radio to communicate with the nearest airstrip. Smokejumpers were then used to attempt containment. If the fire wasn’t contained, the ground troops and heavy machinery were brought in. The patrol area – known in the agency as the Continental Unit - extended across nearly two million acres of national forest backcountry (Figure 4-12). Eventually, the Continental Unit included multiple Lewis and Clark, Flathead, Lolo, and Helena national forest administrative sites, lookouts, and airstrips brought into a massive trans-boundary communications network geared to efficient and rapid conveyance of forest fire information. Weather data and fire ratings were crucial to the Continental Unit; weather data were collected at Benchmark, Steamboat, and Beartop lookouts and consolidated with readings in other locations in the Unit. Data were centralized in Missoula and broadcast across the region on Forest Service radio; every two hours Lewis and Clark foresters were expected to tune in, listen to the reports, and formulate a benchmark for air and the increasingly limited ground patrol (USDA LCNF nd-d; 1948b; Choteau Acantha 1945, 26 July; Ferguson 1946a; USDC Weather Bureau 1949; USDA R1 1949c; 1980b; McKay 1994). 326 Foresters faced a funding crisis at the end of World War II. The agency predicted that forest landscapes could see increased demands from recreation, timber, and wilderness users; all were potential fire hazards. Increased roads and trails, designated 327 Figure 4-12: The Continental Unit. Map by author (USDA R1 1980b; McKay 1994). campgrounds, and updated communications systems were needed. In the Lewis and Clark many roads, campgrounds, and administrative facilities constructed by CCC enrollees in the 1930s had fallen into disrepair. To rejuvenate its infrastructure, meet its management imperative, and maintain its status as a control-orientated conservation agency, the Forest Service leveraged Cold War fears to obtain funds from the Department of Defense, the Office of Civil Defense, and Congress. Forest fire management co-opted terminology and techniques developed in the Cold War; in both fire fighting and Cold War geopolitics, containment was now the goal. And the Forest Service played a role in showcasing the United States’ economic superiority over their Cold War enemies; timber extraction from Forest Service lands annually set new records in the post war period (Hirt 1994; Pyne 1997, 260-94). The agency was quick to demand budgetary increases to expand their road network. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, Congress passed repeated acts encouraging road building on undeveloped public lands – especially those with harvestable timber bodies. Region 1 foresters were happy to begin road work; “eventually,” said Region 1 Assistant Regional Forester J.K. Vessey, “there must be a road within a short distance of every tree” (Vessey 1951). Between 1945 and 1960, approximately 65,000 miles of national forest roads were carved into the backcountry; more than half of these roads were timber access roads. Trails offered little or no financial benefit and did not fit into an increasingly mechanized fire patrol force and therefore declined during the same period. In 1946, the National Housing Administration advanced 328 over $5 million to Region 1 for timber access and fire containment road construction (Vessey 1951; Hirt 1994). Though the timber potential was small in the Lewis and Clark compared to other Region 1 forests, foresters began a long-range road and infrastructure planning process that identified both bodies of timber that could be exploited with minimal road construction and those that required significant extension of the road network. Timber access road extension occurred in the late 1940s on the North Fork Teton, the Beaver- Willow Creek, and the South Fork Teton roads. The North Fork Teton road was extended over seven miles to connect the Front with the West Fork Ranger Station and approximately “50,000 power poles (and) fifteen million board feet of sawlogs” (Lindquist 1946). In the southern portion of the Rocky Mountain Division, Lewis and Clark foresters determined that road extensions were needed along the Dearborn and at Smith Creek to access approximately two million board feet of saw timber. In the northern region, additional roads were needed along the North Fork of Birch Creek and the South Fork of the Two Medicine. The agency identified road construction along Straight Creek, the South Fork of the Sun, and along Beaver Creek as critical to exploiting the timber stands along the Sun River drainage (Ferguson 1946b; Lindquist 1946; Stewart 1946a; Choteau Acantha 1947, 31 July; USDA LCNF 1948c; 1948d; 1948e; 1956; 2004b). Timber access roads augmented the multiple use demands placed on national forests in the post war period. Lewis and Clark foresters utilized federal funds to 329 supplement roads built by timber harvesters in order to encourage rapid development. Timber access roads – such as the North Fork Teton Forest Road - became important to recreation interests. By the mid 1960s, the Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark contained several recreation sites that were accessible by auto only because their roads had once been timber access roads. Timber access roads often served as embarkation points for dude ranchers and pack stock; the agency completed several pack stock bridges and parking lots near roads along the Sun and Teton rivers to facilitate this type of recreational use (Choteau Acantha 1946, 1 August; 1963, 7 February; Harmon 1948b; USDA LCNF 1962c; 2005c). Lewis and Clark foresters also promoted road extensions to facilitate better watershed management and insect control. Following the 1948 flood of the Sun River, Lewis and Clark foresters requested increased road construction funds; they rationalized their request to “extend (the) forest road system to inaccessible areas” by stating that increased road coverage in the Lewis and Clark backcountry would “enable the manipulation of forest cover to increase snow storage and water yield” (USDA LCNF 1948a). The agency also answered the growing threat of spruce bark beetle infestation in the region with road extension to facilitate emergency logging. Road building had unintended consequences in the Lewis and Clark as well. Increased recreational traffic on the rugged North Fork of the Sun forced the agency to officially close the road to motorized traffic; the road had frequently been impassible and was the cause of a great deal of animosity towards the agency. Forest Road 9216 was extended from Palookaville 330 into the Badger watershed for timber access. In the later 1950s, that road and others coming from Lubec, along the Teton, and Two Medicine and Badger creeks were improved to allow oil seismographic testing in the Lewis and Clark. Though foresters attempted to limit use on these roads, campers, hikers, and picnickers had overtaken the seismographic roads, forcing the agency to consider creating improved recreation facilities and erosion controls along those roads (Hanson 1953; Murie 1953; Neitzling 1954; Choteau Acantha 1960, 23 June; Phillip 1960). Despite the national pressure to construct roads in the post war period, few roads truly penetrated the Lewis and Clark backcountry (Figure 4-13, Appendix H). Foresters lamented the lack of roads in their official multiple use plans and utilized the national push for multiple use planning to leverage greater infrastructure improvement dollars from the government. Lewis and Clark foresters claimed that the rugged Rocky Mountain Front topography was responsible; road building in the forest was “difficult and costly and handicaps the harvesting of timber” (USDA LNCF 1962c). Relatively meager timber stands and high road construction costs made harvesting opportunities difficult to sell. Furthermore, limited vehicular access to the region confined casual public recreation to small regions. Foresters pushed for increased road construction to prevent recreational congestion. But ultimately, Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to finance roads that were not directly tied to timber harvest and recreation-based road and trail improvements suffered. While there was sufficient trail space open to hikers and horseback enthusiasts – by 1965 over 228 miles of trails existed in the Lewis and Clark portion of the Bob 331 Marshall Wilderness - Lewis and Clark foresters pointed to a lack of “end-of-the-road facilities” and improved trailheads leading into backcountry and wilderness areas. In 332 Figure 4-13: Transportation infrastructure, 1965. Map by author (USDA FS 1965a). these settings refuse at public camps was also becoming a very real environmental problem (USDA LCNF 1952b; 1956; 1962c; Roskie 1962a; Pomajevich 1965). The 1964 Teton and Sun River floods significantly limited access to the Rocky Mountain Division. The flood “gutted” infrastructure along both watercourses; of the 112 miles of roads in the Rocky Mountain Division, over 60 miles had to be completely redesigned, engineered, and reconstructed. Furthermore, over 125 miles of trail needed reconstruction and 275 miles required significant repairs (Figure 4-14). Gone too were many of the Lewis and Clark’s bridgeworks, telephone communications networks, and airfields. Foresters used helicopters, aerial photographs, and horse-mounted ranger patrols to survey the region for damage. Foresters filed preliminary redevelopment plans and accessed federal disaster relief funds; within two weeks of the flood, crews began their initial clean up (Choteau Acantha 1964, 18 June; USDA LCNF 1964a; 1964ll). Engineers used heavy machinery to punch cat roads through the debris in order to open the region for fire control, administrative patrol, and road and trail survey crews (Figure 4-15). Money and labor came in to the forest from other regions; five five-man crews were immediately brought in to repair roads, trails, and telephone systems on the Middle Fork of the Teton, Headquarters Creek, along the Sun River, on Route and Rock creeks, and at Gates Park. Road and driveway repairs were needed at nearly every Rocky Mountain Division recreation area and at the Choteau, Augusta, and Willow Creek administrative sites. By September of 1964 some forest trails had been repaired enough to facilitate dude ranching and hunting access. The lion’s share of the work was conducted 333 in 1965. The road to Benchmark was reoriented and redesigned to meet greater tourism and backcountry demands. The Beaver and Willow Creek road was also reconstructed as 334 Figure 4-14: Damaged or Destroyed Transportation Infrastructure, 1964 Flood. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1964a). a connector route between Gibson Dam and the Benchmark road. The Sun River road up to Gibson Dam and connector trails and bridges at Mortimer and Hannan gulches were re-engineered. All road and trail construction was standardized; roadbeds were constructed according to predetermined specifications. Trails were carved by small motorized tractors that did not exceed 36 inches – even in wilderness areas. By the end, the cost for road and trail reconstruction in the Lewis and Clark amounted to over $2.5 million and consumed much of the forester’s planning and management time during the mid 1960s (USDA LCNF 1964b; 1964c; 1964d; 1964e; 1964g; 1964i; 1964j; 1964m; 1964n; 1964o; 1964p; 1964r; 1964s; 1964dd; 1964ee; 1964 ii; 1964kk; 1965c; USDA R1 1965c; 1965d; Wenban 1964). 335 Figure 4-15: North Fork Sun River Trail Rehabilitation, 1965 (LCNF-C). The 1964 flood disrupted communications systems on the Lewis and Clark and accelerated a modernization process that had begun in the mid 1950s. Forced to reconcile the continual maintenance costs associated with stringing telephone lines through heavily wooded and fire-prone landscapes, Lewis and Clark foresters began “rolling up the wire” – replacing telephones with short-wave radio (Stein 1957). In 1955 alone, foresters removed and sold 57.5 miles of line in the Rocky Mountain Division. However, the physical geography of the region prevented the use of radios in many locations and, as a result, telephone lines remained as primary or backup communications systems along many of the roads and trails. Telephones connected several of the remaining forest homestead cabins, resorts and dude ranches, and summer homes inside and along the forest border. The 1964 flood damaged over 73 miles of telephone line in the Rocky Mountain Division, significantly limiting the ability of foresters to manage fire. Foresters decided to repair the line from the Wrong Creek administrative site to Gates Park and the line from Gates Park to Bear Top Lookout. All other damaged lines were abandoned in favor of the radio-telephone short wave system. Foresters did take advantage of disaster funding to retrofit the forest with portable and permanent short-wave radios including radio repeaters and utilities at Mount Wright and antennae and electricity generators at West Fork and Ear Mountain administrative sites (USDA LCNF 1955; 1964a; 1964u; 1992b). Lewis and Clark airfields had been continually improved since World War II – a result of changing technological demands, increased aircraft size, and nearly continual 336 incursions by wildlife. In the 1950s, Lewis and Clark foresters diverted money from timber road construction to increase their body of smokejumpers – whom they put to work improving landing strips. Through much of the 1950s, Lewis and Clark foresters explored options that would allow heavy aircraft to utilize their airfields. In 1960, Gates Park was selected for a 3,100-foot expansion. The Forest Service hired IBM to design schematics for the expansion (Stewart 1946b; Smith 1954a; 1955c; Hanson 1954a; 1955; Terry 1959; Stritch 1960; USDA R1 1962a; 1965b). The Gates Park expansion was not completed before the 1964 flood. The flood did significant damage to both the Gates Park and Pretty Prairie airfields (Figure 4-16), thereby limiting forester’s ability to control fire. Following the flood, Lewis and Clark foresters decided that the Gates Park expansion was a necessary feature for future fire control initiatives and would speed up flood reconstruction. Work on the new Gates Park airstrip was completed in 1966. The Pretty Prairie airstrip was completely damaged in the flood. Gully erosion and deposition of silt, boulders, and timber debris forced Lewis and Clark foresters to abandon Pretty Prairie airstrip. The airfield also was located in the Bob Marshall Wilderness, which complicated reconstruction plans by potentially excluding motorized earth moving equipment from the project. Foresters cleared some of the debris from Pretty Prairie – using heavy machinery - and restored it to emergency landing field status (USDA LCNF 1964a; 1964f; 1964h; 1964k; 1964q; 1966c). Foresters decided to locate a new airstrip either at Wood Lake or at the end of the Benchmark road. Foresters utilized aerial photography to determine the optimum location 337 and selected the Benchmark site “because of the advantages in fire control; administration recreational use; and the assured financial assistance from both the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) and Montana Aeronautics Commission” (USDA LCNF 1964a). The FAA had long desired a second airfield within the Lewis and Clark boundaries that was not surrounded by primitive or wilderness area land and contributed $167,400 to the project. Lewis and Clark foresters capitalized on the effects of the flood; in 1967 the Benchmark airfield was completed and the Benchmark region assumed an increasingly important role in Rocky Mountain Division management (USDA LCNF 1966c; 1967a). 338 Figure 4-16: Gates Park Airfield, 1964 Flood (LCNF-C). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Lewis and Clark foresters modernized its administration sites. They officially abandoned some backcountry sites – the Blackleaf Ranger Station disappeared from use and the Empty Jug cabin was transferred from the Lewis and Clark to the Choteau Boy Scouts (Figure 4-17, Appendix I). The agency seriously contemplated abandoning the Lubec Ranger Station on the northern border of the forest and decided that the agency would severely limit improvements to the site. Concordantly, administrative sites in Choteau and Augusta expanded. In anticipation of increased forest use after World War II, Region 1 foresters opened bids to construct prefabricated ranger stations in several important locations. In 1953, land was purchased for a new administrative compound in Choteau and in 1957 the Choteau expansion was complete. Following the Choteau expansion, Region 1 foresters repeated the process in Augusta (Harmon 1950; Choteau Acantha 1957, 27 February; 1962, 22 March; USDA R1 1957a; 1957b; Callantine 1959; USDA LCNF 1964a; USDA FS 1965a). Fire control management in the post-World War II era continued in the same direction it was heading in 1945 – the total control and 10 A.M. policies still were in effect and managed through greater reliance on air support, technology, and fire science. Lewis and Clark foresters relied extensively on aerial patrol and the Continental Unit to locate backcountry fires and to speed smokejumpers to conflagrations. In 1947, the Lewis and Clark coordinated with the United States Army in testing the viability of dropping 1,500 pound water-filled bombs on fires. The 1949 Mann Gulch tragedy – in which thirteen smokejumpers perished in the neighboring Helena National Forest – did little to 339 diminish smokejumper use. Indeed, the Mann Gulch fire ultimately resulted in the Forest Service intensifying their commitment to their “Aerial Attack Forces” and toward greater standardization of aerial fire fighting techniques. In 1952, Region 1 constructed a new 340 Figure 4-17: Administrative Sites, 1965. Map by author (USDA FS 1965a). smokejumping base and fire warehouse outside of Missoula. By 1965, Region 1 began operating a federal interagency smokejumper base in West Yellowstone, MT; the base centralized smokejumper housing and activity for regions 1, 2, and 4 of the Forest Service, Yellowstone and Grand Teton national parks, and thousands of miles of BLM, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and state land (Choteau Acantha 1947, 26 June; USDA HNF 1949; USDA R1 1949a; 1980b; Pyne 1997, 287-90). By the mid 1960s, aerial surveillance, radio technology, and a weak local timber base decreased the need for lookouts in the Lewis and Clark. By 1965, only five functioning lookouts – Beartop and Half Dome in the Teton Ranger District and Prairie Reef, Patrol, and Steamboat in the Sun River Ranger District - remained in the Rocky Mountain Division (Figure 4-18). Use of unimproved lookouts was abandoned. Lookouts continued to coordinate with aerial and ground fire control forces but in the Lewis and Clark, where foresters struggled to maximize timber harvests, lookout infrastructure was deemed redundant; lookouts were removed from deep in the backcountry and evenly dispersed through the management area (USDA FS 1965a). Timber Management Through the middle decades of the 20 th century, the Forest Service worked to craft a timber management policy that could withstand and adapt to variable market demands, fit into a growing list of accepted non-extractive national forest land uses, and transform forests into silviculturally supported timber farms. Foresters utilized both direct and indirect federal funding – in the form of infrastructure creation and fire control – to 341 continue opening new timber bodies to the saw. Following World War II, the Forest Service began a dramatic transformation of their timber management program; intensive timber management allowed the agency to redefine sustained yield and marketable 342 Figure 4-18: Fire Control Infrastructure, 1965. Map by author (USDA FS 1965a). species, thereby expanding the federal forest timber harvest program beyond what was earlier thought possible. Timber cuts on most national forests grew accordingly. Some forests, such as the Lewis and Clark, never reached their allowable cut potential. Intensive management could not overcome geographic distance, rugged topography, and a dynamic economic market that kept the Lewis and Clark timber market on the periphery. Despite this fact, Lewis and Clark landscapes were transformed by the attempt to instigate intensive timber management. The Great Depression hit the timber industry hard; the national timber market peaked in 1926 and “began a downward spiral that would end only with mobilization for World War II” (Clary 1986, 83). Demand for timber fell – as did prices – forcing the timber industry to disentangle itself from regulated timber harvests. The Forest Service still believed that federal forests were a bulwark against boom and bust economic downturns and sought ways to make federal timber attractive. The agency began to allow the timber industry greater flexibility in completing timber contracts; this allowed the industry to work at a slower pace and even reserve logs in hopes of better prices. This did little, however, to stimulate any level of timber industry growth in the early Great Depression. In Region 1, the timber cut had reached a peak in 1928 at 117.5 million board feet sold. In 1931 timber sales had dropped by nearly 35% from 1928. In 1932, only 36.2 million board feet of timber was sold for harvest in Region 1. Most of these sales occurred in the white pine rich forests in western Montana and Idaho (USDA FS 1930d, 30; 1931b, 40; Steen 1998, 20-26). 343 Lewis and Clark National Forest timber sales in the early Depression years reflected the Region 1 trend. Rocky Mountain Division foresters faced the added burden of limited access to the larger timber bodies deep in the Teton and Sun River drainages. Only two mills existed in the Rocky Mountain Division through most of the 1930s – one in Heart Butte had a contract to cut up to 100,000 board feet of rough, unplaned lumber for local consumption. The other mill originated from a timber sale along Waldron Creek. Lewis and Clark foresters had offered the sale with liberal contract requirements that required only that the logger construct his own roads, have the cut completed in four years, selectively harvest the Douglas fir and spruce in a manner that left 5% of the timber standing to ensure reseeding and watershed protection, and practice proper slash disposal. Nels Stremgruson of Fairfield, MT was awarded the contract and he soon prepared a steam-powered mill to move to the site and began to construct timber roads. He was delayed in prosecuting his harvest by the devastating 1931 Waldron Creek fire and the sale was significantly reduced when foresters realized that there was a very limited market for salvage timber. The market all but disappeared once the Depression hit full stride. Lewis and Clark foresters encouraged locals to file for free use permits of the burned and fallen timber – up to $100 worth – for use on farms and as firewood. By 1936, nearly 80% of free timber use in Region 1 came from the seven eastern Montana national forests (Koch 1931; Lockhart 1931a; Streeter 1931a; Choteau Acantha 1932, 10 March; 1933, 4 May; 2003, 11 June; Wiley 1934). 344 The federal government made repeated attempts to stimulate the timber industry, though most were ultimately ineffective. On a national level, the New Deal Forest Service revived its attempt to regulate the timber industry by implementing the Lumber Code and portions of the Copeland Act. Article X of the Lumber Code gave the Forest Service power to regulate the timber industry by reducing production quotas, enforcing a shorter workweek and higher wages, and prescribing sustained yield forestry and comprehensive fire protection plans for all public and private timber sales. Private timber operators were required to submit management plans to a statewide Lumber Code district; the Montana Lumber Code Committee consisted of managers of six of the largest timber operators, a representative from the Northern Pacific Railroad, two members of the Forest Service, and representatives from the Montana State Forest office and the Forestry School in Missoula. Small mills – like those on the Lewis and Clark – felt that the Lumber Code worked against them; the government was interested in pursuing large- scale timber sales and offered plan preparation aide for larger sales through NIRA funds. The effect of the Lumber Code was never fully realized however. In 1935 NIRA was deemed unconstitutional and defunded, forcing the Forest Service to look for other routes to gain influence over the timber industry (Clapp 1933b; Koch 1933b; 1933c; 1934; Clary 1986, 96-98; Baker et al 1993, 123). Region 1 and Lewis and Clark foresters utilized federal support for timber stand improvement. Between 1933 and 1935, Lewis and Clark foresters used funds to conduct timber surveys in the Teton Ranger District – an attempt to identify unburned stands that 345 could be accessed with CCC road crews. Results of the surveys were not promising; the market conditions, difficult topography, and lack of easily merchantable timber did not warrant road construction. Conservation Corps laborers did conduct several successful thinning and fire hazard reduction projects; spike camps regularly were tasked with debris and deadfall removal along the Teton and Sun watersheds. Conservation Corps labor was also used for reforestation, though there is little evidence that much of this occurred in the Rocky Mountain Division. Region 1 planned to expand its federally infused planting program in the early 1940s, but was hampered by the outbreak of World War II (Choteau Acantha 1933, 4 May; 1935, 6 June; USDA R1 1936f; 1936m). Despite federal aid, CCC labor, and a dramatic increase in roads and trails, agency foresters struggled to make timber a profitable venture for small lumber towns in the West. The Forest Service rekindled a discussion on timber harvesting practices that focused not upon watershed and range impact but on best practices to make timber harvesting profitable. Some foresters began to champion clearcutting as a method to both cut industry costs and speed along the reforestation of what the Forest Service deemed a “desirable species.” Others promoted selective cutting of the best timber to bolster prices. Agency research supported selective logging as a silviculturally acceptable and economically beneficial practice, but some within the agency – and within industry – firmly stood behind opening forests to clearcutting. Officially, the agency emphasized selective harvesting through the later years of the Great Depression, “although there was 346 more talk than action in regard to selection” (Clary 1986, 109). Clearcutting had gained a subtle foothold in national forest timber landscapes (Steen 1998, 25-26). The Region 1 timber industry experienced slow, but steady growth through the latter years of the Great Depression. This was in part due to an improved primary resource market in the region and to an increased reliance on national forest timber. The private timber industry had been decimated by the Depression; many private timber landholders in the region liquidated their stock and either abandoned their land or traded it with the Forest Service for access to federal timber allotments. The Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark did not experience similar growth however. Distance to substantial markets and rugged topography remained key roadblocks to timber industry expansion. Free use timber readily supplied the local farming community; repeated fires and floods provided ample opportunities to harvest free use (Choteau Acantha 1940, 26 September; USDA R1 1940f; 1940g; 1940h; Clary 1986; USDA LCNF 1962c). By the end of the 1930s, Region 1 foresters staked their claim as the regional authority on protecting and fortifying primary economies in the West. In 1940, Region 1 published A Forest Economy for the Nation as Related to the Northern Rocky Mountain Territory. The report reviewed the timber situation in the West and identified the only dependable supply of timber in the region as being within agency boundaries. Sustained yield had protected America’s timber resource on public lands. Private timber stock had been depleted to near critical lows. Americans needed to finally recognize that federal acquisition and management of private timber stock was the only way to insure the 347 viability of forest-based resources. Region 1 had shown that they were best suited to plan and protect the interests of the American public – the timber industry included – and thereby perpetuate timber and resource extractive industries in the American West (USDA R1 1940a; Baker et al 1993). Region 1 foresters never had the opportunity to explore how far their claims in A Forest Economy could have taken them. World War II turned the American economy into a war machine – one that generated an insatiable demand for raw materials. Timber was classified as a critical war material and Forest Service employees, both old and new, rallied to meet the call. “To win this war we must have wood,” said 77-year-old Gifford Pinchot. “We must have huge quantities of wood – huge even for the prodigal United States” (Washington Post 1942, 2 July). The Forest Service and the War Production Board worked together throughout the war to increase national forest timber production. The cooperation immediately resulted in increased timber production in Region 1 forests; the Region 1 timber cut grew from 271,000,000 board feet in 1942 to over 1,222,360,000 in 1944. Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to contribute; manpower shortages hampered timber industry growth along the Rocky Mountain Front (USDA FS 1943b; Baker et al 1993; Lewis 2005, 104). Demand for Forest Service timber only increased following World War II. Federal foresters feared they did not have the manpower or infrastructure to meet national and federal housing needs. “Our forests are not producing as much timber as we need today,” said Chief Forester Lyle Watts. “The current shortage of lumber is greatly retarding 348 progress of the Government’s program to expedite housing construction” (USDA FS 1946b, ii). The agency conducted a national timber survey immediately following the war; what they found was a cause for great concern to Cold War foresters. Industry and two world wars had depleted private timber to near exhaustion. The emerging and profitable pulp and paper market drove private foresters to harvest timber earlier than harvests for saw timber. To meet public demand and fill the private forestry void, the Forest Service focused on managing their lands intensively – a process that theoretically would increase efficiency and potential timber growth, thereby allowing the Forest Service to raise the potential sustained yields. Intensive management also gave the Forest Service a scientific legitimacy and status that protected the agency from political intervention and public scrutiny. Regional officers directed foresters to revise management plans for timber working circles - market blocks wherein uniform timber estimates could be made - to maximize sales and authorize increased allowable cuts. "Timber management seems to imply the growing and protecting of trees,” said Forester George Stoltz (1948b). “But we have now reached the stage of development where harvesting and marketing of trees is becoming of real significance” (USDA FS 1946b; Hanson 1947a; 1947b; Lindh 1948a). Lewis and Clark foresters drafted intensive management plans for all four working circles on the Rocky Mountain Division that anticipated immediate timber cut expansion, raised the allowable cut, and detailed significant room for growth should road construction and technological improvement keep pace (Figure 4-19). Intensive 349 management in the Lewis and Clark meant that foresters were expected to increase cutting of lodgepole pine for power poles from 91,000 in 1946 to 160,000 in 1947. In that 350 Figure 4-19: Rocky Mountain Division Timber Working Circles, 1948. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1948c; 1948d; 1948e; 1948f). same period, saw and pulp wood harvesting needed to increase from 3,835,000 to 6,265,000 board feet. Most of this growth was to occur in the Jefferson Division; the Rocky Mountain cut was hampered by the lack of access roads and foresters proposed converting several trails into timber access roads. Foresters saw the greatest potential for harvest along the North Fork of the Teton and recommended a seven and one-half mile road extension to the West Fork Ranger station to open up access to 50,000 power poles and 15 million board feet of saw logs. Road improvements on Willow Creek and the South Fork of the Teton were also made for intensive management purposes. To expedite sales, Lewis and Clark foresters were granted authority to approve much larger timber sales – up to three million board feet – without receiving aid from the regional forester’s office (Harmon 1946; Lindquist 1946; Stewart 1946a; Ferguson 1947; USDA LCNF 1948c; 1948d; 1948e; 1948f). Intensive management and regional demand did initially result in Lewis and Clark timber cut increases. The Lewis and Clark timber harvest between 1944 and 1948 averaged 5.8 million board feet - most of this was harvested in the Jefferson Division. In 1950, under intensive management and federal support to open timber bodies, sixteen million board feet was harvested on the Lewis and Clark. The harvest increasingly revolved around lodgepole pine – for power and telephone poles – and the pulpwood industries. Lodgepole pine had once been considered a trash species, but suburbanization and continued rural electrification fueled extraction. The Lewis and Clark lodgepole pine market garnered national attention; in 1947 the J. Neils Lumber Company looked to 351 locate a pressure treating plant in Libby, MT and wished to utilize the Lewis and Clark as a harvest zone. Lewis and Clark foresters also concentrated on developing a pulpwood industry in the region as a silviculturally sound way to liquidate “ripe” trees – though most of these plans involved the more easily accessible White Sulphur Springs Working Circle. Timber continued to be harvested near Waldron Creek; the North Fork Waldron Sawmill harvested saw timber for railroad ties until the early 1950s. Completion of the North Fork Teton road in 1947 opened up nearly one million board feet of saw timber, posts, poles, and pulp wood; foresters opened the sale in three lots. In 1945, a similar sale was advertised at $2.50 per 1000 board feet of timber and received no bidders; due to market influences, the 1947 lots opened at $3.40 per 1000 board feet of selectively cut timber. Foresters saw an opportune time to capitalize; “the bid is high in view of road construction costs,” said Assistant Regional Forester George Stoltz (1948a), “but there appears to be no reason why the award to the highest bidder should not be made. Money talks” (USDA R1 1946a; 1946b; Ferguson 1946b; 1946d; 1947; Neils 1947; Leftwich 1948; Lindh 1948b; Stewart 1948a; 1948b; Meagher County News 1949, 9 November; Matthews 1951; USDA LCNF 1987b; Baker et al 1993, 165). Under increasing market and political influence, the Forest Service expanded intensive management timber plans through the 1950s. The Forest Service required supervisors to enlarge annual allowable cut to levels that presupposed technological advances in replanting and silviculture. Transforming lodgepole pines from a “weed” species to a commercial species aided foresters in expanding their annual allowable cut. 352 To meet future timber goals, mature trees needed to be liquidated and new ones planted; by 2000, the Forest Service predicted, the agency needed its trees to grow at an annual rate of 105.4 billion board feet per year as compared to the 47.4 billion board feet per year the agency believed was growing in their forests circa 1956. But before new trees could be planted, the older ones had to be harvested quickly, efficiently, and in a manner that allowed the timber industry to keep their profit margins high. The agency was quick to rationalize clearcutting as both silviculturally sound and beneficial to forest ecosystems – as well as to the national timber industry - thereby tying clearcutting to multiple use. Region 1 foresters began to again liken clearcutting to hillside farming; it was up to the Forest Service to “demonstrate silviculture as the agriculturists have demonstrated scientific farming” (Lindh 1946). Foresters proclaimed that clearcutting benefited wildlife and livestock grazing by creating open pasturages suitable for winter grazing land. Clearcutting allowed loggers to remove beetle and insect infested trees – in 1954 over $8 million was invested in road construction projects in the Bunker Creek region outside of the Bob Marshall Wilderness to clearcut four million board feet of bark beetle infested trees. In a 1957 speech given at the Wilderness Conference in San Francisco, CA, Chief Forester Richard McArdle even connected clearcutting and expanded timber harvesting to preservation of wilderness. “The best way to avoid (multiple use) pressure on wilderness is to provide an adequate supply of other resources by good multiple land use on nonwilderness areas. For example, the best way to reduce the demand for the timber in wilderness areas is to see to it that all commercial 353 forest lands are managed so well that they can supply all the timber the Nation needs” (McArdle 1957). Nationally, foresters responded and timber harvests expanded dramatically during the 1950s and early 1960s (Stolz 1947; USDA R1 1952a; Neitzling 1954; USDA FS 1956a; USDA LCNF 1956). Lewis and Clark foresters fulfilled the reforestation mandates of intensive timber management through a five-year plan to rehabilitate burned acreage on Jones Creek (Figure 4-20). Through the late 1950s and early 1960s, Forest Service employees and members of the Blackfeet Nation stationed at Ear Mountain Ranger Station planted tens of thousands of commercially important yellow pine and Douglas fir seedlings in the 354 Figure 4-20: Tree Planting, West Fork Jones Creek, 1957 (LCNF-C, Historical Files). burned-over drainage; grown at the Savanac Nursery, the trees were the first planting of Douglas fir ever planted east of the Continental Divide. The trees were planted using a terracing method that transformed portions of the hillside into small steps – a process that was believed to increase water retention and root growth and eliminate erosion (USDA LCNF 1954a; 1957a; Choteau Acantha 1957, 16 May; 6 June; 1964, 28 May). In 1958, Montana’s elected national representatives inquired of the Forest Service about how best to achieve full use and development of the state’s federal timber. New roads topped the list of needs – access to most of Montana’s timberlands remained a difficult proposition. On the central and eastern forests, the pulp market seemed to be the only logical source for expansion. Ultimately, the central and eastern Montana timber market was held to the periphery by distance, market demands, and few local processing facilities. Until these obstacles were overcome, little expansion could occur. The timber cut on the Lewis and Clark continued to face difficulty and it became clear that forests with marginal timber supplies – especially those on the rural periphery – were overwhelmingly sensitive to market fluctuations and environmental variance. In the Teton Ranger District working circles, new methods for calculating allowable sustained yield pushed the desired cut to over 1.8 million board feet per year. But the actual cut through much of the 1950s languished at around 250,000 board feet per year. Sustained yield targets on the Sun River working circles averaged around 630,000 board feet per year in the 1950s, yet only 100,000 board feet was routinely harvested. To boost sales, the Regional Forester implemented largely ineffective programs to support the pulpwood 355 market in the Lewis and Clark; the pulpwood market consistently declined through the mid 1950s – as did timber cutting on the Lewis and Clark. Despite these difficulties, Lewis and Clark foresters continued to pursue increased timber sales into the 1960s. The majority of new sales were concentrated on the Teton portion of the newly named Four Rivers Working Circle – a combination of the Teton, Sun River, Marias, and Dearborn working circles – where the North Fork Teton Road and in-forest mill sites offered greater opportunity for exploitation (USDA LCNF 1952b; 1954a; 1954b; 1955; 1957a; 1957c; 1958b; 1959; 1962c; USDA R1 1952c; 1958b). The annual allowable cut continued to rise – by 1962 the allowable cut on the Teton District was over eight million board feet per year. The actual cut rose as well, but never reached maximum production - in 1962 the cut on the Teton District reached a high of one and a half million board feet. Foresters continued to lament the lack of roads to access the small pockets of commercially viable timber stands on the Lewis and Clark. In 1962, Lewis and Clark foresters requested federal funds “to supplement purchaser constructed roads” (USDA LCNF 1962c). Federal road subsidies would allow foresters to absorb road construction costs and encourage the timber industry to invest in clearing mature lodgepole pine from the Four Rivers Working Circle. Federally subsidized timber roads also benefited national forest multiple use; more roads equated to more recreation. Below cost, federally subsidized timber sales did encourage some growth in the Lewis and Clark timber industry. In 1962, the Hume sawmill was located in Choteau; its owners 356 received a contract for five million board feet of timber in the Teton backcountry (Choteau Acantha 1962, 7 June; 1963, 18 April; 9 May). Even with federal subsidies, timber sales east of the Continental Divide never reached their allowable sustained yield cut – though federal and forester attempts to place the forests under intensive management did increase the timber harvest in the region. Between 1958 and 1963, the allowable cut east of the Continental Divide grew from 141 million to 231.5 million board feet. Timber access roads and federal subsidies pushed the area cut from 41 million in 1958 to 109.8 million board feet in 1963. Stumpage prices, influenced by market demand and federal subsidies, declined during the same period - from $4.29 per thousand board feet in 1959 to $2.86 in 1963. Lewis and Clark foresters remained unable to overcome the difficult economic and geographic realities to meet intensive management guidelines (Johnson 1963). Grazing and Wildlife Management The Forest Service’s grazing and wildlife management models had clashed in the early decades of the 20 th century. While grazing policy had emerged within a scientific forestry philosophy that promoted full utilization of forest resources for commercial extraction, wildlife management emerged as a reaction to local demands and landscape modification. As a result, the two became inextricably linked – at first in practice and finally, statutorily through the passage of the 1960 Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. The number of livestock present on national forest ranges reached a peak following World War I; cattle and sheep stock in the Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark 357 reached its peak in 1920. Between 1920 and 1929, grazing declined due to a combination of Forest Service carrying capacity studies that prescribed fewer head, criticism by other federal agencies and users over depleted ranges and degraded vegetative cover, dynamic local and national economies, and social changes that began to value recreation and wildlife preservation over grazing. Through the middle decades of the 20 th century, foresters struggled to sustain agrarian livestock economies and wildlife ecologies in the face of dramatic economic shifts, drought, global war, increased recreation pressure, modernization, and the growing demand for forest resources in Cold War America. Lewis and Clark foresters attempted to meet those demands through federally funded research that created standardized range management carrying capacity guidelines. They also demonstrated an almost singular ability to serve as a mediator between local conservation and livestock interests; cooperation was a key to range management in the Lewis and Clark National Forest (USDA LCNF 1929c; 1962c; Cooney 1940). The Great Depression offered the Forest Service an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its social and scientific worth to ranchers. “Times of depression bring out the value of the national-forest range with its assured stability and encouragement for the grower through efficient management to offset low prices,” said Forester Robert Stuart in his 1930 annual report (USDA FS 1930d, 36). National livestock associations called for the agency to act as a stabilizing force by implementing policies that controlled production and demonstrated scientific range management planning. Yet, at the end of the Depression, few would say that the agency had risen to the occasion – at least from a 358 range management perspective. The agency faced immediate criticism from stockmen and their powerful western legislative allies when they initially refused to reduce per- head livestock fees or add additional stock to the range beyond permitted carrying capacities; stability and “the maintenance of a permanent policy ... is of far greater importance to the industry than any temporary benefits which might accrue through their reduction” (USDA FS 1931b, 45-46). The agency’s stalwart opposition to fee reduction lasted only until 1932, when the agency revised its policy and issued a 50 percent cut in grazing fees on all national forest permits. Lewis and Clark ranchers rejoiced; the reduction saved Teton Ranger District stockmen $1,600 in that year alone. The reduction only lasted one year; in 1933 the rates were raised back to the 1931 rate – 14.5 cents per month and 4.5 cents per month per head of cattle and sheep respectively. Foresters justified the rate stating that it was still 40 percent below charges made for private, comparable private pasture (USDA FS 1931a; 1933b; Choteau Acantha 1932, 4 February; 1932, 10 March; 1933, 16 March; 1933, 30 March). The Forest Service utilized federal funding and the expanding New Deal bureaucracy to assert its place as America’s preeminent range management agency. In 1934, Colorado Congressman Edward Taylor introduced a bill to create a Division of Grazing in the Department of the Interior; the Taylor Grazing Act created grazing districts on public land and denied the Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture the right to manage these lands. The Forest Service perceived the Taylor Grazing Act as a threat to their authority and a comment on their cooperative efforts to create a land classification 359 system for private agricultural land with the Soil Conservation Service. In response, the agency published a companion to the Copeland Report titled The Western Range. The Western Range attacked the Department of the Interior for failing to live up to its management responsibilities under the General Land Office and for allowing the livestock industry too much authority in range management decisions. Management complications arose, according to the Forest Service, because industry was forced to deal with two different management agencies with differing guidelines; logically, the Forest Service should manage all rangeland as it had a history of scientific range management (USDA FS 1936d; Rowley 1985, 147-72; Steen 1998, 26-27). Forest Service range management revolved around making scientifically based long term plans that allowed the agency to manipulate the number of head and location of allotments. Through the 1920s and 1930s the Forest Service searched for a standardized methodology, finally arriving on the concept of carrying capacity and calculating AUMs – Animal Unit Months. Carrying capacity and AUM calculation began with range surveys to determine the “forage-acre factor” – a formula that rated the palatability and density of vegetation in a piece of land. The regional office equipped Lewis and Clark range officers with palatability tables that quantified the eighteen agreed-upon vegetation types in the northern Rocky Mountains. The volume of palatable vegetation in an area was then multiplied by a constant – 0.3 for sheep and 0.8 for cattle – to determine the AUM. Once the AUM was calculated and the length of the season was determined, personnel could develop carrying capacity and range management plans (Rowley 1985, 164). 360 Range management plans were detailed documents that described all of the management characteristics for a particular permit including the number of head allowed, dates of entry, exit, and rotation, salting and grazing infrastructure (drift fence and water improvement) plans, and herder instructions. Lewis and Clark foresters relied heavily on local livestock associations to implement management plans. Livestock associations were charged with the responsibility to construct and improve driveways, pack and distribute salt along Lewis and Clark guidelines, and hire a herder to keep flocks moving along designated rotations (Figure 4-21). Throughout the middle decades of the 20 th century, grazing divisions shifted use according to the current economic market and range characteristics. For example, in 1932 the Blackleaf Unit of the Teton Division shifted from sheep and goat use to cattle and horse due to drought conditions. Before any such shift could occur, the agency conducted range carrying capacity studies to determine the allotment’s suitability. Also included in the Depression-era management plans was information on cooperative reseeding and insect control operations; in several locations – Gates Park and Biggs Creek for example – Lewis and Clark foresters provided CCC laborers and NRA funds to aid livestock associations in distributing poison to eradicate grasshoppers on the range (USDA LCNF 1930c; 1931; 1932a; 1934b; 1937b; Choteau Acantha 1932, 29 September; 1933, 14 September; Streeter 1931b; 1932; Martin 1936b). Translating carrying capacity and AUMs to livestock holders was a difficult task; the job was made more arduous by the economic realities of the Great Depression. To ease the management burden, Lewis and Clark foresters were instructed to consolidate 361 grazing units into larger grazing divisions and then to reduce stock throughout the forest. In 1930, 128,281 sheep and 21,584 cattle were grazed in the Lewis and Clark. By 1938, those numbers had dropped significantly – only 75,817 sheep and 12,271 cattle were grazed in the Lewis and Clark. Most of these were allocated to the Jefferson Division. Demand for national forest range remained high however; in 1935 Lewis and Clark 362 Figure 4-21: Teton Cattle and Horse Management Plan, 1932 (USDA LCNF 1932a). Dashed lines signify individual grazing units. Numbered circles equate to pounds of salt needed for distribution. Xs indicate constructed drift fences. officials appealed to local stockmen’s associations to close the forest off to new permittees. The range was full (USDA LCNF 1932a; Choteau Acantha 1935, 31 January; 1935, 7 February; USDA R1 1940e). Stock reductions also occurred in the Rocky Mountain Division as a result of multiple use activities. In 1928, all commercial livestock was excluded from the Bear Creek cattle and horse allotment. Over 50 horses were allowed to continue grazing at Bear Creek through the early 1930s to support local hunters and commercial dude ranches. This allotment was cut in half in 1940 as wildlife conservation groups lobbied the agency to reduce pack stock grazing to support winter elk forage. The Wood-Fairview cattle and horse range once provided forage to over 550 head annually; in 1931, the Straight Creek and Lower Fairview units of that range were set aside completely for game and recreation use. The Petty-Smith range in the southern portion of the forest saw its allotment reduced from 400 head in 1931 to 200 in 1937; elk used the range in their autumn migrations to the private land on the Front. Cattle grazing was severely limited along the borders of the Sun River Primitive Area though in most cases, horse allotments were supported to facilitate recreation (Cooney 1940). The largest stock reduction for recreation and wildlife uses occurred in 1933 when all stock grazing was removed from the North Fork of the Sun River. In 1928, foresters sought to remove all stock from the region to preserve winter range for the Sun River elk herd. A negotiation between the various Rocky Mountain Front livestock associations, conservation groups, and Lewis and Clark foresters extended grazing in the area until 363 1933 – as long as a new and temporary driveway was constructed up the South Fork of Deep Creek and down Biggs Creek – thereby allowing the herd access to migrate down the Sun River corridor and the Bureau of Reclamation to fill the Gibson Reservoir. Livestock associations appealed the reduction in 1933 and asked for a three-year extension due to the extreme economic conditions. Lewis and Clark foresters conducted a quick carrying capacity study and determined that the range was in terrible shape; no extension was granted. Livestock were forever removed from 40,000 acres along the North Fork of the Sun River (USDA LCNF 1930c; 1935d; 1935f; 1962c; Wolff 1932; Kelley 1933b; Choteau Acantha 1933, 16 January; 1933, 30 November; 1934, 7 June). The wildlife situation in the Lewis and Clark National Forest complicated range management. The Sun River Elk herd reached a high-water mark in 1929 at roughly 5,600 head. By the mid 1930s that number had stabilized around 4,300. However, elk still migrated freely between the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests and out onto private ranches along the Rocky Mountain Front. During that same period, the deer population in the same area grew from 5,175 to 14,150. Lewis and Clark foresters believed that range carrying capacity applied equally to wildlife and to range stock and attempted to affect herd numbers by appealing to the state for increased hunting quotas. They were stymied by resistance from local and national conservation groups outside of the forest; public sentiment strongly favored “the propagation of game animals of all kinds ... local organizations ... take considerable interest toward the protection of Game and Fish and especially do they endeavor to Preserve the Elk Herd. Considerable 364 conflicting interests prevail between stockmen and Sportsmen, due to the fact that the Sportsmen have endeavored ... to have all Domestic Stock removed from the Forest, and have it Preserved for game only” (Martin 1933). The result was a depleted landscape that was susceptible to erosion, uncontrolled herd growth, and further grazing restrictions (Martin 1933; Shantz 1939; USDA R1 1942a). Though the state held the authority to manage wildlife, Lewis and Clark foresters often found themselves at the center of the land management controversy. Beginning in the late 1920s, the Sun River elk herd began to winter on private land outside of the forest boundaries. In 1933, an estimated 80 percent of the Sun River herd drifted out of the Sun River Preserve and onto federal grazing and private ranch land; this trend continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The elk routinely caused damage to fences and consumed valuable haystacks. To alleviate the damage, cost, and negative publicity, the state hired men to patrol the Front tasked with hazing the elk back into the forest. These attempts were largely unsuccessful and Lewis and Clark foresters continued to look for alternative ways to control the elk herd (Martin 1933; Ferguson 1939a). Through the 1930s, the Lewis and Clark continued to conduct cooperative game surveys and carrying capacity studies with the Flathead National Forest, the Montana State Fish and Game agency, stockmen, and sportsmen’s groups in an attempt to gain a level of consensus on the state of the herd and of its effect on the range. While most of the groups could agree that there was a problem, not all agreed that the Forest Service’s proposal – an increased game hunt or the purchase of outside winter range – was the 365 solution. Unable to gain any level of traction, Lewis and Clark foresters appealed for federal funds to conduct an extensive and cooperative five year game study to 1) determine the number of elk wintering in the Sun River drainage; 2) determine routes of drift and migration; 3) determine the extent and amount of forage needed and used by the herd; 4) map the cattle and horse grazing units usable by elk for winter forage; and 5) develop plans for best management of the wildlife resource in conjunction with range. In 1936, a separate Region 1 survey was also funded with the goal of building a “permanent and stable” livestock industry through “complete utilization as is consistent” with wildlife management plans (USDA R1 1936d) (Smith 1929; Gordon 1930; Hornby 1930; Kelley 1930d; Koch 1930; Lemmer 1930; Lockhart 1930b; Martin 1933; USDA LCNF 1933; 1934a; 1934c; 1936a; 1936b; 1939; Sperry 1936; USDA R1 1936d; Cooney 1940). The wildlife and grazing conflict did not wait for the foresters to complete their survey and construct their plans. Elk continued to winter outside of the forest. Lewis and Clark foresters continued to restrict cattle and sheep from the range; over 400 head of cattle – approximately 20 percent of the total - were removed from the Teton Ranger District in 1938 alone. Similar cuts were made in the Sun River Ranger District; the 1757 cattle and 4950 head of sheep allocated in 1937 were reduced to 1423 head of cattle and 3950 head of sheep in 1938 to alleviate pressure from elk and wildlife supporters. Augusta sportsmen petitioned forest management to close the section of the forest between the Twin Butte and Sun River reserves to deer and elk hunting. The region connected the Lolo and Lewis and Clark forests and had long been used as a sheep range. 366 At the heart of the conflict were driveways that connected the two forests; elk and deer used the driveways to migrate between the Dearborn and Blackfeet watersheds. Sheep depleted the forage along the driveways as they were moved between ranges, causing near starvation situations in the elk herd. Unable to dictate wildlife management terms, Lewis and Clark foresters were directed to severely reduce sheep allotments on the Dearborn River and relocate the driveway. The permit owner, a long-time rancher named Charmichael, withdrew his permit stating that the added distance associated with a new driveway – combined with flock reductions – made it unprofitable. In 1938, the Dearborn driveway was closed off (Choteau Acantha 1935, 28 March; 1937, 16 December; 1938, 5 May; Ferguson 1937a; 1938a; Kelley 1937c; Smith 1937). Conflict surrounding grazing and wildlife management took an increasingly antagonistic turn in 1937. The Izzak Walton League of Great Falls and the Central Montana Conservation Club colluded with the Front’s irrigation lobby and petitioned the Forest Service, the Department of Agriculture, and Congress to have Regional Forster Kelley and Assistant Regional Forester Glen Smith removed from leadership. The petition claimed that domestic sheep in the Lewis and Clark had so degraded the range and watersheds that “but little irrigation can now be depended upon by diversion alone” (Reynolds 1937). Following the removal of Kelley and Smith, the only solution, so the petition claimed, was the immediate 1) removal of all stock from the national forest; 2) reforestation of all burned areas; 3) reseeding of former grazing areas; and 4) federal purchase of all marginal forest lands for wildlife habitat. Forest Service Chief 367 Ferdinand Silcox directed Lewis and Clark foresters to settle the situation by conducting a cooperative inspection trip of the land in question. Silcox joined members of the various associations on the tour – the results of which vindicated Kelley and Smith. Steady rain in the spring of 1937 produced “abundant ... vigorous” forage throughout the forest (Rachford 1937). Problem areas were noted and incorporated into Lewis and Clark management plans. Nevertheless, the incident did little to foster cooperation between wildlife, livestock, and federal land management groups (Choteau Acantha 1936, 24 December; Granger 1937; Kelley 1937a; 1937b; Moore 1937; Reynolds 1937). In 1938 the Lewis and Clark hired biologist Robert Cooney to extend the game and range study for two winters; in 1940, the Lewis and Clark elk and range management study was completed. The earlier five-year study had given the Forest Service a good idea of herd size, wintering ranges, and migration patterns. Cooney was charged with specifically determining how much elk range could be increased if domestic stock were eliminated on portions of range usable by elk for winter range, and whether elimination of grazing in those ranges would check the migration to private land outside of the forest. Cooney’s recommendations were clear. The size of the herd needed to be regulated through an increased annual kill; the number harvested would vary depending upon the size of the elk herd. After the desired herd size of approximately 2,500 was reached, any annual “increase should be taken on a sustained yield basis” (Cooney 1940). Grazing should be removed from the Beaver, Willow, Little Willow, Ford Creek, Petty Creek, and Fairview plateaus to increase the winter grazing capacity. Finally, the only long-term 368 solution to the range – wildlife situation in the Lewis and Clark would be the purchase and acquisition of land outside of the forest. Cooney located several tracts suitable to elk migration and winter forage (Figure 4-22). Cooney suggested that foresters construct elk fences to keep the herd on the property. Heavy salting and driving were also required to guide the herd to the reserve each year (Ferguson 1938c; Cooney 1940). The necessity to implement a workable elk management plan reached emergency status in the winter of 1938. C.A. Rathbone, owner of the Circle H Ranch located on Ford Creek at the Lewis and Clark forest boundary, contended that for several years the Sun River elk herd had migrated onto his property and caused significant damage – as much as $2,000 annually - to outbuildings, fences, pasture, and standing hay stacks. In August 1938 Rathbone wrote the Forest Service, Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt stating that unless the federal government interceded, he would kill any elk that entered his property. He urged the government to purchase winter range sufficient for the herd. In October 1938, Rathbone published an advertisement in regional papers announcing “with regret, the necessity of making arrangements with killers of elk to establish camps on our ranch during the coming winter for the slaughter of all elk found on our ranch ... this may mean the destruction of 1,000 elk during the coming winter season ... We guarantee absolute protection against prosecution by either federal or state authorities” (Great Falls Tribune 1938, 22 October). Lewis and Clark foresters appealed to the state and to local sportsmen’s groups to intercede. A cooperative elk drive resulted; sportsmen, state game officials, and off-duty Lewis and Clark rangers 369 pushed the elk from the southern portion of the forest near Willow Creek to the North Fork of the Sun River – lighting backfires to keep the elk from doubling back (Great Falls 370 Figure 4-22. Cooney Report on Potential Sun River Elk Herd Winter Range. Map by author (Cooney 1940). Tribune 1938, 25 October; 1938, 27 December; Choteau Acantha 1938, 1 December; 1939, 16 March; Ferguson 1938b; 1939a; 1939b; Shantz 1939). News of the potential slaughter reached national conservation circles; some decried the situation as a “complete breakdown of wildlife policy” (Allen 1938). The Forest Service, unable to manage the elk directly and unconvinced that further grazing reductions would affect reasonable change in the situation, continued to push the state legislature to open up hunting quotas; they actively lobbied Montana Congressmen, the State Fish and Game Department, the U.S. Biological Service and local conservation groups for support. To gain backing for the hunt, Region 1 officials requested that Lewis and Clark foresters organize another cooperative elk herd count; it never happened – by that time communications had so broken down between interested parties that no one trusted count numbers or range carrying capacity figures (Price 1939; Rachford 1939). That winter, Rathbone walked out to one of his fields and shot a bull elk. He immediately contacted state game authorities, was tried and fined $200 for shooting an elk out of season. He appealed and the case was eventually dropped. In June 1939, Rathbone offered his land up for sale as winter elk range. But the money was not forthcoming and still no one could agree that out-of-forest winter range was a logical solution to the problem. Through the mid-1940s the state took an increased role in monitoring elk in the Willow Creek/Ford Creek region; state game patrols worked the region annually through May, hazing elk away from the Rathbone ranch. The herd gradually concentrated in the Sun River and North Fork Flats areas – a region important 371 for the emerging dude ranch and pack guide recreation economies in the Rocky Mountain Front (Ferguson 1941c; 1941g; Wiles 1941). By the end of the Great Depression, commercial grazing had largely been removed from the Sun River, Bear Creek, and North Fork Flats region of the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Small grazing pasturages remained to support the “proper management of the recreational business in the summertime as well as the hunting business in the fall” of several local dude ranches and commercial packers (Ferguson 1941c). The forced elk migration into the Sun River drainage rapidly diminished the amount and quality of forage in the region; Lewis and Clark foresters were pushed to alter the grazing allotments for Sun River dude ranches. Horse permittees were required to stagger the entry date for their horses, to supplement forage with privately secured oats and hay, and to corral feed their horses rather than allowing them to graze. The Forest Service instituted a heavy salting program to keep the elk away from the horse ranges, but that was only partially effective. Foresters discussed using the situation to bring the powerful and influential Montana Dude Rancher’s Association to their side in their attempt to open up the hunt or obtain winter range and considered threatening permittees with an “all horses out” policy “unless the elk damage ceases” (Ferguson 1941c). Instead, Lewis and Clark foresters began to use public educational programs to create broad based local support for abolition of the Sun River Game Preserve and new hunting systems. Once public support was gained, a commission would be formed of local wildlife groups, livestock associations, the Forest Service, and Montana Fish and 372 Game; together the commission would dictate a cooperative management plan for the elk herd. Once the state proved that a cooperative and effective management plan was in place, Lewis and Clark foresters “would have the justification to start liquidation of all of the livestock on the lower Sun River ranges on a five-year plan” (Kelley 1941b). By demanding participation in the committee, the Forest Service would gain a level of control over what had been traditionally a state matter (Kelley 1941a; Sandvig 1941; USDA LCNF 1941b; 1941c). As the Great Depression came to a close, the grazing and wildlife situation in the Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark remained unresolved. Little movement on either side occurred during the war years. Livestock management officials were careful to not replicate the overstocking mistakes they made in World War I. Manpower shortages limited the amount of range analysis and improvement that could be accomplished. Stock associations continued to manage permitted drift fences, water developments, and stock driveways. Ample precipitation during the war years kept the range in relatively good shape. Elk hunting increased during the war years; the state opened up the hunt to combat meat rationing. In 1942, Lewis and Clark foresters pursued the creation of a cooperative conservation committee with the Flathead National Forest and game and livestock interests on both sides of the Continental Divide. In 1943, it was decided that a better approach was to form two separate conservation committees and the Sun River Conservation Committee was created. Though created in 1943, the Sun River 373 Conservation Committee was not active until 1946 - the end of the war perhaps initiating a greater sense of cooperation amongst those involved. The group was charged with the daunting task of examining “the Sun River area with respect to the elk herd, possible acquisition of winter range, recommendations for the size of deer and elk herds (and) ... its findings will be a guide for the Fish and Game Department and Forest Service in the management of the area” (Messelt 1946). Initial members of the Committee represented local stockmen, members of sportsmen clubs, dude ranchers, and the big game management personnel from the Montana State Fish and Game Commission and the Lewis and Clark National Forest (Urquhart 1942; Ferguson 1942b; 1943; Webb 1943a; Choteau Acantha 1945, 8 March). Elevated wartime hunting had reduced the herd significantly. Yet, the herd continued to damage private property. In 1946, the Sun River Conservation Council re- opened discussion on acquiring additional elk range. Lewis and Clark officials proposed attempting to lure the elk further to the north – through salting and hazing - where Depression era abandoned homesteads and Taylor Grazing Act land was more plentiful; the elk could graze that land in an open range fashion. But in 1947, a farmer with land bordering the Lewis and Clark at Sawtooth Mountain offered his property for sale to the Montana Fish and Game Department. The Forest Service consulted their classification surveys and declared that the land was fit for elk winter range. However, Fish and Game could not obtain the sale money on short notice; they appealed to the Sun River Conservation Council who promptly raised the money and purchased land for the Sun 374 River Game Refuge (Figure 4-23). Over the next fifteen years, additions were made to the over 20,000-acre Refuge. Some Rocky Mountain Front citizens rejected the idea of taking profitable ranch land out of commercial production for the sake of wildlife; some even worried that the Sun River Game Refuge would lead to the entire Rocky Mountain Front being designated as an elk and deer refuge (Messelt 1947; 1948; Wolff 1948; Choteau Acantha 1958, 11 September). By 1950, the State Fish and Game Department was fully in control of the elk situation and many believed that the herd was finally at a stable level. But herd management was not an easy task; the herd had to be annually salted and hazed to the Refuge. Once on the Refuge, the elk continued to migrate to surrounding private property. The state constructed fences around portions of the Refuge and continue an elk patrol. Other wildlife problems emerged however; the lowered elk numbers benefited the deer, bighorn sheep, and grizzly bear populations – all began to grow rapidly during the 1960s. Lewis and Clark foresters would be forced to construct management plans for each of them in the decades to come (Messelt 1947; 1951; Siniff 1949; 1952; Keller 2001). Lewis and Clark foresters also continued to support the state’s wildlife management initiatives through the 1950s and 1960s. The shift toward resource extraction, recreation, and timber road creation limited funding opportunities for comprehensive wildlife planning. In fact, in 1948 Forest Service wildlife appropriations were totally eliminated by Congress. Lewis and Clark continued counting elk and 375 mapping their migration as a part of their range management studies. Foresters turned to tagging, radio-collar telemetry, and outside reporting from hunters, hikers, and other 376 Figure 4-23: Sun River Game Range, 2013. Map by author (MT NRIS). recreation users for wildlife data (Choteau Acantha 1949, 3 March; 1955, 20 October; Keller 2001). Region 1 range management in the post war period continued where it left off before the war. Carrying capacity studies and range surveys continued to form the backbone of allocation permits. Lewis and Clark foresters conducted intensive range class mapping and transect sampling experiments to determine the rate of regeneration and forage palatability on smaller and smaller portions of the range. Ten year long range permits were extended in 1945 and again in 1955, giving stockmen some level of stability. Foresters continued to rely on grazing associations to manage permits, implement herder and salting rules, and cooperate in range infrastructure improvements. Despite ample demand for Lewis and Clark National Forest range, increased recreation and national social and economic shifts dictated that a trend toward stock reduction continued. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, cattle were removed from the Birch, Badger, Lubec, and Chicken Coulee areas, as were sheep from the Little Badger allotment (USDA LCNF 1947; 1952b; 1954b; 1965d; Leftwich 1951a; Hinman 1956; Terry 1957; Fallman 1958b; Rowley 1985, 197-230). In the early 1950s, the United States Forest Service began to emphasize the cooperative nature of its grazing policy; rather than continue stock reductions, the agency committed to utilizing stock associations to contribute to range improvement in direct ways thereby bringing “range capacity into line with range use” (Rowley 1985, 232). To facilitate this cooperation, Lewis and Clark foresters created the Lewis and Clark 377 National Forest Grazing Advisory Board in 1951. Through the 1950s and early 1960s, foresters and the Grazing Advisory Board worked together to alter grazing management plans. Occasionally, as in the case of the Little Badger sheep allotment, the Advisory Board recommended that the allotment shift livestock designations to meet current economic needs, labor shortages, and to support range health. The Advisory Board often was used to help set entry dates and organize rotations between distribution units (USDA LCNF 1953; 1955; 1957a; 1958a; Hinman 1955a-k; Greene 1961). The 1960 Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act placed grazing and wildlife management on equal levels of management as timber and watersheds. Stockmen perceived the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act as a threat to the cooperative relationship they had established with the Forest Service. Recreation was now recognized as a legitimate resource use and its inclusion in long term forest planning was required. Stockmen worried that recreation would challenge grazing as a primary national forest use. Foresters assured the stockmen that multiple use meant sharing the land in a balanced way that integrated uses without exclusion (Rowley 1985, 197-230). Lewis and Clark National Forest multiple use grazing and wildlife plans placed both grazing and wildlife in commoditized and simplified terms. Coordinated management of both resources in tandem represented “a key responsibility to be met for the benefit of the general public and local economy” (USDA LCNF 1962c). The plans recognized that conflict between grazing and wildlife still existed – especially in the Salmond, Ear Mountain, and Dupuyer allotments. Range conditions were better than in 378 past years and provided proof that cooperative negotiation had left present elk and stock numbers in balance with available range; cooperation should continue and would directly benefit the local economy. According to multiple use plans, better control could be obtained by eliminating the Sun River Game Preserve, since its existence had contributed to the unregulated growth of the elk and grizzly bear populations. Removal of the Preserve would allow the recreation industry to expand; Lewis and Clark foresters recommended that grizzly bear hunting begin immediately on the Preserve. Increased recreation in the Rocky Mountain Division required that horse pasturages be re- evaluated; most coexisted with elk range and had consistently been overgrazed. The multiple use plan also emphasized that adjustments were necessary for commercial packer horse permits in the Bob Marshall Wilderness; packer camps in the Wilderness were overly concentrated. As a result of the multiple use plan, a survey was conducted to locate alternate locations for packer camps that were well spaced, had water and were well screened from forest trails, and had ample forage and separation from other animals. An action plan for creating and managing these new camps was drafted (Greene 1962; USDA LCNF 1962a; 1962c). Recreation and Wilderness Management Forest Service policies and landscapes were altered in the middle decades of the 20th century to accommodate growing public demands for recreation on agency lands. The trend grew during the Great Depression. Involuntary leisure drew people to recreate in the forests and the Forest Service was forced to meet that impulse through planning, 379 scientific research, and infrastructure improvements. Recreation and wilderness preservation were enfolded into the national forest imperative. New Deal funding allowed the Forest Service to develop recreation improvements. World War II slowed recreation use on the forests, but then it increased rapidly after the war. Again, the agency was compelled to look for funding streams to manage recreation and wilderness (Keeley 1937e; Tweed 1989). Recreational use of the Lewis and Clark National Forest grew steadily through the 1920s and foresters adjusted their management plans to meet the impulse. To meet the demand for forest homesteads and hunting cabins, Lewis and Clark foresters sporadically allowed special use permits to build summer recreation homes. Most of the settlement was concentrated around the Bureau of Reclamation’s Sun River Project facilities. Requests for permits continued through the 1920s and foresters began to discuss organizing summer homes in residential tracts. Camping and picnicking increased in popularity through the 1920s, but unplanned use created sanitation and human-caused fire issues. Campers also tended to concentrate on easily accessible areas, stream banks, and open pastures, which complicated range, watershed, and timber management in those areas. To control camping use, Region 1 foresters began to standardize campground plans and directed foresters to designate suitable areas for campground construction. To meet the continuing need for commercial packers, hunters, and dude ranches, Lewis and Clark foresters altered grazing districts to allow commercial pack stock. These uses were again concentrated in the Sun River region. Dude ranches were also established near Gibson 380 Reservoir and many nearby grazing ranges were transferred to horse allotments (USDA FS 1931b, 50; Cooney 1940; Tweed 1989; USDA LCNF 2000b; HHM Inc 2006). National forest recreation was at an all time high in 1929; the Forest Service estimated that 32 million people visited national forests intent on recreational use that year – a 38 percent increase over 1928. More than 24 million were classified as “transient motorists,” denoting the importance of vehicular recreation access. Recreational visitors to Montana national forests in 1929 numbered 819,045 people; 744,000 accessed the forests using automotive transport. Use grew steadily through the early years of the Great Depression; federal money supporting road construction and total fire control opened up the national forest backcountry to automotive exploration. Montana national forest recreational visitors eclipsed the one million mark in 1931; nearly all – 95 percent – came by car. By 1935, the Lewis and Clark National Forest led all of Region 1 forests for tourism use (USDA FS 1930c; 1930d; 1932c; Choteau Acantha 1935, 19 December). Forest Service summer home construction lagged through the Great Depression – a dual result of economic stagnation and the agency’s prioritization of public recreation sites over private in-forest permits. Furthermore, the agency was forced to de-emphasize summer home construction following complaints over sanitation, road construction, and public access. Despite that, Lewis and Clark foresters continued to plan for private summer home residence construction. The Bureau of Reclamation had long planned for summer home recreation at the Gibson Reservoir and foresters were eager to implement residence plans to meet the small, but enthusiastic, local need. Lewis and Clark foresters 381 implemented a “neighborhood” tract plan model that allowed them to control development – each “neighborhood” consisted of a small number of permitted summer homes – and efficiently maintain access and sanitation infrastructure. Foresters instituted a roadside-strip policy for all summer home tracts; trees, brush, and other natural screening features were required on all summer home developments to keep development out of the sight of other forest users. Multiple neighborhood tracts were surveyed and developed in the Lewis and Clark in the early 1930s (Figure 4-24), including the Lower and Middle Home Gulch tracts and the Bureau of Reclamation Tract. Both the Hannan Gulch and Norwegian Gulch tracts were surveyed, plotted, and planned (Kelley 1932b; Linthacum 1934; Spencer 1935; USDA LCNF nd-w; 1997a; 2003d; HHM Inc. 2006). Campground improvement in the Lewis and Clark was in its preliminary stages in the early Great Depression years. New Deal road improvement for total fire control opened access to the Benchmark region - unregulated camping and significant sanitation issues followed. In 1934, a ten-table recreation area with loop roads and a gravity water pump system was installed at Benchmark as a public camping and picnic area. Foresters also constructed rudimentary camps at Home Gulch and Beaver Creek to balance public use of the Gibson Reservoir. Neither site was considered well-planned or organized (Linthacum 1933; USDA LCNF 1935f). Managing the demand for hunting and the dude ranching industry were major aspects of recreation management during the early 1930s. Foresters faced increasing pressure to supply grazing permits for commercial packers in support of the “dude 382 crop” (Choteau Acantha 1932, 24 November). In 1933, Rocky Mountain Division foresters allowed grazing permits for 375 horses in the region – a twenty percent increase from the previous year. Dude ranching and commercial packing became so important to the Lewis and Clark that Region 1 Forester Kelley requested information on all dude ranchers, packers, and commercial hunting guides in the area. Lewis and Clark foresters permitted several commercial hunting lodges and resorts to open inside forest boundaries to help meet this need. In the early 1930s, the Baker Resort in the Teton Canyon, the Fender Resort near Benchmark, and the Gleason Resort on the Teton at the forest border were all constructed and permitted to work dudes in and out of the forest. Commercial 383 Figure 4-24: Planned and Developed Summer Recreation Neighborhood Tracts, 1930s. Map by author (HHM Inc. 2006). lodges also filled a vital fire control function for Lewis and Clark foresters; guides and packers associated with the lodges routinely were the first to the fire-line and were an invaluable communications asset (Choteau Acantha 1933, 9 March; Hammatt 1933; Kelley 1933b; Wolff 1933e; USDA LCNF 1935f; Gleason 2000; Whitehorn 2005). At the start of the Great Depression, the Forest Service lacked statutory authority to manage both recreation and wilderness. On local and regional levels, foresters had attempted to craft management plans to deal with unauthorized public recreation; until the Forest Service issued the Copeland Report, there was no agency-wide guideline for recreation and wilderness planning. Robert Marshall was hired to write the recreation portion of the Copeland Report. Marshall’s desire to use and preserve wild places for multiple forms of recreation was legendary. His recommendations for Forest Service recreation planning formed the agency’s recreation blueprint through the middle decades of the 20 th century. Under his recommendations, the Forest Service should immediately begin scientific management of national forest recreation in order to improve forest and public health and aid local economies. Marshall recommended that ten percent of all national forest land be withdrawn from utilitarian management for recreational use – approximately 45 million acres in 1933. Forests should begin immediate surveys and planning for seven designated recreation landscapes including superlative areas – areas of exceptional beauty; primeval areas – overmature forest that was difficult to access and harvest in a sustained yield fashion; wilderness areas; roadside areas – scenic strips along rights-of-way; campgrounds; outing areas – picnic and day use recreation sites; and 384 residential areas. Marshall reconciled recreation acreage withdrawals with timber resource management by stating that it would force the agency to concentrate sustained yield timber harvesting in smaller areas that could be easily protected, accessed, and scientifically managed (US Congress 1933, 463-87; Glover 1986; Tweed 1989). Continuing conflict with the National Park Service over the authority to manage recreation landscapes added to agency desires for control over recreation use. The National Park Service emerged in the post-World War I landscape that placed greater importance on promotional tourism and consumption. By the 1930s, the national parks were the crown jewels of America’s federal conservation lands while Forest Service lands were often perceived as utilitarian. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the departments of the Interior and Agriculture skirmished over which bureaucratic branch had the authority to manage recreation landscapes. Foresters connected recreation to tourism and local community support. Timber and fire roads brought visitors from “remote sections ... the resulting business is of great importance to local commercial enterprises ... the recreational potentialities of the national forests now have a substantial significance for their regions” (USDA FS 1931b, 49). In an attempt to legitimize its planning methodology and to create sanitary and attractive recreation landscapes, the agency directed all regions and forests to begin a five-year planning study for recreation and campground development. Region 1 foresters devised a standardized sanitation guideline in line with the nation’s Public Health Service for national forest summer homes and 385 campgrounds which were used as a model for the rest of the Forest Service (USDA FS 1930d; USDA LCNF 1930d; Kelley 1931; Koch 1933a; Rothman 1989). The Forest Service centralized recreation management – as it had timber, fire control, wildlife management, and infrastructure improvement – within their hierarchical organizational structure. In 1935 the Forest Service established a separate Division of Recreation and Lands. Landscape architects staffed the Division, revealing the agency’s desire to manage recreation through site planning, crowd control, and sanitation remediation. Robert Marshall, the author of the recreation section of the Copeland Report, took control of the Division in 1937 until his premature death at age 38 two years later. Under Marshall’s tenure, recreation use management grew within the agency to a position of authority. Region 1 forester Evan Kelley stated that recreation was “regarded by the Forest Service as a major use which ... (was) coordinate with and, (in) certain areas, dominant over other forms of use and services” (1937e). The Division directed forests to utilize New Deal funding to organize forest-wide recreation plans and CCC labor to construct standardized recreation improvements. Forest Service recreation was further differentiated from National Park recreation in this process; Forest Service recreation improvements were standardized to be simple and suited to the national forest environment. “The avoidance of the unnecessary introduction into the forest environment of developments and facilities which tend to despoil the natural” was paramount to Forest Service recreation planning in the 1930s (Kelley 1937e) (Glover 1986; Tweed 1989). 386 Region 1 and Lewis and Clark foresters met this increased recreation impulse through planning, standardization, and further absorbing recreation into their management imperative. The basis of the recreation plan was to provide free recreation opportunities for the public and to integrate recreation as a “part of multiple land use” (USDA R1 1936e). Poor planning had left a legacy of use conflicts and inadequate quality and quantity of development. Region 1 created their own standardized plans for recreation houses and special permit dude ranches that mirrored national agency recreation standards. Plans included directives that all recreation structures must be constructed to preserve the natural setting. Building materials had to be suitable to the forest and uniform and appropriate in design and architecture. Also, property had to be landscaped with informal, natural lines. Region 1 foresters also recommended that forests plan recreation comprehensively, a methodology that provided greater multiple use integration and a measure of predictive value (USDA R1 1934; 1936e). Lewis and Clark foresters crafted a comprehensive recreation management plan for the region of their forest that was undergoing the greatest transformation due to recreation access – the Benchmark area. Titled the “Wood Creek – Ford Creek Recreation Plan,” the eastern Benchmark region was organized as a “recreation unit” and within the unit recreation was recognized as the dominant regional use. The plan divided the area into separate Falls Creek and Wood Creek divisions - each contained assessments of topography, attractiveness of the area, accessibility, available wood, water, and forage supplies, fire protection plans, wildlife, timber, administrative, and mineral developments 387 – twenty-five years before the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. The plan protected the region from free use timber harvests – a problem created by the increased access the Benchmark Road provided. Timber at the mouth of Fairview Creek was reserved from commercial use under administrative order and was made available for summer home recreation tract permit holders to provide cabin construction materials. A timber road was constructed to provide permit holders access to the Fairview Creek timber stand. The Wood – Ford Creek plan organized recreation plans with fire control in mind; telephone lines to Patrol Mountain Lookout and at portable junctions along Mule Creek, Fairview Creek, and at Benchmark created one of the region’s most intricate fire detection systems. The plan noted that recreational demand in the region would increase once the plan was implemented; fishing and wildlife recreation was expected to “contribute more to the recreational value and attraction ... than any other one thing” (USDA LCNF 1935f). To meet this need, Lewis and Clark foresters constructed a fish hatchery on Green Timber Creek, then employed trained fish biologists – a first – to survey and engineer streams to “improve the environmental conditions for trout” in the Lewis and Clark (Maclay 1936) (USDA LCNF 1935f; Maclay 1936). The Wood – Ford Creek plan provided for extensive summer residence development following the tract design model. Recreation tract plans at Double Falls, Aspen, Whitewater, Squirrel, Sunk, Pass, Cascadita, Lick, Mule, Fairview, and Glade creeks anticipated construction of over fifty summer home residences, hunting cabins, or organized club sites. In some locations – Squirrel and Cascadita creek sites – beaver 388 ponds were identified as fish rearing sites. Plans for all sites included water supply systems – most utilized some level of gravity-fed pipeline system that supplied water from upstream neighboring creeks. Tracts were shielded from general public view by lodgepole groves designated as “scenic strips” (USDA LCNF 1935f). Access roads and bridges were also required; the agency looked to federal funding and labor to tie the planned tracts into the general transportation system. The plan also recognized the need for public recreation in the region; portions of Mule and Glade creeks were reserved as public use areas – the preferred use in both sites was as a “good roadside parking and picnic spot.” The Wood Lake area was reserved for potential campground construction and was “to be kept free from all occupancy uses.” The ten-table Benchmark Campground – improved by the CCC in 1934 – was to be expanded to over twenty camping sites. Semi-public club sites and private resorts were planned at Benchmark as well - legitimizing road construction beyond fire control (Figure 4-25). In 1939, Region 1 landscape architects standardized national forest summer home site construction; the manual contained guidelines toward minimizing “evidence of man” in the forest and included multiple construction and site plans (USDA R1 1939a). Despite significant levels of planning, very little summer home and private resort construction occurred in the Lewis and Clark during the latter years of the Great Depression. Summer tract development necessitated large amounts of infrastructure engineering; as the agency negotiated the federal funding landscape in the late 1930s, it became clear that the agency needed to focus its money and labor towards improving and 389 constructing public camping sites. Region 1 foresters standardized campground improvement plans and provided foresters with general layouts, sanitation features, and landscaping tips. Campgrounds needed to “retain and enhance natural attractiveness” and “make Nature’s contribution to human recreation more accessible, more usable, with the fewest possible evidences of disturbance” (USDA R1 1935a). To that end, Region 1 campgrounds were required to use timber and shrubbery to screen all improvements; where trees and shrubs were not available, the agency required foresters to plant local species. Foresters were directed to plan campground locations carefully. Campgrounds should be near administrative sites, transportation routes, and water sources. Fewer, 390 Figure 4-25: Wood Creek-Fork Creek Recreation Plan. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1935f). larger camps that were centrally located were preferred to smaller and scattered campgrounds. Roads and pathways in campgrounds must not be straight lines and should flow naturally in one direction using the natural topography when available – or an engineered topography if necessary. Buffer areas were required around pumps, toilet and other sanitation facilities, and garbage pits. Lakeshores and stream banks were reserved for general use. Each campground was also required to have ample wood supplies, day use and overnight sites, and ample signage pointing to trails and locations of interest. Campsites were standardized with stoves and fireplaces, tables – an important control feature that centralized campers in a specific spot - and parking. Finally, the region standardized the paint-type and color of all Region 1 campsites; all campground improvements were to “henceforth be stained brown in accordance with the following formula unless otherwise specified: 8 parts – Fuller’s Logwood Oil, 1 Part – Burnt Umber ground in oil” (USDA R1 1935a). Locals continued to pressure Lewis and Clark foresters for public campground construction. Region 1 planners identified that “the people from the Butte and Great Falls areas” needed public campgrounds (USDA R1 1937a). The agency contemplated building a campground on the Teton River near the Baker Dude Ranch to control unplanned use. Existing campgrounds at Home Gulch and Beaver Creek were so overused that agency inspections deemed them severely inadequate. Home Gulch was “not a nice site ... too few toilets, tables and garbage pits have been installed ... ashes, cans, papers, clothes, boxes, etc. combine to make a rather bad looking lay-out of this site” (Jefferson 1937). 391 Beaver Creek was just as bad; after inspecting the facilities at Beaver Creek, Lewis and Clark foresters considered “completely abolish(ing) all evidence that campground development was ever attempted by us” (Jefferson 1937) Unplanned sites also existed in Hannan Creek and at Arsenic (Choteau Acantha 1937, 19 March). Until funding and manpower could be arranged, Lewis and Clark foresters met recreation pressure by regulating unplanned camping. Managing unplanned camping grew complicated when it conflicted with pack grazing and the dude ranch-commercial hunting industry. Unauthorized dude ranch camps at Arsenic Creek, in an area known as the Bars, had severely degraded the landscape. Unofficial campsites at the Bars extended into the Sun River Primitive Area and, while legal, left the region denuded of forage following the fall hunting season. The Bars were seen as critical habitat for the Sun River Elk herd. Foresters, with the consent of the Dude Wrangler’s Association, closed the Bars in 1937 and 1938 to camping and associated pack and saddle horse grazing “as a matter of experiment ... to endeavor to get the cooperation of the hunters without any particular law enforcement” (Ferguson 1937b). The closure prompted objections from the dude ranching and commercial packing industry. A petition to reconsider the closure was sent to the Division of Lands and Recreation in Washington D.C. Robert Marshall, head of the Division, questioned the authority of Lewis and Clark foresters to close the area to public camping. Lewis and Clark foresters stated that closing the area was done to protect the grazing resource, thereby placing it under their management imperative (Ferguson 1937c; 392 1938b; Kennedy 1937; Marshall 1937a; 1937b; Marshall 1938; Webb 1937; Wiles 1937b; Wolff 1937; 1938; Brothers 1938; Koch 1938; Sieker 1938; Strong 1938). The situation at the Bars became a national test case of the Forest Service’s legal authority to restrict and manage recreation camping in their forests; as a result Region 1 requested that the Secretary of Agriculture make a general rule giving forests the ability to restrict recreation use inside their boundaries. This was done and added to the USFS manual; however, upon further examination and consultation by the Forest Service attorney, the agency decided that they did not have the authority to exclude the public. As a result, the agency codified regulations to restrict stays in one area to no more than one week (Ferguson 1939c; Wolff 1939). At the end of the Depression, Region 1 national forests were seeing more than one million recreation visitors each year and it was becoming clear that recreation was economically important to local communities. A Choteau Acantha editorial tied Forest Service fire control to the area’s economic future; “Since,” it stated, “every vigil (is) being kept to prevent any conflagration that might destroy Choteau’s primaeval vacation area and beauty spot, campers and others should exercise the utmost caution while enjoying its privileges” (Choteau Acantha 1939, 17 August). World War II hurt recreation in the Lewis and Clark. Recreation sites along the Sun River at Gibson Dam were closed to public access at the beginning of the war for fear of sabotage. The dude ranch industry suffered as well; supply rationing and a national sentiment that disparaged excess and recreation as against the Allied war effort took their toll. Campground maintenance and 393 improvement was nonexistent during World War II due to funding constraints (Choteau Acantha 1942, 7 May; 1942, 21 May; 1943, 25 May; USDA R1 1942c). Following World War II, Forest Service officials once again turned their focus to recreation. The Forest Service identified recreation as a critical element in aiding the United States’ return to normalcy. While many forest managers began to concentrate planning and management on timber and road development, foresters in the Lewis and Clark sought to expand recreational opportunities. Sustained post war economic prosperity, technological advancement, and New Deal infrastructure development and planning all contributed to substantial recreation increases on national forest landscapes. During the post war period, national forest recreational visits in Montana increased 1300 percent – from 500,000 visitors in 1946 to almost seven million in 1965; recreation use in the Lewis and Clark National Forest increased 70 percent between 1949 and 1954. Funding recreation improvements was difficult however. Congressional funding increases in the 1940s and early 1950s were largely limited to timber road creation. Foresters often tied public land recreation to rural and local economic health – using much the same language as they did when talking about timber (Kelley 1937e; USDA LCNF 1954a). Demands for summer homes forced Lewis and Clark foresters to re-examine recreation plans created in the 1930s. Because of low recreation funding and internal pressures to provide an economic foundation for recreation planning, the agency raised summer home fees in 1946 and again in 1955. To defray agency costs, tract permittees were required to also build their own access roads and facilities – using forest products 394 and construction guidelines. Lewis and Clark foresters developed summer home communities following the tract plan. Tract development mirrored suburban development that was ubiquitous throughout the United States. Their developments expanded through the Sun River Canyon Recreational Area first; the Hannan Gulch, Lower Home Gulch, Middle Home Gulch, Mortimer Gulch, and Norwegian Gulch tracts were all re-surveyed and developed between 1945 and 1950. The Wood-Ford Creek Recreation Area was opened to tract development in the late 1940s and early 1950s; the Aspen Creek, Glade Creek, Lick Creek, Mule Creek, and Whitewater Creek tracts were all platted and developed by 1950. The Squirrel Creek cabins were platted in 1955. Finally, cabin developments occurred in the Teton Recreation Area; the Massey Creek tract was developed in 1951 (Figure 4-26; Figure 4-27; Figure 4-28) (Linthacum 1934; 1941; USDA LCNF 1935f; 1954b; 2004b; 2006a; Nagel 1946; USDA R1 1955; Esterl 1961; HHM Inc 2006). Public recreation infrastructure was underfunded and few improvements were made through the mid-1950s. Beaver Creek, Home Gulch, and Benchmark campground – all created in the 1930s with CCC labor – were in dire need of maintenance and refurbishment. The Home Gulch campground was washed out by floodwaters in 1948 and was rebuilt as a small four-table unit. By the 1950s, the Beaver Creek camp had degraded into little more than a picnic ground. In French Gulch near Gibson Reservoir, a makeshift and unplanned public camp descriptively known as Ragtown sprung up and remained on the landscape until 1958. The agency altered previous recreation plans to 395 provide for expanded use and designed sites on the Teton River and on the shores of Diversion and Wood lakes. Lewis and Clark foresters continually appealed for recreation improvement funds and manpower through the mid 1950s but found little relief. Foresters also appealed to local dude rancher and wildlife associations to work in cooperative recreation site management. For example, in 1955 the Cascade Wildlife Association constructed a dam, spillway, and marginal recreation site improvements at Wood Lake (Nagel 1946; Harmon 1947; Harmon 1948; 1950; USDA LCNF 1949b; 1952a; 1955). Fifteen years of unequal federal funding and manpower allocations had led to severely degraded recreation facilities on other public lands. In 1956, the National Park 396 Figure 4-26: Summer Recreation Residences, Teton Recreation Area, 1965. Map by author (HHM Inc 2006). 397 Figure 4-28: Summer Recreation Residences, Wood-Ford Recreation Area, 1965. Map by author (HHM Inc 2006). Figure 4-27: Summer Recreation Residences, Sun River Recreation Area, 1965. Map by author (HHM Inc 2006). Service launched a ten-year, one billion-dollar program to modernize and re-engineer national park recreation facilities across the United States. Mission 66, as it was called, served as a model for the Forest Service’s parallel program – Operation Outdoors – which launched in 1957. Both Mission 66 and Operation Outdoors aimed to expand recreation facilities to meet present and future needs using prefabricated, standardized materials and planning schemes. While similar in need and scope, Operation Outdoors differed from Mission 66 in many ways: the agency viewed infrastructure development under Operation Outdoors as following simple, landscape-appropriate design lines whereas Mission 66 landscape improvements were often architecturally adventurous and expansive. The agency also sought to keep national forest recreation restricted to traditional uses – camping, hiking, picnicking, hunting, fishing, and wilderness travel. Mission 66 planners expanded the definition of recreation in national parks by designing facilities for guided tours and lectures, sporting events, and interpretive services. The agency publicized national forests as public recreation areas. Each forest was required to develop a comprehensive forest-wide recreation plan – the first of its kind (USDA R1 1958a; USDA LCNF 1959; Baker et al 1993; Carr 2007). Operation Outdoors’ focus on public recreation limited any expansion of private recreation residences in the Lewis and Clark and gave foresters funding to implement campground construction and refurbishment plans. Lewis and Clark foresters identified four critical recreation regions in need of public campsites (Figure 4-29). The Benchmark area received considerable upgrades; Benchmark campground was expanded to over 398 twenty camping sites and was provided new signage, sanitation, and end-of-the-road facilities. The agency attempted to develop camping sites at Wood Lake but ran into water supply problems; engineering mismanagement resulted in sanitation seepage into the drinking water supply system. Lewis and Clark foresters also constructed controlled commercial packer and hunting camps – complete with trailer parking, pickets, and stock loading ramps – at Straight Creek just north of Benchmark (McLaughlin 1956; USDA LCNF 1961). In the Sun River Canyon, foresters completely redesigned the Home Gulch campground from a site that was “little better than a forest slum” to a modern, multi-site campground complete with a boat launching facility that allowed safe and controlled public access to Gibson Lake (Olsen 1957). Campground facilities were finally constructed in the Teton River Canyon; the Windy Fork Campground – a ten family unit located on the North Fork of the Teton River – was constructed in 1962 and was viewed by foresters as only a start to public recreational development in the area. The agency planned a large 21-site campground along the northern border of the Lewis and Clark at the summit of Marias Pass. Foresters recognized the necessity and opportunity for recreation expansion along the U.S. Highway 2 corridor that formed the border between the Lewis and Clark and Flathead national forest with Glacier National Park. The Summit campground (Figure 4-30) was developed in 1962 at the end of the Operation Outdoors period. Water development at Summit was difficult – a reason no recreation site had previously been developed there – though agency officials negotiated a water-use 399 agreement with the Burlington Northern Railroad to use their water system to supply the camp. Finally, though only tangentially tied to Operation Outdoors or Mission 66, the planned creation of the national Continental Divide Trail in 1965 through multiple 400 Figure 4-29: Public and Packer Campgrounds, 1965. Map by author (USDA FS 1965a). national forests and national parks exemplified the nationwide attempt to memorialize, historicize, and promote public land recreation. The Continental Divide Trail utilized several Lewis and Clark trails in an attempt to create a continuous north-south trending pathway from the southern border of the United States to Canada (USDA LCNF 1957a; 1959; 1962a; 1962c; Linthacum 1958; Barry 1961; 1962; Pulver 1962; Roskie 1962b; USDA R1 1958c; 1962b; 1963; Byrne 1965; Engler 1971a). Operation Outdoors did not solve all of the recreation infrastructure issues in the Lewis and Clark. Recreation facilities in the Teton Ranger District fell far below need. Limited access points and rugged topography produced heavy recreation-based 401 Figure 4-30: Summit Campground Signage, 1962 (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). congestion. Unplanned recreation occurred regularly on seismograph roads on the South Fork and North Fork of the Teton, the South Fork of the Two Medicine, and on the North Fork of Badger Creek. Local commercial hunting outfits developed extensive and complex unplanned pack camps along the Teton Canyon road and in the Biggs Creek Flats. Agency planners predicted that recreation pressure would continue to mount as population, timber road construction, and awareness of the Bob Marshall Wilderness grew. Campgrounds, roads, hiking and end-of-the-road facilities remained in great need. These issues were addressed in the Teton District Multiple Use plan and associated commercial packer plan for the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The plans called for greater allocations to the region to provide for infrastructure and a thorough survey – one that relied heavily on local input and commercial packer knowledge – to identify areas sufficient for planned packer camps and public recreation sites. The survey asked locals to identify areas that were well-spaced, watered, screened from trails and roads, had forage, and were adequately separated from other uses and wildlife. Eleven sites were chosen – the camps along Biggs Creek were eliminated - and an action plan was put in place intent on creating and managing the new camps. Until funding was secured to create new campgrounds, a “recreation guard” was hired in the Teton District. The guard operated from Gates Park, Cabin Creek, and Wrong Creek administrative stations with the authority to encourage recreation trespassers to use planned sites and facilities (USDA LCNF 1952a; 1962a; 1962c). 402 The catastrophic floods in 1964 destroyed most of the infrastructure improvements made in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Most of the recently constructed recreation sites were so badly damaged as to require near-total overhaul. However, the flood also served as a purgative that allowed the agency to wash away earlier improvements and recreate them along standardized and modernized foundations. After the 1964 flood destroyed Home Gulch campground, agency officials decided that it was cost-effective and beneficial to relocate a campground up the hillsides to the north in Mortimer Gulch. A new boat site – the old one was completely washed away – was approved at Home Gulch and a portion of the original campground site was converted into a boat access parking lot. The Mortimer Gulch campsite was planned to be expansive – 45 units. Construction began on the site in 1965 (Esterl 1964a; 1965; Morrison 1964; USDA LCNF 1964aa; 1965b; USDA R1 1965d). Flooding along the Teton River in 1964 destroyed the newly created Windy Ford campground; deep erosive cuts in the stream bank negated any opportunity to rebuild the site. It was relocated and renamed the Cave Mountain campground. Cave Mountain was planned for twenty sites. A second, smaller campground was also proposed at the same time; the Elko campground site had long been an unplanned public site on the North Fork of the Teton. In the Benchmark area, over 175 feet of approach road to Wood Lake was destroyed. Foresters reconstructed the road with campground expansion in mind, replanted vegetation around the site, and installed new tables and sanitation facilities. The flood also destroyed the Benchmark – Straight Creek hunter and commercial packer 403 campgrounds. The agency used the opportunity to plan and construct official packer camps and a new end-of-the-road facility. Finally, the agency created multiple end-of-the- road recreation facilities to control access to the Bob Marshall Wilderness; sites were constructed along the Middle and North forks of the Teton and on the South Fork of the Sun (Esterl 1964a; 1964b; USDA LCNF 1964a; 1964ff; 1964gg; 1964 hh; 1964 ii; 1964 jj; 1965c; USDA R1 1965e). The middle decades of the twentieth century were periods of great change for Forest Service wilderness management. Following decades of growing public pressure to preserve national forest lands, the Forest Service took the initial steps to modify their management imperative to include wilderness preservation. In 1929 the agency created a new boundary designation – the L-20 primitive area – and set aside millions of acres from most utilitarian uses. However, New Deal modernization threatened Forest Service primitive areas and it became increasingly difficult for agency officials to advocate for roadlessness in an economic depression. Wilderness advocates met the demand for primitive area development with an appeal for minority rights; even if the greatest number of people wanted roads, hotels, timber extraction, and modernization, the greatest good was to place a value on the wilderness ideal. Wilderness supporters organized nationally under the banner of the Wilderness Society and pushed the agency to strictly define primitive and wilderness area management guidelines. Wilderness again came under public scrutiny after World War II as Cold War timber demands and technological advances pushed the agency to consider opening wilderness areas to road construction 404 and an annual timber harvest. In response, citizen activist groups organized and lobbied for wilderness expansion and increased roadlessness. Throughout the period, the Lewis and Clark National Forest was frequently at the center of the wilderness controversy. The 1929 Forest Service L-20 regulation created primitive areas on national forest land and limited primitive area improvements to fire control trails, telephone lines, airfields, lookouts, and administrative use. Two primitive areas bordering the Lewis and Clark were reserved in the early 1930s: the South Fork Primitive area was created in 1931 and spanned 584,000 acres entirely in the Flathead National Forest including 69,000 acres deeded to the Northern Pacific Railroad. The agency acquired the checkerboard lands and forest homesteads within the Primitive Area through exchange and purchase between 1935 and 1955. In 1933 the agency created the Pentagon Primitive Area – 95,000 acres on the upper Middle Fork of the Flathead. A strip of 31,000 acres separated the Pentagon from the South Fork. Foresters wanted to keep that area free from use restrictions and open to the possibility of waterpower and road development connecting the Spotted Bear administrative site in the Flathead National Forest with Benchmark in the Lewis and Clark. The strip was later added to the Pentagon in 1939 when water and road-based recreation development were deemed impractical (Kelley 1932a; Choteau Acantha 1933, 16 March; Wolff 1933b; Shaw 1964, 65-79; Keller 2001). Beginning in 1930 Lewis and Clark foresters began to analyze potential primitive area boundaries in the Rocky Mountain Division. Early in the process, foresters thought that there would be little local opposition to creating a primitive area in the Lewis and 405 Clark but that there might be some “division of opinion” on restricting potential summer home and dude ranch creation (Lockhart 1930g). Ultimately, there was considerable discussion over the Sun River Primitive Area boundary designation. Some Lewis and Clark foresters originally wished to classify large portions of land in the Rocky Mountain Division backcountry as primitive areas; they believed that primitive area classification would trump state wildlife Game Preserve classification and give the agency a measure of control over the Sun River elk herd. Others viewed primitive area expansion as “a Bob Marshallian fetish” and against the agency’s management imperative (Wolff 1933d). The boundary of a Lewis and Clark National Forest primitive area was negotiated several times. Most agreed that it should contain the headwaters of the Sun River and extend to the Continental Divide. Several watersheds, including Route, Rock, and Olney creeks and the West Fork of the Teton were exempted due to the potential for timber harvest and the presence of multiple pending hunting lodge permit applications. Some foresters sought compromise by advocating for summer home development in a potential primitive area as long as permittees did not construct access roads. Fire control infrastructure also influenced the boundary; Lewis and Clark foresters wanted a road to continue past Benchmark to Gates Park and ultimately to Gibson Dam and a second to connect the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests through Rock Creek. Most potential boundary scenarios overlapped with grazing permits on Bear and Moose creeks. Lewis and Clark foresters determined that grazing was allowed to continue in those areas until the permits expired in 1935. The most contentious boundary conflict surrounded the 406 Allan dude ranch at Arsenic / Medicine Springs. The Allans had located their ranch in part because of agency plans to construct roads past Benchmark, thereby opening up the region to recreational use. Rather than force the Allans to relocate, Lewis and Clark foresters consulted the Allans and had them redraw the boundary lines away from their ranch. Finally, the agency consulted the Bureau of Reclamation that advised them that the construction of a second impound dam within potential Primitive Area boundaries had been planned and that boundary modifications should be delayed. The agency, anxious to gain a new level of control over the Sun River backcountry, ignored Reclamation suggestions (Kelley 1930c; Lockhart 1930f; 1930i; Hammatt 1932; 1933; Willey 1932b; 1933a; 1933b; Wolff 1932b; 1932d; 1933c; 1933d). In 1934, the Sun River Primitive Area was created. Its boundary encompassed 240,000 acres free of roads and modern conveniences (Figure 4-31). There was some local criticism of the agency; many wanted the region opened up to public recreation. But the agency had done well to consult the important dude ranchers and livestock holders in the region and gain their support. The Allan family became some of the Sun River Primitive Area’s most stalwart proponents. Management of the northern Montana primitive areas was relatively uncontroversial throughout the Great Depression. The agency sought to use primitive area status to increase their wildlife management abilities with little success. Both foresters and the general public seemed unsure of just what management imperatives fit within primitive areas (Kelley 1933b; Wolff 1936; USDA R1 1936c; Ferguson 1937b; Jefferson 1937; Marshall 1937b; Shaw 1964, 65-79). 407 Internal debate on primitive areas grew. Some foresters saw the L-20 regulations as inconsistent with Forest Service “greatest good” principles – especially since the 408 Figure 4-31: Sun River, South Fork, and Pentagon Primitive Areas, 1936. Map by author (USDA R1 1936n). nation was in the middle of an economic depression. Some within the agency saw primitive land creation as a bulwark against National Park Service expansion and federal New Deal reorganization. Nationally, a debate began over use and access to primitive areas. Some primitive area activists, accustomed to the level of access found in national parks, requested the Forest Service provide primitive area infrastructure - entry-points, sanitation facilities, marked and guided trails, and shelters – that would open primitive area recreation to a larger segment of the population. Roads had been constructed by CCC laborers in several western primitive areas including the Selway-Bitterroot Primitive Area in Montana and Idaho. Members of the Wilderness Society disagreed. Assistant Forester L.F. Kneipp did as well stating, “there should be no need for developing these areas to take care of the large numbers of people who are not capable of exploring wild country without considerable aid. The class of people who need (infrastructure improvements) has millions of acres of other lands open to them, wild enough to suit their most exacting tastes and yet sufficiently improved to provide them with the facilities they need” (Kneipp 1930a). Robert Marshall conducted a survey of roadless areas over 300,000 acres per unit and determined that over 30,000,000 acres of contiguous roadless land existed in western national forests. Between 1937 and 1939, Marshall and other primitive area proponents lobbied the Forest Service to give legal status to primitive areas that made commercial use in L-20 areas illegal. The agency initially resisted modifying the L-20 regulations on the basis that land use needs were highly variable over time and any sort of modification would limit the agency’s ability to 409 meet dynamic economic and social conditions. Marshall himself recommended nearly every “area over 100,000 acres on national forest lands ... to be considered for primitive classification” and spent months examining many western backcountry acreages (Gilligan 1953, 191). Marshall was convinced that the L-20 regulations needed bolstering and he openly criticized the agency’s primitive area standards as broad and insignificant (Gilligan 1953, 132-96; Baker et al 1993). In 1938, largely as a result of Marshall and other pro-wilderness advocates, Chief Ferdinand Silcox instructed each Region to reclassify primitive areas. Areas over 100,000 acres were renamed wilderness and areas from 5,000 to 100,000 acres were designated as wild areas. The reclassification carried new restrictions: all road construction and logging were excluded from either designations. Private airplanes were not allowed to land in the areas except under emergency situations. Grazing and hunting were allowed under permit. Boundary lines had to be redrawn so that existing roads were no closer than one half mile away. On September 19, 1939, the Secretary of Agriculture rescinded the L-20 regulations and approved the U-1, U-2, and U-3 regulations. U-1 created wilderness areas. U-2 established wild areas. U-3 designation gave the Forest Service the right to designate areas as recreation areas and the ability to manage areas for that purpose – over twenty years before the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. In total, the Forest Service established 73 primitive areas and two roadless areas under the L-20 designations – a total of 14,235,000 acres. All three primitive areas in and near the Lewis and Clark met the qualifications for U-1 designation as wilderness areas – the Pentagon Primitive Area 410 eclipsed the 100,000-acre threshold following the “strip” addition (Yard 1940; Gilligan 1953, 194-207; McArdle 1957; Shaw 1964, 65-79). In August of 1940 all three primitive areas were reclassified together and renamed the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The agency originally considered renaming the Selway- Bitterroot Primitive Area after the recently deceased forester and founder of the Wilderness Society. But they decided that combining the three Continental Divide primitive areas into one wilderness area created a physically distinctive and tourist oriented wilderness jewel in the agency’s preservation crown. U-1 wilderness reclassification therefore combined management of the Bob Marshall Wilderness - all 950,000 acres – into a dual-forest management scheme. To facilitate management, the former primitive area boundaries were re-designated as management units; the Flathead continued to manage the South Fork and Pentagon units while the Lewis and Clark focused its wilderness plans on the Sun River unit. Both were required to manage the area under the following guidelines: 1) No roads were allowed into or through the area; 2) No planes were allowed to land other than those for Forest Service and emergency use; 3) No resorts, summer homes, or organized camps could be constructed; 4) No commercial logging was allowed; 5) No commercial grazing was allowed, except for recreational use; 6) the Bureau of Reclamation retained the right to use areas under its control as it sees fit (Kelley 1940; Space 1940; Squire 1940; USDA R1 1940b; 1940i; Wallace 1940; Yard 1940; Shaw 1964, 65-79). 411 Wilderness management took on a somewhat diminished role during the World War II and immediate post-war years. Total Forest Service wilderness acreage did not grow during the 1940s (Figure 4-32). Wilderness area management imperatives existed in a nebulous, pre-multiple use world; while wilderness areas had special and rigidly defined regulations, foresters were not practiced at marrying wilderness management with utilitarian forest management. Wilderness regulations were only taken into account when they conflicted with other uses. When conducting elk and wildlife range surveys, for example, foresters needed to find non-motorized transportation alternatives once inside the Bob Marshall’s boundary. Wilderness areas were predominantly managed for recreation and included in those plans. When time and finances allowed, foresters had local rangers craft and distribute small trail marking signs separate from the traditional Forest Service tree-blazes for the emerging trail riding and hiking culture. The majority of agency wilderness management planning in the 1940s and 1950s concerned fire control. With the total control - 10 a.m. fire management plan in effect, foresters had to craft efficient and technologically sound firefighting methods that fit within wilderness area guidelines. By 1946, Region 1 foresters had fully turned to using smokejumpers, an aerial attack force, and integrated communications and distribution systems like the Continental Unit to fight wilderness area fires (McArdle 1957; USDA FS 1961b). In 1949, the Bureau of Reclamation responded to national calls for hydropower and flood control by opening public discussion on expanding the Sun River Project into the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Two sites were proposed as possible dam sites – the Wilson 412 and Sun Butte dams both would push road development into the Bob Marshall and flood significant portions of the wilderness. The Bureau of Reclamation had legal authority to supersede Forest Service regulation due to their first form reclamation withdrawals set aside on the Sun River before the initial project starting date. Lewis and Clark foresters were wary of public dissent and suggested that they enforce automotive restrictions within the Wilderness while the Bureau surveyed the dam sites. However, the regional office denied Lewis and Clark foresters that option; the 1940 consolidation document 413 Figure 4-32. Total Forest Service Wilderness, Primitive, and Wild Areas, 1930-1961 (USDA FS 1961b). allowed the Bureau to use whatever methods they deemed necessary to further their work. Wilderness boundaries were subject to automatic adjustment if any area was made “unsuited to wilderness classification by reason of improvements or uses by the Reclamation Service" (Harmon 1949) (Leftwich 1949a; Lindquist 1949). In 1955, Region 1 foresters responded to demands from the American Legion to change the name of the Bob Marshall Wilderness to the Colonel Charles L. Sheridan Wilderness. The demand was an artifact of the Cold War era; the American Legion resented the fact that Marshall had supported socialist organizations during his life. “It (was) the American Legion's belief that changing the name of this Area from that of a man who engaged in such odious dealings with very Un-American individuals, to that of a very well respected patriot and defender of his country like Charles L. Sheridan, would be an extremely popular and merited action" (Babb 1955a). A letter requesting the name change, erroneously written to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, stated that the wilderness was created and named "when it was fashionable to spout the 'Party Line' and consort with Party organizers, egg-heads and pseudo-liberals, a twenty year binge of Communist ideology that our great grand-children will be paying for. The name is a disgrace and besmirches the memory of every deceased veteran coming from the sovereign state of Montana" (Doyle 1955). The Department of Agriculture examined the possibilities of changing names – there is some evidence that the Eisenhower administration favored the name change – but ultimately declined titular re-designation (Babb 1955b; Hopkins 1955; Sieker 1955b; McArdle 1956). 414 Beginning in the 1950s, the Forest Service reclassified U-1 regulation primitive lands as wilderness areas. Between 1951 and 1961 total national forest wilderness acreage grew from approximately two million to nearly five million acres. Recreation and wilderness visits increased steadily through the 1950s and the agency sought to increase its national recreation presence. Public support for wilderness grew – or at least grew more vocal during the 1950s. However, the Forest Service also continued to have difficulty managing wilderness alongside increasing timber harvest, oil and gas exploration, and vehicular recreation. Expanding timber cuts and the rise of clearcutting as an accepted and frequently used technology solidified public environmentalists behind increased wilderness (USDA FS 1955b; 1956d; 1961b; Hirt 1994 162-70). Proposed timber harvests in de facto wilderness areas – regions that had not been designated as primitive, wilderness, or wild but existed in a roadless state – bolstered support for wilderness legislation and set a precedent for citizen-based petition. Heavy windstorms in the Flathead National Forest blew down large amounts of timber near the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Flathead foresters worried that the downed trees created a fire and spruce beetle infestation problem; they also wished to harvest millions of board feet of timber in order to meet national resource demands. In the fall of 1953 Flathead foresters surveyed the area – known as Bunker Creek – and decided that a salvage sale was in order; they announced plans to sell 23 million board feet in 1954. To access the downed timber, a thirty-mile long road that paralleled the Bob Marshall boundary needed 415 to be constructed. At its closest point, the road came within ¼ of a mile of the wilderness boundary; it connected to interior roads at the Spotted Bear administration site. Local opposition to the timber road came first from outfitters but soon grew in scope and ferocity. Sportsmen and wilderness advocates worried that roads built into de facto wilderness areas could bleed into designated wilderness areas. Flathead foresters held public meetings to explain the silvicultural necessity for the harvest. Pro-wilderness, wildlife, and outfitter associations responded by petitioning the Secretary of Agriculture for a 279,000 acre extension to the Bob Marshall Wilderness along the south and middle forks of the Flathead River, including the Bunker Creek area. Wilderness supporters along the southern border of the Bob Marshall also petitioned for 50,000 acres along the Blackfoot River in the Scapegoat area to be added as well. Conservation lobbyists combined both claims and petitioned local state legislators; they responded by passing House Joint Memorial 12 requesting wilderness extension (Flathead Conservationists 1955; Hungry Horse News 1955, 4 March; Richards 1955; The Inter Lake 1954, 4 March; 1955, 11 March; USDA FNF 1955; Keller 2001, 40). The governor of Montana vetoed Memorial 12. The Secretary of Agriculture denied the petition to extend the Bob Marshall and the road to Bunker Creek was constructed. But the Bunker Creek controversy served as a rallying cry for wilderness promoters and served to galvanize support behind creating environmental legislation which would take wilderness designation decisions out of the hands of the Forest Service. In 1955, the Sun River Conservation Committee, the supervisor of the Lewis and Clark, 416 and elements of the Outfitters Association, conducted a survey of the Bob Marshall “to obtain outside viewpoints” (Smith 1955a). Most of the Committee, including the Lewis and Clark supervisor, agreed that the Bob Marshall boundary should be extended (Siniff 1955; Smith 1955b; Crouch 1956; Shaw 1964; Keller 2001, 40). In 1956, armed with testimony from outfitters, wilderness enthusiasts, professional foresters – including some from the Lewis and Clark National Forest – and local businessmen, wilderness activists began to lobby the United States Congress for environmental zoning legislation that would limit the Forest Service’s ability to alter wilderness area boundaries. Wilderness legislation discussion lasted for eight years; historian Paul Hirt described the extended Congressional debate over wilderness legislation as “essentially represent(ing) a struggle between those seeking to define ‘conservation’ as a combination of rational resource use along with deliberate nonuse, and those who sought to define conservation as wise use only” (1994, 230). Opponents argued that wilderness was a violation of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act; wilderness areas are confined to wilderness use only. Proponents sought to levy the energy of a new wave of environmentalists into legislation. Wilderness advocates sought three outcomes: first, they wanted Congress to declare wilderness preservation as a national policy. Wilderness supporters also wanted Congressional protection for Forest Service, National Park, and Bureau of Land Management designated wilderness areas, making it more difficult for federal agencies to reclassify land use designations. Finally, wilderness supporters wanted provisions 417 included in any legislation that allowed for new wilderness areas to be created. Pro- wilderness lobbyists asked that new wilderness areas be designated by executive order and settled on a compromise that placed wilderness creation in the hands of both houses of Congress and the President (Roth 1984, 1; Hirt 1994, 229-35). The 1964 Wilderness Act transformed the national forest imperative. The Forest Service had a “new role as one of several wilderness advisors to Congress, which now had the final word on what areas would be designated wilderness” (Roth 1984, 2). The Wilderness Act defined wilderness as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean ... an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation” (US Congress 1964). This greatly complicated multiple use and utilitarian planning. The nebulous “untrammeled” and “primeval character” language opened doors for future litigation and public input. Environmental advocates soon learned that they could use the Act to push for roadless national forest lands reclassification. An initial test of the Wilderness Act came in the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Public protest in the 1950s had put to rest Bureau of Reclamation plans to construct the Wilson and Sun Butte dams. The 1964 floods re-ignited Reclamation’s desire for floodwater storage projects on the Sun River. Both the Bureau and the Forest Service were unsure whether or not Reclamation’s first form withdrawals could stand up to Congressional legislation. Wilderness advocates protested dam construction in the Bob 418 Marshall wilderness areas; dams and reservoirs did not equate to the “untrammeled” and “primeval” characteristics of wilderness land. Development of the dam sites, however, was allowed; the Act permitted water resource development within established wilderness boundaries so long as the project had undergone a period of Forest Service review, a public comment period, and was specifically authorized by the President (Cliff 1965; Costley 1965; Pomajevich 1965; USDA R1 1965a). The Lewis and Clark region served as a further testing-ground for the Wilderness Act. In 1963 Helena foresters published a plan – in conjunction with the Multiple Use- Sustained Yield Act – for the Lincoln Ranger District. The plan detailed road construction, timber harvest, and recreation development – along multiple use standards – in a 75,000-acre portion of undeveloped forest that bordered the Lewis and Clark and the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Figure 4-33). The development area contained no roads and had been undeveloped – a de facto wilderness. It was used extensively by Lincoln residents for informal recreation and was important for Lincoln’s growing commercial guide and packer industry. Historically, the Forest Service had not protected the Lincoln backcountry as a primitive or wilderness area, despite the fact that foresters had posted signs leading into the region prohibiting motorized vehicles. Recreation development in the Lincoln backcountry was designed to leave the area in a “near natural” environment (Fishing & Hunting News 1963, 26 October; Independent Record 1963, 31 March; USDA HNF 1963; Roth 1984). 419 In 1960, Lincoln residents became aware of the development plan; three men, including a sporting goods storeowner named Cecil Garland, organized the Lincoln Backcountry Protective Association in objection to the planned road and campground construction. Garland appealed to the Forest Service to alter its plan; the southern portion of the area could be logged but the northern backcountry should be left untouched and 420 Figure 4-33. Lincoln Backcountry Area (Great Falls Tribune 1963, 1 December). protected as wilderness – an extension of the Bob Marshall. Opposition to opening up the backcountry grew. In June 1963, Helena foresters altered the plan slightly and a portion of the road was eliminated. Protest crystallized behind Garland; Montana state legislators, the Montana Fish and Game Commission, and the Western Montana Fish and Game Association all supported Garland. In the face of increasing public opposition, Helena foresters decided to delay construction (Fishing & Hunting News 1963, 26 October; Great Falls Tribune 1963, 22 May; Independent Record 1963, 15 September; 1964, 5 January; Roth 1984). The debate grew in complexity and symbolized the conflict between preservation and multiple use in the western United States. The timber industry saw the Lincoln backcountry issue as a watershed moment; wilderness was a denial of congressionally mandated multiple use and an act of “extreme selfishness” (Koessler 1963). Many Lincoln residents loved the idea of wilderness, but did not wish to see wilderness extended into their backyards. Most were in agreement that the timber in the Lincoln backcountry was not of merchantable quality; the Forest Service promised to replant the area with productive and desired stands – an idea that appealed to many. Recreationists fell on both sides of the issue; many supported keeping the area untouched but others saw the opportunity planned and developed recreation provided (Missoulian 1963, 23 October; Great Falls Tribune 1964, 19 January). In 1964, Garland called upon the Wilderness Society for aid. Together, they petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture and Montana Congressmen Lee Metcalf, James 421 Battin, and Mike Mansfield to support the extension of the Bob Marshall Wilderness into the Scapegoat-Lincoln backcountry area. Both Metcalf and Mansfield proposed an extension of 75,000 acres in the Lewis and Clark and Helena national forests; Battin, aware of an opportunity to out due Metcalf and Mansfield, introduced a bill calling for a new wilderness area of 240,500 acres to be created. The acts were the first citizen- initiated wilderness proposals made after the passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act. The proposals were repeatedly delayed by various lobbying efforts and as the 1960s came to a close, Lincoln residents and agency foresters alike were unsure whether the Scapegoat- Lincoln Wilderness would be created (US Congress 89 th , 1 st Session 1965a; 1965b). Mining and Watershed Management Planning for hardrock quartz and lode mining use on the Rocky Mountain Division never constituted a significant management challenge for Lewis and Clark foresters. Most Region 1 national forests saw an increase in mining claims during the Great Depression as out-of-work laborers and farmers turned to the hills in an attempt to strike pay dirt. Between 1930 and 1936, Region 1 foresters constructed over 302 miles of forest development roads – with the aid of federal funds and labor - to facilitate transportation to and from new mining claims. However, no mineral development roads were constructed in the Lewis and Clark. In 1934, two claims were located in the Rocky Mountain Division. Clarence Lynch and Godman White of Augusta claimed the Grizzly Quartz Lode along Biggs Creek within the Sun River Primitive Area. L-20 primitive area management rules allowed mining in primitive areas as long as roads were not 422 constructed. Inspection and preliminary tests indicated that there were significant possibilities that the site could be developed into a productive gold, silver, and lead mine, but the inaccessibility of the site limited any development. A second claim was filed near the Benchmark administration site. Charles Brown made improvements to the site but little ore was discovered (Kelley 1936; Nagel 1946; Fulbright 1996). Most of the mining claims in the Rocky Mountain Division concerned oil and natural gas prospecting. Through the Great Depression and the war years, the petroleum industry sporadically explored and extracted oil and gas from the Rocky Mountain Front overthrust belt. Oil exploration accelerated in the 1950s. In 1955, significant oil and gas structures were discovered at Pincher Creek just north of the Canadian boundary. Geologists from multiple petroleum companies expanded exploration all along the Rocky Mountain Front. Seismographic tests showed that there was a significant oil body along Deep Creek extending into the Lewis and Clark and ultimately into the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The agency allowed exploration crews to construct roads into the forest near Palookaville. In the late 1950s, natural gas was discovered at the mouth of the Blackleaf Canyon. By late summer wells were developed at the Lewis and Clark boundary (Choteau Acantha 1955, 9 June; 1955, 1 September; 1955, 22 December; 1958, 3 April; 1958, 7 August; USDA LCNF 1962c). Petroleum industry geophysicists believed that large bodies of oil and gas existed inside of the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Both foresters and conservationists worried about how an oil discovery would impact the wilderness area. Foresters refused requests to 423 build exploration roads into the Bob Marshall; petroleum industry scientists continued exploration work in the wilderness using locally hired commercial pack strings. Oil companies approached the state Fish and Game department wishing to lease large portions of the Sun River Game Refuge. Requests were denied but members of the Sun River Conservation Committee and Lewis and Clark foresters both spoke out against oil exploration in the area; both feared that the oil industry would seriously disturb the carefully planned elk migration onto the Refuge (Crouch 1956; Smith 1956; Stein 1957). Following the passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, Lewis and Clark foresters were forced to incorporate oil and gas exploration and drilling into their management plans. Foresters recognized the economic importance of oil drilling, both on a national and a local level. However, foresters were concerned over the “sporadic” nature of this economic boom. Oil and gas exploration therefore required “special management action” in order to protect forest lands and still allow for oil and gas exploitation (USDA LCNF 1962c). Unrelenting drought conditions through the 1920s and 1930s forced the agency to take a greater interest in watershed management. Bureau of Reclamation officials took bids from local contractors to raise the spillway at Gibson Dam – an attempt to add to the reservoir’s storage capacity. They also pursued PWA funds to create a storage reservoir on Deep Creek in the Lewis and Clark for irrigation water. New Deal financial and manpower support allowed the Forest Service to address watershed management in new ways; both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Reclamation used CCC labor to 424 construct flood control features and to modernize existing irrigation features. The CCC established two Bureau of Reclamation camps in the Rocky Mountain Front – BR-80 and BR-33. Both camps were located on the Sun River near Augusta. Crews constructed the 7.5 mile Willow Creek Feeder Canal, worked on the Fort Shaw Canal, and participated in stream restoration and erosion control – mostly by installing riprap – along the Sun River. Bureau of Reclamation CCC laborers were used “on loan” for stream and fire control projects within the Lewis and Clark (USDA FS 1930d; 1936b; 1937; USDA R1 1936m; Choteau Acantha 1937, 11 March; 1940, 9 May; 1940, 26 September; Pfaff 2010). The movement toward multiple use that began with New Deal funding for recreation and infrastructure improvements transformed Forest Service watershed management. In 1935, the agency hired trained biologists from the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries to work on stream development for recreation. Two biologists were detailed to provide reconnaissance of degraded fisheries and draft stream development plans for the Helena, Deerlodge, and Lewis and Clark national forests. Agency officials were concerned that poorly planned and haphazard state and local trout restocking programs were causing some watersheds to become overstocked and leaving others depleted or stocked with unsuitable species. Following a reconnaissance survey, biologists recommended placement of 115 fish structures – mostly small, two-log dams protected with woven wire and holes – on multiple creeks and streams to “improve the environmental conditions for trout” (Maclay 1936a). Conservation Corps and ERA laborers constructed the fish structures. The program continued into 1936; in all over 125 425 structures were constructed in the Rocky Mountain Division by CCC labor, including 25 on Ray Creek, 60 on Straight Creek, 10 on Fairview Creek, 10 on Beaver Creek, 25 on Ford Creek, and 20 on Welcome Creek. Trout rearing ponds were also constructed at Welcome Creek administrative site and fish screens were installed at Diversion Dam (Maclay 1936a; 1936b). Lewis and Clark watershed management remained concerned with recreation- based improvements through the Great Depression and World War II. By the end of the 1930s, the agency was actively participating in fish stocking. Biologist-foresters crafted management plans that prioritized streams needing restocking and recommended portions of watersheds that should be closed to fishing – though the ultimate stocking and season decisions were made by the state Fish and Wildlife Department. Lewis and Clark foresters recommended that all streams that drained into the Sun River from the forest boundary west to the upper end of Gibson Reservoir be closed to fishing for propagation. Agency scientists also began to analyze environmental suitability for separate species. Fish stocking on the recreationist-accessible Sun River system received priority funding and manpower. Large numbers of rainbow trout were stocked annually on the Sun River tributaries. Cutthroat were largely planted in the southern portion of the forest and were secondary in priority (Figure 4-34) (USDA R1 1939c). Watershed management fell to a low-priority in the war years. However, post war demands for urbanization, modernization, and environmentalism fueled a new watershed management trend that emphasized rural electricity, flood relief, and clean water. 426 Furthermore, Congress issued a call in 1947 for greater public federal control of watersheds. For the first time in agency history, hydrologists were assigned away from research positions and placed in management roles (Hays 2009, 23). The Forest Service declared that it was time to create a mechanism to draft and implement comprehensive forest-wide watershed management plans that conformed to its management imperative. The Washington D.C. office directed each regional headquarters to craft an introductory regional plan for water administration and then to designate a forest within their region to create a watershed-specific test plan based upon a watershed unit. The Birch Creek watershed in the Lewis and Clark was selected as the Region 1 test watershed. The directive stated that since there was no policy or standard to act as a guideline, “we must feel our way and build as we go” (Salmond 1946). Despite the proclaimed necessity of the plan, financial restrictions delayed completion of the final report. As a result, the preliminary Birch Creek watershed management plan was fragmented and incomplete (Betts 1945; Ferguson 1946c; 1946e; Salmond 1946; USDA R1 1948; Leftwich 1951a). In 1944, following the passage of the Flood Control Act, the Bureau of Reclamation announced plans for watershed development in the Missouri River Basin. Reclamation had effectively used New Deal funding and labor to conduct multiple basin- wide investigations for large-scale flood control and irrigation projects; watersheds in the Lewis and Clark were included in the Missouri River Basin Project. A small, but important component to the flood control plans presented by the Bureau was Wilson 427 Reservoir on the North Fork of the Sun River (the name of the proposed reservoir was changed in 1951 to the Upper Sun Butte Reservoir) (Figure 4-35). Lewis and Clark 428 Figure 4-34: Lewis and Clark Annual Fish Stocking Program, 1939. Map by author (USDA R1 1936c). foresters spent decades attempting to create and implement management plans – watershed and otherwise - around the Bureau of Reclamation’s potential Sun Butte site (USDI BOR 1941; 1944; 1957; Messelt 1951). Reclamation’s Missouri River flood control program was bolstered by the 1948 Sun and Teton river floods. Flood waters caused over $31,000 of damage in the Lewis and Clark, pushed water over the top of Gibson Dam, and washed out bridges and roads in Blackleaf Canyon. By the end of June, flood waters had obliterated over 180 bridges and culverts in Teton County. Especially hard hit were Sun River Project diversion structures and irrigation lines. Following the flood, foresters crafted a series of guidelines and standards that intended to augment the Birch Creek Watershed Management Plan and serve as a forest-wide system of rules for flood-control watershed management. The new standards encouraged the inclusion of any measure “which will assure the success of the Flood Control program ... even if it has no direct connection with flood control. If a measure looks doubtful, better include it” (USDA LCNF 1948a). Flood control management practices therefore included the extension of the road system into inaccessible areas to allow better access, enabled the manipulation of forest cover to increase snow and water storage, and sought to decrease the elk and deer population to implement grazing controls. Management practices also included the development of pilot research projects that established uniform criteria for timber cutting, rangeland management, and channel stabilization (Choteau Acantha 1948, 10 June; 1948, 24 June; USDA LCNF 1948a). 429 The Soil Conservation Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation recommended the construction of flood control structures above Gibson Reservoir “as the only solution” to mediating repeated floodwater damage (Wolff 1948). A new reservoir also added to irrigation possibilities on the Rocky Mountain Front – an attractive proposition following the Depression years. The Wilson Reservoir, with its 106,000 acre foot capacity, soon seemed too small to effectively hold back floods and 430 Figure 4-35: Wilson / Sun Butte reservoir, 1953 (Great Falls Tribune, 5 July 1953). provide for expanded irrigation use; a new, larger dam – the Sun Butte Reservoir - had three times the capacity of Gibson. The revised Sun Butte Reservoir plan anticipated that water would be backed up along both the North Fork and South Fork of the North Fork of the Sun River into the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Harmon 1948a; USDI BOR 1948; Leftwich 1949b; Messelt 1951; USDA LCNF 1962c). Opposition to the Sun Butte Reservoir came from several directions. The Sun River Conservation Committee saw the reservoir as an obvious disturbance to the Bob Marshall Wilderness. It also made the “Pitman-Roberson purchase of winter range” for the Sun River elk herd a waste of time and money as the reservoir cut the elk herd from its migration route to the plains (Wolff 1948). Recreation and timber interests suggested that the Forest Service take an active role in flood control and consider restoring vegetation and timber on burned-over watersheds. State Fish and Wildlife was openly concerned with the effect the dam structures would have on elk habitat, feed, and calving. The dude ranching community also objected. The dam was to be constructed on the Allan site on the North Fork of the Sun. The reservoir also would cut severely into known and established hunting sites. Wilderness groups protested the site as an intrusion into the primitive aspects of the Bob Marshall and an affront to wilderness principles; they also objected to the use of motorized vehicles, road building, and heavy machinery use that would be necessary to investigate and construct the dam. Finally, the National Park Service conducted a study to assess the impact of dam construction on regional recreational opportunities and concluded that the Sun Butte site “would have a very 431 detrimental effect upon the value of Sun River as a recreational and wilderness area” (Leftwich 1949b)(Harmon 1949; Hoge 1949; Leftwich 1949a; Lindquist 1949; Nye 1949; Messelt 1951; Great Falls Tribune 1953, 25 June). In 1951, plans for the reservoir were momentarily shelved. The Bureau of Reclamation revived the plan in 1953 following another flood on the Sun and Teton rivers. This time Bureau officials did not hesitate to implement plans. Studies on “an Upper Sun Butte dam and reservoir on the North fork of the Sun River will get ‘high priority’ in ... allotment of planning funds” (Great Falls Tribune 1953, 25 June). The plans again garnered significant protest from sportsmen’s associations, Montana Fish and Game, the National Wildlife Service, the Wilderness Society, and local chambers of commerce. Some Lewis and Clark foresters were also opposed to the Sun Butte Dam. The Lewis and Clark superintendent even contacted Howard Zahniser, the executive secretary of the Wilderness Society, to confirm his organization’s objections to the dam. “It’s comforting,” said superintendent Zane Smith, “to have you watching out for our mutual interests” (Smith 1953). Kenneth Vernon, Region 6 director of the Bureau of Reclamation, answered complaints that the dam would flood the Bob Marshall Wilderness by stating that flooding will happen – the question is whether or not it occurs in the mountains or in Great Falls (Great Falls Tribune 1953, 2 July; 1953, 8 July). The Bureau of Reclamation’s Sun Butte plans indicated that Gibson Reservoir was not sufficient for flood control and that only the Sun Butte reservoir system could effectively protect the Rocky Mountain Front from future flooding events. Region 1 432 foresters disagreed and assigned researchers from the Northern Rocky Mountain Experiment Station to evaluate the potential value of Sun Butte for flood control. The report confirmed what Lewis and Clark foresters and the State Water Resources Board already believed – the Bureau of Reclamation had “overplay(ed) the importance of the proposed dam as a flood control measure” (Smith 1954c). Bureau claims that the dam would bring material benefit to Rocky Mountain Front communities through further irrigation lacked a “showing of need;” there was simply no demand for expanding irrigation in the Front. Finally, Lewis and Clark foresters detailed the dramatic alteration to carefully constructed management plans should the reservoir be created. Wilderness boundaries would have to be re-drawn. Infrastructure and recreation plans would have to be completely redone to include the construction of access roads along Gibson Reservoir, rerouting of existing trails, and the purchase and demolition of summer homes. The reservoir also conflicted with wildlife management and timber harvesting schedules. At a minimum, Lewis and Clark foresters stated, the Sun Butte dam construction would cost the forest over $422,000 (Friedrich 1953; Harmon 1953; Hanson 1954b; Smith 1954c; Billings Gazette 1957, 30 June). The Sun Butte controversy became a showcase scenario wherein the Forest Service attempted to exercise its power to control land management against other federal agency plans. The Bureau of Reclamation’s first form withdrawal on the Sun River gave them every right to proceed with dam construction. The Forest Service used public meetings and press releases to rally support from wildlife groups and local 433 conservationists against the dam. At the governmental level, the USDA submitted a draft bill to “prevent damage to Federal lands and their management by Federal dam and water reservoir projects” (Cliff 1957). The bill gave federal land management agencies the right to investigate the impacts of reservoir development and recommend that the Bureau of Reclamation replace and restore any facilities, services, plans, and infrastructure that would be damaged or impeded by reservoir construction. The bill was soundly opposed by both the secretaries of the Interior and Defense but ultimately resulted in the USDA requiring forests to analyze and submit damage costs ahead of time and to use those numbers in evaluation of dam sites. Following a Lewis and Clark “Forest Service Impact Statement,” the Sun Butte plan was again delayed (Siniff 1954; Cliff 1957; Fallman 1958b). The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act and the modern environmental movement pushed the Forest Service to turn its focus away from flood control momentarily and toward stream and watershed rehabilitation. Echoing fifty-year old statements, Lewis and Clark multiple use plans in the 1960s reaffirmed the belief that watershed maintenance was the most important use of Lewis and Clark land. Over one million acre-feet of water originating from the Teton Ranger District alone were used along the Front for irrigation and rural and urban development. The repeated floods of the 1940s and 1950s had left watersheds in need of rehabilitation. Immediate restoration plans had to be implemented to assure irrigation delivery and water quality. Through the early 1960s, Lewis and Clark foresters conducted several watershed improvement projects. Riprap and step-downs 434 were installed on Jones and Hungry Man creeks and along the South Fork Teton Trail, and shoreline stabilization plans were implemented on the upper portions of Gibson Lake. In 1962, in concordance with multiple use plans, the Hungry Man Creek restoration project was transformed into a timber harvest stabilization project and ditches were installed around a timber road to minimize erosion and washouts (Choteau Acantha 1960, 4 February; Phillip 1961; 1962; USDA LCNF 1962c; Pulver 1963b). The 1964 floods caused significant damage to the Rocky Mountain Division’s watersheds (Figure 4-36). Because of the magnitude of the flood, watershed rehabilitation plans were immediately drafted on both the Teton and Sun River ranger districts. Rehabilitation plans sought to not only return Lewis and Clark watersheds to productivity, but also to engineer them in a way that would minimize any future flood damage. Plans divided rehabilitation work by ranger district and then again by watershed and were organized along multiple use standards. Watershed rehabilitation was organized alongside recreation, range, timber, fire control, and infrastructure needs. Plans included logjam removal, streambed and channel re-routing, bank stabilization, fishery rehabilitation, erosion control for road and trail construction, and new irrigation diversion works (Figure 4-37; Figure 4-38). Gabions and jetties were constructed on several streams to reduce stream velocity. Dogwood, cottonwood, native grasses, and willows were planted along banks for stabilization (USDA LCNF 1964y; 1964cc; 1965c). The 1964 floods also brought the Sun Butte Reservoir into discussion again. Following the flood, the Bureau of Reclamation requested permission to re-examine the 435 Sun Butte site (Figure 4-39). State agencies and local interest groups again protested the action – this time using the 1964 Wilderness Act as defense against development. “The now unified and practiced opposition to the Sun River canyon dams campaigned once more against the project, writing letters to congressional delegates and agency officials. Their work ultimately paid off” (Keller 2001, 41). Though it was decided that reservoirs could indeed be built in wilderness areas – with presidential permission and following a significant review and public comment process – protests by locals, national interest groups, state agencies, and Lewis and Clark administrators ultimately forced the Bureau of Reclamation to look elsewhere for floodwater storage. The Bureau of Reclamation abandoned Sun Butte reservoir plans and instead selected a site lower down the Sun 436 Figure 4-36. Flood Damage on the Middle Fork of the Teton River, 1964 (LCNF-C). 437 Figure 4-37: Bank Stabilization at Benchmark, 1964 (LCNF-C). Figure 4-38: Gabions at Pretty Prairie in the Bob Marshall Wilderness, 1964 (LCNF-C). River near the town of Simms (Choteau Acantha 1965, 6 May; Cliff 1965; Costley 1965). Conclusion The transformation of the Lewis and Clark National Forest continued through the turbulent middle decades of the 20 th century. Foresters utilized federal funding to implement plans aimed to simplify and standardize national forest landscapes according to a management imperative that relied on scientific evaluation and large capital and manpower inputs. Repeatedly, Lewis and Clark foresters were required to modify their management imperative to meet changing economic, social, and environmental demands. 438 Figure 4-39: Sun Butte Reservoir, 1964 (LCNF-C). In doing so, Lewis and Clark foresters attempted to maintain their expert and authoritative role as the primary land manager of the Rocky Mountain Front. Lewis and Clark landscapes were therefore modified as the result of an ongoing negotiation process that formally and informally integrated utilitarian forestry into a locally variable, yet nationally framed, multiple use management model. National and local social and economic drivers pushed Lewis and Clark foresters to make policy and imperative alterations. With increased federal funding, Lewis and Clark foresters completed numerous and transformative infrastructure projects that opened the forest to greater recreation- and aesthetic-based public access. Recreation grew in importance through the middle decades of the 20 th century and foresters altered landscapes, boundaries, and management plans to control, organize, and accommodate these demands. Limited timber resources on the forest could not keep pace with harvest demands despite attempts to market lodgepole pine and pulpwood. The decline in the Front’s agricultural economy also opened the Lewis and Clark to oil exploration and reclamation initiatives. Both complicated national forest management. The Forest Service also initiated the creation of wilderness areas in the Rocky Mountain Division, beginning in the 1930s, but by the mid-1960s, the right to continue designating landscapes as wilderness had been taken away from them. Environmental drivers required Lewis and Clark foresters to incorporate intricate watershed rehabilitation engineering projects and wildlife protection into their management imperative and placed the agency in a bureaucratic struggle with other 439 federal land agencies that had statutory right to manage portions of the Lewis and Clark landscape. The agency completed large-scale infrastructure transformations to institute “total control” over fire. There was some success in limiting catastrophic backcountry fires, through gains came with significant financial, scientific, and labor costs. Following extensive surveys, the agency reduced grazing allotments to allow forage for elk and wildlife – as well as recreation – and acted as an intermediary in finding a winter game refuge for the Sun River herd. 440 CHAPTER 5: THE NATIONAL FOREST IMPERATIVE - 1965 TO 2000 Introduction Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the end of the 20 th century, the Forest Service was forced to confront new and multiple initiatives that threatened to decrease the agency’s decision-making powers and restrict the Forest Service’s management imperative. Forces from both inside and outside the agency drove these changes. They resulted in unprecedented landscape and administrative changes that transformed all levels of federal forest management. The Lewis and Clark National Forest was not immune from these changes. With the passage of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY), the Forest Service entered into a period in which planning was increasingly complicated by growing demands for extractive and recreational resource use and a growing body of scientific literature highly critical of the agency’s management imperative. Public pressure and scientific criticism resulted in a series of Congressional decisions, such as the Wilderness Act of 1964, which limited the agency’s decision-making authority. Further legislative mandates, including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), forced the agency to meet procedural planning baselines before it could undertake any new management initiatives. Public input into national forest planning was now statutory. Crafting management plans became an 441 arduous task and implementing them was increasingly difficult due to a growing litigious culture surrounding public lands policy. As a result, the agency incorporated these statutory directives into its management imperative and devoted much of its time and manpower to negotiating suitable management plans (Hirt 1994 266-292; Malmsheimer et al 2004; Lewis 2005, 187-231; Hays 2009, 106-143). As the 20 th century drew to a close, the Forest Service began to look for alternatives to utilitarian scientific forestry as a way to quiet opposition and minimize litigation. The agency slowly began to recognize the merits of managing their landscapes from an ecological point of view, rather than from a sustained yield basis. This “new perspective” on management reflected cultural and economic changes in society and a growing relationship between the environmental movement and ecologists. This perspective also reflected the agency’s desire to regain an element of managerial control over their forests. In the 1990s, the Forest Service adopted ecosystem management as its guiding principle. The “greatest good of the greatest number” (Wilson 1905, 3-5) was transformed into “caring for the land and serving people” (USDA FS 2014). The United States Forest Service and Ecosystem Management (1965-2000) At the national level, the United States Forest Service began the 1960s on a confident note. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act codified much of what the agency had been doing for decades. The agency could look back on the perceived successes of their management imperative. Intensive management and the application of science and 442 technology to resource problems had brought a sense of optimism to utilitarian forestry. The policy of “total control” had minimized the extent and damage of wildfire. Recreational use of national forests was steadily increasing. By the end of the decade, however, the Forest Service was embroiled in several controversies that reflected a growing criticism over the agency’s intensive management practices and utilitarian imperative. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring made the public more aware of the dangers of pesticides on the environment. Soon, the Forest Service’s practice of applying herbicides and insecticides such as DDT and dioxin to tree stands - used to cull undesirable tree species - and on the range - to eliminate noxious weeds – came under scrutiny. By the early 1970s, the use of toxic herbicides had become intertwined with protests over the use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War. Environmentalists were incredulous when they discovered that such toxins were being used in federal forest management. The agency could not combat the criticisms. It had not conducted any analysis on the possible side effects of using herbicides on forests or on its users (Clary 1986, 177-179; Fedkiw 1998, 165; Lewis 2005, 187-190). Controversy over agency timber management practices also lessened public confidence in the Forest Service and fueled a series of studies and lawsuits that forever changed public lands management. The practices of clearcutting and terracing in the Bitterroot National Forest in western Montana inflamed local residents, environmental activists, and forest service employees (Figure 5-1). Retired Bitterroot National Forest Supervisor, Guy Brandborg, challenged the Forest Service’s intensive management 443 program. Through collaborations with Montana Senators Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf, local wilderness proponents, and other retired Forest Service rangers, Brandborg forced Region 1 foresters to examine clearcutting and intensive management practices. The Region 1 analysis was critical of portions of the Bitterroot timber program. Most notably, the report illuminated an undercurrent of concern within the agency about clearcutting and intensive management. “There is an implicit attitude among many people on the staff of the Bitterroot National Forest that resource production goals come first and that land management considerations take second place” (USDA R1 1970b, 9) (Lewis 2005, 154-160; Swanson 2011). 444 Figure 5-1: Clearcutting on the Bitteroot National Forest (Lewis 2005, 155). In 1969, Senator Metcalf recruited Dr. Arnold Bolle, Dean of the University of Montana’s School of Forestry, to conduct an investigation into Bitterroot timber management. Bolle’s report was direct: “multiple use, in fact, does not exist as a governing principle on the Bitterroot National Forest” (Select Committee of the University of Montana 1970). The report moved past management practices on the Bitterroot and implicated intensive management practices throughout the United States Forest Service. “The rigid system developed during the expanded effort to meet the national housing post-war boom ... continues to exist in the face of a considerable change in our value system – a rising public concern with environmental quality. While the national demand for timber has abated considerably, the major emphasis on timber production continues” (Dombeck et al 2003, 31). The underlying sentiment was that the agency had abandoned multiple use and “the greatest good” in return for industry and increased budgets (Craig 1971, 35-49; Clary 1986, 180-194; Hirt 1994, 266-292; Lewis 2005, 154-160; Swanson 2011). Controversy over the agency’s intensive management program extended outside of Montana and into the United States Courts of Appeals. Local hunters enlisted the help of the Izaak Walton League to bring suit against the Forest Service over clearcutting in West Virginia’s Monongahela National Forest. The suit claimed that clearcutting was in violation of the 1897 Organic Act, which explicitly stated that “only dead, matured or large growth” trees could be cut in national forests (Doig 1976, 12). The lawsuit charged that the agency had exceeded its authority when it cut all timber in a region. The suit 445 opened up Forest Service management practices to a public that, thanks in part to the Vietnam War and the Pentagon – Watergate scandals, was growing increasingly distrustful of government agencies. The agency had spent decades decrying the waste inherent in private timber practices only to commit the same destructive practices cloaked under the guise of intensive sustained yield management. In 1975, the Fourth United States Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an earlier ruling that banned clearcutting in the Monongahela as a violation of the Organic Act. The agency decided that appealing the decision was pointless (Doig 1976; Clary 1986, 180-194; Hirt 1994, 260-265). The controversy over federal public land management practices coalesced in the late 1970s into a movement that sought to devolve land management powers to the states. The Sagebrush Rebellion sought to open up federally controlled land to new uses and to reduce environmental restrictions. In 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan declared that he supported the Sagebrush Rebellion and that under his administration he would pursue privatization of federal forest lands. Privatization did not happen, but with Reagan’s support, the agency pursued an aggressive backcountry timber harvest meant to spur home construction and suburbanization. The increased cut again brought the agency under scrutiny from environmentalists and opened their management practices to numerous lawsuits (Cawley 1993, 3-4; Lewis 2005, 199-201). At the same time, the Forest Service initiated a new computerized forest-planning model named FORPLAN. FORPLAN attempted to simulate multiple use management. It used watersheds as a management unit. FORPLAN integrated fire and other uses into 446 management plans by linking various use-specific models and databases. It allowed foresters to simulate activities involving land use, vegetation, and wildlife. Through much of the 1980s, the Forest Service based their management plans on FORPLAN simulations. Critics of FORPLAN, and later the Forest Service itself, believed that FORPLAN placed too high a value on timber production to provide meaningful and environmentally sustainable management plans (Iverson 1986; Nie 2008). Timber cuts increased throughout the 1980s and “as the harvest levels increased ... so did the protests. The environmental cold war was turning hot just as the ideological Cold War, which had spawned the drive to get out the cut, was winding down” (Lewis 2005, 202). Through the 1980s, the Forest Service continually lost court cases over clearcutting and wildlife protection. The agency increasingly came into conflict with environmental groups and other federal agencies such as the United States Fish and Wildlife Service over the ways that multiple use had been implemented. By the end of the 1980s it became apparent to Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson that traditional forestry had “hit the wall” and could “no longer ... fly in the federal government” (Steen 2010, 2). Intensive multiple use management “looked like abuse of the land” to the general public (2). To some within the agency, such as those involved with the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, there were significant questions about the Forest Service’s commitment to protecting the ecological integrity of its forests (Flader 1999, 3; Lewis 2005, 202-205; Hays 2009, 106-110; Steen 2010). 447 Internal dissent grew within the agency. In 1990, Region 1 Forester John Mumma directed his forest supervisors – including the supervisor of the Lewis and Clark National Forest – to increase timber sales on each of their forests following a directive by Congress and the Washington D.C. office of the Forest Service. Several supervisors replied to Mumma that to do so would require the violation of several environmental laws and instead they should significantly reduce the cut. In support of his supervisors, Mumma struck out against the congressional mandate and advised his supervisors “if they had to choose between protecting the environment and meeting congressional timber harvest targets, they should choose the environment” (Lewis 2005, 205). Many of the Region 1 supervisors wrote a joint memo to Chief Robertson stating that the annual Region 1 timber harvest should be cut by nearly 40 percent. Robertson, under pressure from Congress to meet their harvest goals, was unable to significantly lower the cut. Mumma was transferred from Region 1 and subsequently retired leading to a congressional investigation into the suspected mistreatment of federal whistleblowers (Hirt 1994, 286-292). It was clear to everyone that the Forest Service management imperative needed fundamental changes. Robertson proposed that the agency pursue a course of management that incorporated “new perspectives” into the management imperative. His “New Perspectives” sought to balance timber management alongside the other forest uses described in the MUSY Act. It was based upon a timber harvesting approach that emphasized maintaining the ecological integrity of the forest. Ecologically minded 448 foresters had been implementing ecological forestry on many levels throughout the Forest Service since the 1970s. “New Perspectives” attempted to capture successful ecosystem methodologies already in practice and incorporate them into larger management practices. In 1991, Robertson approved a charter for “New Perspectives” that included commitments to “1) strengthen the ecological basis of land management; 2) sustain the diversity and productivity of the land for multiple-resource values and uses through ecosystem management; and 3) improve the responsiveness of land management to public concerns” (Shands et al 1994, 36-37). However, it was unclear how the Forest Service would implement “New Perspectives” on the ground. Timber industry officials worried that it would limit the timber harvest. Environmentalists felt that it was just a public relations maneuver and lacked substance (Lewis 2005, 213-216). In 1992, Robertson announced that “New Perspectives” would become the Forest Service’s official management policy and would now be called ecosystem management. Implementing ecosystem management was difficult. Ecosystem management accommodated ecological values yet still allowed for commodity extraction. It prohibited clearcutting as a standard silvicultural tool and focused on the maintenance of ecosystems rather than sustained yield harvesting. It sought to bring complexity in the form of biodiversity back into federal forestry (Hays 2009, 106-114). National forest ecosystem management had several specific goals. It was organized around the intent to 1) maintain ecological processes such as disturbance, water and nutrient cycling, and energy flow; 2) manage ecosystems using multiple ecological 449 domains and evolutionary time frames; 3) maintain viable populations of native and desired non-native species; 4) encourage social resiliency; 5) manage ecosystems for the human sense of “place;” and manage ecosystems to maintain the mix of goods, functions, and conditions that the society wanted. It was a tall order for forest managers who were accustomed to managing largely for sustained yield use (USDA FS 1996). The pathway toward ecological forest management within the Forest Service began decades before Chief Robertson’s declaration. Lawsuits, public protest, and congressional legislation motivated individual forester-scientists to seek new and often ingenious management and planning techniques. Ultimately, foresters saw the implementation of ecological forestry as a means to regain agency decision-making autonomy. The agency lost discretionary power in 1964 with the passage of the Wilderness Act and then again in 1969 with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA came from the recognition of “the profound impact on the environment of human activities, including urbanization, population growth, industrial pollution, resource exploitation, and technology. It asserted that humanity must ... bring ‘man and nature’ into productive harmony with each other” (Merchant 2002, 181). NEPA required all federal agencies to disclose their intention to conduct projects that may impact the environment and to seek public input of these projects before final plans could be implemented. NEPA also required each agency to conduct an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS) to assess the potential ecological impact of 450 its project. Once the EIS or EA was completed, the agency was required to put forth a series of alternatives that clearly stated the environmental impact of each. The public and other agencies were able to comment on proposed plans, though agencies were not statutorily bound to implement public opinion. However, the EIS became “a weapon in the legal arsenal used by environmental organization to force the Forest Service ... to examine from all sides the long-term implications of management decisions” (Lewis 2005, 197). Ultimately, NEPA dramatically extended and complicated the planning and management process for the Forest Service and forced the agency to move beyond an economic understanding of multiple use to one that was more ecologically structured (Lewis 2005, 152-197; Nie 2008, 44-86; Hays 2009, 122-123). The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 did far more to push the agency down the path toward ecosystem management than any other legislative action. The ESA placed the authority to manage both species and species habitat under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The intention of the act was to provide a means for agencies to preserve the habitats of endangered and threatened species. Public participation in listing and delisting threatened animals was encouraged. The public could also bring suit against federal agencies to prevent any action that was deemed harmful to threatened or endangered species and their habitats. For the Forest Service, the ESA was “the hammer” environmental groups used to pursue court cases against the Forest Service (Steen 2010, 2). The agency could not escape the fact that their intensive management forestry imperative was, as Chief Dale Robertson said, “creating endangered 451 species” (Steen 2010, 2). Environmental groups utilized ecosystem science to list multiple species and habitats as threatened. Foresters therefore had to craft management plans that not only minimized the effect on endangered species habitats but also worked toward habitat repair and promotion (Thomas 2004, 20-25; Lewis 2005, 152-154; Nie 2008, 44-86; Hays 2009, 122-124). In 1974, Congress passed the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA). The act was an intermediary step that required the Forest Service to commit to long-range planning initiatives. The RPA required the Forest Service to create ten-year assessments of the nation’s forest and rangeland renewable resources and required the agency to prepare a five-year planning document. The intent of the RPA was to align agency projects with congressional funding. But rather than expediting backlogged projects, the RPA resulted in a massive bureaucratization of the agency. In an attempt to satisfy both NEPA and the ESA, the Forest Service expanded its hiring roles far beyond the scope of traditional forestry. Employees were tasked heavily with planning initiatives and were further removed from the day-to-day forest management operations (Dombeck et al 2003, 106; Lewis 2005, 152-154; Nie 2008, 44-86). As the Forest Service labored to craft preliminary management plans, national antagonism grew over federal mismanagement. The Bitterroot and Monongahela cases drew the ire of environmentalists and a growing body of the public that distrusted the American government. Some members of Congress wished to place heavy prescriptions upon the Forest Service, thereby limiting the amount of discretion the agency had to 452 manage its lands. Pro-agency legislators argued that the Forest Service operated best with as little Congressional intrusion as possible. In 1976, Congress passed legislation that was essentially a compromise between these two positions. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) essentially codified the National Forest planning process. The NFMA contained some prescriptive language; clearcuts were limited in size and the agency was mandated to provide for a measure of diversity in plant and animal communities in each forest. The NFMA also emphasized planning and public participation in decision-making (Clary 1986, 192-194; Hirt 1994, 260-265; Nie 2008, 45-51). The NFMA essentially repealed the 1897 Organic Act and became the “fundamental charter for the Forest Service” (Clary 1986, 192). While it contained some prescriptive language, it also “kept Forest Service discretion intact with loopholes large enough to drive logging trucks through” (Hirt 1994, 263). It did, however, refine the definition of sustained yield as it pertained to the Forest Service and therefore altered the agency’s management imperative. Sustained yield was redefined as “non-declining even flow.” Each forest’s output of timber must be capable of being sustained perpetually without declines. While this may sound similar to sustained yield, it was a knock-out blow for the timber industry and traditional scientific foresters. Non-declining even flow eliminated the possibility for large-scale old growth cuts – a process that had long been a crucial step in transforming forests into sustained yield tree farms (Clary 1986, 192-194; Hirt 1994, 260-265). 453 Through the latter decades of the 20 th century, debate grew over the effectiveness of the NFMA and whether or not it actually reformed the Forest Service’s management imperative. Increased public participation in the planning and decision-making process opened the Forest Service to increased litigation and had a direct effect on Forest Service planning and implementation. In this way, Forest Service decision-making discretion became limited. The NFMA was, in a way, an attempt to democratize forest management. And, “though planning took precedence, judicially enforceable standards, albeit of questionable value, were written into NFMA as a way to check the heretofore unquestioned professional judgment of the USFS” (Nie 2008, 228). However, the NFMA did little to significantly alter the substance of the national forest management imperative in the late 20 th century. “Talk of balanced programs, interdisciplinary planning, and multiple use could not alter the Forest Service’s focus on timber” (Clary 1986, 193). Through the 1980s, Congress and the Reagan administration enthusiastically supported increasing timber harvests. At the same time, the nation grew more aware and in favor of environmentalism, ecosystem management, and integrated approaches to public land management. As foresters attempted to craft and implement plans in compliance with NEPA, the ESA, and the NFMA, local special interest groups, environmentalists, and ecosystem scientists exerted a steady and unrelenting force on the Forest Service. In this way, the NFMA served as a bridge toward Forest Service ecosystem management (Clary 1986, 192-194; Hirt 1994, 260-265; Nie 2008, 229-231; Hays 2009, 106-111). 454 Ecological management was an attempt by the Forest Service to manage their forests holistically and from a perspective of forest health rather than sustained yield. It was also a decision designed to regain managerial control over their forests by integrating ecological forestry into a multiple use model. Ecological forestry revolved around “the relatively new recognition of the enormous range of animal and plant species in the natural environment and the intricate relationship among them that formed an ecological system” (Hays 2009, 112-113). While the national forest management imperative had once sought ecosystem simplification as a means to plan, manage, and commoditize natural resources, ecosystem scientists entreated the Forest Service to incorporate at least some of the thousands of plant and animal species present on their forest landscapes – species that had been ignored or potentially eradicated - in their management plans (Lewis 2005, 206-231; Hays 2009, 106-136). Through the latter decades of the 20 th century, foresters pursued small ecosystem management projects and experimented with ways to improve and restore habitat. In Illinois’ Shawnee National Forest, foresters began to emphasize the restoration of native ecosystems and began to break up CCC-planted pine plantations with native hardwoods. Several forests implemented prescribed fire as a forest and range health management tool; in several wildernesses, including the Bob Marshall, let-burn policies were implemented (Shands et al 1994; Lewis 2005, 213-226). However, implementing ecosystem management into the larger national forest imperative proved difficult and through the end of the 20 th century, ecosystem 455 management had not been completely integrated. Foresters had little experience in planning for and managing a multitude of habitats. In the past, the Forest Service had pursued multiple use and an expanding management imperative by surveying, inventorying, and designating use boundaries. This gave the agency a small measure of control over their forests. However, “ecological forest objectives ... could not be dealt with just by segregating their use from the ‘general forest’; they required restrictions” (Hays 2009, 131). Industry associations – including recreation, grazing, mining, and timber – often disagreed with the science behind ecosystem management plans and objected to the agency’s policy of managing landscapes for the viability of species. Industry litigation in the 1990s often attacked the Forest Service on its dynamic definition of “viability” and how it would monitor the ongoing health of the forest habitat. The agency used the Management Indicator Species (MIS) approach to ecosystem health – an MIS was representative of large numbers of habitats and species. If the agency kept the MIS in a viable state, then the land was being managed on an ecologically sound basis (Hays 2009, 130-136). At the end of the 20 th century, the Forest Service was still struggling to implement ecosystem management at a forest level. The Clinton and Bush administrations and shifting congressional powers offered their own competing versions of ecosystem management. The shifting national economy has played a part as well. In 1998, Chief Mike Dombeck announced that the Forest Service would support ecosystem management by suspending new road construction in most inventoried roadless areas. Falling timber 456 sales in the 1990s had reduced funds for road construction and President Clinton encouraged the agency to pursue roadlessness and wilderness. Dombeck’s decision allowed the agency to clear a substantial backlog of forest road repairs and could be ecologically justified. However, in 2001 President George W. Bush ordered Dombeck’s successor, Dale Bosworth, to rescind the roadless area decision and allow regional foresters to green-light new road construction projects (Lewis 2005, 224-228; Hays 2009, 130-136). Settlement in Montana and Along the Rocky Mountain Front (1965-2000) Settlement and population patterns in Montana and along the Rocky Mountain Front during the last decades of the 20 th century are emblematic of broad trends occurring throughout the American West. While population grew steadily through much of the West, especially in cities, several counties in Montana lost population. Population loss occurred most dramatically in counties east of the Continental Divide and in regions that relied on commodity and resource extraction as a primary economic driver. Throughout the final decades of the 20 th century, two general themes played out along the Rocky Mountain Front. First, rural towns such as Choteau and Augusta steadily lost population and experienced a parallel decline in services, economy, and opportunity. Second, as populations dwindled, those that remained became increasingly dependent upon exploiting natural resources to maintain a viable economy. This included an increased reliance on the federal government for agricultural aid and watershed protection, 457 harvesting energy resources, and capitalizing on amenity based tourism, suburbanization, and conservation (Nash 1985; 1999; Malone et al 1991; Wyckoff 1991; 2002). While portions of the American West and Montana experienced population growth during the latter decades of the 20 th century, regions with largely undiversified, extractive resource-based economies lost population. This trend is reflective of broad social, cultural, and technological changes taking place in the United States. Resource- based capitalism that drew settlement to regions like the Rocky Mountain Front failed to sustain adequate settlement. Local, national, and global commodity prices did not fulfill the promise of earlier regional promotions. Technological advances also lessened the demand for labor. Rural communities throughout the West found it increasingly difficult to keep younger residents employed. As a result, rural towns experienced a dramatic and in some cases near-cataclysmic decline of businesses and services. Throughout the 1980s, several businesses in Choteau, Augusta, Valier, and Dupuyer failed, leaving Main streets partially shuttered and citizens without staple stores. In the early 1990s, Choteau struggled with the loss of emergency hospital services (Choteau Acantha 1985, 3 January; 1986, 2 January; 1988, 21 January; 1993, 23 March; Robbins 1994; Wyckoff 2002). Population statistics for Montana and the Rocky Mountain Front support these trends. Between 1960 and 2000, the state grew nearly 34 percent – from 674,767 people to 902,195. Much of this growth occurred in Montana’s urban areas. Billings (70.0 percent), Missoula (110.6 percent), and Bozeman (105.9 percent) all experienced high growth rates over the same period. Other urban areas with ties to commodity extraction 458 or Cold War era military support grew less vigorously and eventually stagnated. Great Falls experienced a nine percent growth surge between 1960 and 1970 due to a promising oil and gas industry and an expansion of the Malmstrom Air Force Base. By 1980, however, Great Falls’ population began to decline and by 2000 had only grown by two percent over the 1960 to 2000 period (USDC 1961; 1972; 1982; 1991; 2000; Choteau Acantha 1969, 23 October). Rocky Mountain Front counties and urban areas experienced little to no growth between 1960 and 2000. This trend began late in the 1960s. Glacier (-6.8 percent), Pondera (-13.6 percent), and Teton (-16.2 percent) counties all lost population between 1960 and 1970. Lewis and Clark County (18.8 percent) saw a surge of growth during the same period, however most of that was in the urban area of Helena. Augusta (-13.9 percent), the main Rocky Mountain Front community in Lewis and Clark County, lost population at a rate similar to other Front communities. Between 1960 and 2000, Choteau also lost nearly ten percent of its total population (USDC 1961; 1972; 1982; 1991; 2000). Rural communities in Montana and along the Rocky Mountain Front turned toward the federal government for aid to continue commodity-based lifestyles. While the number of farms decreased between 1960 and 1980, farmers increasingly utilized federal crop subsidies and adjustment programs. Federal farm support included subsidized loans and direct payments for modernization, soil conservation programs, insurance against natural disaster, and federal commodity price supports. The Rocky Mountain Front experienced bumper crops through the mid 1970s. Exporters happily capitalized on grain 459 shortages in the Soviet Union and associated high prices. Prices for agricultural commodities grew so high that USDA Secretary Earl Butz urged American farmers to “plant fence row to fence row” and to “get big or get out” (Pollan 2006, 52). Montana farmers responded and farm size grew through the 1970s. The 1980s brought a bust cycle as drought ravaged the land. Global surpluses and declining prices also hit Rocky Mountain Front farmers hard and farm numbers continued to drop through the 1980s and 1990s. In the mid 1980s, a conservative presidency and Congress enacted farm legislation that decreased federal agricultural subsidy support and farmers throughout the region defaulted on loans used to expand farms in the 1970s (Choteau Acantha 1966, 13 January; 1966, 24 February; 1969, 23 January; 1972, 3 August; Malone et al 1991, 320-322; Nash 1999, 101-143). Both drought and flood returned to the Rocky Mountain Front between 1965 and 2000 and communities turned to federal and state governments for aid in minimizing the damage. Drought hit the Rocky Mountain Front farming communities in 1966, 1977, 1980, throughout much of the mid- and late-1980s, and at the end of the 20 th century. In 1977, the drought in Teton County was so extreme that the area was declared a disaster area. Ranchers were allowed to purchase hay for livestock with federal funds. In 1980, the drought was severe in eastern and central Montana; despite a record number of Montana farmers applying for federal payments, the total drought related economic losses were estimated to be $380 million. In 1985, Montana grain farmers received more in federal deficiency payments and insurance than they did for crop sales (Choteau Acantha 460 1966, 3 March; 1966, 26 May; 1977, 3 November; 1985, 3 January; 1986, 2 January; 1988, 1 December; Teton County Local Emergency Planning Committee 2013, 23-63). The 1964 Teton and Sun River flood was the largest flood in recent Rocky Mountain Front history. Communities along the Front called for federal involvement in flood control. Floods again hit the Front in 1975 and 1986 and these resulted in federal disaster area declarations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) aid. The 1975 flood caused over $1 million of damage in Choteau. The Army Corps of Engineers conducted studies to determine if the region was well suited for diking. Beginning in 1976 and continuing through the early 1980s, the Army Corps and other federal agencies sought to declare that much of Choteau was located within the Teton River flood plain. The public fought the flood plain declaration until 1984 when 80 percent of Choteau was declared in the 500 year flood plain, making it very difficult to obtain insurance from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and loans for developments and improvements (Choteau Acantha 1975, 24 June; 3 1975, 3 July; 1975, 9 October; 1976, 21 October; 1980, 24 January; 1982, 26 August; Teton County Local Emergency Planning Committee 2013, 23-63). Several Rocky Mountain Front communities saw economic promise in oil and gas exploration. The 1970s national oil and gas crisis revived interest in exploration along the Front. Exploration occurred in the Teton and Blackleaf canyons and near several Front communities. Oil wells were drilled and oil harvested in Bynum, near Muddy Creek, and in the Blackleaf Canyon. Oil exploration in the Lewis and Clark National Forest, 461 especially in and near the Bob Marshall Wilderness, became one of the most pressing and contentious management issues for local foresters in the last decades of the 20 th century. Though several wells did bring in oil and natural gas, energy extraction did not result in the anticipated economic boom proponents of drilling envisioned (Choteau Acantha 1973, 20 September; 1974, 28 February; 1975, 14 August; 1979, 6 September; 1981, 2 April; 1986, 19 June; 1992, 20 May; USDA FS 1997). As in many places around the American West, tourism gained increasing importance as an economic driver in the Rocky Mountain Front. The tourism industry in the Front was heavily oriented around the natural environment and the region’s public lands. Hunting, fishing, and outfitting remained a dominant form of tourism economy. In the late 1960s, a ski resort was established in the Teton Canyon. Snowmobiling emerged as an important recreational tourist activity in the late 1960s. Hiking, horseback riding, and mountain biking all grew in popularity and importance through the 1980s (Choteau Acantha 1967, 17 August; 1969, 13 February; 1987, 17 September). Despite the wealth of nature-based tourism opportunities, the tourism industry in the Rocky Mountain Front did not significantly mitigate the loss of other economies. To expand the industry, Teton County in 1992 pursued environmental tourism economic development funds from the United States Forest Service. Teton County was one of six selected to participate in “Project P.R.I.D.E.” - Planning for a Rural, Independent, Diversified Economy - a rural economic development program that emphasized expanding public land-adjacent small town tourism economies. Three short-term projects 462 were selected for the region including constructing a rest stop and information center, purchasing a building for the Old Trail Museum, and expanding bird watching facilities at Freezeout Lake southeast of Choteau. Several long-range projects were evaluated including creating a threshing museum, developing a dinosaur interpretive center at the Egg Mountain fossil site, expanding the Rocky Mountain Hi (Teton Pass) Ski Area, and promoting lodging construction. Through Project P.R.I.D.E., Teton County was awarded over $100,000 to develop rest areas and a parking lot at the Teton Trail Museum and over $4,500 for bird watching facilities at Freezout Lake (Choteau Acantha 1992, 22 January; 26 February; 1994, 16 June). Beginning in the mid 1970s, two Western land use trends – suburbanization and land conservancy - emerged in the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 5-2). In 1976, the Arrowleaf subdivision was developed near the entrance to the Lewis and Clark on the Teton River. The development was hotly contested. Author A.B. Guthrie Jr., the Montana Wilderness Association, and dude ranch operators Kenneth and Alice Gleason sued the developers over the lack of a full environmental impact statement. The suit did not stop the development. In 1979, the Nature Conservancy purchased the Gleason’s Circle 8 guest ranch and land in and around the Pine Butte Swamp . The Conservancy purchased the properties to protect the regional ecosystem; the Pine Butte Swamp contains the only lowland swamp habitat in the continental United States that was still occupied by grizzly bear. Through the 1980s, the Nature Conservancy acquired other properties along the Front including 600 acres suitable for fossil excavation on Egg Mountain. The 463 Conservancy had to struggle against some negative local sentiment. Some locals feared that the Conservancy had locked up too much land and would deny locals recreation access. In 1985, the Boone and Crockett Club also acquired the Triple Divide Ranch outside of Dupuyer as a “demonstration project to show that ranchers and hunters can be 464 Figure 5-2: Rocky Mountain Front Subdivisions and Conservancy Sites, 2000. Map by author (USDA FS 1988). friends” (Choteau Acantha 1985, 3 October). The ranch was renamed the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Ranch. Both the Boone and Crockett and Nature Conservancy ranches remained as operational ranches (Choteau Acantha 1970, 1 March; 1985, 2 May; 1986, 25 December; Whitehorn 2005; Flowers 2010). Patterns and Landscapes of Management, Lewis and Clark National Forest (1965-2000) Following the passage of the 1960 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSY), United States Forest Service management was increasingly focused on crafting and implementing management plans. This was not a new task. Federal foresters had created management plans since the early agency days. However, the federal forest planning and management environment in the final decades of the 20 th century was more complex. Single resource planning could no longer exist. Foresters found that a majority of their time was spent on creating plans that met rigorous legislative standards. The agency also considered and occasionally implemented public demand, and they fit local plans within an expanding national forest management imperative. Lewis and Clark foresters participated in this planning process. Through a series of plans, Lewis and Clark foresters attempted to create management guidelines that interpreted changing legislative, economic, social, and environmental demands and placed them within their management imperative. 465 Forest Boundaries and Administration (1965-2000) With the 1960s multiple use plans, Lewis and Clark foresters attempted to assess the management needs of each resource contained within the MUSY and craft management decisions that incorporated potentially conflicting uses within defined regions known as management zones. Through utilizing management zone planning, foresters assessed the “management situation” of each zone and outlined brief “management decisions” that incorporated single resources within the larger management situation. Foresters delineated management boundaries on the basis of broad similarities in management situations. Region 1 administrators provided Lewis and Clark foresters with broad management directions and coordinating requirements for each zone (Figure 5-3). Each zone was assessed for a key value – one or more resources that had the highest 466 Figure 5-3: Region 1 MUSY Zone Management, 1967 (USDA R1 1967c). relative value in a zone or management unit. In the Teton Ranger District, High Area Management Zone 1 encompassed the South Fork of the Teton River. Despite the fact that all of the major watersheds within the Teton Ranger District originated within this unit, it was determined that recreation was the key value in High Area 1 and that “all land uses shall be performed so as not to destroy any scenic or recreational values” (USDA LCNF 1962c, 21) (USDA LCNF 1966c; USDA R1 1967c; Teague 1980). Lewis and Clark foresters wrote MUSY plans through the late 1980s. The scope and emphasis of those plans varied by time period. Changes in agency philosophy, public sentiment, and legislative mandate were expressed in the MUSY plans. Following the passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973, the Lewis and Clark MUSY was amended to reflect changes in the management imperative. The MUSY stated that a “priority for the use of available forage will be given to big game species where livestock-wildlife conflicts are identified on important big game winter range” (USDA LCNF 1973a). Similar adjustments were made following the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970. MUSY plans following NEPA make frequent reference to the role of public input in the decision-making process (USDA LCNF 1973a; USDA R1 1978). Following the passage of NEPA, Forest Service Chief Edward Cliff ordered the agency to craft an organizing document that pushed national forests to “involve the public in forestry policy and program formulation” (USDA FS 1970b). The brief also directed regional foresters to write a series of management directives that protected multiple use, 467 enhanced rural communities, promoted wilderness, and expanded public understanding of forest resource conservation. Once the regional guidelines were completed, Lewis and Clark foresters conducted a thorough land resource study of the Teton and Sun River Ranger Districts and nearby communities. The purpose of the study was threefold: first, Region 1 wished to determine the land management direction for both districts and assess the use and economic interrelationship between the districts, adjoining federal, Native American, and private lands. A second objective of the study was to assess the management structure of both ranger districts. Region 1 foresters directed the Lewis and Clark survey team to evaluate the economic and functional necessity of keeping two ranger district headquarters along the Rocky Mountain Front. Finally, Lewis and Clark foresters utilized the Rocky Mountain Front resource study to acquaint local users with the public comment process mandated in NEPA. Foresters hosted a series of meetings around the Rocky Mountain Front in 1972 (USDA FS 1970b; Choteau Acantha 1971, 15 April; 1972, 13 April; USDA R1 1972). In 1972, Lewis and Clark foresters also chartered the Lewis and Clark National Forest Advisory Council to “provide a forum for discussion of policy matters which may be raised by the Forest Service” (USDA FS 1972). The council was an expansion of the grazing advisory board idea of the 1950s and 1960s. Council members advised the Forest Supervisor on “broad policy programs and procedures concerning the protection, development, and multiple use management of the Forest” but did not have the authority 468 to recommend policy changes (USDA FS 1973a) (Great Falls Tribune 1972, 8 September; Sherick 1972). Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the issue of roadlessness was a perpetual public comment and planning issue. The Forest Service was required by the 1964 Wilderness Act to conduct surveys of all roadless lands under agency management and evaluate them for wilderness suitability. The Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I) began in 1967 and was completed in 1972. The RARE I findings were considered unsatisfactory by wilderness and wildlife advocates. Out of a potential 56,000,000 acres of roadless Forest Service land, RARE I only identified 12,300,000 for further wilderness study. The results of RARE I were almost immediately challenged. Lawsuits by the Sierra Club contended that the Forest Service selection criteria was faulty and resulted in a low percentage of land selected. Furthermore, selection guaranteed only that identified land would be “given priority for further intensive studies” (USDA FS 1973e, 7). There was no surety of wilderness recommendation or classification (USDA FS 1973e; 2000; Glicksman 2004, 1150). The Forest Service agreed to conduct a second roadless inventory (RARE II) in 1977. Again, the wilderness recommendations were seemingly low - only 15 million acres were designated for further study. Four areas on the Rocky Mountain Front, totaling 353,041 acres, were identified as having roadless characteristics. Foresters selected 57,649 acres, or almost 16 percent, of the Rocky Mountain Front designation for wilderness recommendation. Another 27,568 acres along the Front were recommended 469 for further study. RARE II was also challenged in court and many of its recommendations ultimately voided (USDA FS 1979b; Karr 1983; Keller 2001; Glicksman 2004, 1150). The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA) and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) moved the Forest Service to create long-range plans for each national forest. Each plan had to comply with NEPA and ESA. To guide regional foresters through the process of advising individual forest plan creation, the agency created an implementation guide that provided an analysis of the present economic and population situation and predicted national forest use trends for recreation, wilderness, wildlife, grazing, timber, and water (USDA FS 1975; Teague 1980). In 1977, Lewis and Clark foresters unveiled their first attempt at a regional management plan. The “Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan” utilized the public comments harvested in the 1972 resource study and the publication of an environmental impact statement (EIS) to meet NEPA requirements. The public comment period helped the agency “identify several key issues which the Plan must resolve” (USDA R1 1978, 12). The issues identified public concern both for and against future wilderness classification, oil and gas development, increased motorized access to national forest lands, and the construction of additional dams for irrigation and flood control. Foresters also assessed the future potential of group recreation site development and the space that special use summer homes required, as well as competition for forage between wildlife and livestock (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). 470 Following the directives laid out in the RPA and NFMA, Lewis and Clark foresters submitted a range of alternative actions for public consideration and environmental impact assessment (Figure 5-4). Alternative A emphasized amenity values and recommended that all roadless and undeveloped lands in the planning unit be studied for possible wilderness classification. It denied off-road vehicle use and additional dam construction in the forest and limited oil and gas leasing to fewer than 4,000 acres. Public access rights-of-way would be acquired along the South Fork of the Two Medicine River and in the Dearborn River-Falls Creek areas to decrease congestion along the Sun and Teton River corridors. Where wildlife and livestock competed for forage, the plan 471 Figure 5-4: Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan Alternatives, 1978. Map by author (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). favored wildlife. Alternative B “closely (resembles) the current management situation” though small changes were made to address wilderness and energy exploration issues (USDA R1 1978, 19). Only areas that had wilderness qualities comparable to previously selected wilderness areas and that were adjacent to those regions would be selected for wilderness recommendation. Oil and gas leases were recommended on 138,000 acres of the planning unit and would be granted as long as they were designed to protect wildlife. Motorized recreation would be banned only in areas where sensitive soils and vegetation could be damaged. Dam construction was not recommended. Recommendations for both the wildlife-livestock and public access issues were comparable to Alternative A. Alternative C emphasized “activities which promote local, regional and National economic development” (19). Oil and gas leases were recommended on 150,000 acres. Wildlife habitat and domestic grazing were given equal precedence. Additional dam construction and additional wilderness designation were not recommended. All other aspects of Alternative C mirrored Alternative B. Lewis and Clark foresters compared each alternative against a list of environmental and socio-economic effects and individual evaluation criteria developed for each management issue. Portions of the alternatives that best met the evaluation criteria and had a positive environmental and socio-economic effect were selected for the recommended plan. Adjustments to the alternatives were made in cases where no alternative satisfied the criteria (Choteau Acantha 1977, 15 December; USDA R1 1977b; 1978). 472 The recommended management plan conformed in parts to Alternative B, although there were significant deviations (Figure 5-5). Over 22,000 acres of wilderness 473 Figure 5-5: Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan Recommendations, 1978. Map by author (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). recommendations were added to Alternative B for a total of 161,399 acres. Oil and gas activities were limited by the ESA. Oil and gas development was restricted from areas where development interfered with wildlife wintering and elk calving areas and grizzly bear habitat. A series of recommended lease conditions were advised by the foresters including a “go slow” approach that restricted public motorized use of oil and gas roads, ended new seismic exploration road construction, and restricted access to wells during elk migration seasons. Foresters recommended that no new summer home permits be allowed and that selected permits be placed on limited tenure. Though the recommended plan favored wildlife over grazing, acreage allocated to domestic grazing in Alternative B was increased slightly in the recommended plan. The foresters also suggested that a series of prescribed burns be used on steep slopes to increase the usable browse for wildlife. No alternative recommended additional dam construction, and all alternatives recommended acquisition of rights-of-way to the South Fork of the Two Medicine and the Dearborn River – Falls Creek areas; both recommendations were upheld. Finally, foresters recommended that three special management areas be created and managed for their “roadless and undeveloped character” (USDA 1978, 28). These special management areas – on the Middle and South Forks of the Teton River, the northside of the Gibson Reservoir, and in the Badger-North Fork Birch Creek area – were designed to provide undeveloped and wilderness-like recreation opportunities while providing some motorized vehicle access (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). 474 Despite attempts to utilize public input in the decision making process, Lewis and Clark foresters faced significant public criticism especially over the oil and gas leasing recommendations. “Concern for a way of life as well as the land and wild animals was demonstrated in a large way” by hundreds of Rocky Mountain Front locals in a series of public meetings geared toward organizing against the Forest Service plan (Choteau Acantha 1978, 23 March). A group of locals, headed by outfitter and elementary school teacher Gene Sentz, organized the Friends of the Rocky Mountain Front and were openly critical of the agency’s plan to finance oil and gas road construction through timber sales along the lease areas. Public protest of the plan was so overwhelming that any action was delayed into the early 1980s (Choteau Acantha 1978, 23 March; 1978, 5 April; Sentz 2010). Following the passage of the NFMA, Forest Service headquarters issued a series of regulations that required a new round of regional planning initiatives and allocated RPA objectives to individual forests. Headquarters also required each forest region to clarify specific issues and management concerns present in their region and establish a series of guidelines and threshold standards for their resolution. The NFMA specifically emphasized regional establishment of standards and guidelines for timber harvesting, silvicultural management, transportation corridor development, and air quality. Region 1 was the first to develop a proposed regional plan. It was “unique” (USDA R1 1980a, 1). Rather than preparing draft environmental impact statements (DEIS) for a selective range of alternatives and opening them as a whole to public input, Region 1 foresters first 475 highlighted several issues present in their forests and then offered multiple alternatives to address each issue and management concern. The goal of this action was to reduce negative public sentiment against the agency and to create a more maneuverable planning environment for individual forests. Region 1 foresters identified a number of issues and management concerns including development of energy resources, forage needs for livestock and wildlife, recreation management, watershed management, habitat, wood fiber needs, and private “checkerboard” land ownership (USDA R1 1980a; 1980c). Beginning in 1981, Lewis and Clark foresters began constructing a forest-wide management plan that was in line with RPA and NFMA regulations. Lewis and Clark foresters were careful to describe public participation “in developing the details” as a “vital part of the District operation” (Choteau Acantha 1981, 2 April). A DEIS forest plan was submitted for public comment in 1984. In the DEIS, Lewis and Clark foresters divided the region into 18 management areas, each with different management goals, defined potentials, and limitations. Eleven of these management areas were delineated along the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 5-6). For each area, a management goal was identified and management directions given for each specified forest use. Geographic units were then delineated (Figure 5-7). Geographic units were used to “describe and illustrate how the management area prescriptions will affect specific parts of the Forest” (USDA LCNF 1986b, 4/1) (Choteau Acantha 1981, 26 February; USDA LCNF 1984a; 1986b). 476 The DEIS originally identified 11 management alternatives. In November 1984, five alternatives were added to the DEIS to address wilderness additions. The alternatives 477 Figure 5-6: Management areas, Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). ranged from a “no action alternative” that recommended the forest maintain the present course of action, to alternatives that provided maximum levels of timber harvest and 478 Figure 5-7: Geographic areas, Lewis and Clark National Forest plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF1986b). livestock grazing at the expense of wildlife habitat and semi-private recreation, to alternatives that limited resource extraction and promoted primitive and public recreation (USDA LCNF 1984a; 1984b). The DEIS forest plan garnered considerable comment. The Friends of the Rocky Mountain Front again initiated a series of public comment sessions over proposed oil and gas exploration leases permitted in the plan. The Friends were especially concerned over 60,000 acres of lease applications pending on the Silver King-Falls Creek and Renshaw areas that had been recommended for wilderness in the Rocky Mountain Front Planning Unit management plan. Other public concerns were over allowable types of off-road and undeveloped recreation allowed, conflicts between wildlife migration and extractive uses, and amounts of timber to be harvested (USDA LCNF 1984; 1986c; Sentz 2010). In 1986, Lewis and Clark foresters published a NFMA and RPA compatible forest plan. It contained major revisions from the 1984 draft plan which were “a direct result of the public involvement with the DEIS” (USDA LCNF 1986b, 1/12). Recommended wilderness was added along the Rocky Mountain Front in the West Fork of the Teton drainage and management areas related to timber harvest were reduced. The plan did not address any significant changes in oil and gas leasing. The 1986 Lewis and Clark National Forest plan identified a series of long-range goals that largely corresponded with the Region 1 management concerns (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Regional forester James Overbay selected DEIS Alternative G to “guide the management of the Lewis and Clark National Forest for the next 10 to 15 years” (USDA 479 LCNF 1986c, 7). Alternative G was an alteration of Alternative F following an initial period of public commentary. Along the Rocky Mountain Front, it maintained levels of developed recreation while increasing dispersed, unimproved recreation. Alternative G focused on threatened and endangered wildlife habitat maintenance and promoted scenic values. Oil and gas exploration would continue as long as it was “conducted carefully with a high degree of concern for the wildlife, recreation and scenic values” (11). Wilderness was recommended, but on a limited basis until oil exploration was completed. Timber harvest on the Rocky Mountain Front was downgraded to 500,000 board feet over the 10-15 year period – enough to supply local needs without the construction of permanent roads. Timber and energy exploration roads were to be short and reclaimed after use (Choteau Acantha 1986, 19 June; USDA LCNF 1986c). Lewis and Clark foresters worked to implement the forest plan beginning in 1987 despite increasing public criticism. The proposed wilderness additions drew criticism from wilderness supporters and detractors alike. Foresters prepared EIS reports that included 33 combinations of alternatives for oil and gas wells in the Badger and Two Medicine watersheds but could not find one that met general approval. Recreational campers protested the agency’s new regulations that limited the number of people allowed in a campsite. Access to the forest remained a controversial issue for much of the early 1990s. The agency’s prescriptive burn fire policy outlined in the plan became a major issue in 1988 when nearly 300,000 acres of wilderness, state, and private land burned. The agency’s grizzly habitat plan received significant opposition when the public 480 discovered that it included a significant timber harvest (Choteau Acantha 1987, 4 June; 1987, 17 September; 1988, 29 September; 1988, 10 November; 1989, 19 October; 1989, 2 November; 1990, 11 July; 1990 12 December; 1991, 13 March; 1992, 19 March). The agency drafted yearly monitoring and evaluation reports that assessed the effectiveness of the forest plan and its implementation. In the first few years, several amendments were added to the forest plan to create management standards for, among other things, monitoring compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act, guarding sensitive species, grizzly bear management, grazing in riparian areas, and elk management. With each evaluation, the complexity of Lewis and Clark forest management grew (USDA LCNF 1987c; 1991; 1992d; 1993c). On June 4, 1992, Chief Dale Robertson directed each regional forester to craft a collection of strategies for implementing ecosystem management on a national, regional, and forest level. To aid the regional foresters, the Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain Research Station was directed to develop a strategy that could implement an ecological approach to multiple use management. An inter-agency committee known as FEMAT created a corresponding assessment and management plan. They both supported a complex planning and management approach that emphasized ecosystem integrity and integrated human disturbance into natural ecosystems. Both reports recommended that federal agencies utilize adaptive management procedures. Adaptive management “is based on the concept of management as an experiment, ... accepts uncertainties, ... (and) provides a rapid feedback and evaluation loop for redirection of the experiment” (USDA 481 RM 1994, 12). Adaptive ecosystem management accepted the fact that ecosystems are dynamic, have limits, and are not completely predictable. It also placed a premium on science, experimentation, and technology – all critical components of the national forest management imperative. In this way current forest management plans could be amended to meet an ecosystem management approach. In 1996, a framework for developing an ecosystem management plan for portions of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana was developed. Still, by the end of the 20 th century, neither Region 1 nor Lewis and Clark foresters had developed an ecosystem management plan (Robertson 1992; FEMAT 1993; USDA RM 1994; 1997; USDA PN 1996). In 1999, President Clinton directed public land agencies to again study the case of roadless area classification and management. Between 1999 and 2001, the Forest Service catalogued approximately 58,500,000 acres of inventoried roadless areas – or nearly one third of all Forest System lands. The Clinton-era roadless initiative had two goals that were both tied to ecosystem management. First, the agency sought to utilize roadless designation as a method to reduce road construction and minimize damage to ecologically important resources. Second, the Forest Service stated a desire to “aggressively” decommission and remediate unnecessary roads (USDA FS 1998). The agency formulated its roadless initiative “in response to strong public sentiment for protecting roadless areas and the clean water, biological diversity, wildlife habitat, forest health, dispersed recreational opportunities, and other public benefits provided by these areas” (Glicksman 2004, 1155). The final roadless rule was issued in January of 2001. It 482 prohibited road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvest in inventoried areas. Along the Rocky Mountain Front, nearly 348,000 acres were designated as inventoried roadless areas (USDA FS 1998; Glicksman 2004; Nie 2008). Region 1 and the Lewis and Clark National Forest underwent a series of attempted and actual boundary changes during the final decades of the 20 th century. These boundary redefinitions were largely due to federal attempts to streamline the bureaucracy that to many had grown unwieldy and bloated. Many also saw an economic benefit to redrawing boundaries and increasing the size of management jurisdictions. Furthermore, many claimed that modern road and communications systems negated the need for smaller ranger districts and spatially centered regional headquarters. In 1971, Lewis and Clark foresters began the process of obtaining public input for what would eventually become the 1977 Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan. At public meetings held throughout the Rocky Mountain Front, foresters asked the public to weigh in on the necessity of national forest ranger district headquarters existing at both Augusta and Choteau. The discussion continued through 1974. Foresters cited “inflationary pressures and the realities of the Forest Service budget” as reasons for consolidation (Choteau Acantha 1974, 10 January). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Lewis and Clark’s budget increased at a rate of two to four percent annually while inflation escalated at twice that rate. Timber-poor forests, like the Lewis and Clark, faced difficulties obtaining enough operating funds. Consolidating the Sun River and Teton ranger districts would save the forest $26,000 annually. At public meetings, citizens 483 from both Choteau and Augusta opposed the move. Some worried about the loss of access to the agency and that removing rangers from Rocky Mountain Front communities further disconnected the Forest Service from understanding the needs of the locals. Most objected to the loss of economy, jobs, and population that would come to whichever district headquarters was abandoned. As a result of overwhelming negative public input, Lewis and Clark foresters abandoned consolidation for the time being (Choteau Acantha 1971, 15 April; 1972, 13 April; 1974, 17 January; 1974, 24 January; 1974, 4 April; USDA R1 1978). At the same time, and for some of the same reasons, Region 1 was going through a period of reorganization. President Nixon sought to increase federal bureaucratic efficiency by making the Forest Service’s regional boundaries conform to other federal boundaries. Three of the agency’s regions – the Intermountain (Region 4), the Southwestern (Region 3), and the Northern (Region 1) – would be dissolved. Region 1 headquarters would be abandoned in Missoula, MT and administrative control would be shifted to Denver, CO (Figure 5-8). The planned reorganization also phased out regional offices at Albuquerque, NM, Ogden, UT, and experiment stations at Ogden, UT and Asheville, N.C. Over 1,000 employees were affected by the proposed realignment. Also included in the reorganization plans was a three-stage study that intended to revamp forest boundaries inside of Region 1. Foresters involved in the study began to examine the possibility of merging the six national forests east of the Continental Divide – the Beaverhead, Lewis and Clark, Gallatin, Custer, Deer Lodge, and Helena – into three 484 forests with headquarters in Bozeman, Billings, and Helena. To smooth over the consolidation, Region 1 forester Steve Yurich suggested that the agency adopt a “back to the farm” and “closer to the resource” concept that would suggest that elimination of people in headquarters offices placed more people at district levels and on forest jobs (Yurich 1973) (Helena Independent Record 1973, 1 March; Choteau Acantha 1973, 29 March; USDA FS 1973c). Considerable public and political protest followed. All of Montana’s congressmen, including Republican Dick Shoup, were critical of the plan. Senator Mike Mansfield called it a “stupid, short-sighted, ill advised solution” (Helena Independent 485 Figure 5-8: Proposed Regional Structure Adjustment, 1973. Map by author (USDA FS 1973c). Record 1973, 25 April). Forest Service officials who were critical of the consolidation were advised by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to keep quiet or “heads could roll,” prompting the Montana Wilderness Association to formally request Butz’ resignation (Great Falls Tribune 1973, 16 April). The reorganization prompted Senate hearings in June of 1973 and it was quickly determined that it was not in the best interest of the Forest Service, the Department of Agriculture, or the federal government to pursue reorganization (McGuire 1973; USDA R1 1973). Both ranger district and regional office consolidation returned as an issue in the late 1970s. Both were the result of national economic turbulence. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter asked the Forest Service to consider closing regional offices, reorganizing regional boundaries, and to look for ways to achieve greater manpower efficiency. The Forest Service considered the action but ultimately declined to undertake any action citing the “severe undesirable effect on personnel potentially affected (in 1973)” and the resulting “demoralized personnel and production” (Great Falls Tribune 1977, 13 October). In 1978, Lewis and Clark foresters began a trial plan that combined district management for the Teton and Sun River ranger districts. The yearlong trial gave the agency proof that national forest lands on the Rocky Mountain Front could be managed efficiently and more inline with the NFMA and the Front’s management plan from one headquarters and through a consolidated ranger district. The Sun River and Teton ranger districts were merged into the Rocky Mountain Ranger District on May 1, 1979. The 486 ranger districts’ headquarters were consolidated in Choteau. A minimal staff and a forest information and visitors center was kept at Augusta (Choteau Acantha 1979, 3 May; Miles 1979; Weyers 1979; Mills 2012). Lewis and Clark foresters continued to modernize administrative sites. They enlarged sites in urban areas and and utilized backcountry sites for wilderness, fire, grazing, and administrative control (Figure 5-9, Appendix J). The district ranger station in Choteau and the new Augusta information center were enlarged and modernized in 1983. Administrative sites near the forest boundary were also modernized and used for fire control. In 1972, a new administrative site, Little Badger, was created to serve as a control point between the forest and the Blackfoot Reservation. It also became home to one of the agency’s horse winter pasturages. Backcountry sites were used for wilderness control, summer administration, and winter game studies (Engler 1966; USDA LCNF 1969; Greene 1972; Richmond 1973; Choteau Acantha 1981, 2 February; USDA R1 1983b; 1983c; USDA LCNF 2004e). Transportation infrastructure planning also continued. Through the latter decades of the 20 th century, Lewis and Clark foresters worked to balance road and trail development to meet dynamic forest development needs including intensive management timber harvesting, oil and gas exploration, recreation, and public access. Foresters also became more aware of the environmental impacts of road and trail construction, use, and maintenance. 487 The 1960s Region 1 and corresponding Lewis and Clark MUSY plans equated resource development with expanding the existing road system. Intensive management timber harvesting could only occur at the rate of new road development. Lewis and Clark 488 Figure 5-9: Administrative sites, 1988. Map by author (USDA FS 1988). foresters identified pockets of merchantable timber throughout the forest, but the rugged topography precluded most timber-related road construction. “High road costs have a dampening effect on the demand for the timber under present market conditions” (USDA LCNF 1966c, 4). Road access problems were especially acute in the Teton Ranger District where the only improved forest roads were along the North and South Forks of the Teton River. Trails, such as the South Fork of the Two Medicine, were occasionally used as four-wheel roads for oil and gas seismic testing in the 1960s. Public protests and the RARE I inventory prompted Lewis and Clark foresters to place controls over motorized use of trails by the oil and gas industry (USDA LCNF nd-z; 1966c; USDA R1 1967c). In 1965, Lewis and Clark foresters conducted a trail and road assessment to coordinate MUSY forest development plans. Trails were classified by type of travel – all purpose, hiker, fireman, or limited purpose. Trails had a secondary classification that showed the primary value of the trail to the forest – whether it was a range driveway, an experimental area trail, a fire control trail, a nature trail, a recreation trail, or a snowmobiling trail. Early regional and Lewis and Clark MUSY plans repeatedly lament the condition of trails in the Lewis and Clark. Most of the trails were “essentially the 1930s fire control and administration system ... there is a great need for improvement to supplement the road network” (USDA R1 1967c). The MUSY plans predicted increased traffic and use on roads and trails and directed foresters to place an emphasis on 489 maintaining and modernizing the road and trail system (USDA LCNF 1965a; 1966c; USDA R1 1967c). Management plans in the 1960s and early 1970s dictated that road and trail infrastructure be expanded to meet the growing recreational impulse. This resulted in Lewis and Clark foresters re-designing some of the major forest roads and wilderness trails. In 1966, the Beaver-Willow Creek road was completed to create a recreational loop road that connected the Benchmark Road with the Sun River and Gibson Reservoir. The Benchmark, Sun River, and Teton roads were all redeveloped in the late 1960s and early 1970s to meet the needs of expanding summer hiking and campground use and a growing winter skiing and snowmobiling culture. Wilderness trails in the Bob were re-evaluated from the point of view of recreation use as opposed to fire control. Foresters noticed that wilderness trails that radiated from main roads, such as the North Fork and South Fork Sun River Trails and the Hoadley Creek Trail, were receiving heavy recreational use by hikers and horseback riders. In 1970, foresters recommended that it would be “desirable to put back system trails that have been deleted” in order to disperse crowds and reduce overuse and erosion (Rittersbacher 1969). Furthermore, several wilderness trails were re- routed around bogs and switchbacks and footbridges were constructed (Slusher 1966; USDA R1 1966c; 1967a; 1968; Choteau Acantha 1968, 4 July; 1968, 1 August; 1970, 25 June; 1970, 10 December; Nordberg 1970). Expanded recreational road and trail use also brought public criticism. Hikers complained about conflict with motorized trail use – motorbikes and four-wheeled 490 vehicles – and foresters noticed that some trails were showing signs of erosion and disrepair. Furthermore, foresters worried that motorized recreation on forest trails would confuse RARE classification and open the forest up to litigation. In 1967, Region 1 foresters directed all of their forest supervisors to find ways to manage this conflict. On multiple occasions throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters placed bans on motorized recreation on forest trails and in some cases, on forest roads. Repeated attempts to control motorized trail access failed to produce recognizable results. As a result, the Forest Service issued a series of rules in 1973 that created special trail designations specifying where off-road vehicles may and may not operate. Following a public comment EIS, the agency decided that this rule would be implemented in 1976 (Choteau Acantha 1969, 17 April; 1970, 23 July; 1971, 29 April; 1972, 13 July; 1973, 24 May; Engler 1972a; 1972b; USDA FS 1973b). Beginning in 1971 and continuing through the end of the 20 th century, Lewis and Clark foresters implemented seasonal road and trail closures to protect wildlife habitat, migration corridors, and to limit erosion. Foresters worked in cooperation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to determine locations and timelines for closures that corresponded with the annual elk migration to the Sun River Game Refuge. Trails were also closed to protect grizzly bear habitat. Beginning in 1975, foresters began closing roads to protect against rutting and erosion (Choteau Acantha 1971, 29 April; 1975, 8 May; 1979, 12 April; 1982, 21 October; 1982, 21 October; 1987, 8 October; Mills 2012). 491 The Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan placed an emphasis on continued road and trail maintenance for resource development. It recognized the timber limitations of the Rocky Mountain Front and largely defined resource development in terms of oil and gas exploration, recreation, and wildlife and grazing management. The plan denied new road construction for seismic oil and gas exploration. Roads constructed for oil and gas development were closed to most recreational vehicles (snowmobiles were allowed) and open on a limited basis for agency administration and management (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). The management plan also established a “travel plan” that identified areas, roads, and trails that were subject to certain controls (Figure 5-10). Regions were broken down into one of six control classes. Wilderness areas (C1) were closed to all motorized vehicles. Roads and trails in the Lubec Ridge area (C2) were closed to all vehicles from December 1 through May 15. Multiple regions were closed yearlong to motorized vehicles over 40 inches in total width (C3). Snowmobiles were allowed in these regions. Trail vehicles - motorized vehicles of less than 40 inches total width - were restricted to designated trails. Roads and trails in the Dupuyer Creek and Sun River Canyon areas (C4) were closed to all motorized vehicles from December 1 through May 15. Motorized vehicles were limited to restricted trails between May 16 and November 30. Multiple trails - including those around Gibson Reservoir (C5) - were closed to all motorized vehicles except snowmobiles. Finally, the Mettler and Chicken Coulee trails were closed to motorized vehicles from December 1 through May 15. Through the latter decades of 492 493 Figure 5-10: Rocky Mountain Front Travel Plan, 1978. Map by author (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). the 20th century, travel plans were frequently updated to address changing use, environmental, and access patterns (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). The plan promoted increased motorized access to the forest. In 1978, the Rocky Mountain Front only had motorized access at six points. Foresters felt that greater access would more evenly distribute recreation and eliminate congestion and environmental overuse. Furthermore, lack of access roads contributed to high production costs and limited the amount of timber and hard rock minerals that could be produced from the forest. The plan recommended obtaining easements for access at the Dearborn River or on Falls Creek and on the South Fork of the Two Medicine River. After an analysis of alternatives, it was decided that vehicular access to the Dearborn and Falls Creek area could not be obtained past the then C Bar N Camp (now called the Montana Wilderness School of the Bible). A trailhead and parking lot was established that allowed non- motorized access to the Dearborn. No access was granted along the Two Medicine River at Whiterock or at other proposed sites near the Swift Reservoir, despite public demand and positive environmental impact statements (Figure 5-11). In most cases, the forest lacked appropriate funding to purchase rights-of-way, though in one case, the Boone and Crockett’s Roosevelt Ranch blocked public access near Blackleaf. The Boone and Crockett club denied the agency an easement and barred access to the four-wheel drive road that ran through their property into the forest. Sportsmen were even arrested when they cut the lock on the gate and drove into the forest. The action prompted the Teton County Sportsmen’s Association to sue for access. In response, the Boone and Crockett 494 organization created a parking lot for horse travelers and hiker access but denied vehicular access to the forest (USDA R1 1977b; 1978; Grant 1978a; 1978b; Choteau 495 Figure 5-11: Proposed and Actual Access Points, 1981. Map by author (Choteau Acantha 1981, 4 June). Acantha 1981, 4 June; 1987, 5 February; 1988, 21 January; 1988, 28 January; 1988, 27 October). By the mid 1970s, large portions of the soon-to-be Rocky Mountain Ranger District’s road and trail budget were allocated to recreation development. The goal of this work was to equalize recreational use impacts and to control access points to trails. Trails long abandoned in the wilderness areas were reconstructed using “primitive tools” in an attempt to conform to the Wilderness Act – though occasionally trail crews obtained permission to used power equipment and explosives (Worf 1978). The agency constructed end-of-the-road and trailhead facilities consisting of parking lots, restroom structures, horse troughs and hitches, and trash bins through the 1970s, signifying a major shift in recreation management along the Rocky Mountain Front (Figure 5-12). Foresters frequently utilized volunteers from local conservation clubs and Youth Conservation Corps members to construct facilities and maintain sections of heavily used recreational trails (Choteau Acantha 1973, 12 July; 1973, 9 August; 1973, 13 September; USDA FS 1976b; Mills 1979; 2012; Swanger 1979; Worf 1979; USDA LCNF 1982d). The 1986 Lewis and Clark Forest Plan identified the importance of forest access roads, limited timber road construction on the Rocky Mountain Ranger District, and developed a transportation plan that encouraged public recreation and supported grizzly and elk habitat. In accordance with the NFMA, the forest travel plan was reviewed every two years; foresters assessed monitoring efforts and decided whether roads needed restrictions to protect soils, vegetation, and wildlife. Travel plans were made 496 cooperatively with Montana FWP and local advisory groups. The plan emphasized rehabilitation of forest roads over new construction, especially in the Rocky Mountain District. Trail work through the end of the 20 th century consisted of maintenance and 497 Figure 5-12: Trailhead Facilities, 1976. Map by author (USDA FS 1976b). relocation to redistribute wilderness recreation away from environmentally sensitive areas, bogs and other zones especially prone to erosion (Figure 5-13, Appendix K) 498 Figure 5-13: Transportation Infrastructure, 2000. Map by author (LCNF-GF). (Choteau Acantha 1986, 19 June; 1987, 21 May; 1988, 21 July; 2003, 4 June; USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c; 1987a; 1993c; 1998g; 1999b; 2001b; Mills 2012). Decisions about transportation infrastructure construction, repair, and access were guided through the forest plan management zone process. Rocky Mountain Ranger District forest roads fell into four management zone classifications. Roads in management zones with H or S-categorization were managed for “high public access.” Foresters were directed to permit motorized use on all arterial and collector roads and on some local roads. Foresters were allowed to selectively close roads for periods of time to resolve use conflicts, promote safety, and protect resources such as wildlife habitat. Roads in E and I-classified management zones were managed for “low public access.” Motorized use was allowed on all arterial and on some collector roads. Local road motorized use was restricted. Foresters were permitted to issue closures similar to those in “high public access” zones. In the Rocky Mountain Ranger District, these roads bordered the forest-public land interface. Roads in F, G, N, and O management zones were designated to “minimize public access” and foresters were directed to limit motorized use on these roads, which were in resource-use areas. Finally, no roads were allowed in M, P, and Q-categorized zones (Figure 5-14). In E, F, G, I, N, and O-zones, roads constructed for resource extraction were closed to public use and obliterated when not needed (USDA LCNF1986b; 1986c; Gorman 1994). Trail infrastructure zone management was concerned with controlling off-road vehicle access and trail design characteristics. Trails near the national forest-public land 499 border were largely open to off-road vehicle access with exceptions being wilderness P- zones, RARE II roadless inventoried N-zones, and semi-primitive recreation and wildlife 500 Figure 5-14: Lewis and Clark National Forest Road Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF1986b; 1986c). habitat F-zones. In high or moderate use areas, trail construction needed to be “compatible” to the natural surroundings. In all other areas, with the exception of the M, or Research Natural Areas, trail construction had to conform to the “natural” surroundings and be as unobtrusive as possible. No trail construction was allowed in the Research Natural Area (Figure 5-15) (USDA LCNF1986b; 1986c; Gorman 1994). Challenges to the Forest Service’s Total Control fire policy came repeatedly through the latter decades of the 20 th century. Managing wildland fire in light of the 1964 Wilderness Act initially troubled foresters used to controlling fires through pseudo paramilitary and highly mechanized suppression forces. Research conducted by the Forest Service and other land agencies demonstrated the positive effects of prescribed fire and let-burn policies. Costs for suppression skyrocketed through the financially troubled 1970s. These factors, plus the rise of large “megafires,” all contributed to the Forest Service restructuring its fire policy away from totally controlling fire to eventually using fire for ecological forest management (Pyne 1997; National Interagency Fire Center 2001; Hudson 2011). Between 1967 and 1977, the Forest Service initiated a series of fire policy reviews that were driven by emerging science, environmental legislation, economics, and a series of large fires. A review in 1967 supported the 10 A.M. policy during normal fire seasons but granted some leeway for early and late season fires. If fires occurred during those periods, total control was the forester’s prerogative. Public criticism of Forest Service total control grew following large and costly fires in Region 1 in 1967 and 1970. In 1968, 501 the National Park Service altered its fire management policy to recognize the role of fire in natural ecosystems. It allowed natural fires to burn under prescribed conditions. The 502 Figure 5-15: Lewis and Clark National Forest Trail Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF1986b; 1986c). NPS also began to use fire as a management tool. In 1971, the Forest Service again reaffirmed the 10 A.M. policy and implemented a new 10-acre policy that mandated that total control be achieved before a fire reached 10 acres in size. But the agency also approved pre-planned exceptions to total control in wilderness areas. The 10-acre policy dramatically expanded the economic cost of suppression; funds allocated nationally for presuppression grew from $6,000,000 in 1965 to $85,000,000 in 1976. Large fires kept occurring, especially in 1967 and 1970. As a result, in 1974, the Forest Service publicly announced that, as an agency, it was now dedicated to fire management as opposed to fire control. In 1975, the agency wrote a new set of management standards that were written into policy in 1977. This policy eliminated most of the aspects of total control including the 10 A.M. and 10-acre policies. It detailed management strategies that were “pluralistic ... a policy of fire by prescription” (Pyne 1997, 294). Suppression was an option, but not a mandate for foresters. Fire became a tool in forest management rather than something to plan against (Pyne 1997; National Interagency Fire Center 2001; Hudson 2011). Region 1 and Lewis and Clark foresters worked to integrate national fire policy into forest-wide plans. Region 1 and Lewis and Clark MUSY plans placed emphasis on controlling man-made fires caused by a reckless public and poor disposal of timber slash. Fire control remained highly centralized and focused on technology and rapid deployment of fire control forces. Smokejumpers operated out of landing fields and from the headquarters in Missoula. Planes were routinely used by the mid 1960s to drop fire 503 retardants such as Borate on Lewis and Clark fires. The agency even contracted with the fertilizer industry to develop fire retardants that contained chemical fertilizers to support reforestation. By 1971, the agency had equipped planes with state of the art infrared scanners developed by the Department of Defense that detected fires that weren’t smoking enough to be seen by lookouts or spotters (USDA LCNF 1966b; 1966c; Choteau Acantha 1967, 25 May; 1968, 15 August; 1972, 3 August; USDA R1 1967c; 1980b). The 1967 and 1970 fire seasons had been particularly severe. Region 1 smokejumpers worked over 90,000 man-hours attempting to suppress fires that burned over 60,000 acres. At the same time, the Forest Service was looking for ways – through consolidation and modernization – to reduce the financial burden of total control. This economic demand was augmented by the National Park Service’s acceptance of prescribed burning. Region 1 foresters began to craft policy to determine adequate fire plans for wilderness areas. In 1970, Region 1 foresters began a study in the Selway- Bitterroot Wilderness to determine the potential benefits of allowing wildfire to “more nearly play its natural role” (USDA R1 1970a). Lewis and Clark foresters directed the district rangers in the Teton and Sun River ranger districts to model the Selway-Bitterroot plan to fit a fire plan under development for the Lewis and Clark portion of the Bob Marshall Wilderness. In 1972, a prescribed let-burn policy was implemented into the Lewis and Clark portion of the wilderness. In 1976, foresters from the Helena, Flathead, and Lolo national forests coordinated with Lewis and Clark foresters to establish boundaries and conditions in which natural fire would be permitted to burn in the Bob 504 Marshall complex and to establish areas where wildfire would be suppressed (USDA LCNF 1966b; 1966c; USDA R1 1967c; 1980b; Powell 1970; Dollan 1976; Choteau Acantha 1981, 16 July; 1988, 28 July; Baker et al 1993). Fire control infrastructure in the Lewis and Clark was affected by continued modernization and shifting fire management philosophies. In 1966, a landing field was constructed at Benchmark (Figure 5-16). Benchmark was selected for its advantageous location just outside of the Bob Marshall Wilderness and at the end of an important and increasingly used forest road and recreation area. Foresters decided to have a formal 505 Figure 5-16: Benchmark Airfield, 1966. Photo courtesy of LCNF-C. dedication ceremony to inaugurate the Benchmark landing field to “capitalize on” the landing field’s multiple use management capability (Keeney 1967). By 1970, wilderness restrictions and public pressure forced the elimination of the Gates Park landing field. Consequently, by the late 1980s, Benchmark landing strip was the sole landing field in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. In 1968, Lewis and Clark foresters began an assessment of lookouts with the goal of either modernizing and replacing or decommissioning archaic lookouts. Of the five existing improved lookouts, two – Steamboat and Half Dome – were selected for removal (Figure 5-17) (Barry 1967; Camp 1968; Dargan 1968; Kiesling 1970; USDA FS 1965a; 1976b; 1988; USDA LCNF 1967a). Lewis and Clark foresters implemented a fire management action plan in 1984 – and reiterated in the 1986 forest plan - that allowed foresters discretion in determining fire prescription and adequate suppression efforts. Fires were broken down into five management classes – control, operational, observation, wilderness, and special. Foresters were mandated to “control” fires, or engage in complete suppression, occurring in timber stands that had important visual value or that were located in developed recreation areas and in municipal watersheds. “Operational” management areas were predominantly in timber harvest regions and received the highest level of prescribed fire for range, wildlife, silviclutural, and hazard reduction purposes. In some “operational” areas, foresters were allowed to initiate planned ignitions. Land in the “observation” category were either in high elevation or low productivity areas. Fire prescriptions could be planned as well as unplanned. In “observation” areas, both man-made and natural fires 506 could qualify for prescription. Natural “wilderness” fires were classified as prescribed fires; man-caused “wilderness” fires were treated as wildfires and managed for 507 Figure 5-17: Fire Control Infrastructure, 1988. Map by author (Dargan 1968; USDA FS 1988). suppression. Finally, “special” fire management zones were those that did not fit into any of the above categories. Prescription in “special areas” often involved hazard reduction (USDA LCNF 1984c; 1986b). Foresters stressed the implementation of prescribed burning in the 1986 Lewis and Clark forest plan as “appropriate to achieve land management goals, including improvement or maintenance of vegetation diversity” (USDA LCNF 1986b, 2/72). Foresters also noted that prescribed fire through planned ignitions had been limited to slash and road debris removal and that “the use of fire in natural fuels to improve resource production has received very little emphasis” (6/33). As a result, fuel levels on the Lewis and Clark had progressed beyond natural levels, resulting in a buildup of dead fuels, conifer encroachment on the grasslands, stunted timber growth, and the potential for destructive megafires. To reduce fuels and associated suppression costs, foresters were encouraged to design timber sales to break up large expanses where fuels had piled up (USDA LCNF 1984c; 1986b). Lewis and Clark foresters have managed fire suppression and prescription through the management zone model outlined in the forest plan. The plan delineated regions where suppression activities that ranged from “aggressive control” to let-burn (USDA LCNF 1986b). In management zones classified as E, F, G, I, M, N, and Q, fire suppression ranged from “control” to “confinement” depending on location and potential damage to resources, fire behavior, and a coordinated risk assessment. In management zones classified as H, O, and S, fire was to be aggressively controlled due to present 508 recreational, timber, transportation, and visual quality resources. Finally, in wilderness or P-classified management zones, fire suppression followed a let-burn standard (Figure 5-18). Prescription also followed a management zone model. Prescription in management zones H, O, and S was handled through planned ignitions to enhance and maintain resources. Foresters were also directed to actively include fuel reduction techniques in these zones including burning, removal, and rearranging. Due to the high user traffic in these zones, all prescription and fuels reduction had to meet visual quality standards set by the Forest Service. Prescription in management zones P and Q allowed for only unplanned, or natural, prescription to occur. In the remaining management zones both planned and unplanned prescription could be used at the discretion of forest managers. Planned prescription had to follow a public comment EIS process (Figure 5-19) (USDA LCNF 1984c; 1986b; Gorman 1994). Each summer throughout much of the 1980s, fires returned to Region 1 and the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. An extended drought and tinder-dry conditions forced Lewis and Clark foresters to repeatedly place restrictions on recreation and extractive use. As the drought continued, the agency expended large portions of its budget on fire patrols. The dry conditions negated most of the prescription choices available to foresters, though small 230-acre and 100-acre prescribed burns were initiated in 1981 and 1987. Management focused on containing and controlling fires. Lewis and Clark foresters repeatedly turned to smokejumper crews from Missoula and fire crews from the 509 Blackfeet Reservation (Choteau Acantha 1979, 11 October; 1981, 30 April; 1985, 3 January; 1985, 4 July; 1986, 14 August; 1988, 28 July; USDA LCNF 1982d). 510 Figure 5-18: Lewis and Clark National Forest Fire Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). On July 11, 1988, Beartop Lookout forest guard Walt Jaeger discovered a plume of smoke emanating from the rugged, old growth forest in the Bob Marshall Wilderness 511 Figure 5-19: Lewis and Clark National Forest Fire Prescription Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). near Gates Park. Foresters determined that the fire was lightning caused and well within the Wilderness boundary and therefore eligible for prescription. Rocky Mountain Ranger District Fire Management Officer Norm Kamrud identified that the fire was in a region with heavy understory. “In the past,” said Kamrud, “we have been such good caretakers, we have permitted a large build up of fuel in the forest” (Choteau Acantha 1988, 28 July). By July 12, the fire had grown to approximately 40 acres. Lewis and Clark foresters developed a plan to monitor the fire and it was placed in prescription. Agency officials predicted the fire would grow to a perimeter of 5,000 acres (Choteau Acantha 1988, 21 July; USDA LCNF 1988a; 1988f). The Gates Park fire remained stable until the end of the month. Strong westerly winds pushed the fire to over 3,000 acres by July 26. The fire created several spot fires in neighboring Ray Creek and Red Shale canyons – all were within prescription. Fireguards had placed a perimeter around the Gates Park administration site to protect that resource and to keep the fire from spreading east out of the Wilderness boundary into the North Fork of the Sun River. But by the end of July, Lewis and Clark foresters were contemplating abandoning Gates Park, falling back to the North Fork of the Sun River, and beginning a “major fire suppression effort” (Stiger 1988). On July 30, fireguards at Gates Park were removed. The fire perimeter had grown to 8,364 acres. Large areas of the forest were closed to the public (USDA LCNF 1988a; 1988f). In early August the fire expanded to over 10,000 acres. The fire moved across fire lines at Gates Park and out of the Wilderness boundary. Foresters prepared to combat the 512 fire if it made a run up Biggs Creek but continued to only monitor the fire’s activity. By August 11 th – one month since the fire began – the fire had expanded to over 20,000 acres. The fire burned so hot along Ray and Headquarters creeks that foresters indicated that the watersheds had been left sterilized. In early September, the fire made several runs, consumed over 36,000 acres, and destroyed the Wrong Creek administration site. Firecrews continued to construct firelines to keep the fire inside the Wilderness boundary. The fire burned until snow fell in late September. It ultimately consumed over 54,000 acres (Choteau Acantha 1988, 4 August; 1988, 11 August; USDA LCNF 1988a; 1988f). On June 25, 1988 a similar lightning fire was detected in the Lolo National Forest in the Scapegoat Wilderness. It was allowed to burn under prescription. It smoldered for more than a month until late July. On July 27, the Canyon Creek fire expanded to over 33,000 acres, crossed into the Helena National Forest, and then entered the Lewis and Clark at the headwaters of the Whitetail, Bald Bear, and Upper Twin drainages. Once it crossed the Continental Divide, “aggressive action was taken to keep the fire inside the Scapegoat” (USDA LCNF 1988f). It was to little avail; on August 29, the Canyon Creek fire exploded to 55,000 acres, crossed the Dearborn River and ran out of the Wilderness. Though over 600 people were placed on containment duty, extreme winds on September 6 pushed the fire over 180,000 acres overnight. The fire ran out onto private lands destroying hundreds of miles of fence, tons of hay, several ranch buildings, and over 200 head of cattle. On September 9, the fire made another run through the Falls Creek area 513 consuming four recreation cabins. Before it snowed, the Canyon Creek fire had burned over 247,000 acres (Figure 5-20) (USDA LCNF 1988f). 514 Figure 5-20: Gates Park and Canyon Creek Fire Perimeters, 1988. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1988f). Interior Secretary Donald Hodell stated that the “Forest Service has received a black eye for the let burn policy” (Choteau Acantha 1988, 15 September). The blow-ups in Gates Creek, Canyon Creek, and a third in Yellowstone National Park prompted a congressional review of the let-burn policy. Though there was considerable public, political, and industry protest over the policy, the committee affirmed the benefits of prescriptive fire. However, it required that public land agencies utilizing fire create more in-depth fire management plans and participate in greater cooperation. It directed all agencies to review plans. In 1990, representatives of the Flathead, Lewis and Clark, Lolo, and Helena national forests met to discuss how prescribed fires would be managed in the Bob Marshall Complex (Choteau Acantha 1989, 12 January; 1990, 18 January). Extreme fires in 1995 and 2001 further altered federal fire policy. Reviews of the federal wildland fire policy emphasized the role that fire played in contributing to ecosystem sustainability. Because the 2001 fire policy required foresters to incorporate fire into all resource management plans, Lewis and Clark foresters actively incorporated prescribed burns into forest management plans. Prescriptive burning was used on several occasions through the end of the 20 th century to remediate grasslands and for fuel reduction (Figure 5-21). Public reaction was mixed over prescribed burn policy. Comments surrounding a prescribed burn in 2000 in the South Fork of the Sun River display the complexity of using fire as a forest management tool after decades of pursuing total control. “Since the use of logging has been forbidden,” said an Augusta 515 resident, “we’ve had to fall back on prescribed fire” (Great Falls Tribune 2000, 20 June) (National Interagency Fire Center 2001). Timber Management (1965-2000) The Forest Service timber management policy was transformed in the latter decades of the 20 th century to adapt to dynamic cultural, economic, and environmental shifts. Timber management in the 1960s and early 1970s mirrored post-WWII intensive management practices. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act supported maximum timber yields. Regional foresters struggled to balance timber demands with competing uses, sluggish economies, growing public participation, and increasing environmental fervor. 516 Figure 5-21: Prescriptive burn, Mortimer Gulch, 1996. Photo courtesy of LCNF-C. The Bitterroot and Monongahela controversies shone a negative light on intensive management timber harvesting. Public opinion supported restricting or limiting the size and methods the Forest Service authorized. The NFMA adopted a revised definition of sustained yield founded on the principle of nondeclining even-flow. This limited the amount of timber removed from each forest. But forestwide, unsustainable timber harvests – many at below-cost - continued into the 1980s. Timber harvests slightly declined in the early 1980s as the United States rode out a period of economic stagnation. Harvests increased dramatically in the middle and latter 1980s as a result of President Ronald Reagan’s and George Bush’s emphasis on home building and timber extraction. As timber harvests increased, so did concern for forest health. By the early 1990s, timber harvests in many forests began to take on a tertiary importance behind habitat restoration and forest health. By the end of the 20 th century, timber management on most national forests focused less on producing a sustained yield of timber products and more on how timber management could be used as a tool to promote ecological health (Hirt 1994, 216-265; Lewis 2005, 207-231; Hays 2009, 106-136). In the middle 1960s, Region 1 was a major timber producer for the Forest Service. Between 1960 and 1965, the region’s allowable sustained annual cut grew from 1.0 to 1.4 billion board feet. Most of that growth occurred in the heavily timbered forests west of the Continental Divide. In 1965, for example, timber cut from the Lewis and Clark National Forest constituted less than one percent of the total Region 1 cut. Lewis and Clark foresters repeatedly had difficulty meeting aggressive harvest totals and were 517 ordered, along with others in similar situations, to prepare a five-year coordinated timber harvest and road access plan (Crow 1966; USDA R1 1966c; 1966e). Despite the fact that Region 1 MUSY plans highlighted the importance of intensive management and expanding transportation systems, Lewis and Clark foresters found it difficult to meet anticipated cut targets. Lewis and Clark MUSY plans recognized the increased demand for timber and highlighted successful sales, but also noted the topographical and economic difficulties in arranging timber harvests. “Road building is difficult and expensive. These high costs have a dampening effect on the demand for the timber under present market conditions” (USDA LCNF 1966c). Furthermore, balancing expanding timber harvests along the Front with other dominant multiple uses proved futile and Lewis and Clark foresters were forced to reduce the acreage available to timber harvest. In 1960, Lewis and Clark foresters advertised a 14 million board feet timber sale in the Teton drainage. The timber was sold to Fred Israelson of Libby, MT in 1961. Israelson turned the sale over to the Rocky Mountain Timber Company when he realized that the territory was too difficult to log. The sale passed to two more parties for similar reasons and was finally logged, with financial support from the Forest Service, in 1968. Lewis and Clark MUSY timber management plans focused on the potential “to thin out some of the overstocked stands to meet” local post, pole, Christmas tree, and firewood demands (USDA LCNF 1966c). Post and pole logging in lodgepole pine stands remained the predominant form of timber extraction through the mid 1970s but declined as local telephone companies modernized and began 518 replacing pole and line transmission with underground cable (USDA LCNF 1966c; USDA R1 1967c; Choteau Acantha 1968, 18 April; 1977, 28 July). Regional MUSY plans also set goals for replanting and reseeding burned and cutover areas. The preferred method of preparing ground for replanting was through prescribed burning. Burned over areas in Jones and Hungry Man creeks and timber clearcuts on the West Fork of the Teton were burned of slash and debris to allow for seed dispersal and to mimic natural processes. Terraced planting occurred in Jones Creek and on the North Fork of Ford Creek throughout the 1960s with varying degrees of success (USDA LCNF 1966c; USDA R1 1966b; 1966d; Choteau Acantha 1971, 16 September; 1971, 21 October). By the late 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters had reconciled their management plans with the realities of the Rocky Mountain Front’s topography, limited timber bodies, wilderness declarations, and RARE II roadless inventories. In the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan, foresters identified timber bodies that provided high, moderate, and low timber management opportunities. They also identified timber bodies that were unable to be exploited because of access (Figure 5-22). Merchantable timber bodies existed south of the Sun River, especially in the Green Timber and Beaver basins, along the Benchmark road, and in the Elk Creek region. Limited timber bodies were available along the Teton River road and in the South Fork Two Medicine drainage. Foresters recommended only 72,517 acres of land for timber management, a reduction of 135,091 acres from the 1960 timber management plan. Foresters saw oil and gas exploration as 519 the only real opportunity for expanding timber management because road construction costs would be borne by oil and gas companies (USDA R1 1977b; 1978; Choteau 520 Figure 5-22: Exploitable Timber Bodies, Rocky Mountain Front plan, 1978. Map by author (USDA R1 1978). Acantha 1978, 23 March). The Region 1 and Lewis and Clark timber harvest benefited from the Reagan administration’s push to increase timber production. In 1982, Region 1 timber cuts grew by 44 percent. Four major timber sales were advertised in the Rocky Mountain Ranger District. All corresponded to exploitable regions in the Rocky Mountain Land Management Plan. Timber contractors constructed all timber roads in the Green Gulch, Lower Pike Creek, and Waldron Creek sales. All sales went through the public comment EIS process. Contractors utilized small clearcut units to maximize production but were required to practice selective cutting in areas that could contribute to erosion and watershed degradation (Choteau Acantha 1981, 2 April; 1985, 17 January; USDA LCNF 1982a; 1982c; 1982d; 1983a; USDA R1 1983a). The 1986 Lewis and Clark Forest Plan also reflected the national drive for timber – at least in part. In the 1984 forest plan EIS proposal, foresters concluded that the Lewis and Clark could withstand an annual cut of 13 million board feet. The final 1986 plan showed a one million board feet increase over the 1984 plan, which met the average annual levels of timber sales since 1960. However, nearly all of the 14 million board feet harvest was planned in the Jefferson Division of the Lewis and Clark. The Rocky Mountain Ranger District was only allocated an annual cut of 500,000 board feet – a 50 percent reduction from the 1984 draft. This reduction was made to support “the abundance and diversity of wildlife, recreation and scenic values found there” (USDA LCNF 1986c, 11). Timber road construction was limited to non-permanent, low-standard 521 truck trails “used to provide access for firewood, post, pole, houselog, and sawlog cutting by local residents” (11). Furthermore, aggressive timber harvests in the Rocky Mountain District since 1980 had dramatically reduced accessible timber stands (USDA LCNF 1984a; 1984b; 1986b; 1986c). Timber harvest plans for the Rocky Mountain Ranger District have been guided by the forest plan management area designation (Figure 5-23). Timber harvests on E, F, G, H, I, and S-designated management areas have been managed since 1986 under an unprogrammed classification. Unprogrammed timber harvest areas allow for users to obtain Christmas trees, firewood, and ornamental wood products through administrative use, free use, fire and insect salvage, and sanitation cutting. No timber harvests were allowed in M, N, P, and Q-designated management areas. Commercial timber harvesting was only allowed in O-designated management areas. O-designated management areas allowed for both unprogrammed and programmed timber harvest activities. Programmed activities included clearcuts that did not exceed 5 acres, shelterwood cutting, and selective cutting of both even-aged and uneven-aged stands (USDA LCNF1986b; 1986c; Gorman 1994). Through the 1990s and into the 21 st century, timber management in the Rocky Mountain Division moved away from large merchantable timber sales and focused more on public use, thinning for forest health, and fire salvage sales (Figure 5-24). Lewis and Clark timber sales dropped dramatically with the formal introduction of ecosystem management. In 1992, over 24,000,000 board feet were sold on the Lewis and Clark. A 522 year later, only 6,000,000 board feet were sold. By 2000, timber sales had been reduced to 1,700,000 board feet and most of these were in the Jefferson District. In the Rocky 523 Figure 5-23: Lewis and Clark National Forest Timber Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). Mountain District, the agency cut small temporary roads to allow locals access for firewood. Lewis and Clark foresters contemplated a large fire salvage sale following the Canyon Creek fire but ultimately declined implementing the sale when it was determined that the EIS needed for road construction would take far longer than the usable value of the burned timber. Timber harvests and thinning for fuels reduction took place in the 524 Figure 5-24: Timber Salvage Sale, Teton Canyon, 2010. Photo by author. Benchmark, Two Medicine, and Teton regions (Choteau Acantha 1989, 5 January; 1992, 5 August; USDA LCNF 1992d; 1993c; 2013; Headwaters Economics 2012b). Grazing and Wildlife Management (1965-2000) Rocky Mountain Front range managers had every reason to be optimistic about the grazing and wildlife situation during the last decades of the 20 th century. The elk population had stabilized and winter range was secured – in fact, there were repeated calls to eliminate the Sun River Game Preserve as most agreed that it had outlived its usefulness. Livestock owners and the Forest Service had entered into a period of cooperation and public input regulated through the Grazing Advisory Board system. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act recognized the legitimacy of both grazing and wildlife as manageable and worthwhile uses and early forest MUSY plans placed great emphasis on managing both uses in a compatible fashion. Intensive rangeland management promised new and exciting technologies and methodologies that could increase forage use to a maximum carrying capacity and still protect the resource (Engler 1969; Merritt 1969). Yet, there were also reasons for concern. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act also recognized recreation as an important use. Rocky Mountain Front livestock and wildlife interests feared that expanding the public recreation use would reduce traditional grazing privileges and encroach on wildlife habitat. Broad American cultural and societal changes had people questioning the validity and necessity of ranching lifestyles. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) brought outside public input into the 525 allotment and forest management planning process and threatened to destabilize the hard- fought negotiated truce between livestock and wildlife interests. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) mandated that managing agencies take a new look at human impacts on wildlife and reorganize management imperatives to overtly defend and improve species habitat. Try as they might, in certain quarters there were growing demands for expanded use. “Sportsmen are continually demanding that greater numbers of elk and deer be carried ... cattlemen press for increases at every opportunity ... the range is too limited to meet the needs of all the users” (USDA LCNF 1966c) (Rowley 1985, 231-244). Throughout the latter decades of the 20 th century, Lewis and Clark foresters worked to bring the stock industry in line with range capacity and wildlife needs. Foresters utilized intensive range management techniques to stabilize the range, improve forage health, and reduce soil loss. The agency conducted repeated soil analyses, assembled range infrastructure, and manipulated stocking plans. By the mid 1960s, fire, domestic stock overuse, conflict with wildlife, floods, droughts, and incompatible management had all worked to leave the Lewis and Clark range in only fair condition at best. Widespread soil and vegetative loss had occurred in many ranges on the Rocky Mountain Front. MUSY plans indicated that a “complete range analysis and establish(ment of) proper use management on all domestic livestock range” was a primary management objective (USDA LCNF 1966c). The primary goal of Forest Service range management during the latter decades of the 20 th century was stability. Beginning in the mid-1960s, foresters conducted in-depth 526 soil surveys every decade. The surveys formed the basis of allotment management plans and were augmented by seasonal range surveys, transect plot studies, and important information on range qualities supplied by users. The main objective of the majority of grazing plans was to “improve the primary range to at least good condition with static trend” (Nordberg 1975). Foresters often recommended intensive management techniques that allowed certain ranges to go ungrazed for periods when forage was in a sensitive state, when grazing was in conflict with wildlife, or when the range was overused. By the mid 1970s, foresters routinely placed grazing allotments under a “deferred rotation” management plan that required permittees to rotate their herds through a series of ranges according to a predetermined calendar based on forage and potential wildlife conflict. Lewis and Clark foresters also used a “rest rotation” system and “off and on” permits that eliminated grazing on some ranges for up to a year. Foresters frequently used infrastructure improvements such as gates and drift fences to enforce these exclusions and increasingly relied on cooperation with permittees to construct and maintain improvements as a condition of their grazing right. When conditions on the range became unsatisfactory, Lewis and Clark foresters reduced the size of allotments or split large allotments into smaller units and managed them separately. Recognizing the role grazing permits played in rural economic stability, Lewis and Clark foresters usually offered affected users range in other parts of the forest until their allotments improved (Figure 5-25) (USDA LCNF 1967b; 1971; 1973; Chisholm 1968; McGlothin 1969a; Nordberg 527 1971; Dargan 1972a; 1972b; Lyle 1974; USDI BLM 1974; Mills 1975a; Young 1981; Gunn 1982a). 528 Figure 5-25: Grazing Allotments, Lewis and Clark National Forest. Map by author. Lewis and Clark foresters managed commercial packer and dude ranch allotments in a similar cooperative fashion. As most of these allotments were located near the Sun River Game Preserve or in the Bob Marshall Wilderness, the forester’s main objective was managing forage competition between the packers’ horse and mule teams and wildlife. Foresters were keen to avoid overuse and most packer allotment plans indicated strict minimum ground cover percentages that must be maintained. Permittees were required to strictly maintain infrastructure improvements such as corrals and drift fences to keep herds within their small permit areas (USDA LCNF 1968a; Martin 1968; McGlothlin 1969b; Mills 1970a; 1970b). Lewis and Clark foresters placed their administrative pasturages under similar management plan scenarios. Allotments were coordinated on a rotation basis and minimum ground cover percentages established. Lewis and Clark foresters guarded their administrative pasturage carefully. Historically, the agency horse and mule teams wintered at Lubec and Willow Creek. In the late 1960s, the Lubec administration site was transferred to the National Park Service. New administration range had to be found as the cost of private pasturage was prohibitive and conditions at Gates Park and Ear Mountain administrative pastures were unsatisfactory. In 1969, foresters split the Teton cattle and horse allotment and created the Jones Creek administrative pasturage. In 1972, the Palookaville administrative pasturage was created to service the northern portion of the Teton Ranger District and reduce cover disturbance on the other administrative pasturages (Greene 1972; Richmond 1973; Mills 1975b). 529 Foresters expanded and modified the concept of Animal Unit Months (AUM) as an intensive management methodology to gain stability. Management plans in the 1960s and 1970s varied between quantifying grazing levels in AUMs and Animal Months (AM). Lewis and Clark foresters sought total conversion to the AUM method in the mid 1980s – a process that was “a confusing exercise” to both permittees and foresters (Gorman 1985). While AM assessments detailed the number of livestock permitted to graze an allotment on a monthly tenure basis, AUM management calculated the amount of forage required by an animal for one month. Using soil and range analyses, foresters could then calculate stocking levels. AUM assessment also allowed foresters to adjust range stocking as conditions warranted. Rather than eliminate head, AUM management placed stocking levels directly in terms of forage. Though the methodology for determining AUMs may have been complex, permittees understood the value of sustaining forage and often worked in cooperation with the agency to benefit forage stability. On several occasions, permittees requested temporary AUM reductions to improve the forage resource (Mills 1975a; Gunn 1982a; 1982b; Gorman 1985). Federal range management agencies also sought economic stability by slowly raising grazing fees to fair market values. Uniform fee increases were mandated for all federal land agencies. In determining the fee structure, foresters were tasked with predicting market value for forage and setting a price that provided a fair return to the agency and that was still equitable to the users. In the 1978 Rangelands Improvement Act, Congress established a formula that allowed for annual fee adjustments based on the 530 cost of leasing private land, and incorporated beef cattle prices and production costs. Grazing fees in the Lewis and Clark rose by $0.20-0.48 per AM between 1969 and 1980. When livestock prices dipped in the recession of the early 1980s, so did permit fees. In 1981, grazing fees in the Lewis and Clark for cattle were lowered $0.45 per AM. As prices rose in the latter 1980s and 1990s, permit fees correspondingly increased (Radar 1966; Choteau Acantha 1974, 28 February; 1980, 31 January; 1982, 28 January; 1989, 19 January; USDA FS 1979a; Rowley 1985, 241-243; Overbay 1993). Lewis and Clark foresters coordinated grazing and wildlife stability through the planning process. For the first time, the economic impacts of wildlife management were included in forest plans. Both the Lewis and Clark and Region 1 MUSY plans of the 1960s noted that demand for range on the Rocky Mountain Front, both from livestock and wildlife, far exceeded range. Both livestock and wildlife numbers needed to be managed in cooperation – livestock with stock associations and wildlife with recreationists and state game agencies - in order to balance habitat with game numbers. Livestock grazing had important economic and cultural legacies on the Front. Plans indicated that range for both wildlife and livestock could be expanded through clearcut timber harvests. MUSY plans for the Bob Marshall Wilderness recognized the importance of wildlife – elk, grizzly bear, and fish species – to the wilderness resource and dictated that the area be managed to promote wildlife habitat. The Bob Marshall Wilderness represented critical habitat for endangered species and served as critical elk forage range. Overbrowsing on southern slopes was identified as 531 causing erosion and silting. To support the elk resource, fire burned timber would no longer be replanted and the burned area would be actively managed as wildlife range (Slusher 1966; USDA LCNF 1966b; 1966c; USDA R1 1967c). Forest Service biologists in the mid 1960s began to note declining grizzly bear populations in the Rocky Mountain Front. It was clear that the species was nearing extinction. The Bob Marshall Wilderness MUSY plan identified grizzly bear habitat as a critical resource and specified that it was imperative that foresters “maintain a suitable environment for grizzly bears” and other native, rare, and endangered species and “manage habitat and use to sustain them to the extent it (was) feasible” (Slusher 1966). In 1967 the Montana legislature created a grizzly bear hunting license and established a trophy fee to generate revenue for habitat research. By 1971, Lewis and Clark foresters had decided that it was time to begin a grizzly bear research study in the Bob Marshall to coordinate recommendations with the Rocky Mountain Front Land Resource Plan. In that same year, foresters closed trails in the Dearborn River-Blacktail Creek region of the forest to off-road vehicles when it was discovered that recreational vehicle access was impacting grizzly sows in the region (Engler 1971; Choteau Acantha 1971, 29 April; 1985, 11 July). The Endangered Species Act altered management priorities on the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Foresters revised the Lewis and Clark MUSY plan to demonstrate their commitment to wildlife management. The plan directed foresters to manage livestock and wildlife winter range conflicts by giving “Priority for the use of available 532 forage ... to big game species” (USDA R1 1978, 16). Significant management change occurred in 1975 when the grizzly bear was placed on the threatened and endangered species list. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service classified all of the Rocky Mountain Front as critical grizzly bear habitat and directed that all federal and state land managers address threatened habitat as a part of their management plans. Plans had to incorporate public comment as a function of the NEPA process. Forest officials coordinated with U.S. Fish and Wildlife, the BLM, and National Park Service to create coordinated grizzly bear management guidelines that included avoiding any human activities in habitat areas during critical seasons, deferring livestock grazing on riparian areas until July 1, removing livestock from riparian areas if forage base was removed by 50 percent, and preventing extractive activity of any kind within a one mile radius of den sites during denning periods (Choteau Acantha 1977, 21 April; 1977, 15 December; 1985, 11 July; Mealey 1979; USDI FWS 1979; Gorman et al 1987). In 1977, the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan identified several key issues that affected both wildlife and grazing management. The management plan recognized that wildlife and roadless management were the primary uses of the Rocky Mountain Division; timber, livestock, and mineral extraction continued as secondary uses. It supported the earlier MUSY plan and favored wildlife habitat over domestic livestock. Where competition for forage existed, Lewis and Clark foresters allocated 65 percent of available forage to wildlife and the remaining 35 percent to livestock. Intensive management was implemented to expand range and habitat. Foresters were 533 directed to use prescribed burns on steep slopes to increase wildlife forage. Construction of new reclamation or flood control dams was not recommended; additional dams would “flood grizzly bear and other wildlife habitat and fish spawning areas” (USDA R1, 27). Grizzly bear habitat management was already stressed on 350,474 acres (Choteau Acantha 1977, 15 December; USDA R1 1977b; 1978). The impact of oil and gas exploration along the Front on grizzly bear habitat and elk migration routes was a critical consideration of the management plan. Foresters recognized the necessity of allowing oil and gas leases to continue but they limited oil and gas activities through lease stipulations that required protection of elk wintering and calving areas and grizzly bear habitat. Elk migration routes, wintering, and calving areas were restricted on a seasonal basis as were operations that occurred near grizzly bear feeding sites, denning areas, and breeding and rearing habitat (USDA R1 1977b; 1978). The management plan had an immediate impact on wildlife and grazing management in the Lewis and Clark. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, roads and trails – frequently in the Beaver and Willow Creek areas – were repeatedly closed due to the seasonal elk migration. Lewis and Clark foresters began active wildlife habitat management programs that improved not only elk and grizzly bear habitat, but also fish spawning sites. Several Rocky Mountain Front grazing allotment management plans underwent a thorough revision process that included an NEPA environmental assessment and public comment to incorporate grizzly bear management into their plans. Lewis and Clark foresters began identifying remote areas where grizzly bears could be relocated to 534 avoid potential human and livestock conflict (Choteau Acantha 1981, 2 April; 1981, 30 July; 1981 22 October; USDA LCNF 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1982d). Perhaps most significantly, the management plan directed foresters to seek collaboration with other land managers to develop coordinated threatened and endangered species monitoring and evaluating frameworks. The Lewis and Clark foresters joined with the BLM, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks to form the Interagency Rocky Mountain Front Task Force (ITF). Through funds provided them by several of the oil and gas exploration companies, the ITF conducted multiple studies including radio collaring to determine how seismic oil and gas activity affected bear movement and habitat. The IFT expanded its research to include bighorn sheep, mountain goat, elk, mule deer, and raptor populations and created a series of management guidelines. Through this research, Lewis and Clark foresters mapped functional bear management units (BMUs) (Figure 5-26). BMUs were used to track populations, assess grizzly habitat against other uses, and conduct research. As the agency began to look toward ecosystem management, BMUs grew to fit those guidelines (Choteau Acantha 1981, 27 August; USDA LCNF 1982d; 1986a; Gorman et al 1987; USDA R1 1990c; Baker et al 1993, 85). But by 1985, Rocky Mountain Front locals began to wonder if the grizzly bear population was truly threatened. During that spring and summer, residents reported 21 incidents of grizzly contact on private land. Locals used scare-guns, snares, electric fences, and in some cases, rifles to keep grizzlies away from hives and herds. The Forest 535 Service requested that the ITF craft new management guidelines that sanctioned a special grizzly bear hunt in the Front and in the Bob Marshall – only to be implemented in cases where bears became troublemakers – and acknowledged the right of the grizzly to use 536 Figure 5-26: Grizzly Bear Management Units, 1990. Map by author (USDA R1 1990c). some private land. The ITF management plan indicated zones of private land along the forest interface where grizzly bears would be allowed to exist and “management would actually favor bear use” (Choteau Acantha 1985, 5 December). A buffer zone to the east would allow bears only occasional use. Finally, bears were not allowed within a three- mile zone around towns such as Augusta, Choteau, and Dupuyer or near Forest Service campgrounds. Locals began to feel that the grizzly “has taken supreme standing” in the Rocky Mountain Front and petitioned to have grizzlies removed from the threatened species list (Choteau Acantha 1985, 27 June). The Fish and Wildlife Department denied the petition and kept the grizzly on the threatened species list. In 1986, local ranchers wishing to halt enforcement of the ESA filed suit in federal court against the Department of the Interior. The suit was unsuccessful, but it did encourage the Reagan appointed Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife to request that grizzly be removed from the threatened list in Glacier National Park, the Bob Marshall Wilderness, and along the Rocky Mountain Front. Critics suggested that the director was motivated to delist the grizzly in order to ease access to oil and gas reserves (Choteau Acantha 1985, 13 June; 1985, 5 December; 1985, 12 December; 1986, 6 February; 1986, 6 May; 1986, 18 December; Gorman et al 1987). As a result of the controversy, the ITF submitted a major revision to its management plan in 1987. It contained clear and straightforward management objectives for managing grizzly bear, bighorn sheep, mountain goat, elk, mule deer, and raptors in the Rocky Mountain Front. Though the directives varied based upon species, all repeated 537 a similar theme that directed federal and state land managers to avoid or minimize 1) destruction of habitat; 2) human disturbance that displaced wildlife from important seasonal areas; 3) increased direct human contact that caused mortality; 4) increased human contact that caused stress; 5) mortality or impairment due to environmental or chemical contamination; and 6) increased human and wildlife interaction resulting from habitat intrusion. The ITF plan incorporated elements of the Lewis and Clark plan and was guided by research from multiple agencies and academic institutions. In 1989, the Lewis and Clark forest plan was amended to apply the ITF grizzly guidelines (Gorman et al 1987; USDA LCNF 1989). In 1986, the Lewis and Clark Forest Plan recognized both grazing and wildlife as major and beneficial uses. Foresters were directed to emphasize stability, act to recover the endangered and threatened gray wolf and grizzly bear populations, and maintain current populations of elk and coldwater fish species. The plan contained few details on wolf recovery in the Rocky Mountain Division but included an action plan for grizzly bear management that called for coordination between multiple agencies, outfitters and guides, and stockmen to halt grizzly poaching and to improve research on grizzly habitat and human disturbance. A planned program of annual prescribed burning was incorporated to maintain elk forage and road and trail closures were mandated to minimize interference with migration. Foresters managed wildlife habitat in I, O, and Q management zones to maintain or improve existing habitat. These zones were located along elk migration routes south of the Sun River and in grizzly bear habitat west of the 538 Teton River. Management zones E, F, G, and N were managed for habitat maintenance. High traffic and human impact zones like areas H and S were managed to minimize impact on wildlife forage. No management was prescribed for wilderness and study area zones (Figure 5-27) (LCNF 1986b; 1986c). In the early 1980s, foresters shifted range management on grazing allotments from intensive management to either “extensive” or “low” management intensity. Extensive management employed fencing, water development, and salting to gain full utilization of forage allocated to livestock. Low management intensity used long seasons, herding, and salting to insure that management controlled livestock numbers so that livestock use remained within present grazing capacity. With the 1986 plan, grazing was roughly guided by management zones that directed foresters to improve the condition of each range through cooperative agreements, permit modification, prescribed burning and infrastructure improvements, and prioritized monitoring. Grazing allotments in the I- management zones received highest priority for monitoring and range improvements, since management zone I lay at the forest boundary with the Sun River Game Range and provided a critical wildlife migration corridor. Management zones E and O were granted moderate priority overall but received a high priority for funding. Grazing plans in E and O zones were re-examined and adjusted every 10 years. These zones were in critical wildlife-livestock conflict areas largely along or near the forest boundary. Grazing in wilderness areas was, by virtue of the Wilderness Act, limited to recreation and outfitter horse and draft animals. No grazing was allowed in M zones. All other zones were 539 deemed as low priority grazing management areas; all received low priority funding for range management and improvement. Grazing plans in these areas were revised every 20 540 Figure 5-27: Lewis and Clark National Forest Wildlife Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). years. Over the course of the plan implementation, grazing would be minimally increased throughout the entire Lewis and Clark from 71,000 AUMs to 73,600 AUMs. No grazing additions would be allowed in big game or riparian areas unless wildlife habitat needs were first met (Figure 5-28) (LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Monitoring in the 1990s indicated that foresters had adequately incorporated the new wildlife management strategies into their imperative. Habitat improvements routinely met or exceeded plan projections. Landsat and radio collar technology had increased the database showing how wildlife were using the forest. All grizzly bear populations were stable in the Rocky Mountain Division. During the 1990s, grazing management routinely underperformed due to limited success in increasing forage through prescribed burning. New range surveys were conducted and range management plans created in high impact areas such as the Sun River Canyon Range (USDA LCNF 1992d; 1993c; 1999b; 2001b; Munoz 2000; 2003; 2004). Recreation and Wilderness Management (1965-2000) The complexity of Lewis and Clark recreation and wilderness management grew during the final decades of the 20 th century due to broad cultural and economic shifts in American society. Recreation and wilderness management had been intricately linked since the L-20 primitive area designations in the late 1920s. Now, with MUSY and the Wilderness Act affirming wilderness and recreation as separate, yet still intersecting uses, Region 1 and Lewis and Clark foresters seemed unsure of how to move forward. The Wilderness Act placed the Forest Service in the role of gatekeeper between a public that 541 demanded either expanding or limiting wilderness, a dynamic economic and political arena, and growing evidence that long-held management practices were damaging wild 542 Figure 5-28. Lewis and Clark National Forest Range Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). places. Lewis and Clark foresters sought collaboration and co-management with other forests and wilderness users to provide greater comprehensive management and mitigate the perceived loss of control. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield mandates codified many of the recreation management practices that the Forest Service already employed and gave foresters a framework to promote recreation as a primary use into its management imperative. During the final decades of the 20 th century, managing recreation became a year-round affair that incorporated all aspects of the multiple use and ecosystem management processes (Roth 1984; Baker et al 1993; Lewis 2005; Hays 2009, 22-23, 106-136). In 1964, wilderness supporters in Lincoln, MT coordinated with the Wilderness Society and a cadre of Montana congressmen to propose creation of the Scapegoat- Lincoln Wilderness in the Helena, Lolo, and Lewis and Clark national forests. It was the first citizen-created wilderness proposal made after passage of the Wilderness Act. Region 1 forester Neal Rahm publicly lamented the loss of Forest Service control over land use designations. “We have lost control and leadership in the sphere of wilderness philosophy ... if lines are to be drawn, we should be drawing them” (Roth 1984, 32). To regain control, foresters drew up a MUSY plan for the Scapegoat area. It concluded that wilderness was a suitable use in much of the Scapegoat but that management agencies should prioritize accessible public recreation. Despite Region 1 attempts to sell the public on its MUSY objectives, the Scapegoat was declared a wilderness in 1972. It contained 543 over 200,000 acres spread through the Lolo, Helena, and Lewis and Clark national forests (US Congress 89 th , 1 st Session 1965a; 1965b; USDA FS 1968; 1971; Roth 1984). In 1968, foresters from the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests began collaborating on a co-management plan for the Bob Marshall Wilderness. In 1970, they added members from the Helena and Lolo national forests to the discussion. Their goal was to create a wilderness complex with uniform rules and seemingly unbounded interiors. Foresters authorized restricting motorized use on all Lewis and Clark and Flathead trails that led into the Scapegoat. They proposed to bring back system trails that had long since been abandoned or left in disrepair. They coordinated on waste disposal, fire plans, and how to distribute and collect visitor use information. As a group they decided to eliminate all permanent outfitter improvements in the wildernesses. The combined group also conducted relatively extensive public comment periods and user studies to determine the attitudes of wilderness users and shape management direction. Many wilderness users wanted the agency to control the sizes of parties using wilderness areas, eliminate litter, provide better maps and information, and provide better end-of- the-road facilities and trailheads (Engler 1969; Rittersbacher 1969; Powell 1970a; 1970b; Stankey and Lucas 1970; USDA FS 1971). The product of these meetings was a published collaborative management plan for the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The plan noted that human influences have caused patterns of disturbance that, if continued, “will become substantially more noticeable and will conflict with the resource” (USDA FS 1972b, 4). Foresters proposed a range of 544 management activities to mitigate these effects including allowing native plant and animal communities to develop naturally, elimination of management infrastructure, and better distribution of information to the public. Recreation guidelines directed foresters to limit the size of parties to 15 people and 35 head of pack and draft animals. The length of stay was limited to no more than 14 days. Semi-permanent outfitter camps were abolished. Users were directed to use standing dead trees and deadfall for fuel as long as wood was cut and collected outside of the trail and campsite viewing area. Natural tree and plant succession were mandated. To control noxious grasses, foresters mandated that all outfitters supplement available forage with either pellets or certified weed-free hay. All efforts were made to research best practices for encouraging wildlife, fisheries, and watershed health. Finally, foresters were directed to consider using prescribed burning “to offset past control of natural fire” (19). In 1976, foresters from the Lolo, Lewis and Clark, Helena, and Flathead national forests began the process of writing a combined management plan for both the Scapegoat and Bob Marshall wildernesses using the Bob Marshall plan as a template (USDA FS 1972b; Minister 1976; Schlamp 1976a; 1976b). Public reaction to the management plan varied. Many lamented that wilderness areas did have minimum sanitation facilities located at key trail junctures and that the size of parties diminished the wilderness aesthetic. The most significant complaint to the management plan came from outfitters. For decades, outfitters had been allowed to construct improvements on their permitted base and spike camps in the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Figure 5-29). The management plan required that all improvements – corrals, 545 hitchracks, caches, and toilets – be phased out by the end of the 1974 season. Outfitters felt betrayed by the Forest Service and stated that these improvements helped to prevent resource damage. The Montana Outfitter’s Council requested a hold on the plan until the Forest Service examined potential wilderness area damages due to the removal of semi- permanent camps. Foresters denied the moratorium and pursued dismantling outfitter camps. However, by 1976 Region 1 foresters decided that individual outfitter plans that outlined specific management directions for each outfitter camp were necessary. Plans were implemented in 1977 (Corpe 1972; 1974; Engler 1973a; Rich 1973; Worf 1973; Mills 1977). 546 Figure 5-29: Outfitter Camps, Bob Marshall Wilderness, 1974 (LCNF-GF). In 1971, the Forest Service began its initial RARE inventory. Following its completion in 1973, the Forest Service designated 274 New Study Areas for wilderness classification study. Among those selected were the Great Bear Study Area located in the Flathead and Lewis and Clark national forests. In 1976, the Flathead River was designated as a component of the National Wild and Scenic River system. The Middle Fork of the Flathead, which is contained within the Study area, was designated a “wild” river. Following that designation, the Forest Service began a one-year wilderness examination of the Great Bear. During the public comment period, two-thirds of the local and three-fourths of the regional responders supported creating the Great Bear Wilderness. Rocky Mountain Front locals expressed fear that a wilderness in the headwaters of the Valier project would reduce water and irrigation rights. In 1977, the Forest Service made a recommendation to Congress that 77 percent of the study area - 299,000 acres - be classified as wilderness (Choteau Acantha 1976, 17 June; 1977, 27 January; 1977, 18 August; 1977, 15 December; Stoner and Smith 1977; USDA R1 1977a; USDA FNF 1980). Congress did not follow the agency’s recommendation and instead proposed that 359,871 total acres be added to the wilderness system. The Great Bear Wilderness included 293,571 acres in the Flathead National Forest. Another 66,300 acres of wilderness in the Lewis and Clark, identified in the RARE II inventory as the Rocky Mountain Face-Continental Divide Study Area, was added to the Bob Marshall Wilderness (Figure 5-30). Of the original 386,560 acres in the Great Bear Study Area, 547 only 26,660 acres were found not suitable for wilderness. The bill was amended by 9,600 acres in the Teton area to allow for winter skiing and snowmobile recreation and by nearly 3,000 acres near the Hungry Horse reservoir in the Flathead National Forest for 548 Figure 5-30: Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex. Map by author. mining claims. In 1978, the Great Bear Wilderness and Bob Marshall addition were signed into law (Choteau Acantha 1978, 24 August; 1978, 14 September; UDSA R1 1978; 1979). The RARE II inventory identified other Study Areas in the Rocky Mountain Division for wilderness examination (Figure 5-31). The Renshaw Study Area contained 32,499 acres south of the Sun River and adjoining the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The Silver King-Falls Creek Study Area contained 39,800 acres and lay near the southeast boundary with the Scapegoat Wilderness. The Deep Creek Study Area was in between the Sun and Teton rivers and contained 28,900 acres. Due to recreational and grazing use, the Forest Service did not recommend the Deep Creek Study Area for wilderness. Despite the fact that most of the RARE II process was discounted in court, both the Renshaw and Silver King-Falls Creek study areas were managed for much of the early 1980s for their wilderness qualities (USDA LCNF 1982d). Foresters examined 352,098 roadless acres for wilderness classification during the 1986 Forest Plan process including the RARE II Study Areas. Of that, 51,834 acres was recommended in the plan for wilderness. In making their recommendations, foresters weighed public support heavily and excluded regions where oil and gas exploration, grazing, and big game habitat management precluded conditions prescribed in the Wilderness Act. Management zone Q describes each of these recommendations (Figure 5-32). The plan dictated that these areas be managed to protect their wilderness characteristics. Each was to be managed with limited grazing and trail investment until 549 Congress determined their wilderness status. Foresters in the Lolo, Lewis and Clark, Helena, and Flathead national forests created management standards for the combined Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). 550 Figure 5-31: RARE II Study Areas. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1982d). Nationally, the most recent evaluation of inventoried roadless areas took place between 1998 and 2000. The inventory resulted in the 2001 Roadless Rule wherein 58.5 551 Figure 5-32: Lewis and Clark National Forest Wilderness Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b). million acres of Forest Service land was protected from future road building and timber cutting. The Roadless Rule was an attempt by the Forest Service to come to grips with decades of litigation over timber harvests in remote areas and an impetus to expand the federal forest management imperative to better serve ecosystems. Most of the Rocky Mountain Ranger District was covered in the Roadless Rule (Figure 5-33). While the Roadless Rule mandated the key characteristic of roadlessness, it did not place wilderness management regimes on roadless areas, unless already specified in forest management plans. The Roadless Rule encountered significant opposition. President George W. Bush altered the Roadless Rule when he entered office to allow greater state decision-making over roadless classification. This decision was overturned in U.S. District court in 2006 when it was determined that President Bush’s plan was “infected with a clear error of judgement ... To apply this categorical exclusion to an agency action that repeals a major set of environmental protections nationwide in scope and substitutes a less protective regime that for the first time encourages state-by-state management of the national forests stretches the categorical exclusion well past the breaking point” (Nie 2008, 102). In 2013, the roadless rule survived its final court appeal. Following the decision, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided that no further challenges were allowed due to the statute of limitations (Nie 2008, 92-124). Recreation management grew in complexity during the final decades of the 20 th century. Half a century of Forest Service road and trail infrastructure management had given the public unprecedented access to national forest landscapes. Campgrounds and 552 recreation areas had been modernized through the Operation Outdoors initiative. The modern environmental movement and more discretionary time and income encouraged 553 Figure 5-33: Lewis and Clark National Forest Roadless Plan, 2001. Map by author (LCNF-GF). the public to explore public lands. Technological advances in personal all-terrain vehicles allowed the public to experience large amounts of the forest that only those on horseback could have previously seen. The national forest recreation impulse shifted from being a seasonal affair to a year-round management task as the public pushed for access to recreation opportunities during the winter months. Finding suitable locations for public recreation grew more difficult as the pubic and forest scientists became more aware of the ecological impact of human disturbance to forest ecosystem regimes. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act legitimized recreation alongside utilitarian forest uses and opened the door to comprehensive recreation management in all forest zones. The MUSY plans in the 1960s and 1970s predicted dramatic recreation use growth. As was true in earlier recreation planning, foresters believed that recreation infrastructure and a system of rules was necessary to control the negative environmental impacts of recreation. To meet the demand, forests needed a corresponding increase in recreation facilities and infrastructure. In the Lewis and Clark, this resulted in the expansion and modification of the public campground and watercraft recreation system, new trailhead and winter recreation facilities, and a new system of rules for off-trail and wilderness recreation. This expansion was not without difficulty though. Foresters struggled both with financing recreational improvements and meeting the various and often-irreconcilable demands of the public (USDA LCNF 1966c; USDA R1 1967c). Between 1965 and 1967, the final phases of Operation Outdoors were being completed in the Lewis and Clark. Mortimer Gulch campground in the Sun River Canyon 554 and Summit campground on Highway 2 were completed in 1966. In 1967, the Cave Mountain campground was completed following the devastating 1964 flood in the Teton Canyon. But as foresters appraised the future of recreation in the region, it became clear that there were simply not enough public, planned, and controllable recreation opportunities to meet the anticipated need. The new road in the Sun River Canyon, constructed after the 1964 flood, gave the public direct automobile access to Gibson Lake. Recreational boaters accessed the lake via a steep and often rutted hillside. Besides the obvious danger of such an approach, foresters were concerned about the amount of erosion that boaters were causing and proposed that a boat launch be constructed at the Home Gulch campground. The Forest Service presented two separate plans for public comment. After considerable debate, a design was selected but due to financial restraints, the plan was shelved until it was included in the 1978 Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan. Recreation use studies at that time indicated that over 17 percent of automobiles entering the Rocky Mountain Front were bound for Gibson Lake. The need for the ramp was great but the cost was prohibitive for the agency. In 1979, the Bureau of Reclamation noted that erosion from the undeveloped boat launch was degrading the water quality of Gibson Lake and asked the Forest Service to control the situation. Foresters proposed a compromise that included a BOR funded boat ramp from the Home Gulch Campground that would be planned and constructed by the Forest Service. In 1980, the ramp was constructed (Esterl 1965; Braida 1966; Chisholm 1966; Choteau Acantha 1967, 10 August; USDA R1 1968; 1978; USDA LCNF 1979a; 1979b). 555 Public recreation expansion in the late 1960s and 1970s was planned along automobile transportation corridors. The rehabilitation of the Benchmark road following the 1964 flood provided the agency with an opportunity to expand public recreation deep into the Rocky Mountain Front. By the late 1960s, Benchmark had emerged as a major recreation node for the Forest Service with multiple campground facilities – including a “Fly-In” campground next to the Benchmark landing field for recreational aviators (Figure 5-34). Foresters expanded and redesigned the Straight Creek-Benchmark packer campground and corrals to service guided access to the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Packers had long been using Benchmark as a disembarkment point. To gain control of this use and manage the amount of on-horse recreation in the wilderness, the agency mandated that all packers planning to access the Bob Marshall from Benchmark must use the facilities. For the first time, packers were charged a fee - $2.00 per day - to use the corrals. Lewis and Clark foresters proposed using Youth Conservation Corps manpower in the 1970s to create a day use only camp along the Benchmark Road at Wood Lake. The picnic area was completed by the late 1970s following considerable NEPA process public comment and delay (Esterl 1966; Greitl 1966; Barry 1966; 1967; USDA R1 1967a; 1967b; Engler 1971a; Duncan 1973a; Stark 1977; Smith 1982; USDA LCNF 1987a). By the mid 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters initiated a new phase of campground expansion and trailhead construction. This was done to meet the growth of both automobile and hiking-based recreation. MUSY plans all pointed to the necessity of re- engineering the forest trail system into something that was friendly to recreational users – 556 meaning that it was well signed and matched forest aesthetics. End-of-the-road facilities had to be expanded as well. A campground was constructed near the West Fork Teton administration site complete with a recreational trailhead. The Home Gulch and Mortimer campgrounds were also expanded, as were end-of-the-road facilities on the Dearborn. Finally, foresters transformed a dispersed public use site along the Teton River into the three-site Elko campground and the former Goat Bluff administrative site into the Mill Falls campground. Trailheads were standardized throughout the forest (Figure 5-35, Appendix L). In 1980, Lewis and Clark foresters published a hiking guide to the Rocky 557 Figure 5-34: Benchmark Recreation Area (USDA R1 1967a; 1967b). Mountain Front that contained information about trails, facilities, and scenic attractions along the routes and encouraged hikers to explore the backcountry of the Front (Loscheider 1977; Choteau Acantha 1978, 3 August; USDA LCNF 1980a; 1980d; 1981d; 2004 b; Kinsman 1982). Public use of Forest Service campgrounds grew so rapidly that the agency was forced to issue a new set of regulations to govern sanitation, public conduct, and noise. The regulations banned users dumping trailer waste and other refuse at their sites and prohibited cleaning fish on camp tables. Radios and motor-driven equipment were not allowed at certain times during the night. In 1977, the agency limited occupancy at each 558 Figure 5-35: Recreation Improvements, 2000. Map by author (LCNF-GF). of their campsites to 14 days in any one area. The decision was “intended to give all recreationists an equal opportunity” (Choteau Acantha 1977, 23 June). The agency instituted a fee system for some of the more heavily used campgrounds. Foresters were open about the need to charge for recreation. Charging a nominal fee defrayed the cost of hauling trash and waste from the campgrounds and discouraged casual use. Initially, fees were only charged at Summit and Cave Mountain campgrounds. In 1971, the $1.00 per night fee was charged at Summit and Mortimer campgrounds only. Both fees and the number of fee-based campgrounds grew through the final decades of the 20 th century. By the late 1980s, fees ranged between $4.00 and $5.00 per night. Only the Elko and Mill Falls campgrounds were free sites (Choteau Acantha 1968, 9 May; 1969, 19 June; 1970, 11 June; 1971, 10 June; 1972, 1 June; 1977, 13 October; 1987, 28 May; Dargan 1972c; Solen 1982). Campground sanitation was a persistent problem for Lewis and Clark foresters. Limited funds, fewer foresters in the field, and an increased awareness of the environmental impacts of pollutants on watersheds placed considerable stress on recreation managers. The garbage pick-up situation at Summit campground on Highway 2 forced the agency to hire more staff just to haul trash and clean up after users. Summit was closed sporadically during the 1970s – and was even briefly transferred to the Flathead National Forest - when staff were not available to perform this function. Water contamination was a consistent problem at Summit as well. The cost of installing a new sanitation system was prohibitive and the agency was required to negotiate with the 559 Burlington Northern Railway for use of their well system. Sanitation issues occurred at the Home Gulch and Mortimer campgrounds again. Foresters wanted to install an ultraviolet water sterilization system at Mortimer, but again costs were prohibitive and a simple gravity-flow system was installed (Higgins 1968; Powell 1968a; 1968b; 1969; 1971; Selken 1968; Olsen 1969; 1970; Coutant 1971; Richmond 1973b; Swanger 1976; USDA LCNF 1970; 1983b). Space for public recreation in the Rocky Mountain Division came at a premium. Few automobile access points existed and the few relatively flat, open spaces suitable for new campground sites were already occupied by administrative sites, previously constructed campgrounds, forest homesteads, or summer recreation cabins. In the early MUSY and again in the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan, foresters debated the possibility of eliminating some summer homes to create space for public recreation. With the earliest lease not expiring until 1989, foresters decided that an individual evaluation of each special-use site should be undertaken and placed on a limited tenure basis. No new resort or summer home permits were to be granted (USDA LCNF 1966c; USDA R1 1977b; 1978). National forest winter recreation was a post World War II phenomenon in Region 1. Advances in plastics, lift-technology, and personal all-terrain vehicles made both skiing and snowmobiling a large part of recreation management in the last decades of the 20 th century. In 1962, Region 1 had 150,000 winter users. By 1969 that number had doubled and continued to grow thereafter. Growth forced the agency to construct rules to manage 560 winter recreation and control areas where it could occur (Choteau Acantha 1970, 11 June; 1971, 25 November; 1978, 3 May; 1982, 24 June; Baker et al 1993). In 1967, a group of businessmen from the Rocky Mountain Front proposed constructing a ski run in the Teton Canyon on Mt. Lockhart. After Lewis and Clark foresters conducted a snow survey and assessed the accessibility of the project, the Forest Service issued the Teton Pass Ski Area Corporation a special-use permit to construct ski facilities and a connection road. The initial facilities were modest. Teton Pass Ski Area only consisted of a towrope and an A-frame building that was built “to meet the specifications of the Forest Service” (Choteau Acantha 1967, 24 August) (Choteau Acantha 1967, 9 March; 1967, 17 August; 1967, 2 November; 1967, 30 November). Skiing in the Rocky Mountain Front was a modest, but growing industry through the 1970s. Teton Pass Ski Area expanded operations several times, building new lodge facilities and parking lots and installing high capacity chair lifts. Traffic through the Teton Canyon forced the Forest Service to repeatedly resurface the road. The agency added guardrails and widened portions of the road to meet ski resort traffic needs. These wide spots became a problem for foresters. Skiers routinely parked alongside the Teton road and either hitchhiked or snowmobiled to the ski area (Choteau Acantha 1968, 27 June; 1969, 4 September; 1970, 10 December; 1973, 18 October; 1974, 21 February; 1975, 4 November). By 1969, Lewis and Clark foresters noted increased snowmobile use in Teton Canyon. Snowmobile derbies were routinely held east of the Cow Track Lodge in the 561 canyon. Foresters were concerned that snowmobile use on the Teton road conflicted with traffic from the ski area. They crafted a series of rules limiting access to the region. Snowmobile access on the South Fork Teton inside the forest boundary was allowed only on portions of the road that were impassable for wheeled vehicles. The North Fork Teton road from the forest boundary to the ski area was closed to snowmobiles at all times but usable from the ski area to the West Fork administration site as long as the road remained impassable to auto traffic (Choteau Acantha 1969, 6 February; 1970, 24 December). In the early 1970s, snowmobiling and all-terrain vehicular recreation began to conflict with environmental sentiment and legislation. A bill to limit snowmobile access to public lands appeared in the 1971 Montana legislature. In 1972, the Montana Fish and Game department requested that land management agencies be required to conduct environmental impact studies on the impact of snowmobile and all-terrain vehicle on big game winter ranges. As a result of the growing concern over the effect of this type of recreational use on habitat, off-road motorized recreation became a part of the forest travel plan process (Choteau Acantha 1972, 21 December; USDA R1 1978). Throughout the 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters issued rules and modified the landscape to control off-road and snowmobile recreation. New rules prohibited any snowmobile use between the forest boundary and the ski area. The Forest Service solicited public input on rules regarding all-terrain vehicles. Following a comment period, the agency began closing specific roads and trails throughout the forest to off- road motorized recreation. In 1974, the agency utilized Youth Conservation Corps labor 562 to construct a snowmobile road from the newly named Teton Recreation Area to the West Fork administrative site to alleviate traffic problems and concerns for wildlife habitat. The Forest Service also cooperated with Montana Fish and Game to construct a snowmobile parking lot in Waldron Creek. This served as a snowmobile trailhead and controlled the trails accessible to snowmobilers (Choteau Acantha 1974, 15 August; 1974, 9 September; 1974, 12 December). By 1986, recreation management became a large part of the forest plans and it grew in complexity in the era of ecosystem management. Foresters instituted a series of management standards that attempted to direct recreational use to areas with large, heavy- use campgrounds and service areas. Sanitation, safety, and visual attractiveness were priority concerns for forest management. Most of the management zones in the Rocky Mountain District met these criteria. No recreation was allowed in management zone N. The entire area was managed to maintain wilderness characteristics pending a decision on classification. In management zones P and Q, recreation was allowed but could only exist in a transitory manner. Packers and hikers could only set up temporary campsites (Figure 5-36) (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Standardized landscape management principles applied to all recreation development and planning throughout the forest. For each management zone, decisions were made to guide both the setting and the Visual Quality Objective (VQO) - an assessment of the relative visual resource quality as it relates to potential resource use and development - of recreation improvements. Setting described the landscape evidence of 563 recreational use that a visitor would notice if he or she were experiencing that portion of the forest. All future recreation management activities had to conform to the setting and 564 Figure 5-36: Lewis and Clark National Forest Recreation Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). VQO standards. Management zone S – the Teton Pass Ski area and snowmobile park – was classified as a “roaded rural” setting, meaning that a visitor would notice a substantially modified environment and experience moderate to high user interaction. In “roaded rural” landscapes, resource management had been geared toward recreation. Management zones E and O were classified as “roaded natural” settings. Evidence of user recreation use was prevalent and interaction was considered low to moderate. In “roaded natural” settings, resource activities are evident, though they blend with the natural environment. Management zone H was classified as either “roaded rural” or “roaded natural” and could be managed to meet either standard. Management zones G, F, and N were to be managed as “semi-primitive” settings that allowed some motorized use but kept evidence of recreation to a minimum. Finally, management zones P and Q were managed for an “unmodified” or “primitive” setting free from evidence of manmade recreation infrastructure. The plan was modified to allow for the presence of historic motorized use settings in management zone Q (Figure 5-37) (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). The VQO provided a guideline for foresters for altering the landscape in any management action. If the VQO conflicted with the management prescription, then “the prescription will prevail, unless the area is within the seen areas of the roads or trails” (LCNF 1986b 2/28). In all cases, the plan directed foresters to make every effort to mitigate management to meet the prescribed VQO. Management zone S was classified with a “modification” VQO. Management activities, such as the Teton Pass Ski Area, 565 were allowed to dominate natural landscapes. However, design of facilities and infrastructure were required to borrow from the natural settings. Management zone E was 566 Figure 5-37: Lewis and Clark National Forest Recreation Settings Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). managed for a “partial retention” VQO. In zone E, resource management could change landscapes, but the natural appearance of the site had to remain dominant. Management zone O, which was heavily influenced by timber extraction and recreation use, was managed either for “modification” or “partial retention.” Management zones P and Q were managed for “preservation” VQO. In those areas, visual evidence of management activities was prohibited and only ecological change should be in evidence. Finally, management zones F, G, H, I and N were managed for either “partial retention” or “retention.” “Retention” VQO management required that activities be conducted so that landscape modifications would not be evident to the average user (Figure 5-38) (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Lewis and Clark foresters were able to successfully balance recreation management with other uses late in the 20th century as ecosystem management became increasingly important. This was perhaps due to the fact that Lewis and Clark foresters had been prioritizing recreation management for an extended period of time. Perpetually underfunded, foresters prioritized maintenance at heavy use developed sites and trailheads. Both the South Fork and Mortimer Gulch campgrounds were rehabilitated and several trailheads were created. Foresters actively policed for off-road recreation violations in the travel plan. The agency also began a monitoring program to determine the effects of dispersed camping in sensitive areas. In most cases, dispersed camping was allowed to continue in predetermined sites and for limited stays. Occasionally, foresters 567 posted “no camping” regulations in areas near wildlife migration zones, in areas of high fire potential, or in sensitive watersheds (USDA LCNF 1993c; 1998f; 1999b; 2001b). 568 Figure 5-38: Lewis and Clark National Forest Visual Quality Objective, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Mining and Watershed Management (1965-2000) Mineral exploration became a highly combative use in the final decades of the 20 th century. Lewis and Clark foresters had previously allowed limited exploration and drilling on public lands – as the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act mandated. Public sentiment was divided. To many, oil and gas exploration offered a non-agricultural economic activity for the Rocky Mountain Front populace. Others saw oil and gas development as directly counter to environmental legislation and sentiment. As the 20 th century came to a close, Lewis and Clark foresters were forced to make critical decisions regarding public land mineral rights that could dramatically alter their management imperative. Region 1 and Lewis and Clark MUSY plans identified oil and gas development as “of great economic and strategic importance” (USDA R1 1967c). Seismic exploration activities in the 1960s in the Teton Ranger District resulted in negligible mineral finds and caused considerable disturbance to the area, mostly due to road building activities necessary to move drilling equipment. “Past gas and oil exploration work destroyed the surface resource and caused erosion along seismograph roads” (USDA LCNF 1966c). Despite that fact, Lewis and Clark foresters predicted that exploration and drilling activity would resume and must be provided for in management plans. The MUSY plans directed foresters to approve oil and gas roads only in approved locations and with provisions tied to the permits that allowed for adequate, standardized drainage and revegetation of disturbed areas (USDA LCNF 1966b; 1966c). 569 Regional MUSY plans also anticipated that oil and gas exploration in the Rocky Mountain Front would prove to be a critical test for how mineral leasing would operate in wilderness and RARE I and II designated areas. The Wilderness Act allowed mineral exploration and development in wilderness areas through 1983 and directed management agencies to conduct thorough mineral inventories of wilderness areas. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, foresters from the Lewis and Clark and Flathead national forests coordinated on combined mineral studies of the Bob Marshall Wilderness. The USGS joined as a collaborative agency to assess hydrocarbon potential and expanded the inventory to the Scapegoat Wilderness. The inventories caused some public concern. Outfitters and wilderness groups, emboldened by successes in the Scapegoat, questioned the Forest Service about how these inventories would be used (USDA R1 1967c; Hofferber 1969; Mudge 1970; USGS 1970; Choteau Acantha 1971, 1 July; 1972, 13 April; 1972, 6 July). The release of inventory information resulted in a chain of lease applications for exploration. By 1976, over 500,000 acres of the Lewis and Clark – nearly all along the Rocky Mountain Front – had been subject to a lease application. This included 50,000 acres of land within the Bob Marshall Wilderness. State officials touted the immediate economic benefit; companies had to pay $0.50 per acre for each lease that was approved even if no exploration or drilling occurred. In 1977, the Lewis and Clark issued its draft EIS for the Rocky Mountain Front Management Plan to public comment. It recommended that 92,000 acres within the Lewis and Clark remain open to mineral 570 occupancy. Another 46,000 acres near the forest boundary could be developed through slant-drilling. Exploration could continue throughout the forest with no guarantee of a permit. Locals responded critically to the draft EIS. Choteau school teacher and outfitter Gene Sentz organized the Friends of the Rocky Mountain Front to lead opposition to the mineral guidelines in the plan (Choteau Acantha 1974, 28 February; 1976, 3 June; 1977, 15 December; USDA R1 1977b; Sentz 2010). In 1978, Lewis and Clark foresters released their recommendations for the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan. Despite strong public sentiment against the draft leasing recommendations, foresters upheld the decision to declare nearly 92,000 acres as suitable for leasing: 12,530 acres along the Two Medicine River; 14,433 acres along the Dupuyer and Teton rivers; 35,168 acres on the Sun River and Beaver Creek; and 29,831 acres along Willow and Elk creeks. The plan stipulated that leases would only be initially recommended on no more than two of these areas. Future releases would depend on examinations of the environmental effects gathered at the first lease areas and the “development of appropriate lease stipulations” (USDA R1 1978, 25). Sentz and the Friends of the Rocky Mountain Front protested the decision. Overwhelmed by the opposition to the management plan, Lewis and Clark foresters agreed to reexamine leasing on non-wilderness areas and ordered a new environmental assessment (USDA R1 1978; Keller 2001, 51-54; Sentz 2010). Oil and gas exploration continued along the Rocky Mountain Front through the late 1970s and early 1980s. Drilling began in the Blackleaf Canyon. Seismic surveys 571 were conducted throughout the Teton Ranger District. Helicopters transported men and equipment to remote, roadless locations. Subsurface and surface “shots” were set off and their vibrations recorded (Choteau Acantha 1978, 6 July). In 1979, Consolidated Georex Geophysics, an energy company, applied to conduct seismic exploration in the Scapegoat, Bob Marshall, and Great Bear wildernesses. Lewis and Clark and Flathead foresters coordinated on examining the environmental feasibility of “bombing the Bob” (Sentz 2010). Per their recommendations, Regional Forester Tom Coston denied the application. Consolidated Georex joined forces with the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association and the Mountain States Legal Foundation to appeal the decision. In 1981, Forest Service Chief Max Peterson reversed Coston’s decision and granted the permit to conduct seismic exploration in the Bob Marshall Complex. The decision infuriated local wilderness supporters and brought oil and gas exploration to the national stage. The Friends of the Rocky Mountain Front coordinated with the newly formed Bob Marshall Alliance, the Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society and filed a countersuit in support of the Forest Service’s original decision and EIS. It was initially denied, but further protest resulted in the House Interior Committee passing an emergency mineral withdrawal of all claims for the entire Bob Marshall Wilderness complex (Choteau Acantha 1979, 10 May; 1979, 6 September; 1979, 29 September; 1979, 22 November; 1980, 14 February; 1980, 1 May; Bob Marshall Alliance 1980; Keller 2001, 51-54; Sentz 2010). In 1981, the Forest Service completed its environmental assessment of the proposed oil and gas lease decision in the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management 572 Plan. Foresters had found that no significant environmental impact would occur in the leasing areas and that occupancy leasing could begin. Region 1 foresters would immediately begin processing a large backlog of oil and gas applications on 286,000 acres of Rocky Mountain Front land not included in the management plan (Figure 5-39). To simplify the process Lewis and Clark foresters switched to a “programmatic approach for non-wilderness lands” that utilized one environmental assessment to cover the entire program of permits for prospecting on the Front (Choteau Acantha 1982, 8 July). Companies applied to re-open old well sites in the Blackleaf area. Again, local opposition to Rocky Mountain Front mineral development threatened to force the Forest Service to alter their leasing plans. In 1981, the Bob Marshall Alliance filed suit over the 1981 environmental assessment. In 1986, Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt was decided in favor of the wilderness supporters. Leases, so said the decision, violated NEPA and the ESA (Choteau Acantha 1980, 12 June; 1980, 26 June; 1981, 8 January; 1981, 15 January; 1981, 26 February; 1981, 10 September; USDA LCNF 1985; Keller 2001). Foresters looked to the 1986 Forest Plan to help coordinate development. It directed foresters to assess permits on a case-by-case basis. Each lease site would undergo a specific EA to meet ESA standards. Oil and gas development in specific management zones – E, I, and O - was allowed with stipulations that they not affect wildlife migrations and impact habitat and that all roads and developments be fully reclaimed. The agency recommended that no occupancy be allowed in zones where mineral development could interfere with recreation – S and H – and in the M-zone 573 special management area. Occupancy was not allowed in the F zone due to its rugged topography that precluded road development. Following the Bob Marshall Alliance v. 574 Figure 5-39: Rocky Mountain Front Oil Leases and Wells, 1980s. Map by author (Powers 1981; USDA FS 1981; USDA LCNF 1985). Watt decision, foresters denied all oil and gas developments in the N-management zone for a period of 10 to 15 years. Finally, the agency recommended that occupancy be denied in several zones with certain exceptions. Development could occur in G- management zones within one mile of already developed roads. Occupancy could occur in Q-management zones only where surface resources could be maintained and reclaimed. Once leases expired, however, development would not be allowed. Development in wilderness zones was not allowed, except in accordance with state mining laws (Figure 5-40) (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Meanwhile, under encouragement from the Reagan administration, large oil companies like Chevron and American Petrofina filed for permits to drill wells in the Badger-Two Medicine region. Despite ardent public comment against allowing the leases, the Forest Service and BLM issued a decision to allow drilling. Another round of appeals followed, forcing the Forest Service to conduct a full environmental impact statement. The EIS determined that drilling and development was consistent with Forest Service and national regulations and recommended that both the Chevron and Fina wells – and associated roads – be approved (Figure 5-41). An “unprecedented” number of appeals were filed with the Forest Service (Keller 2001, 52). Initially, the agency denied all appeals. But under the gaze of public scrutiny, the agency ultimately reversed its decision (Choteau Acantha 1986, 3 April; 1986, 19 June; 1987, 23 April; 1987, 13 August; 1988, 2 March; 1989, 2 February; 1989, 19 October; 1990, 19 April; USDA LCNF 1990d). 575 Public protest over oil leases continued through the early 1990s. In 1993, Bruce Babbit, the Clinton administration Secretary of the Interior, issued a moratorium on oil 576 Figure 4-40: Lewis and Clark National Forest Mineral Occupancy Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). and gas development in the Badger-Two Medicine area lasting until 1996. During this period, many of the leases expired and in 1994, Lewis and Clark foresters again began 577 Figure 5-41: Fina and Chevron Oil Wells and Infrastructure. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1990d). the EIS process for future oil and gas leasing. A 1994 request for public comment resulted in overwhelming local and national response on both sides of the oil leasing issue. In 1997, Lewis and Clark Supervisor Gloria Flora issued her final impact statement. Guided by the results of a “comprehensive analysis that considered the cumulative effects of activities on the current and future resources, economics, and social patterns” of the Rocky Mountain Front and the “great deal of public comment expressed both in favor of and against leasing,” Lewis and Clark foresters decided that no future lands along the Rocky Mountain Front would be offered for mineral lease (USDA FS 1997, 1). In making her decision, Flora noted that the “need for oil and gas does not outweigh the intrinsic values of the lands in and along the Rocky Mountain Front” and that the “value of place” superseded the economic worth of development (5). Leaseholders, including Chevron and Fina, were allowed to trade out their leases for others in other locations. In 2000, all mineral activities were officially withdrawn from the Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark National Forest (USDA FS 1997; USDA R1 2000). Two general trends ran through Rocky Mountain Front watershed management during the final decades of the 20 th century. The threat of floods returning to the Front prompted locals to call for the Forest Service to approve large-scale retention dams. Foresters conducted environmental impact statements on proposed dams on the Sun River at Castle Reef but the cost of relocating the Hannan Gulch administration site, Home Gulch campground, several summer homes, and most of the road and trail features proved too high and the agency abandoned these plans (USDA R1 1968; Trotter 1972). 578 The ever-present threat of floods returned to the Front in 1975 and again in 1986. The 1975 flood caused extensive damage across the Gallatin, Helena, Lewis and Clark, and Flathead national forests. Statewide, damage totals exceeded $8,000,000; over $1,000,000 of damage occurred in Choteau. The entire Rocky Mountain Front was declared a disaster area. In the Lewis and Clark, the greatest damage occurred in the South Fork of the Two Medicine, Teton, and Sun rivers. Foresters were forced to repair campgrounds, trails, and watersheds that had recently been rehabilitated following the 1964 flood. NEPA and ESA regulations and the nebulous state of the RARE inventories in the 1970s delayed repair and several roads and watershed rehabilitation plans would not be completed until the early 1980s. Floods in 1986 caused less in property damage to the Front, but killed several residents (Choteau Acantha, 3 July; 1976, 26 February; 1977, 28 April; 1977, 8 September; 1980, 20 January; 1986, 6 March; USDA R1 1975; Hancock 1976; Dailey 1978). The dominant trend in Forest Service watershed management was outlined in the 1897 Organic Act and reaffirmed in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. Growing environmentalism combined with a more refined understanding of ecological forest health through the final decades of the 20 th century. Lewis and Clark foresters responded by devoting large portions of their forest plans and management efforts to watershed and soil rehabilitation. Early MUSY plans recognized suburbanization and recreation as vital reasons for watershed management. Intensive management was necessary to supply future water 579 demands. Lewis and Clark foresters created a special management zone – the Water Influence Zone – and a series of loose recommendations to promote full utilization of the water resource. Management plans and activities focused on improving Lewis and Clark watersheds for irrigation, urban water supplies, camping, and recreational fishing (USDA 1966b; 1966c; USDA R1 1967c). With the passage of NEPA and the ESA, watershed management took on a new level of complexity. In the 1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began monitoring national water quality. The EPA frequently evaluated national forest plans and projects and frequently highlighted agency deficiencies in watershed protection. Before they took any major action – whether it was constructing a road, proposing a timber sale, or assessing livestock range – Lewis and Clark foresters were required to assess the impact of the action on watersheds and soils. In the late 1970s, foresters began a voluminous soil resource and watershed improvement inventory that was utilized to assess the suitability of watersheds for multiple management practices (Hancock 1980; 1982; USDA LCNF 1982d; Hays 2009, 114-118). Watershed and soil management took on increasing relevance in Lewis and Clark forest plans. Several recommendations in the Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan contained provisions for watershed and soil maintenance. In the plan, foresters recommended that all new dams forever be excluded from the Lewis and Clark. In the 1986 forest plan, the agency placed a premium on watershed management. The plan mandated that all management activities adhere to state water quality standards. The 580 selected plan alternative levied management standards in an attempt to limit sedimentation to less than one percent annually. Foresters prioritized funding in management zones to mitigate high impact activities. High priority for watershed improvements and funding was given to management zones H and S - where recreation could severely degrade watersheds. High priority was also planned for management zone I to protect wildlife habitat. Moderate priority was given to management zones O and E to mitigate potential erosion in timber and mineral exploration areas. Management zones G, F, M, and N received low prioritization for watershed rehabilitation. In wilderness areas, foresters were mandated to meet or exceed watershed quality through natural rehabilitation efforts. Finally, in Q-zones, foresters were directed to take action to maintain watershed quality while still preserving semi-primitive wilderness qualities (Figure 5-42) (USDA R1 1977b; 1978; USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Ecological forestry transformed watershed management. Ecological forestry used a whole-system approach to assess forest health. Foresters began to shift management away from just looking at specific points of erosion and pollution to understanding how multiple management techniques and “incidents” create a cumulative watershed profile. Through the 1990s, Lewis and Clark foresters focused on implementing best management practices that met state water quality standards and engaging users in cooperative watershed management. Lewis and Clark foresters also utilized a cooperative watershed monitoring program that allows water data to be integrated into hydrographic models (USDA LCNF 1999b; 2001b; Hays 2009, 114-118). 581 582 Figure 5-42: Lewis and Clark National Forest Watershed Management Plan, 1986. Map by author (USDA LCNF 1986b; 1986c). Conclusion The transformation of the Lewis and Clark National Forest continued through the final decades of the 20th century as foresters modified their management imperative to meet citizen- and ecological-based initiatives to manage public lands with greater environmental awareness and public input. Managing landscapes and crafting policy guidelines grew increasingly complicated as layer after layer of legislative control elements created statutory frameworks for forest resource management. As they attempted to fold all of these aspects into their management imperative, foresters sometimes struggled to meet the promise of multiple use resource management. The complexity of forest management became increasingly evident as foresters worked to not only balance competing public opinion over the value of separate uses, but also the ecological impact the use of one resource could have on another. The utilitarian forestry dream of Gifford Pinchot had in many ways been transformed from one of production to one of mitigation. Ecosystem management challenged foresters to manage their forests in a coordinated and comprehensive manner that utilized the primary threshold of forest health. It expanded the forester’s gaze. The utilitarian forester viewed the forest as a collection of commodities. The ecological forester saw a forest as a composition of vegetative and animal species that were greatly impacted by human disturbance. The task therefore of the ecological Forest Service was to employ the key elements of the management imperative - the application of science, technology, federal largesse, and 583 professionalism - to minimize and in some cases repair disturbance. Through 2000, Lewis and Clark foresters were only beginning to understand how that imperative worked. 584 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION This dissertation examines the evolution of national forest landscapes in the Rocky Mountain Front region of north-central Montana. It explores how even seemingly peripheral Forest Service landscapes are representative of broad economic, political, and cultural trends shaping the United States. Furthermore, this research uses a case-study approach to describe the evolution of the Forest Service’s management imperative. Former Lewis and Clark Supervisor Gloria Flora said, “all natural resource decisions are actually social decisions” (Flora 2012). A historical geographic examination of the Lewis and Clark National Forest therefore reveals “the actors” involved in management policy and landscape change (Latour 2005, 12). Finally, this dissertation explores how national forest landscapes are the result of a largely informal negotiation process between the Forest Service, other federal and state agencies and authorities, the public, and the natural world that has transformed Forest Service landscapes into a middle landscape. It therefore expands the definition of a middle landscape from that of a place “between the urban and the wild, between nature and culture” to a meeting point where diverse and complex social relations and value systems are transferred to the landscape (Harrison 2006, 16). In doing so, this dissertation provides a meaningful set of interpretive tools and a methodology for examining how the public lands resources and the ecological world are valued and understood. 585 Landscape Change and the National Forest Imperative Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by again returning to the format utilized in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Beginning with boundaries and concluding with watershed resources, landscape change for each management element of the Rocky Mountain Division of the Lewis and Clark National Forest is explored. This discussion will include a brief examination of how these landscape changes are representative of local and national drivers and negotiated middle landscapes. Finally, this dissertation will conclude by exploring some of the near-future management initiatives facing Lewis and Clark foresters and suggesting that historical geographic investigations into national forest landscapes may provide decision makers and users with a better understanding of the heterogenous nature of public land landscapes and the social and ecological processes shaping public places. Boundaries Lewis and Clark National Forest boundaries underwent external and internal transformations that were the result of varying management structures, economic conditions, and technology. Initial forest boundaries defined an area that approached three million acres in size and reflected the centralized nature of the GLO management era. Following the transfer of the Forest Service to the Department of Agriculture, the boundary of the Lewis and Clark decreased in size to one that roughly corresponds to the boundary of the present day Rocky Mountain Ranger District. Boundary reduction was 586 the result of Gifford Pinchot’s decentralized view of utilitarian forestry. Furthermore, it allowed for foresters to implement a level of administrative control. The reduced forest boundary allowed rangers to police the forest boundary for trespass, maintain an authoritative presence, and implement some management tasks. Ranger districts too were small - six districts existed within the current Rocky Mountain Ranger District. District size corresponded reflected national standardization but conformed to local topographical features and population centers. Lewis and Clark boundary changes in the middle and latter 20th century reflected larger agency mandates to centralize forest management. Centralization was viewed as a method to increase efficiency and decrease forest management expenditures. In the early years of the Great Depression, the Lewis and Clark was merged with the Jefferson National Forest in order to lessen the economic burden placed on management. The original six districts were also consolidated into two - the Sun River and Teton - with the merger. During the recession of the late 1970s, the Sun River and Teton districts were combined into the Rocky Mountain Ranger District, largely as a cost-saving method. Technological advances in transportation and communication also contributed to expanded forest boundaries. While automotive access became a factor destabilizing foresters’ ability to control forest use, it also greatly expanded the forest management sphere. This allowed forest management to decrease their administrative presence inside the forest boundary, reduce their in-forest patrol staff, and expand their forest boundaries. 587 Telephone and radio communication also allowed foresters to efficiently continue to manage despite the increased territory. Internal boundary shifts also reflected wider economic and social trends. To placate concerns that federal forests were comprised of inalienable land, the Forest Service allowed forest homesteads within their boundaries. However, the agency dictated the terms of homestead withdrawal and precluded entry on many eligible homestead sites. Nevertheless, forest homesteads remain on the landscape (Figure 6-1). In some cases, forest homesteads have been passed down through generations. Other forest 588 Figure 6-1. Boundary at Ford Creek. Photo by author, 2013. Cattleguards are a key infrastructure feature at forest boundaries. The boundary at Ford Creek runs through forest homestead land. homesteads have not only changed ownership, but use as well. This was an iterative process defined by shifting economic and social trends. Many forest homesteads ceased agricultural production during the 1920s and the Great Depression. Some, such as the “Scoutana” site near the Willow Creek administration site were purchased by neighboring ranchers in the Depression and then later transformed into recreational sites (Figure 6-2). Internal boundary shifts also corresponded to national efforts that encourage agency consolidation. Fire, forest disease, and trespass complicated federal forest management in areas bordering private inholdings. The Forest Service sought to incorporate private land - usually railroad land grants - into their forest boundaries in 589 Figure 6-2: Scoutana Private Campground. Photo by author, 2013. order to achieve more seamless management. Through the middle decades of the 20th century, Lewis and Clark foresters openly purchased inholdings in order to consolidate their boundaries. Administrative Sites Rocky Mountain Front administrative sites have changed in both form and function through the 20th century. Early GLO forest administrators co-opted squatter homesteads and trapper cabins. However, under utilitarian forestry the Forest Service expanded and standardized administrative sites. Site withdrawal location was determined by national regulations, local population, and topography. The Forest Service required the placement of administrative sites inside or adjacent to forest boundaries. This allowed rangers to monitor forest use at access points. Rocky Mountain Front topography precluded the agency from selective site selection. As national and local demands for timber, wildlife protection, and fire control expanded, administrative sites were extended into more peripheral backcountry areas. Though the climate of the Rocky Mountain Front negated any possibility of year-round habitation of these backcountry sites, they became important nodes of control and critical elements of the Continental Divide fire management plan. As the Rocky Mountain Division became more oriented to recreation and wilderness, these backcountry administrative sites took on added importance in support of those uses. In some locations, administrative site withdrawals were transformed into other use-determined landscapes. The former Goat Bluff administration site was constructed on 590 the remnants of the McGurk-Teton sawmill. As the Goat Bluff site gave way to the Ear Mountain site, all structures were either demolished or shipped away to other sites. Yet, the agency never relinquished its claim to the site. As recreation demands increased in the latter decades of the 20th century, the Goat Bluff site was selected as a non-fee recreation area. Staffing and use of Lewis and Clark administrative sites mirrored national trends of urbanization and modernization. Early Lewis and Clark administrative sites were family affairs; the agency actively sought out married rangers. This effectively tied the agency to the community and created an aura of permanence. As urban centers grew and communication and transportation systems made accessing forest information easier, year-round administrative sites were relocated in communities outside of the forest boundary. In-forest administrative sites shifted to seasonal use. While they were often refurbished and basic damages repaired, only sites that were frequently accessed by recreational uses - such as Benchmark and Hannan Gulch (Figure 6-3) - were consistently modernized. Other sites, such as the Willow Creek ranger station, served specific functions removed from public contact and were therefore a low priority for modernization (Figure 6-4). District and forest headquarters were expanded into multi- building modernized bureaucratic centers (Figure 6-5). Road and Trail Infrastructure Road and trail construction was a primary responsibility for Lewis and Clark foresters. Roads and trails were integral mechanisms of forest control. Early roads and 591 592 Figure 6-3: Benchmark and Hannan Gulch Administrative Sites. Photo by author, 2013. 593 Figure 6-5. Lewis and Clark National Forest Headquarters, Great Falls, MT. Photo by author, 2011. Figure 6-4: Willow Creek Administrative Site. Photo by author, 2013. trails were extensions of local and wildlife networks and followed the Rocky Mountain Front’s rugged topography. However, road and trail construction were soon incorporated into the agency’s management imperative and were standardized and prioritized. Road and trail creation were heavily influenced by national economic trends. Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to build and maintain roads and trails in the early decades of the forest. Road and trail infrastructure became severely degraded in the early Great Depression. However, New Deal financial and manpower support allowed Lewis and Clark foresters to extend and standardize transportation infrastructure throughout the forest. This greatly increased foresters’ management capability and allowed the agency to pursue enhanced fire control, wildlife studies, and timber inventories. Road construction in the Lewis and Clark was again hampered by the economics of the post war resource boom. During the post-World War II era, Lewis and Clark foresters equated road construction - or the lack thereof - with their ability to exploit timber bodies. Roads were a necessary infrastructure feature to place federal forests under the sustained yield imperative. Most post war road construction was financed through timber sales. Yet the rugged Rocky Mountain Front topography limited the economic viability of harvesting timber in the region. Therefore, few new roads were constructed in the Rocky Mountain Division in the latter decades of the 20th century. Temporary class roads were constructed in the Two Medicine, Blackleaf, and Badger regions of the forest to conduct seismic oil and gas explorations, though few of these remained as Forest Service standardized roads. 594 Road and trail construction also led to greater public use of the Lewis and Clark and compelled the Forest Service to expand its management imperative. Roads and trails provided public access to the forest and supported a multi-varied recreation movement. This important and increasingly dominant use of Rocky Mountain Division road and trail infrastructure provided users a new way of viewing, experiencing, and ultimately valuing western public lands. Recreation-based forest experiences, accessed through the road and trail system, have resulted in a dramatic transformation of the agency’s management imperative. Recreation-based access also fuels much of the budgetary means by which the agency maintains and develops road and trail systems. Lewis and Clark foresters maintain their transportation infrastructure to meet scenic and visual quality baselines that correspond with the forest landscape. Though trail size is standardized, maintenance is prioritized based upon use (Figure 6-6). There have also been growing demands for limiting forest access. Beginning with the L-20 regulations and continuing through the 2001 Roadless Rule designations, Lewis and Clark foresters have expanded the management of roadless regions. This action is, in a way, an attempt to strengthen control of how and where the public uses the transportation infrastructure. Since the 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters have issued regional and local travel restrictions in an attempt to increase forest health, limit erosion, aid wildlife migration, and mitigate noxious weed invasion (Figure 6-7). Travel plans are somewhat fluid as ecological conditions vary by season, as does the public desire to 595 access remote points in the forest (Figure 6-8). Lewis and Clark foresters work diligently to control off-road and incompatible trail uses and frequently monitor road and trail use statistics to prioritize funding for maintenance. Fire Management Fire is important landscape feature in the Lewis and Clark. Much of the Rocky Mountain Front has burned at one time or another during the past century of forest management (Figure 6-9). Fire management was greatly influenced by economic variables. Fire management infrastructure was costly and fire control was an unpredictable budgetary expense. Damages accrued during the 1910 Big Burn were quantified in economic terms and foresters responded by implementing forest wide fire management plans that included infrastructure construction. As technology changed, so did the fire control landscape. Phone lines were replaced by wireless radio. Daily 596 Figure 6-6: Low and High Priority Trails. Photos by author, 2013, 2011. The trail to the right is a high-use trail near the Bob Marshall Wilderness border in the Teton watershed. 597 Figure 6-8: Road Closures, Teton Watershed, 2010. Photos by author. Figure 6-7: The Benchmark Road. Photo by author, 2013. Roads have become increasingly implicated in the spread of noxious weeds. mounted patrols were supplanted by improved lookouts and then by aerial surveillance. Foresters leveraged public fears of catastrophic fire and timber famine into budget, manpower, and research-funding increases. This landscape legacy is ubiquitous throughout the forest and is represented in road and trail infrastructure, lookouts, airfields, and remnants of long-abandoned communications systems (Figure 6-10). Lewis and Clark foresters were keenly aware of the influence fire had on the public’s perception of Forest Service management activities. Through the middle decades of the 20th century, large-scale wildland fire was often viewed as a sign of poor agency management. Public concerns over fire reflected use-based concerns and social value 598 Figure 6-9: Fire Legacy in the Rocky Mountain Division. Map by author. judgments. Rocky Mountain Front agriculturalists feared that fire would increase sedimentation and destabilize irrigation regimes. The timber and pulpwood industry viewed fire as a loss of marketable goods. Wilderness and recreation users saw fire as an aesthetic scar and a potential loss of revenue. Negative perceptions of Forest Service fire management encouraged Lewis and Clark foresters to focus funding, manpower, and technology toward fire management initiatives. 599 Figure 6-10: Benchmark Airfield. Photo by author, 2013. This perception of fire management shifted in the latter decades of the 20th century - in part a reaction to the diminishing economic returns brought by total fire control, but also reflecting a broad social shift toward environmentalism and greater ecological management of federal forests. The transition to this alternate view of fire management occurred as the country began to re-evaluate the impact of primary resource economic activities on forest ecosystems. As timber production on marginal forest lands decreased in importance - as it did on the Lewis and Clark - scientists from both within and outside of the agency argued that the most enduring landscape legacy left by national forest fire management was overgrown and diseased forests. Thanks to aggressive federal fire management, western national forests had become overly susceptible to catastrophic fire. Since the late 1970s, Lewis and Clark foresters have been attempting to integrate fire into their management protocols through planned and prescribed burning. Fires occur frequently in the Rocky Mountain Front and have become an accepted part of the national forest landscape (Figure 6-11). Community education programs promoted by the Forest Service have spread the gospel of the beneficial impacts of fire on forest ecosystems. Yet, smoke-filled summer skies are a difficult thing to accept and the visual legacy of even a moderate fire season can be seen for many years. Fire scars can be seen in many places along the Front and Lewis and Clark foresters are faced with an ongoing battle to manage both public perception and ecosystem effects of fire. 600 Timber Management When the Lewis and Clark National Forest was created, the public was promised that national forest timber reserves would be harvested on a sustained yield basis. One of the basic tenets of the national forest imperative required instituting timber harvests suitable to clear old growth forests. Once cleared, national forests could be replanted on a systematic schedule, thereby insuring a predictable and sustainable supply of timber to the nation. But, timber management practices changed over time. Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to open timber resources in the early decades of the 20th century. Multiple 601 Figure 6-11: Fire Landscape, Teton River. Photo by author, 2009. economic, geographic, and social factors limited the timber harvest. Rugged topography and an incomplete road network precluded major harvests. The Bureau of Reclamation also blocked sales because reservoir projects had a higher value than timber harvests. The primitive area/wilderness movement took an early hold in the Lewis and Clark and backcountry timber sales in protected areas were excluded. Reforestation of cutover and burned areas was an important aspect of utilitarian forestry but was restricted along the Rocky Mountain Front due to the economic limitations of the region’s timber market. Reforestation occurred sporadically along the Rocky Mountain Front, though most agency reforestation efforts occurred in high-value forests. However, pine seed and seedling planting did occur along the Front. In some cases, major landscape modifications were made. Terraced planting occurred in Jones Creek and along the North Fork of Ford Creek in the 1960s with varying degrees of success (Figure 6-12). Budgetary restrictions severely hampered efforts to open old growth timber bodies on the Lewis and Clark. While Congressional appropriations aimed at increasing timber sales in the post war period transformed the agency’s timber management program, they had little impact on the Rocky Mountain Division. Most of the money went to accessible forests that were well endowed with marketable timber resources and close to cities. Though a pulpwood industry was created in the Lewis and Clark, much of that harvest occurred in the Jefferson Division of the forest. 602 Market conditions discouraged Lewis and Clark foresters from attempting to reach sustained yield outputs. For much of the 20th century, the timber market demanded pine species that were not readily found or accessible in the Rocky Mountain Front. This relegated the timber industry to supplying only local needs for posts, poles, and railroad ties. Negligible local markets, combined with difficult topography, lack of access roads, and a growing environmental movement concerned with forest and watershed health limited the timber industry - both nationally and locally - in the latter decades of the 20th century. 603 Figure 6-12: Unsuccessful Terracing, Ford Creek. Photo by author, 2013. Currently, timber harvesting in the Lewis and Clark occurs in discretely managed zones, for forest health/fuel reduction purposes, or a result of timber salvage sales after large fires (Figure 6-13). Much of the current timber harvest in the Rocky Mountain ranger district is for local use - including firewood and Christmas cutting (Figure 6-14). The agency continues to create infrastructure to aid this diminished industry, however. Small, temporary roads are occasionally created to allow local firewood harvests. Occasionally, when traveling through the Rocky Mountain Front, you can come across landscapes that were once a part of the timber management infrastructure. For example, timber roads remain within in the Teton watershed and are frequently gated 604 Figure 6-13: Timber Salvage, Fool Creek Fire. Photo by author, 2009. from public use. Place names such as Headquarters Creek, Two Shacks, and Biggs Creek are all remnants of the pre-national forest tie cutter camps on the Sun River. Perhaps the most easily identifiable feature is the broad plain that you encounter in the Green Timber Basin (Figure 6-15). Once home to the Bisbee sawmill, the site resembles any western ghost town location - you can see where the ground was leveled and foundations were dug to facilitate an ambitious timber harvest. It looks out of place in the context of the rugged topography of the Rocky Mountain Division. 605 Figure 6-14: Firewood Cutting at Mill Falls Campground. Photo by author, 2012. Grazing and Wildlife Management The Forest Service’s grazing policy emerged within a utilitarian forestry model that promoted full utilization of range resources for commercial livestock. Wildlife management was not a part of the agency’s initial imperative. Early in the 20th century, public demands emerged for integrating wildlife into grazing management plans. Through the middle decades of the 20th century, Lewis and Clark foresters struggled to sustain agrarian economies and maintain wildlife ecologies. In later decades, foresters were faced with implementing stringent wildlife protection measures into all of their forest plans. 606 Figure 6-15: Bisbee Sawmill Site. Photo by author, 2013. Many economic and cultural changes have shaped grazing and wildlife management in the Lewis and Clark National Forest. Prompted by rapid settlement in the Rocky Mountain Front, Lewis and Clark foresters managed extensive grazing resources for commercial use in the early decades of the 20th century. Range management was a budding science and foresters did not fully comprehend the impact overgrazing would have on the range. Furthermore, range permits did not allow for seasonal climatic and vegetative variations. The growth of the Sun River elk herd further depleted the range, and soon local game enthusiasts began to petition Lewis and Clark foresters to limit or exclude livestock from the forest. Unable to manage wildlife alongside of livestock, the Forest Service began a multi-year process of permit reduction, infrastructure creation, and range surveys. The agency increased their understanding of range characteristics and incorporated management techniques that included carrying capacity studies, rotation grazing, and salting and infrastructure improvement to balance livestock use, wildlife populations, and range health. Through this process, Lewis and Clark foresters accomplished two goals. First, they were significant participants in a national movement to incorporate wildlife management into the national forest management imperative. Frustrated by their inability to directly manage wildlife populations and concerned that further livestock reductions would critically weaken the Rocky Mountain Front economy, Lewis and Clark foresters expanded their understanding of grazing management to include species other than domestic livestock. They developed research that allowed for a much greater 607 understanding of range conditions, wildlife migration and calving patterns, and forage use. Secondly, Lewis and Clark foresters relied heavily on cooperation and negotiation to resolve conflicts between livestock and wildlife interests. Through much of the 20th century, Lewis and Clark foresters attempted to bring state and federal agencies together with livestock and sportsmen’s associations to reach some level of management solidarity. Though these negotiations were often not successful, they created a template for future informal negotiations between local users and the Forest Service. Though it is an overstatement to say that these attempts at cooperative management led directly to the more formalized user-agency interactions in the latter decades of the 20th century, they certainly created a precedent for public input. Cooperative agreements with livestock and sportsmen’s associations had significant landscape impacts as well. Most Lewis and Clark grazing permits contained directives that mandated the permitee to improve range infrastructure and conform to management salting and distribution guidelines. Cooperation with sportsmen’s associations ultimately resulted in the establishment of winter game range outside of the forest’s boundary (Figure 6-16). Lewis and Clark foresters continue to manage a reduced, but locally important, livestock industry (Figure 6-17). Livestock reductions have had as much to do with changing national economic climates as they have to do with livestock conflicts. The Rocky Mountain Front livestock industry was significantly reduced during the Great 608 609 Figure 6-16: Sun River Wildlife Management Area. Photo by author, 2010. Figure 6-17: Cattle at Nilan Reservoir. Photo by author, 2013. Nilan Reservoir is located near the Benchmark entrance to the Lewis and Clark National Forest. This photo was taken just before the herd was moved into the forest. Depression. More recently, modernization, urbanization, and increased commercialization have impacted the industry. Distance from the Front to market has also hampered growth. Wildlife management has proved to be a continuing challenge for Lewis and Clark foresters. Wildlife management has had a significant economic impact on the Rocky Mountain Front. Recent studies have shown that outdoor recreation tourism - largely focused on hunting and wildlife viewing - plays “a substantial role in the economy” of the Rocky Mountain Front (Headwaters Economics 2012a, 28). In an attempt to regulate and promote the wildlife and dude ranch-packer industry along the Front, Lewis and Clark foresters grant special use permits for in-forest dude ranches and maintain packer corrals at multiple locations (Figure 6-18). Packers are also allowed to designate reserved, albeit temporary, base and spike camps in the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex. Wildlife management grew in complexity following the passage of the Endangered Species Act. Lewis and Clark foresters have had to incorporate broad measures to protect and rehabilitate habitat in their management plans to meet the requirements of the ESA. Additionally, the ESA has forced Lewis and Clark foresters to implement single species habitat studies and incorporate them into new ecosystem management regimes. Furthermore, local wildlife interest groups continue to influence and monitor Lewis and Clark forest management plans. Interest groups annually survey the forest and report on the forest’s wildlife populations and habitat health. 610 Perhaps the most prominent wildlife landscape feature present in the Rocky Mountain ranger district is the sheer abundance of wildlife (Figure 6-19). It is not difficult to see many examples of Rocky Mountain Front wildlife. In the course of this research, I saw multiple deer, elk, raptors, mountain goat, sheep, and black bear. I never did see a grizzly bear, something for which I am both sad and grateful. 611 Figure 6-18. South Fork Packer Corrals. Photo by author, 2013. Recreation and Wilderness Management One of the primary motivating factors for the creation of the initial federal forest reserves was for their protection and the opportunities they offered for recreation and appreciation. Despite that, federal foresters initially denied the inclusion of recreation and wilderness protection in their management imperative because both were seen as non- utilitarian. But by the middle decades of the 20th century, foresters were forced to accommodate growing public demands for recreation and public land preservation due to enduring cultural and economic changes. By the final decades of the 20th century, recreation had become a dominant national forest use along the Rocky Mountain Front 612 Figure 6-19: Rocky Mountain Front Wildlife. Photos by author, 2010-2013. and multiple areas were managed for wilderness characteristics - whether they had been designated wilderness areas or not. Recreation management was incorporated into the national forest imperative in the 1920s and 1930s. Recreation development was as much about control as it was about providing recreational opportunities. Motorized access to the forest and increased leisure time resulted in an increase in unplanned camping and picnicking throughout the Rocky Mountain Front. Campers concentrated in easily accessible areas, frequently along stream banks and open pastures. As no infrastructure existed, sanitation issues, man-caused fires, and degraded watershed resulted. Furthermore, foresters were inundated with applications for forest homesteads and special use recreation cabins. Lewis and Clark foresters were forced to incorporate recreation into their management plans. The result was a steady growth in the type and amount of recreation-based infrastructure improvements planned, constructed, and maintained by Lewis and Clark foresters. Through the middle and latter decades of the 20th century, several campgrounds were constructed in the Rocky Mountain Division. Campgrounds were standardized to provide predictable and repeatable recreational experiences and to give the agency a measure of control over campers (Figure 6-20). To encourage use of the designated sites, campgrounds were initially available free of charge. Another enduring landscape legacy of the recreation movement in the Lewis and Clark is the existence of numerous summer homes. Early summer home creation was an extension of the forest homestead impulse. Rather than grant locals homestead rights, 613 foresters authorized the issuance of special use permits that allowed the construction and summer occupancy of small cabins (Figure 6-21). This gave the agency a degree of control over private national forest recreation. The number of permits was limited. Each permit was required to be renewed every 20 years and could be negated by the agency at that time. Lewis and Clark foresters developed summer homes along a tract system that replicated suburban American neighborhoods. This allowed foresters to easily control access, sanitation, fire protection, and the visual quality of the residences as well as make tract-wide adjustments should management plans warrant. 614 Figure 6-20: Wood Lake Campground. Photo by author, 2013. Campsites were standardized to give ample space, contain safe and sturdy fire cylinders and benches, and some level of privacy despite the compact nature of campground development. Campground creation and maintenance varied with the shifting national economy and agency priorities. Much of the initial Lewis and Clark recreation infrastructure was built using New Deal financing. During World War II, both the means and the manpower 615 Figure 6-21: Summer Homes, Mule Creek and Bureau of Reclamation Tracts. Photos by author, 2013 to continue recreation development were not available and most facilities became severely degraded. However, national post war initiatives to modernize public land facilities infused funds earmarked for recreation development into the agency. Lewis and Clark foresters turned their focus to more public forms of recreation and increased the number of campgrounds throughout the Rocky Mountain Front. Many of these were constructed in locations frequented by local, unregulated campers (Figure 6-22). No new summer homes have been constructed in the Rocky Mountain Division since the late 1950s. Through the latter decades of the 20th century, Lewis and Clark foresters had to meet new recreation impulses and integrate them into their management plans. Hiking, off-road, and winter recreation emerged as significant impulses and required special management to maintain control. Trailhead facilities - complete with restrooms, parking lots, trash receptacles, and information boards were constructed at several well-used trail junctures. Off-road recreation required the agency to craft a series of special travel rules that limited where and when recreationists could use motorized and all-terrain vehicles. Winter recreation became a significant recreational use in the Teton watershed. Foresters granted a special use permit for the construction of a ski hill. An increase in snowmobiling in the region forced the agency to designate a special snowmobile parking area to and craft rules governing snowmobile use in the forest boundary (Figure 6-23). Wilderness management was subject to similar cultural and economic shifts as other forest uses. Following decades of growing public pressure to preserve national 616 forest lands, the agency took the initial steps to modify their imperative to include wilderness preservation. In the late 1930s, the Forest Service took the lead in classifying wilderness areas and protecting them through a series of rules that defined applicable use. Varying economic situations, however, have impacted wilderness management. In the 1930s, it was difficult for foresters to advocate for roadlessness in the face of the Great Depression and local unemployment. Despite this fact, relatively few primitive areas were altered by roadbuilding in the New Deal era - none of the primitive areas in and around the Lewis and Clark were modified. Though the national organization of the Wilderness Society is given much of the credit for this, the rugged Rocky Mountain Front 617 Figure 6-22: Elko Campground. Photo by author, 2009. topography had just as much to do with it. Ultimately, it was not economically feasible to construct roads into the Rocky Mountain Front backcountry for timber extraction. Foresters faced a second economic push to open roadless areas to multiple use in the 1950s. Foresters were under increasing pressure to supply ever increasing amounts of timber. As a result, the Forest Service lost the power to designate wilderness lands within their borders. Fearful that the agency was complicit with the timber industry, wilderness supporters, fueled by the growing environmental movement, supported legislation that placed the authority to designate wilderness areas in the hands of Congress and the President of the United States. In an attempt to regain control, the agency instituted a series of roadless classification examinations that culminated in the 2001 Roadless Rule. 618 Figure 6-23: Winter Sports Area, Teton River. Photo by author, 2009. Under the Roadless Rule, inventoried roadless Forest Service lands were mandated to remain roadless. Multiple areas in the Rocky Mountain Division are managed for roadlessness, even though they have not been classified as wilderness areas. Wilderness infrastructure is kept at a minimum per regulations in the Wilderness Act. Lewis and Clark foresters have constructed several end-of-the-road facilities, including horse loading ramps, parking lots, and sanitation features to help manage wilderness recreation (Figure 6-24). Many of the ecosystem management techniques practiced in other portions of the forest originated within the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex boundaries. Mining and Watershed Management Mining and watershed management emerged in the latter decades of the 20th century as important forest uses in the Lewis and Clark. Both were early entries into the national forest management imperative but were largely ignored as foresters struggled to manage forests for sustained yield timber and forage harvests, implement fire protection plans, and construct infrastructure improvements. Both mining and watershed management grew in prominence in the second half of the 20th century as a result of the changing economic, social, and scientific climate. Mining in the Rocky Mountain Division had never been profitable. The topography and limited precious mineral deposits precluded most hardrock mining opportunities. Oil and gas resources along the Front are plentiful however, and there were sporadic endeavors to harvest petroleum and natural gas through much of the 20th 619 century. Much of this occurred just outside of the forest boundary (Figure 6-25). It wasn’t until the late 1970s and 1980s when the combination of geopolitical tension, rising prices, and technological advances made oil exploration inside the Lewis and Clark feasible that the agency was required to craft management plans which would meet highly altered environmental and ecological standards. Mining had to be re-incorporated into the management imperative. Between the late 1970s and late 1990s, local organized opposition to oil and gas mining in the Lewis and Clark created a bulwark against any attempt to develop oil leases in the forest. This signified a monumental shift in the national forest management 620 Figure 6-24: Entrance to the Bob Marshall Wilderness. Photo by author, 2011. The gate is to keep motorized vehicles out of the Complex. imperative. It soon became clear that the economic need for resource extraction in the Rocky Mountain Front did not outweigh the perceived value and sense of place. Local opposition to oil and gas extraction had in a sense recast the Rocky Mountain ranger district as a protected landscape. Watershed management in the Lewis and Clark followed two general trends that were both highly influenced by national movements. Though watershed guidelines were detailed in the 1897 Organic Act, early management was concerned primarily with infrastructure creation concordant with the Bureau of Reclamation’s Sun River Project and associated irrigation endeavors (Figure 6-26). A subtle shift in this trend prompted multiple attempts to expand the reservoir system inside the Lewis and Clark for dual 621 Figure 6-25: Private Land Oil Development Near Dupuyer, MT. Photo by author, 2010. irrigation and flood control purposes. Each successive attempt to build a new dam in the Lewis and Clark failed in the face of strong public opinion. Wilderness, wildlife, recreation, and grazing advocates all objected to increased reservoir construction. A second dominant trend in Forest Service watershed management was outlined in the Organic Act and reaffirmed in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. Growing environmentalism and increased understanding of watershed’s contribution to overall forest health emerged in the latter decades of the 20th century. Reoccurring floods in the 622 Figure 6-26: Irrigation Watershed Landscapes. Photos by author, 2010-2013. From left to right, top to bottom - Below Swift Reservoir; Pishkun Feeder Canal; Above Diversion Dam; Below Gibson Reservoir. 1960s and 1970s also contributed to this endeavor as foresters sought ways to stabilize banks and stream beds and limit erosion. Lewis and Clark foresters responded by incorporating watershed and soil rehabilitation into their management plans. By the late 1980s, Lewis and Clark foresters began to prioritize management efforts that limited erosion and sedimentation to less than one percent of the total stream load annually. Watershed health emerged as a priority metric in ecosystem management. “National Forest Management is a Never-Ending Game” Though this historical geography ends at the beginning of the 21st century, management of the Rocky Mountain Division has continued and will continue into the future. In 2012 the Forest Service announced that it had crafted a set of new planning guidelines that would provide structure to new national forest plans. In 2013, the agency gave the public an opportunity to review and issue advisory comments on the planning guidelines. In 2014, the Lewis and Clark National Forest plans to begin the long and arduous task of revising its forest plan to meet the new guidelines. At its core, the new planning rule integrates multiple aspects of ecosystem management into forest plans. Sustainability, ecosystem integrity, and ecosystem diversity are all to be critical elements of future forest plans. Multiple use remains as well and must be integrated into ecosystem management and habitat protection plans. The planning rule also promises greater collaboration and public involvement in the planning process. It is unclear, however, whether this collaboration will extend beyond the planning stage. 623 In 2011 and again in 2013, Senator Max Baucus of Montana proposed adding approximately 67,112 acres of land to the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex in the Lewis and Clark National Forest (Figure 6-27). The Rocky Mountain Front Heritage Act would also classify 208,160 acres of Rocky Mountain Front land as a Conservation Management Area (CMA). The CMA designation - as well as the wilderness classification - are nebulous at best. According to Baucus, the CMA will be created to “keep things the way they are” (Baucus 2011). All of the areas that would be classified as wilderness under the Heritage Act are already managed by Lewis and Clark foresters - as directed by their forest plan and the 2001 Roadless Rule - for wilderness characteristics. They know better than anyone that changing that area designation away from wilderness management would be a near impossibility. In the course of this research, I conducted numerous informal interviews with past and present Lewis and Clark National Forest employees. So many declined to go on the record in the early stages of this process that I frequently hesitated to even ask. Instead I tried to gather general perceptions of their experience managing the Rocky Mountain Front. One informal conversation sticks out among the many. It occurred in the back room storage area of the Lewis and Clark National Forest Headquarters in Great Falls, MT - a cavernous and warren-like warehouse filled with maps, memorandum, and project filed that detailed portions of over a century of Rocky Mountain Front forest management. It was late in the afternoon and most of the office was closed. In this case I had asked my informant if I could record our interview. He was not comfortable with that 624 and requested that I not use his name. Over the months of research I conducted in Great Falls, we had several of these conversations. “National forest management is a never-ending game,” he said to me on one occasion. “The only problem is is that the rules keep changing. Some players know that. The others don’t. I’m usually one of the ‘don’ts.’” 625 Figure 6-27: The Rocky Mountain Front Heritage Act (Baucus 2011). In the process of completing this research I have often thought about that conversation. In part, this research goes a long way toward describing how the rules have changed over the past century. More importantly, it examines how the players themselves shaped those rules based not only on scientific principles - as the early utilitarian foresters envisioned - but through a complex and largely informal negotiation process that was rooted in variable perceptions and valuations. As a result, agency management practices were transformed to answer, control, and manage each of those perceptions. This research provides a framework for understanding the century-long transformation of a massive bureaucratic entity that is often described as unwieldy, implacable, and incapable of change. Furthermore, this research assesses key landscape changes along the Rocky Mountain Front and how these changes were shaped by the United States Forest Service. It suggests the value of seeing the region beyond the metrics of forest use and value, ecology, or management. It also suggests that the Rocky Mountain Front can be envisioned as a landscape where complex social, ecological, bureaucratic, and economic discourses are woven together, displayed, and made real. Public land management is by nature contentious. I contend that this is the case because such debates are the key meeting points where our values are transferred to the landscape. Ultimately, this is a story of success. It does not claim that Forest Service management of the Lewis and Clark National Forest has not been without pitfalls. It shows the evolution of an agency as it continually adapted its management policies and landscapes to meet dynamic 626 attitudes, values, and needs of both cultural and ecological worlds. It is therefore a human story that describes both mistakes that were made, lessons learned, and a commitment to and evolution of an underlying management imperative. Greater understanding of the processes that contributed to the formation of these landscapes can only add depth, meaning, and perspective to the increasingly complex process of managing public lands. 627 REFERENCES CITED Key to Archives FHS = Forest History Society, Durham, NC FNF = Flathead National Forest Headquarters, Kalispell, MT HNF = Helena National Forest Headquarters, Helena, MT LCNF-C = Lewis and Clark National Forest, Rocky Mountain Division Headquarters, Choteau, MT LCNF-GF = Lewis and Clark National Forest Headquarters, Great Falls, MT MHS = Montana Historical Society, Helena, MT MSU = Montana State University Library, Bozeman, MT NARA-CP = National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD NARA-DC = National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. NARA-DN = National Archives and Records Administration, Denver, CO NARA-S = National Archives and Records Administration, Seattle, WA R1HQ = USDA Forest Service Region 1 Headquarters, Missoula, MT UM-Mansfield = University of Montana Library, Missoula, MT UMT = University of Montana Special Collections, Missoula, MT Adams, C.H. 1913a. Letter to Forest Supervisor, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 30 September (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1913b. Letter to Forest Supervisor, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 12 December 12 (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1914. Letter to Forest Supervisor, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 7 March (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1915. Letter to Forest Supervisor, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 18 January 18 (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). Adams, James E. 1912. Letter to Forest Supervisor, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 4 July (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites, Piegan RS). _____. 1913. 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Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. _____. 1971. “A Proposal: Scapegoat Wilderness, Helena - Lolo - Lewis and Clark National Forests” (LCNF-C, Library and Historical Files). _____. 1972a. “Committee Control Record, Region 1, Lewis and Clark National Forest Advisory Council,” 5 September (NARA-S, RG 95 Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 19). _____. 1972b. “National Forest Wilderness: Bob Marshall Management Plan (LCNF-C, Library and Historical Files). _____. 1973a. “Committee Control Record, Region 1, Lewis and Clark National Forest Advisory Council,” 26 February (NARA-S, RG 95 Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 19). _____. 1973b. “Off-Road Vehicles Controls Due in National Forest,” 31 March (FHS). _____. 1973c. Press Release 1253-73, “Forest Service to Adjust Regional Structure,” 24 April (FHS, F3.3). _____. 1973d. Press Release, “Forest Service Suspends Plans to Change Regional Boundaries,” 16 July (FHS, F3.3). _____. 1973e. Roadless and Undeveloped Areas, Final Environmental Statement. Washington D.C.: USDA Forest Service. 712 _____. 1975. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974: Outline of Forest Service Plans for Implementing the Act. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. _____. 1976a. Highlights in the History of Forest Conservation AIB-83. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. _____. 1976b. Lewis and Clark National Forest, (Rocky Mountain Division), Montana, Principal Meridian, Montana. Washington D.C.: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1976c. National Forest System. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. _____. 1979a. Final Environmental Statement, Grazing Fees for Grazing and Livestock Use on the National Forest Service (FHS, F7.3). _____. 1979b. Final Environmental Statement, Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (FHS). _____. 1981. “BMA Lease Applications, Figure 18” (LCNF-C). _____. 1983. Land Areas of the National Forest System FS-383. Washington D.C.: USDA. _____. 1986. The Forest Service and the Civilian Conservation Corps: 1933-42, FS-395. Washington D.C.: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1988. Lewis and Clark National Forest, (Rocky Mountain Division), Montana, Principal Meridian, Montana. Washington D.C.: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1996. A Framework for Ecosystem Management in the Interior Columbia Basin and Portions of the Klamath and Great Basins. Portland: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station. _____. 1997. Lewis and Clark National Forest Oil and Gas Leasing: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Record of Decision. _____. 1998. “Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: Temporary Suspension of Road Construction in Roadless Records, 63 FR 9980.” _____. 2000. Forest Service Roadless Area Conservation: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1. Washington D.C.: USDA Forest Service. 713 USDA Forest Service, District 1 (USDA D1). 1910a. "Report of Supervisors' Meeting, District 1" (NARA-S, Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 4). _____. 1910b. "War on Prairie Dogs To Be Continued in 1910" (FHS, US Forest Service Newspaper Clipping File, Box 30). _____. 1911. "Annual Non-Statistical Report, District 1, 1911," 13 July (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 7). _____. 1912a. "Annual Non-Statistical Report, District 1, 1912," 20 July (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 7). _____. 1912b. "Report of Supervisors' Meeting, District 1" (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 4). _____. 1913. "Annual Non-Statistical Report, District 1, 1913, " 1 February (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 7). _____. 1914a. "Annual Non-Statistical Report, District 1, 1914," 13 May (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 7). _____. 1914b. “Report of the Proceedings of Supervisors’ Meetings, Forest Service, District 1,” 2-7 February (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 4). _____. 1915. "District Forester's Annual Report, District 1, 1915," 10 May (NARA-S, RG 95 Division of Information and Education Subject Files 1908-1970, Box 7). _____. 1918. “Guide to Accompany Constitution and By-Laws for Stock Associations,” 20 May (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 3). _____. 1921. “Cooperative Agreement Between the District Forester and the State Fish and Game Commission of Montana,” 24 May (LCNF-GS, Wildlife). _____. 1923. “Five Horse Barn Plan B-1” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1924. “Ranger Dwelling Plan R-1” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). 714 _____. 1926. "Annual Geographic Names Report," 28 January (NARA-S, Division of Engineering, Geographic Names, Box 3). _____. 1927. "Annual Geographic Names Report," 28 January (NARA-S, Division of Engineering, Geographic Names, Box 3). _____. 1928a. “Frame Office Plan C-3” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928b. “Lightning Protection for Lookout Houses & Patrolman’s Cabins” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928c. “Log Firemans Cabin Plan C-1” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928d. “Log Office Plan C-2” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928e. “Plumbing Diagrams for Ranger Dwellings Plans R1 & R-3” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1929a. "Annual Geographic Names Report," 2 February (NARA-S, Division of Engineering, Geographic Names, Box 3). _____. 1929b. “Camp Ground Improvements Plan M-5” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1930. "Annual Geographic Names Report," 4 February (NARA-S, Division of Engineering, Geographic Names, Box 3). _____. 1931. "Annual Geographic Names Report," 16 December (NARA-S, Division of Engineering, Geographic Names, Box 3). USDA Forest Service, Flathead National Forest (USDA FNF). 1933. “Wrong Ridge Seen Area” (FNF, Fire Management, Seen Areas). _____. 1955. “Relation of Spruce Beetle Control in Bunker Creek to the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area” (MHS, Metcalf Collection #172, Box 127). _____. 1980. Flathead Wild and Scenic River: Recreation Management Direction. Kalispell, MT: USDA Forest Service (FNF). _____. 1981. "Range Management Study - Bob Marshall Wilderness," 9 January (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness and Primitive Areas, Box 1). 715 USDA Forest Service, Helena National Forest (USDA HNF). 1949. “Report of Board of Review, Mann Gulch Fire, Helena National Forest – August 5” (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1963. "Long Range Plan, Northern Half, Lincoln Ranger District" (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 73). USDA Forest Service, Lewis and Clark National Forest (USDA LCNF). nd-a. “Cultural Site Record. Ahorn Trail #209” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1322). _____. nd-b. "Cultural Site Record. Arsenic Creek Trail #208" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT256). _____. nd-c. “Cultural Site Record. Benchmark Creek Trail #256” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1250). _____. nd-d. "Cultural Site Record. Benchmark Guard Station" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC941). _____. nd-e. "Cultural Site Record. Bisbee Sawmill Historic Site" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1849). _____. nd-f. "Cultural Site Record. Blackleaf Ranger Station” (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC607). _____. nd-g. "Cultural Site Record, Blackleaf Trail #106" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT0568). _____. nd-h. "Cultural Site Record, Blacktail Landers Sheep Driveway" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1965). _____. nd-i. "Cultural Site Record. Carmichael Cabin" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC430). _____. nd-j. "Cultural Site Record. Deep Creek Station" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT579). _____. nd-k. "Cultural Site Record. Ear Mountain Ranger Station" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT204). 716 _____. nd-l. “Cultural Site Record. East Ahorn Trail #225” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1323). _____. nd-m. “Cultural Site Record. East Fork Falls Creek Trail #219” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Record, 24LC2007). _____. nd-n. “Cultural Site Record. East Fork Woods Creek Trail #170, Draft” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24PN552). _____. nd-o. “Cultural Site Record. Ellis Creek Trail #227” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1519). _____. nd-p. “Cultural Site Record. Hoadley Creek Trail #226” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1518). _____. nd-q. “Cultural Site Record. Home Gulch-Lime Gulch #267” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1236). _____. nd-r. “Cultural Site Record. Indian Creek/White River Pass #211” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1133). _____. nd-s. "Cultural Site Record. Jennings Trail #118" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1204). _____. nd-t. “Cultural Site Record. Mt. Pablo Trail #181” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1105). _____. nd-u. "Cultural Site Record. Mettler Coulee Trail #172" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1206). _____. nd-v. "Cultural Site Record, North Fork Teton Trail #107" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT600). _____. nd-w. "Cultural Site Record. Shelton (Bannister) Cabin #250-50" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2059). _____. nd-x. "Cultural Site Record, Tie Hackers' Road, N. Fk. Sun River" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT185). _____. nd-y. "Cultural Site Record. Thurber (Sanborn) Cabin #267" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT492). 717 _____. nd-z. “Cultural Site Records. Two Medicine Trail #101” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 23PN120). _____. nd-aa. "Cultural Site Record. Wrong Creek Multicomponent Site" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT560). _____. nd-bb. "Forest Service Region One Administrative Facilities Inventory Addendum Sheet for Augusta Information Station and Work Center" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC110). _____. nd-cc. "Linear Cultural Site Record, Blacktail Trail #223" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT495). _____. nd-dd. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Deer Creek Trail #276” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2158). _____. nd-ee. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Dog Gun Trail #180” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1207). _____. nd-ff. “Linear Cultural Site Record. East Side Sun Trail #109” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT558). _____. nd-gg. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Goat Creek Trail #249” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1807). _____. nd-hh. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Green Fork Connector Trail #279” (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1965). _____. nd-ii. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Larch Hill Historic Route” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1802). _____. nd-jj “Linear Cultural Site Record. Monroe Creek Trail #188” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT557). _____. nd-kk. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Moose Creek Trail #131” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1805). _____. nd-ll. "Linear Cultural Site Record, Moose Furman Trail #261" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2160). 718 _____. nd-mm. "Linear Cultural Site Record, Mortimer Gulch Trail #252" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT569). _____. nd-nn. "Linear Cultural Site Record, North Fork Red Shale Trail #130" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1806). _____. nd-oo. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Prairie Creek Trail #262” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1808). _____. nd-pp. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Ray Creek Trail # 164” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT559). _____. nd-qq. "Linear Cultural Site Record. Rock Creek Trail #111" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1801). _____. nd-rr. “Linear Cultural Site Record. South Fork Sun Low Water Trail #265” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2159). _____. nd-ss. "Linear Cultural Site Record, Straight Creek Trail #212" (LCNF- GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1963). _____. nd-tt. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Wrong Ridge Trail #187” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT605). _____. nd-uu. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Biggs Creek Packer Allotment #101” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-vv. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Birch Creek Packer Allotment #126” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-ww. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Blacktail-Dearborn Packer Allotment #202” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-xx. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Chicken Coulee C&H Allotment #119” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-yy. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Cow Creek C&H Allotment #103” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-zz. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Cunnif Basin C&H (Formerly East Fork Falls Creek C&H Packer Allotment)” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). 719 _____. nd-aaa. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Cyanide-Bailey C&H Allotment #204” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-bbb. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Deep Creek C&H Allotment #104” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-ccc. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Dupuyer Creek C&H Allotment #105” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-ddd.“Rocky Mountain R.D., Elk Creek C&H Allotment #206” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-eee. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Fairview-Benchmark Packer Allotment #207” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-fff.“Rocky Mountain R.D., Ford Basin C&H Allotment” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-ggg. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Ford Creek C&H Allotment” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-hhh. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Gates Park Packer Allotment #111” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-iii. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Halfmoon Packer Allotment #208” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-jjj. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Hannan Gulch Horse Pasture #223” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-kkk. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Heart Butte C&H Allotment #106” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-lll. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Home Gulch Packer Allotment #209” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-mmm. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Lime Gulch Packer Allotment #210” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). 720 _____. nd-nnn. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Little Badger S&G Allotment #112” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, S&G Allotments). _____. nd-ooo. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Lubec-Badger C&H Allotment #109” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-ppp. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Main Falls Creek C&H Allotment #211” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-qqq. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Middle Fork Teton River Packer Allotment #110” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-rrr. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Mortimer Gulch Packer Allotment #212” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-sss. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Salmond C&H Allotment #113” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-ttt. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Sawmill C&H Allotment #114” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-uuu. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Scoffin Creek C&H Allotment #115” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-vvv. “Rocky Mountain R.D., South Fork Teton Packer Allotment #107” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-www. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Smith Creek C&H Allotment #213” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-xxx “Rocky Mountain R.D., Steamboat Mountain C&H Allotment #203” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, C&H Allotments). _____. nd-yyy. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Sun Butte-Blacktail Allotment #210” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-zzz “Rocky Mountain R.D., Upper Dearborn Packer Allotment #216” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-aaaa. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Whitetail Packer Allotment #217” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). 721 _____. nd-bbbb. “Rocky Mountain R.D., Wrong Creek Packer Allotment #118” (LCNF-GF, Grazing, Commercial Allotments). _____. nd-cccc. “Seismic Roads, Old” (LCNF-C, Backroom Files). _____. 1909. “Recapitulation. Total Estimate of Timber in the Lewis and Clark National Forest by Watersheds and Classes” (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 170). _____. 1911a. "Fire Killed Timber, Lewis and Clark National Forest, Montana: South Fork of Two Medicine River, 80,000,000 feet" (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Region 1, Box 121). _____. 1911b. "Report on Proposed Administrative Site: Ear Mountain" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites, Ear Mountain Ranger Station). _____. 1912. The Lewis and Clark Lookout, 1/5. Choteau, MT: Lewis and Clark National Forest, Department of Agriculture (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1913a. "Description of Survey of The Badger Creek Ranger Station" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites). _____. 1913b. “Public Sentiment in District 1,” 18 November (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 9). _____. 1915a. “Intensive Land Classification, Sun River Project” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1915b. “Report on Intensive Land Classification Sun River Project, Lewis and Clark National Forest, District No. 1” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1916a. "Extensive Land Classification, Lewis & Clark National Forest” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1916b. "Preface Report, Land Classification, Lewis & Clark National Forest" (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1917a. “Report on Conditions Existing on the Winter Elk Range. Lewis and Clark National Forest” (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). 722 _____. 1917b. “Summary of Timber Cut and Administrative Costs” (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 121). _____. 1918a. “Lewis and Clark National Forest, Intensive Land Classification” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1918b. "Sun River Valley Market Study" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1920. “Supplement to the Intensive Land Classification Report, Sun River Project, Lewis and Clark National Forest, Montana” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1921. "Annual Game Report, Lewis & Clark National Forest" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1922. "Annual Game Report, Lewis & Clark National Forest, 1922" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1923. "Digest of Inspection Report, Grazing" (NARA-S, RG 95 USFS-Region 1 Division of Operations Inspection Folders, Box 10, LCNF 1908, 1920-1923). _____. 1924. "A Study of the Ford Creek Experimental Area on the Lewis and Clark National Forest, 1924" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1925a. "Elk Study - March, 1925" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1925b. "Memorandum on Movements of Stock on Ford Creek Range" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1926a "Game Report, Lewis & Clark National Forest for 5-Year Period Beginning January 1, 1926" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1926b. “Northern Pacific Cruise” (LCNF-GF, U-Adjustment). _____. 1927a "Annual Game Report, Lewis & Clark National Forest" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1927b. "Range Appraisal, Lewis & Clark, December 1927" (LCNF-GF, Grazing Files). _____. 1928a. "Elk Study, February and March, 1928," 17 April (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). 723 _____. 1928b. "G-Working Plans, Heart Butte Allotment, Lubec-Teton Ranger District" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1928c. "Hannan Gulch Ranger Station" (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928d. “Improvement Plan, Willow Creek Ranger Station” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1928e. "Lower Two Medicine Division, Deferred and Rotation Grazing Plan" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1928f. “Sun River Elk Study” (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). _____. 1929a. “Camp Ground Improvements Plan M-5” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1929b. "G-Working Plans. Allotment R, Straight Creek Division" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1929c. Map of Domestic Stock and Game, 31 December (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). _____. 1930a. "History of the Dearborn Fire" (NARA-S, RG 95 Lewis and Clark NF, Box 17). _____. 1930b. “Lewis & Clark National Forest, Sun River Ranger District” (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). _____. 1930c. "Range Management Plans - District No. 3. North Fork of Sun River Division Beginning Season of 1930" (LCNF-GF, Grazing). _____. 1930d. "Report Loss of Tourist Trade as Consequence of Forest Fires," 11 November (FHS, US Forest Service Newspaper Clipping File, Box 10). _____. 1931. "Lewis & Clark Forest, Unit Plan Map, Falls Cr. C&H Division," (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1932a. "Grazing Work Plan. Teton C&H Division" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1932b. "Lewis and Clark National Forest, O-Fire-Cooperation" (NARA-S, RG 95 Lewis and Clark NF, Box 17). 724 _____. 1933. "Fish and Game, Lewis and Clark Sun River Elk Study" (LCNF-GF, Wildlife/Historic Range Files). _____. 1934a. "Fish and Game, Lewis and Clark Sun River Elk Study" (LCNF-GF, Wildlife/Historic Range Files). _____. 1934b. "Management Plan 1934, Lower Falls Creek," (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1934c. "Working Plan for Sun River Elk Study, Lewis and Clark Forest, 1934 to 1938," 15 October (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935a. "G-Working Plans, District No. II. Division A. Blacktail S&G" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935b. "G-Working Plans. District No. II. Division I. Sun River C&H" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935c. "G-Working Plans. District No. II. Division II. Willow Creek C&H" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935d. "G-Working Plans. District No. II. Division III. Smith Creek C&H" 16 January (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935e. “Grazing Management Plans. Lubec Ranger District. Lower Two Medicine Division” (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1935f. "Lewis and Clark National Forest Recreation Plan: Wood Creek - Ford Creek," 19 April (LCNF-GF, Recreation). _____. 1936a. "Fish and Game, Lewis and Clark Sun River Elk Study" (LCNF-GF, Wildlife/Historic Range Files). _____. 1936b. "Rocky Mountain Division-Winter Game Study, Sun River-Dearborn Study Units" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1937a. “Fire Plan, Lewis & Clark National Forest” (LCNF-C, Miscellaneous Files). _____. 1937b. Map of Sun River District Grazing (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). 725 _____. 1937c. "Map of U.S. Forest Service Horse Pasture at Willow Creek Ranger Station, Lewis and Clark Nat. For.," 30 October (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1937d. "Summary of Stocking of Rocky Mountain Division of Lewis & Clark National Forest From 1910 thru 1937," 5 May (LCNF-GF, Wildlife). _____. 1938a. "Fire Plan Organization Chart, Lewis & Clark National Forest, Teton Ranger District," (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1938a. "Lubec R/ Station Map" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites, Improvement Binder) _____. 1938b. "Plan of Fire Prevention Action, Teton District No. 1," 14 April (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1938c. "Telephone Map, Lewis & Clark National Forest (LCNF-GF, Communications, Improvement Binder). _____. 1938d. "Trail Plan Map, Teton Dist. No. 1" (LCNF-GF, Roads and Trails, Improvement Binder). _____. 1939. "Fish and Game, Lewis and Clark Sun River Elk Study" (LCNF-GF, Wildlife/Historic Range Files). _____. 1940. “Report of the Year, 1940” (LCNF-C, Miscellaneous Files). _____. 1941a. "Choteau-Teton Telephone Line, Lewis & Clark Natl. Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95, Lewis and Clark NF, Box 11). _____. 1941b. "Objective Management Plan: Sun River Management Unit" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1941c. "Objective Management Plan: Willow Creek Management Unit" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1945a. “Fire Equipment Plan, Sun River Ranger District, 1945” (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1945b. “Fire Equipment Plan, Teton Ranger District, 1945” (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). 726 _____. 1947. "Special Rules" (NARA-S, RG 95 Lewis and Clark National Forest, Box 14). _____. 1948a. "Abstracts from Letters of Instruction for Flood Control Survey Which Indicated the Guides or Standards Followed" (LCNF-GF, Watershed). _____. 1948b. “Fire Control Organization Placement Summary” _____. 1948c. "Status of plans for Management of National Forest Timber, Dearborn Working Circle," 6 December (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 155). _____. 1948d. "Status of plans for Management of National Forest Timber, Marias Working Circle," 23 December (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 155). _____. 1948e. "Status of plans for Management of National Forest Timber, Sun River Working Circle," 30 December (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 155). _____. 1948f. "Status of plans for Management of National Forest Timber, Teton Working Circle," 28 December (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 155). _____. 1948g. "Trails Maintenance Atlas" (LCNF- GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1952a. Memorandum, Tract Discussions, 2 July (LCNF-GF). _____. 1952b. "Teton Ranger District," 10 December (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness Primitive Area, Box 3). _____. 1953. "Lewis and Clark National Forest Advisory Board" (NARA-S, RG 95, Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 19). _____. 1954a "Annual Report to Stockholders, Lewis and Clark National Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1954b. "Sun River District," 15 March (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness Primitive Area, Box 3). _____. 1955. "Annual Report to Stockholders, Lewis and Clark National Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1956. "South Fork Sun River - Straight Creek - Patrick Basin" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). 727 _____. 1957a. "Report to Stockholders, Lewis and Clark National Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1957b. “Special Use Permit: Intermountain Microwave,” 17 September (LCNF-C, Special Use Permits). _____. 1957c. "Tentative Sales Program for F.Y. 1958 & 1959" (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 120). _____. 1958a. "Committee Control Record: Lewis & Clark National Forest Grazing Advisory Board," 3 May (NARA-S, RG 95, Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 19). _____. 1958b. "Report to Stockholders, Lewis and Clark National Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1959. "Information, Lewis and Clark National Forest, Northern Region" (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 73). _____. 1960. “Timber Management Plan, Four Rivers Working Circle, Lewis and Clark National Forest, Montana, Region 1 (FHS, Subject Files, Lewis and Clark National Forest, Montana). _____. 1961. "Wood Lake Camp" (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1962a. "Land Use Plan For Commercial Packer Operations in The Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, 26 September (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness Primitive Area, Box 9). _____. 1962b. “Lewis & Clark National Forest, Teton District: Old Seismic Roads” (LCNF-C). _____. 1962c. "Teton District Multiple Use Plan" 19 July, (LCNF-C). _____. 1964a. “1964 Flood Repair Planning and Progress Report” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1964b. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Adm. site roads damaged flood area” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). 728 _____. 1964c. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: All Campground roads in damage area” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964d. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Beaver Creek - Willow Creek” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964e. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Benchmark” 17 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964f. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Benchmark Airstrip” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964g. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Benchmark Pack” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964h. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Gates Park Airstrip” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964i. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Gates Park Pack” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964j. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: North Fork Teton River” 17 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964k. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Pretty Prairie Airstrip” 17 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964l. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: S. Fk. Teton River” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964m. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: Sun River” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964n. “Cost Estimate For Transportation System Facilities: West Fork Pack” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964o. “Flood Damage. F.Y. 1964” (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964p. “Flood Damage. F.Y. 1964, Lewis and Clark National Forest” 22 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). 729 _____. 1964q. “Flood Report - 1964. Transportation Facilities - Airstrips" (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964r. “Flood Report - 1964. Transportation Facilities - Roads and Road Bridge" (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964s. “Flood Report - 1964. Transportation Facilities – Trails and Trail Bridges" (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964t. “Project Work Plan, 9 Miles of Channel Rehabilitation and/or Bank Stabilization” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964u "Project Work Plan, Additional radios needed” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964v. “Project Work Plan, Channel clearing of 110 miles of stream along roads” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964w. “Project Work Plan, Construct new telephone line from Gates Park to Seven Lazy P Ranch” 15 July (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964x. “Project Work Plan, Debris Jam Removal above Reservoir Storage Areas” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964y. “Project Work Plan, Fishery Resource Rehabilitation Planning” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964z. “Project Work Plan, Home Gulch Boat Landing” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964aa. “Project Work Plan, Mortimer Site NFRS #6” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964bb. “Project Work Plan, Lower Mortimer Site NFRS #29” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964cc “Project Work Plan, Planning watershed restoration work on both districts” 18 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964dd. “Project Work Plan, Repair of Flood Damaged Trails on D-1 (Choteau District) of Lewis & Clark National Forest” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). 730 _____. 1964ee. “Project Work Plan, Repair of Flood Damaged Trails on D-2 (Augusta District) of Lewis & Clark National Forest” 20 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964ff. “Project Work Plan, Repair of damage to South Fork of Sun River end of road facility” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964gg. “Project Work Plan, Straight Creek packer camp” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964hh “Project Work Plan, Wind Mountain Camp 7” 1 July (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964ii. “Project Work Plan, Wind Mountain Camp Road” 19 June (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964jj. “Project Work Plan, Wood Lake” 2 July (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1964kk. “Road and Trail Reconstruction Map” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1964ll. "Soil and Water Control Projects" (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1965a. “Lewis & Clark D1, National Forest Development Transportation Plan," 30 June (LCNF-GF, Roads and Trails). _____. 1965b. "Standard Specifications for Installation of Recreation Facilities," (LCNF- GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1965c. “Stream Rehabilitation Plans and Accomplishments, Sun River District, Teton District, Lewis and Clark National Forest” (LCNF-GF, Heritage Office). _____. 1965d. “Summary of Transect Cluster and Current Range Condition and Trend Rating: Cluster Number 15, Deep Creek C&H,” 28 July (LCNF-C). _____. 1966a. "Castle Reef Dam Study: Proposed Reservoir Area" (LCNF-C). _____. 1966b. “Lewis & Clark National Forest (Rocky Mountain Division): Sun River Ranger District,” 5 December (LCNF-C). _____. 1966c. “Teton Ranger District, Multiple Use Management Plan” (LCNF-C). 731 _____. 1967a. "Benchmark Airfield Dedication" 23 July (NARA-S, RG 95, Historical Collection, Box 76). _____. 1967b. “Salmond C&H Allotment Range Management Plan” (LCNF-C). _____. 1968a. “Middle Fork Teton Packer Allotment Management Plan” (LCNF-C). _____. 1968b. "Project Work Plan: Construction of a self-guided, interpretive trail at Cave Mountain Campground," 7 October (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1969. Gates Park Improvements (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC936). _____. 1970. "Final Construction Report, Mortimer Gulch Campground, Water System," 26 May (LCNF-GF, 2330 Campgrounds). _____. 1971. “Scoffin Creek C&H Allotment” (LCNF-C). _____. 1973. “Lewis and Clark National Forest, Multiple Use Management Plan” (LCNF-C). _____. 1977. “Sun Butte Allotment” (LCNF-C). _____. 1979a. Gibson Lake Boat Ramp & Parking Lot Traffic Analysis & Benefit Cost Study (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1979b. Staff Paper: Construction of Boat Launch Facilities at Gibson Reservoir (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1980a. “Camping and Picnicking” (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1980b. “Cultural Site Record. Charmichael Cabin” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC430). _____. 1980c. "Elk Creek C&H" (LCNF-C). _____. 1980d. “Hiking: Lewis & Clark National Forest, Rocky Mountain Ranger District” (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1981a. "Project Proposal: To use the Environmental Analysis (EA) Process To reexamine and revise the Allotment Management Plan for the Dupuyer Creek C&H Allotment" (LCNF-C). 732 _____. 1981b. "Project Proposal: To use the Environmental Analysis (EA) Process To reexamine and revise the Allotment Management Plan for the Heart Butte Allotment" (LCNF-C). _____. 1981c. "Project Proposal: To use the Environmental Analysis (EA) Process To reexamine and revise the Allotment Management Plan for the Sawmill C&H Allotment" (LCNF-C). _____. 1981d. Recreation Site Preseason Safety Inspection, Elko Camp, 21 May (LCNF-GF, 2330 Campgrounds). _____. 1982a. “Green Gulch Timber Sale,” 3 November (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1982b. "Inactive Mine Sites" (LCNF-C). _____. 1982c. "Plans for Proposed Forest Development Project: Green Gulch Sale. Green Gulch Road No. 3307, Green Gulch West Road No. 3308" 14 June (LCNF-C). _____. 1982d. "Status Report, Lewis and Clark National Forest" (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 76). _____. 1983a. "Lewis & Clark National Forest: Timber Compartments" (LCNF-C). _____. 1983b. "Use Agreement between Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture and Burlington Northern Inc" February (LCNF-GF, 2330- Campgrounds). _____. 1984a. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan. Great Falls, MT: USDA Forest Service (MSU). _____. 1984b. Draft Environmental Impact Statement Supplement, Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan. Great Falls, MT: USDA Forest Service (MSU). _____. 1984c. “Fire Management Action Plan, Lewis and Clark National Forest” (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1985. "Lewis and Clark, Oil Leases" (LCNF-C). 733 _____. 1986a. “Lewis and Clark National Forest: BMU Boundaries,” 5 December (LCNF-C). _____. 1986b. Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan. Great Falls, MT: USDA Forest Service (MSU). _____. 1986c. Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Record of Decision. Great Falls, MT: USDA Forest Service (LCNF-C). _____. 1987a. "Benchmark Road No. 235" (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1987b. “Cultural Site Record, North Fork Waldron Site” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT11). _____. 1987c. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 1987” (MSU). _____. 1988a. Chronology, Gates Park Prescribed Fire, July 10 to October 30, 1988, Bob Marshall Wilderness. Great Falls, MT: USDA Lewis and Clark National Forest. _____. 1988b. "Cultural Site Record, Lower North Fork Badger Creek Cabins" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24PN123). _____. 1988c. Press Release, “National Forest Recreation Strategy Announced,” 16 February (FHS, F15.1). _____. 1988d. Press Release R1:2134, “More Than 700 Miles of National Recreation Trails in Northern Region National Forests,” 9 August (FHS, F15.1). _____. 1988e. Press Release R1:2144, “950 Kilometers of Marked Ski Touring Trails, 3,400 Miles of Snowmobiling Trails in Northern Region’s National Forests,” 23 November (FHS, F15.1). _____. 1988f. Up Front: News from the Rocky Mountain Front (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1989. “Forest Plan Amendment Number 3, Lewis and Clark National Forest,” April (LCNF-GF). 734 _____. 1990a. “Cultural Site Record. Badger Cabin” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24PN13). _____. 1990b. "Cultural Site Record. Welcome Creek Guard Station" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records). _____. 1990c. Northern Continental Divide Grizzly Bear Ecosystem: Bear Management Units (BMUs). Missoula, MT: USDA R1 (LCNF-C). _____. 1990d. “Summary: Final Environmental Impact Statement for Exploratory Oil and Gas Wells - Proposed Oil and Gas Drilling near Badger Creek and Hall Creek,” October (LCNF-C). _____. 1991. Five Year Review, 1987-1991: Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan. Great Falls, MT: USDA Forest Service (MSU). _____. 1992a. "Cultural Site Record. Blacktail Trail #207" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC548). _____. 1992b. "Cultural Site Record. Mt. Wright Lookout." (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT255). _____. 1992c. “Cultural Site Record. North Fork Sun River Trail #201" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT228). _____. 1992d. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 1992” (MSU). _____. 1993a. "Cultural Site Record. Forest Development Trail #224 Prairie Reef Lookout Trail" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1134). _____. 1993b. "Cultural Site Record. Forest Development Trail #203 West Fork of Sun River Trail" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1132). _____. 1993c. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 1993” (MSU). _____. 1994a. “Cultural Site Record. Lange Creek Trail #243” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1227). 735 _____. 1994b. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Oil and Gas Leasing EIS: Request for Public Comments,” February (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 76). _____. 1995a. “Cultural Site Record. Open Fork Trail #116” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT561). _____. 1995b. “Cultural Site Record. Phillips Creek-Canyon Creek Trail #150” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT269). _____. 1996. "Cultural Site Record. Petty Ford Creek Trail #224" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1288). _____. 1997a. "Cultural Site Record. Fitzgerald Recreation Cabin" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1319). _____. 1997b. "Cultural Site Record. Old Bear Top Lookout Cabin Remains." (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC488) _____. 1998a. "Cultural Site Record. Dupuyer Sawmill" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT277). _____. 1998b. “Cultural Site Record. Green Fork Trail #228” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1511). _____. 1998c. "Cultural Site Record. Hyde Creek Trail #139" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1205). _____. 1998d. “Cultural Site Record. Moose Ridge Trail #194” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1523). _____. 1998e. "Cultural Site Record. North Fork Sun River Trail #110" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT279). _____. 1998f. "Mortimer Gulch Campground & Trailhead Rehab Project, 16 October (LCNF-GF, Camp and Trailhead). _____. 1998g. "Rocky Mountain Ranger District, Cap 1 List - Priority List, Trails Capital Investment Projects,” 16 October (LCNF-GF, Roads and Trails). _____. 1999a. "Cultural Site Record. Muddy Creek Sawmill" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT281). 736 _____. 1999b. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 1999” (LCNF-GF). _____. 2000a. “Cultural Site Record. Calf Mountain Trail #137” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL993). _____. 2000b. Cultural Site Records. Rumford Recreation Cabin (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2009). _____. 2001a. Rocky Mountain Ranger District Grazing Allotments (LCNF-GF, 2210-Grazing). _____. 2001b. “Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan: Monitoring and Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 2000-2001” (LCNF-GF). _____. 2002a. “Cultural Site Record. Clary Coulee Trail #177” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 25TT274). _____. 2002b. "Cultural Site Record. Gates Park Guard Station" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC936). _____. 2002c. “Cultural Site Record. Sun Canyon Lodge” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1716). _____. 2002d. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Beartop Lookout Trail #129 (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT286). _____. 2002e. “Linear Cultural Site Record. North Fork Dupuyer Trail #124 (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT487). _____. 2002f. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Wall Trail #175 (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1803). _____. 2002g. "Linear Historic Cultural Site Record, West Fork Teton River Trail #114" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT490). _____. 2003a. “Cultural Site Record. North Wall Trail #174” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1525). 737 _____. 2003b. "Cultural Site Record. Old Bear Top Lookout Cabin Remains" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC488). _____. 2003c. "Cultural Site Record, South Fork Badger Creek Trail #104" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24PN136). _____. 2003d. "Preliminary Amended Cultural Site Record. Middle Home Gulch Recreation Neighborhood" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC0803). _____. 2004a. "Cultural Site Record. Mt Frazier-Chicken Coulee Trail #153" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT567). _____. 2004b. "Cultural Site Record. West Fork Teton Guard Station" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT566). _____. 2004c. “Cultural Site Record. Woods Creek Trail #140” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24GL1104). _____. 2004d. “Linear Cultural Site Record. Headquarters Creek Trail #165” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT493). _____. 2004e. “Site Monitoring Form, Green Fork Ranger Station” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC937). _____. 2005a. “Linear Historic Cultural Site Record. Cigarette Creek Trail #247” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1962). _____. 2005b. “Linear Historic Cultural Site Record. Elbow Pass Trail #248” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC1964). _____. 2005c. “Linear Historic Cultural Site Record. Whiterock Trail #102” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24PN0143). _____. 2005d. "Site Condition Monitoring/Site Form Amendment. Cabin Creek Guard Station" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT202). _____. 2006a. Historic Cultural Site Record. Manning Recreation Residence Cabin Site (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2009). _____. 2006b. "Inventory, Site Testing, and NRHP Evaluation for 24LC0154 - Sawmill Flats Multi-Component Site" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC154). 738 _____. 2008a. "Cultural Site Record. Two Shack's Flat Cabins" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT582). _____. 2008b. "Cultural Site Record. Washboard Reef Trail #117" (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT604). _____. 2009a. “Cultural Site Record. Crazy Creek-Bruce Creek Trail #152” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT601). _____. 2009b. “Cultural Site Record. Nesbit-Olney Trail #157” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT603). _____. 2009c. “Cultural Site Record. Mount Wright Trail #160” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24TT602). _____. 2009d. “Linear Historic Cultural Site Record. Bighead Trail #242” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2157). _____. 2010. “Linear Historic Cultural Site Record. Crown Mountain Trail #270” (LCNF-GF, Historic Site Records, 24LC2172). _____. 2013. Environmental Assessment: Benchmark III Fuels Reduction. Choteau, MT: USDA Forest Service. USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station (PN). 1996. A Framework for Ecosystem Management in the Interior Columbia Basin and Portions of the Klamath and Great Basins. Portland, OR: USDA Forest Service. USDA Forest Service, Region 1 (USDA R1). 1930. Memorandum to Forest Supervisors, 15 July (LCNF-GF, U-Adjustment). _____. 1934. "General Construction Standards for Private Camps or Summer Homes Under National Forest Permit, Region One" (NARA-S, RG 95 Recreation and Land Use Subject Files, Box 10). _____. 1935a. Campground Improvement Guide, Region 1. Missoula MT: USFS _____. 1935b. “Portable Unit Building” (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1936a. "14' x 16' Ready Cut Cabin Plan" (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). 739 _____. 1936b. "Extent and Class Surveys" (NARA-S, RG 95 Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 5). _____. 1936c. "Information on the South Fork of the Flathead, Sun River and Pentagon Primitive Areas" (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 70). _____. 1936d. "Northern Region: Range and Wildlife Management" (NARA-S, Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 5). _____. 1936e. "Northern Region: Recreation and Lands" (NARA-S, Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 5). _____. 1936f. "Northern Region: Timber Management" (NARA-S, Alpha and Numeric Subject Files, Box 5). _____. 1936g. Press Release #675, 19 January (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936h. Press Release #679, 20 January (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936i. Press Release #723, 2 June (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936j. Press Release #731, 13 July (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936k. Press Release #748, 18 September (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936l. Press Release #757, 24 October (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936m. Press Release #764, 14 November (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1936n. “Primitive Areas on Flathead and Lewis and Clark National Forests” (LCNF-C). _____. 1937a. Press Release #770, 1 January (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1937b. Press Release #773, 14 January (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1937c. Press Release #792, 1 May (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1937d. Press Release #802, 14 July (UM-Mansfield). 740 _____. 1938. Press Release #852, 14 October (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1939a. "General Construction Standards for Summer Homes Under National Forest Permit, Region 1" (NARA-S, Timber Sales, Box 141). _____. 1939b. "Item #1-Residence, 1 1/2 Story" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites). _____. 1939c. "Stream and Lake Survey and Fish Distribution Plan: Lewis & Clark National Forest, Montana," 8 February (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1940a. A Forest Economy for the Nation as Related to the Northern Rocky Mountain Territory. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1940b. "Bob Marshall Wilderness Area," 10 August (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness Primitive Area, Box 3). _____. 1940c. "Construction Plan, Augusta Ranger Station, Lewis and Clark National Forest, 15 April (LCNF-GF,Blueprints). _____. 1940d. Fireman’s Guide, Region 1. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1940e. "Grazing Statistics - Region 1, 1940" (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1940f. Press Release #874, 1 February (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1940g. Press Release #881, 4 May (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1940h. Press Release #887, 26 July (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1940i. "U-1 Classification Map, Bob Marshall Wilderness," 18 December (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness Primitive Area, Box 5). _____. 1941. Press Release #897, 13 March (UM-Mansfiesd). _____. 1942a. "Cumulative Grazing Statistics, National Forests of Montana, 1919 to 1941 and Cumulative Big Game Estimates National Forests of Montana, 1909 to 1941," (LCNF-GF, Historic Range Files). _____. 1942b. Press Release #905, 7 March (UM-Mansfield). 741 _____. 1942c. "Recreation Improvement Planning, Allen Resort Special Use," 3 June (LCNF-GF, Recreation). _____. 1943. Press Release #919, 25 August (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1944a. "Teton River Bridge near Ear Mountain Ranger Station," (LCNF-GF, Blueprints). _____. 1944b. Press Release #942, 8 December (UM-Mansfield) _____. 1946a. Press Release #962, 27 February (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1946b. Press Release #965, 4 April (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1948. Press Release #1015, 5 February (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1949a. Press Release #1047, 31 October (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1949b. Public Camp and Picnic Grounds of the Northern Region. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region _____. 1949c. “Radio Schedule 3385 KC” (LCNF-GF, Fire Management). _____. 1952a. Press Release #1096, 24 April (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1952b. Press Release #1097, 26 April (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1952c. "Pulpwood Sales Review, Gallatin & Lewis and Clark National Forests" (LCNF-GF, Timber. _____. 1955. Press Release #1176, 23 April (UM-Mansfield). _____. 1957a. "Augusta Ranger Sta., Lewis & Clark National Forest, Plot Plan" (LCNF- GF, Blueprints). _____. 1957b "Choteau Ranger Station Plot Plan," 23 January (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites, Choteau). _____. 1958a. Campgrounds and Picnic Areas in the Northern Region. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region 742 _____. 1958b. Full Use and Development of Timber Resources of Montana. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service (FHS, Subject Files, Lewis and Clark National Forests, Montana). _____. 1958c. "Recreation Planning, Lewis & Clark National Frst. Home Gulch Camp," 18 August (LCNF-GF, Recreation). _____. 1962a. "Plans for Proposed Gates Park Airfield #1151" (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1962b. "Summit Camp Development Plan" (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1963. "South Fork Sun River Camp" (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1965a. "Index Map for Bob Marshall Wilderness," 1 July (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness, Primitive Areas, Box 5). _____. 1965b. "Final Construction Report, Forest Airfield, Gates Park Airfield No. 1151," 12 October (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1965c. "Plans for Proposed Forest Development Road: Benchmark Road Project No. 235.1 & .2," 4 May (LCNF-GF, Road Development Maps). _____. 1965d. "Plans for Proposed Forest Development Road: Sun River Road No 108" (LCNF-GF, Road Development Maps). _____. 1965e. “Recreation Planning: Lewis & Clark National Forest, Benchmark Horse Camp” 21 January (LCNF-GF, Pack Camps and Corrals). _____. 1965f. “Recreation Planning: Lewis & Clark National Forest, Mortimer Gulch Camp” 25 January (LCNF-GF, 2330-Campgrounds). _____. 1966a. "Annual Goals For R-1 Planting Programs, K-V and P&M Functions," July (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Files, Box 31). _____. 1966b. "Division of Timber Management in R-1" (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Files, Box 31). _____. 1966c. "Final Construction Report, Forest Development Trails, Blackleaf Creek Trail No. 106, North Fork Teton Trail No. 107.1, Crazy Creek-Bruce Creek Trail No. 152.1 & .2, Lewis & Clark National Forest, Teton County, Montana," 28 January (LCNF-GF, Project Files). 743 _____. 1966d. Multiple Use in Action: 1966 in Review. Missoula: USDA Northern Region (NARA-S, RG 95 Alpha and Numeric Files, Box 19). ______. 1966e. "Timber Sale Program F.Y. 1962-65," 23 February (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Files, Box 31). _____. 1967a. "Final Construction Report: Forest Development Roads Benchmark Road No. 235.1 and .2, Straight Creek Campground Road No. 9230, Benchmark Campground Road No. 9229, Lewis & Clark National Forest," 17 May (LCNF-GF, Project Files). _____. 1967b. "Fly In Campground," 23 June (LCNF-GF, 2330 Campground Files). _____. 1967c. “Multiple Use Management Guide for the Northern Region” (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1968. Preliminary Report, Sun River Project, Montana. Proposed Castle Reef Dam and Reservoir, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (LCNF-C). _____. 1970a. “Fire Management Study for the White Cap Area of the Selway-Bitteroot Wilderness" (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness and Primitive Areas, Box 2). _____. 1970b. Management Practices, Bitterroot National Forest: A Task Force Appraisal, May 1969-April 1970. Missoula: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region (FHS). _____. 1971. USDA Forest Service Environmental Statement. A Proposal - Scapegoat Wilderness. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region. _____. 1972. Management Direction for Northern Region. Missoula: USDA Forest Service, Region One (MSU). _____. 1973. Press Release R1-25, “Northern Region Reorganization,” 19 January (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 2). _____. 1975. “Northern Region News” (R1HQ) _____. 1977a. A Proposal: Great Bear Wilderness, Flathead and Lewis & Clark National Forests Montana. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region. 744 _____. 1977b. “Rocky Mountain Front Planning Unit Land Management Plan. Part III: Appendix” (LCNF-C). _____. 1978. “Rocky Mountain Front Land Management Plan: A Summary of Recommended Land Management Plan and Draft Environmental Statement for the Rocky Mountain Front Planning Unit,” 19 January (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 76). _____. 1979. "An Addition to the Bob Marshall Wilderness," 13 November (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness and Primitive Areas, Box 1). _____. 1980a. A Summary of the Proposed Northern Region Plan. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region (MSU). _____. 1980b. History of Smokejumping. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1980c. The Proposed Northern Region Plan. Missoula MT: USDA Forest Service, Northern Region (MSU). _____. 1983a. Northern Region News (NARA-S, RG 95 Historical Collection, Box 69). _____. 1983b. "Rehabilitation-Ear Mountain Guard Station" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites). _____. 1983c. "Residence Addition" (LCNF-GF, Administrative Sites). _____. 1986. “R-1 Ecosystem Data Handbook” (LCNF-C, Historical Files). _____. 1988. Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex: Outfitter Camps, December (LCNF-GF, 2320 Wilderness and Primitive Areas, Box 9). _____. 1990. “Northern Continental Divide, Grizzly Bear Ecosystem, Bear Management Units (BMUs),” 11 September (LCNF-C). _____. 2000. “Record of Decision: Rocky Mountain Front Mineral Withdrawal,” 25 September (R1HQ). _____. 2010. When the Mountains Roared: Stories of the 1910 Fires. Missoula: United States Department of Agriculture. 745 USDA Northern Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station. 1944. "Lumber Production for the Northern Rocky Mountain Region During 1943," 8 December (NARA-S, RG 95 Timber Sales, Box 183). USDA Office of Experiment Stations. 1892. Experiment Station Record, vol. 3: August, 1891-July 1892. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. USDA Office of Information. 1918. "National Forests Furnish Seven Million Dollars Worth of Recreation (FHS, US Forest Service Newspaper Clipping File, Box 33). USDA Press Service. 1921. "Careless Tourists Start Destructive Forest Fires" (FHS, US Forest Service Newspaper Clipping File, Box 10). _____. 1924. “Experiments That Last a Lifetime Common in Idaho Forest Study,” 8 August (FHS, US Forest Service Newspaper Clipping File, Box 30). USDA Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station (RM). 1994. An Ecological Basis for Ecosystem Management, RM-246. Fort Collins, CO: USDA Forest Service. _____. 1997. Decision Support Systems for Ecosystem Management: an Evaluation of Existing Systems, RM-GTR-296. 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Fishing & Hunting News, Missoula, MT Great Falls Tribune, Great Falls, MT. Helena Independent (Record), Helena, MT. Helena Weekly Herald, Helena, MT. Hungry Horse News, Columbia Falls, MT. Inter Lake, Kalispell, MT. Meagher County News, White Sulphur Springs, MT. Missoula Sentinel, Missoula, MT. Montana Post, Virginia City, MT. New York Times, New York, NY. Sun River Sun, Sun River, MT. Spokesman Review, Spokane, WA Washington Post, Washington D.C. 758 APPENDICES 759 APPENDIX A HGIS METHODOLOGY AND DATA BASE SCHEMA 760 This research employed multiple database relationship schema to manage temporal-spatial data. The following appendix will 1) describe the database relationship schema directly employed in HGIS data management; 2) provide a logical database schema identifying cardinality; and 3) describe how this data management model was related to other non-tabular data. In doing so, this research provides a framework for managing HGIS data in a way that preserves the integrity of the data and allows for spatial and temporal data to be connected to other data management schema that does not characteristically fit within GIS. A common problem in HGIS data management concerns how to deal with dynamic attributes of a point, line, or polygon over time. To display how points, lines, and polygons in my database changed over time, I employed multiple database relationship schema. In doing so I was able to relate points, lines, and polygon databases to relationship tables that described the current use status of the spatial phenomena. The benefits of this approach were many: 1) it kept my databases “clean” - meaning that there were no redundancies, 2) it allowed me to query my database at multiple timeframes throughout my analysis, and 3) it is editable and can be added to in the future. Spatial point, line, and polygon data were recorded in one of three large databases. Point data represented features that could easily be symbolized by point features in a GIS including administrative sites, lookout towers, and campgrounds. Spatial data was stored in the POINT DATA field. The NAME field existed as a text attribute that was of my own making. When making a map with point features was 761 necessitated, I selected points from the point database and created a new data layer. To this layer I added a new field called REL. The REL field served as the key field in a many-to-one relationship with a point-based relationship table. The relationship table contained feature attribute information that described the function of that point at that time. Linear data, largely consisting of road and trail data, shifted over time as Forest Service personnel added to, decommissioned, or altered linear features. I utilized a similar database model coupled with a dynamic segmentation process to edit linear data. Dynamic segmentation allowed me to create measurable routes along each linear feature and create layers that represented the extent of linear features at many time intervals. The literature suggested that I could simply split the lines into new linear features to accomplish this task. But by using dynamic segmentation, I was able to avoid redundancies and kept my database “clean” and usable. I followed a similar relationship schema as with the point database. When I created a new layer, I edited the layer to include a REL field and utilized a many-to-one relationship with a linear relationship table that contained generalized feature attribute information. Using a similar process for the polygon database was problematic. Polygons often represented boundaries in my study and dynamic segmentation would not work. Therefore, I decided to include a REL field in the initial polygon database. Each polygon was digitized separately and related through the REL field to a polygon relationship table that contained feature attributes. As a result, this database was quite large. The literature 762 suggests that there is a methodology to deal with this using older versions of ARC INFO, but no such versions of the program could be obtained. What follows is a representative database schema for my point, line, and polygon databases that identifies the cardinality and relationship. FID POINT DATA NAME 6 PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 7 PT_0002 BADGER CREEK CABIN 34 PT_0003 AUGUSTA ADMIN SITE ONE TO ONE RELATIONSHIP FID POINT DATA NAME REL 6 PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 7 PT_0002 BADGER CREEK CABIN 13 34 PT_0003 AUGUSTA ADMIN SITE 4 MANY TO ONE REL POINT FEATURES DESCRIPTION 2 USFS RO HQ for region; manages many forests 3 USFS SO HQ for forest; manages entire forest 4 USFS DO HQ for ranger district; manages several stations 763 APPENDIX B LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST ADMINISTRATIVE SITES AND FIRE CONTROL POINTS, 1905-1910 764 POINT NAME REL PT_0006 BLACKLEAF ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0012 HANNAN GULCH ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0017 WILLOW CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0049 PRETTY PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0061 NORTH FORK DUPUYER ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0065 PALMERS FLAT ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0071 BEAVER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0072 BIRCH CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0074 ELK CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0075 MEDICINE CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0076 TETON ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0077 PIEGAN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0078 PAMBRUN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0079 GOAT BLUFF ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0080 FORD CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0081 FALSE SUMMIT_UPLANDS ADMIN SITE 5 765 APPENDIX C LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS, 1912 766 EventName REL LENGTH 1912_0002 1 5.694330389 1912_0002 1 2.040890174 1912_0002 1 0.32557362 1912_0002 1 18.0039977 1912_0002 1 5.283744387 1912_0005 1 7.366367819 1912_0009 1 5.70615076 1912_0009 1 0.166171713 1912_0011 1 6.518133488 1912_0011 1 1.590454715 1912_0020 1 13.12034256 1912_0020 1 3.478464901 1912_0034 1 1.652657655 1912_0034 1 2.791374815 1912_0039 1 0.602455628 1912_0039 1 9.945233755 1912_0039 1 0.40121657 1912_0039 1 0.147365961 1912_0047 1 5.76289261 1912_0053 2 12.21069995 1912_0056 1 4.456530522 1912_0059 2 3.296529548 1912_0061 1 2.992195675 1912_0067 2 0.264829026 1912_0067 2 3.285986324 1912_0072 1 6.839623677 1912_0072 1 13.87438382 1912_0072 1 0.7432047 767 EventName REL LENGTH 1912_0075 1 13.90039088 1912_0076 2 11.52299882 1912_0077 2 14.61285366 1912_0081 2 10.22395556 1912_0081A 1 9.44350557 1912_0082 2 9.842786025 1912_0082 2 5.075627643 1912_0082 2 5.619272488 1912_0087 1 19.64622488 1912_0089 1 6.873962527 1912_0092 2 4.740816674 1912_0093 1 2.62460654 1912_0093A 2 4.636011989 1912_0095 1 6.67704021 1912_0106 1 1.130518995 1912_0106 1 3.521558038 1912_0110 1 1.685535171 1912_0110 1 1.444020559 1912_0110A 2 1.240303149 1912_0114 1 11.31933606 1912_0114 1 0.016133871 1912_0114 1 0.375681235 1912_0114 1 8.98861649 1912_0114 1 2.556029731 1912_0114 1 2.556029731 1912_0119 2 1.984612138 1912_0119 2 0.644181521 1912_0144 1 2.008969825 768 EventName REL LENGTH 1912_0144 1 4.562220579 1912_0144 1 0.455529417 1912_0178 3 14.671571 1912_0187 2 4.124848005 1912_0187 2 0.994748667 1912_0187 2 0.629586377 1912_0206 2 1.990244882 1912_0206 2 9.33474418 1912_0216 2 0.877365048 1912_0224 1 1.989568307 1912_0225 1 0.04111605 1912_0225 1 1.601600047 1912_0225 1 6.925996864 1912_0225 1 0.831384293 1912_0225 1 2.131528212 1912_0231 1 5.070472744 1912_0236 1 1.875245746 1912_0247 1 13.87738752 1912_0247 1 0.294088109 1912_0247 1 5.329647671 1912_0247 1 1.713648524 1912_0250 1 4.677258995 1912_0252 1 1.787495901 1912_0252 1 1.056180407 1912_9001 2 6.572976792 769 APPENDIX D LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST ADMINISTRATIVE SITES AND FIRE CONTROL POINTS, 1929 770 POINT NAME REL PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0004 BEARTOP LOOKOUT 10 PT_0005 BENCHMARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0006 BLACKLEAF ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0008 CHOTEAU ADMIN SITE 3 PT_0010 EAR MOUNTAIN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0011 GATES PARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0012 HANNAN GULCH ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0013 MT WRIGHT LOOKOUT 9 PT_0016 WEST FORK TETON ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0017 WILLOW CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0018 WRONG CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0018 WRONG CREEK ADMIN SITE 12 PT_0046 STEAMBOAT LOOKOUT 11 PT_0049 PRETTY PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0057 INDIAN POINT ADMIN SITE 12 PT_0060 WRONG RIDGE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0069 HEART BUTTE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0073 LAKESIDE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0074 ELK CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0081 FALSE SUMMIT_UPLANDS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0098 PATROL CREEK LOOKOUT 10 PT_0132 MOUNT BALDY ELECTRONIC SITE 9 PT_0140 HALF DOME CRAG ELECTRONIC SITE 10 PT_0355 LARCH HILL LOOKOUT 10 PT_0359 SCAPEGOAT MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0360 CAMP WELLMAN 12 771 POINT NAME REL PT_0361 BM 8580_WHITETAIL CREEK 9 PT_0362 BM 8215_OBSERVATION POINT 9 PT_0363 BM 8250_CIGARETTE CREEK 9 PT_0364 BM 8677_SUGARLOAF MT 9 PT_0365 BM 5120_WILLOW CREEK 9 PT_0366 BM 7475_LIME RIDGE 9 PT_0367 BM 8094_GREEN TIMBER CREEK 9 PT_0368 BM 8214_BLACKROCK CREEK 9 PT_0370 CAMP TODD 12 PT_0371 BM 8355_TWIN PEAKS 9 PT_0372 BM 8135_DEER CREEK 9 PT_0373 BM 8086_ELLIS CREEK 9 PT_0374 BM 8105_PEARL BASIN 9 PT_0375 BM 6060_GIBSON 9 PT_0379 BM 6968_GOAT CREEK_SUN 9 PT_0380 CAMP ALLAN 12 PT_0381 BM 8030_ SHEEP MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0382 BM 5680_MEDICINE SPRINGS 9 PT_0383 SLATEGOAT_WHITERIDGE 11 PT_0384 BM 8100_SALT MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0385 CLIFF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0386 BM 8535_ BLACKTAIL GULCH 9 PT_0387 BM 8285_DEEP CREEK 9 PT_0388 BM 5720_BRIDGE CREEK 9 PT_0389 ROCKY MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0390 BM 8108_ROUTE CREEK 9 PT_0391 BM 8385_CHOTEAU MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0392 BM 7235_MIDDLE FORK TETON 1 9 772 POINT NAME REL PT_0393 BM 7835_MIDDLE FORK TETON 2 9 PT_0394 BM 8210_WRANGLE CREEK 9 PT_0395 BM 8065_MOONLIGHT PEAK 9 PT_0396 BM 8327_MOUNT FRAZIER 9 PT_0397 BM 7585_SOUTH FORK MUDDY 9 PT_0398 BM 8450_BOWL CREEK 9 PT_0399 BM 8625_MOUNT PATRICK GASS 9 PT_0400 BM 8199_BIG HORN MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0401 BM 7810_WALLING REEF 9 PT_0402 BM 8237_OLD MAN OF THE HILLS 9 PT_0406 BM 7316_KILLEM HORSE CREEK 9 PT_0407 BM 8095_FAMILY PEAK 9 PT_0408 BM 7340_CURLY BEAR MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0409 BM 8385_MORNINGSTAR MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0410 BM 8275_SCARFACE MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0411 BM 8195_GOAT MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0412 LOST HORSE CAMP 12 PT_0413 BM 7435_CONTINENTAL DIVIDE 4 9 PT_0414 BM 7665_BIG LODGE MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0415 HEART BUTTE 11 PT_0416 LITTLE PLUM PEAK 11 PT_0418 ELK CALF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0419 BM 7000_LITTLE BADGER 9 PT_0420 MOUNT PABLO 9 PT_0421 BM 5215_MARIAS PASS 9 PT_0422 BM 5061_FALSE SUMMIT 9 773 APPENDIX E LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS, 1929 774 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0001 4 2.532081301 LN_0002 4 26.11856914 LN_0002 4 1.397634412 LN_0003 4 5.177167109 LN_0004 4 6.110735387 LN_0004 2 0.96261216 LN_0005 4 12.30992762 LN_0005 5 1.226216578 LN_0006 4 0.993071782 LN_0007 4 7.087340923 LN_0008 4 0.530649973 LN_0008 4 7.349478014 LN_0008 4 8.468814462 LN_0008 4 4.512238102 LN_0009 5 5.70615076 LN_0010 5 6.303914402 LN_0011 5 9.673495132 LN_0012 5 3.007092298 LN_0012 6 0.256806569 LN_0013 5 5.644710942 LN_0014 5 2.048047773 LN_0014 5 2.926464808 LN_0016 6 2.909946632 LN_0017 6 5.355966786 LN_0020 6 4.547635668 LN_0020 2 0.719047441 LN_0022 6 3.052153287 LN_0025 6 1.677142023 775 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0025 6 3.055325751 LN_0026 5 4.240857861 LN_0028 6 1.33771719 LN_0030 6 0.947183623 LN_0030 6 1.24768278 LN_0031 6 1.590454715 LN_0032 6 0.249371583 LN_0033 4 2.001420801 LN_0033 2 3.788795811 LN_0033 5 0.137485558 LN_0033 5 0.313434169 LN_0034 4 6.990490407 LN_0035 5 2.891342125 LN_0036 5 4.579346882 LN_0037 5 8.817134446 LN_0038 5 8.262311924 LN_0039 5 6.811779432 LN_0041 6 3.546602123 LN_0044 6 5.884689863 LN_0045 6 1.463778203 LN_0045 6 1.334564823 LN_0047 5 5.76289261 LN_0050 6 3.339296705 LN_0051 6 1.597719416 LN_0053 4 0.978002678 LN_0053 4 1.044676363 LN_0053 2 8.949998709 LN_0053 2 6.278443137 776 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0054 4 16.48759341 LN_0056 4 12.07370604 LN_0059 6 3.296529548 LN_0060 5 1.355765531 LN_0061 5 4.407092954 LN_0062 4 2.265415121 LN_0063 4 3.487881257 LN_0064 5 14.97102254 LN_0065 4 0.721677644 LN_0066 6 4.586860272 LN_0067 5 1.955571777 LN_0068 5 2.861106632 LN_0069 5 2.84561186 LN_0070 4 4.622592262 LN_0070 4 0.521764347 LN_0071 4 11.51171197 LN_0072 4 13.87438382 LN_0075 5 13.90039088 LN_0079 2 4.246276582 LN_0080 5 1.794224483 LN_0081 5 19.74948395 LN_0082 2 9.190682923 LN_0083 5 10.9780645 LN_0085 5 4.664442156 LN_0086 6 1.871145973 LN_0087 4 14.50452318 LN_0087 2 5.120240175 LN_0088 5 0.95729138 777 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0089 5 6.873962527 LN_0092 2 10.49803806 LN_0093 6 7.260618529 LN_0095 5 6.67704021 LN_0096 6 1.441501194 LN_0100 6 4.702673419 LN_0101 6 2.732035044 LN_0102 6 1.135593221 LN_0103 6 1.667497927 LN_0105 2 1.176350869 LN_0106 5 3.521558038 LN_0107 6 1.450766868 LN_0110 6 1.164471247 LN_0110 6 1.585158747 LN_0114 4 22.14126547 LN_0114 4 0.579956264 LN_0114 5 0.447685243 LN_0115 4 2.556029731 LN_0119 2 1.984612138 LN_0122 6 3.359610419 LN_0171 5 0.610615459 LN_0178 3 24.32331857 LN_0181 6 1.004133865 LN_0182 5 1.328075595 LN_0184 2 1.655394613 LN_0186 2 6.65186706 LN_0187 2 20.2134066 LN_0202 4 0.881819403 778 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0206 2 9.346552695 LN_0216 2 1.688653616 LN_0219 6 1.790791945 LN_0225 5 5.029555315 LN_0226 5 0.041737368 LN_0231 5 4.279396719 LN_0236 5 1.979356181 LN_0242 5 0.51841821 LN_0243 4 1.1547883 LN_0249 6 2.657847822 LN_0249 6 2.95552809 LN_0250 6 0.765527778 LN_0251 6 2.736988448 LN_0252 6 2.883341734 LN_0252 6 2.9019024 LN_0258 5 3.686436258 LN_0259 5 6.398645104 LN_0259 5 1.61149587 LN_0260 5 1.423021691 LN_0268 5 10.33671838 LN_0274 5 5.140437551 LN_0277 6 1.587658835 LN_0278 6 3.924730429 LN_0279 4 0.422531566 LN_0279 6 4.27951134 LN_0280 4 2.040890174 LN_0281 6 7.477175338 LN_0282 6 3.577713703 779 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_0283 6 1.636141304 LN_0285 6 1.20110808 LN_0285 6 1.86903172 LN_0285 6 1.525789549 LN_0286 5 1.395017648 LN_0286 5 5.157370581 LN_0286 5 2.463583717 LN_0289 6 5.203927101 LN_0294 4 0.243661774 LN_0298 6 0.441904789 LN_1171 5 0.39333277 LN_2005 4 1.314743097 LN_2013 5 1.813374822 LN_2016 6 2.563604284 LN_2044 6 3.383756478 LN_2045 6 2.107418616 LN_2056 4 8.501527194 LN_2067 5 3.285986324 LN_2076 2 8.357878136 LN_2078 6 3.361611431 LN_2079 6 0.815929643 LN_2079 6 0.869816854 LN_2082 5 11.80558086 LN_2110 6 1.685535171 LN_2177 6 2.583333489 LN_2183 2 3.750539062 LN_2222 6 2.305749264 LN_2249 6 3.647554891 780 ROUTE_ID REL LENGTH LN_2252 6 3.617569885 LN_2282 6 2.771434214 LN_2283 6 3.521803147 LN_2285 6 2.095880841 LN_2994 6 3.422259473 LN_2995 2 2.793813579 LN_2996 6 2.41971316 LN_2997 6 3.807549858 LN_2998 6 1.573286695 LN_2999 6 3.318359119 LN_9001 2 6.572976792 781 APPENDIX F LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS, 1938 782 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0066 6 4.586860272 1938_0077 2 3.567566409 1938_0020 2 20.2183297 1938_0058 6 4.230292101 1938_0061 5 6.640244979 1938_0236 5 9.808804333 1938_0013 5 5.644710942 1938_0272 4 3.873843169 1938_0284 6 3.787685243 1938_2016 6 2.563604284 1938_0079 6 8.39687888 1938_0099 6 2.202135101 1938_0201 2 0.883764625 1938_0092 2 10.49803806 1938_0094 6 2.655193258 1938_0067 5 1.301770044 1938_0259 4 6.398645104 1938_0031 6 1.590454715 1938_0023 6 3.570190174 1938_0026 4 1.309696239 1938_0183 2 6.623087856 1938_2996 6 2.41971316 1938_0181 6 1.001026989 1938_0028 6 1.33771719 1938_0259 4 2.159288908 1938_0067 2 1.98421628 1938_0037 4 8.817134446 1938_0114 4 25.73833711 783 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0250 6 1.707475533 1938_0030 6 2.16879321 1938_0019 6 11.15287908 1938_2282 6 2.771434214 1938_0070 4 6.678123902 1938_0233 6 1.174419652 1938_0075 4 13.90039088 1938_0020 2 0.998980322 1938_0060 5 12.45590821 1938_0250 6 4.677258995 1938_0225 5 6.925996864 1938_0008 4 3.766858009 1938_0268 5 10.33671838 1938_0002 4 26.01435238 1938_0178 2 24.32331857 1938_2117 6 0 1938_0105 2 2.911311825 1938_0104 6 2.494800347 1938_0042 6 4.384431934 1938_0034 4 15.56468797 1938_0007 4 7.087340923 1938_0077 2 8.45878588 1938_0110 6 1.685535171 1938_0233 6 4.155242839 1938_0020 5 4.6127305 1938_0286 5 9.084020796 1938_0179 2 10.18852918 1938_0012 5 1.008565445 784 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_2222 6 2.305749264 1938_0089 5 6.873962527 1938_0076 2 8.357878136 1938_0093 2 2.096938411 1938_0101 6 3.857509675 1938_0049 6 3.038971433 1938_0045 6 2.827511828 1938_0260 4 2.057570686 1938_0050 6 3.339296705 1938_0048 5 7.343001475 1938_0175 6 7.792206675 1938_0008 4 7.367821476 1938_0278 6 5.58269769 1938_0277 6 4.242709044 1938_0107 6 1.450766868 1938_0048 5 1.447517605 1938_0920 6 3.318359119 1938_0033 4 13.3502333 1938_0022 6 3.052153287 1938_0078 2 4.646396241 1938_0283 6 1.636141304 1938_0017 6 5.355966786 1938_0102 6 1.135593221 1938_0119 2 1.984612138 1938_0067 4 11.53752816 1938_0232 6 4.277168116 1938_0173 6 3.332498875 1938_0020 2 1.781667022 785 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0231 4 6.851028839 1938_0010 5 6.303914402 1938_0047 5 5.76289261 1938_0073 6 1.361004049 1938_0269 6 5.134281805 1938_2994 5 3.422259473 1938_0289 6 5.203927101 1938_0016 6 0.419605236 1938_0087 4 16.87852049 1938_0108 5 7.810299864 1938_0206 2 2.390514005 1938_0258 4 11.39387804 1938_0057 6 5.337702273 1938_0021 6 5.579118314 1938_0175 6 4.832237138 1938_0063 4 8.866529889 1938_0279 6 3.818454838 1938_0285 6 8.436271454 1938_0012 5 4.936827476 1938_0220 2 2.556481931 1938_0095 5 5.108530338 1938_0035 5 2.891342125 1938_0040 6 3.10967136 1938_0122 6 3.359610419 1938_0253 6 5.249461947 1938_0008 5 0.823715648 1938_0263 6 1.013907522 1938_0267 5 4.175303631 786 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0282 6 3.577713703 1938_0280 6 2.040890174 1938_0110 6 1.444020559 1938_0081 2 19.74948395 1938_0117 6 4.816787307 1938_0088 5 2.147547266 1938_0110 6 1.179648122 1938_0020 6 3.4390247 1938_0005 4 17.1110499 1938_0249 6 8.768443967 1938_0056 4 12.07370604 1938_0080 5 4.92122421 1938_0266 6 3.105730897 1938_0274 5 1.328075595 1938_0006 5 0.993071782 1938_0016 6 0.26617376 1938_0032 6 5.449095662 1938_0092 2 10.49803806 1938_0058 6 3.29652976 1938_0054 4 16.48759341 1938_0106 5 3.521558038 1938_0043 6 5.200394236 1938_0072 4 13.87438382 1938_0024 6 4.161314552 1938_0103 6 3.056769815 1938_0064 4 14.97102254 1938_0020 6 3.153721547 1938_0285 5 1.45333993 787 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0181 6 1.435364583 1938_0001 5 4.177083853 1938_0025 6 1.401453695 1938_0044 6 4.423849112 1938_0096 6 1.441501194 1938_0090 5 2.399545364 1938_0206 2 9.346552695 1938_0275 6 2.82801474 1938_0083 5 10.94078247 1938_0038 5 8.262311924 1938_0008 4 7.858071237 1938_2013 5 1.813374822 1938_0281 6 7.477175338 1938_0070 4 0.445522254 1938_0291 2 1.403655215 1938_0051 6 1.710896622 1938_0040 6 7.083329883 1938_0082 2 16.15823522 1938_0004 4 6.089425505 1938_0251 6 2.736988448 1938_0252 6 3.617569885 1938_0036 5 4.579346882 1938_0262 6 3.171254939 1938_0274 5 5.140437551 1938_0283 6 3.521803147 1938_0029 6 3.010839541 1938_0023 6 1.602023407 1938_0215 6 1.808151419 788 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0233 6 0.447808895 1938_0046 6 4.776496894 1938_2995 2 2.793813579 1938_0018 6 8.229807823 1938_2997 5 3.807549858 1938_0025 6 3.078244982 1938_0016 6 2.909946632 1938_0085 5 10.58598031 1938_0256 4 9.257858223 1938_0154 6 2.049849682 1938_0145 4 1.358128773 1938_0011 5 9.673495132 1938_0026 4 5.996984857 1938_0070 4 0.243661774 1938_0015 6 1.698629203 1938_0290 6 1.836233994 1938_0086 6 2.423342803 1938_0093 6 5.163680117 1938_0039 4 9.945233755 1938_0041 6 3.006010267 1938_0115 6 2.556029731 1938_0252 6 5.8223219 1938_0014 5 4.974513203 1938_0009 5 5.70615076 1938_0071 4 11.51171197 1938_0002 2 1.501851168 1938_0003 5 10.92989194 1938_0069 5 4.393947168 789 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_0087 2 2.767697557 1938_0100 6 4.702673419 1938_0082 2 11.80558086 1938_3928 6 1.843956046 1938_3927 6 1.022606009 1938_3926 6 1.353546984 1938_3925 6 2.301453136 1938_3924 5 5.17501815 1938_3076 2 1.610986375 1938_3201 2 1.839250709 1938_3920 5 3.613000397 1938_3921 6 1.154327533 1938_3250 6 0.956578466 1938_3919 6 0.694353655 1938_3257 2 1.255346155 1938_3923 5 4.719198504 1938_3922 6 3.950360069 1938_3918 6 1.921567231 1938_3917 6 1.113442821 1938_3916 6 1.266562108 1938_3915 6 0.8694886 1938_3914 6 1.157598122 1938_3913 6 4.230099152 1938_3066 6 2.29153559 1938_3911 5 10.89840277 1938_3910 6 2.978480743 1938_3909 6 1.715568301 1938_3082 5 4.325223954 790 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_3912 5 1.234670993 1938_3103 6 1.763987477 1938_3905 6 0.450279654 1938_3099 5 1.895554802 1938_3907 6 0.597869559 1938_3908 6 0.867237637 1938_3906 6 3.658433112 1938_3090 6 2.196933747 1938_3904 6 1.686372808 1938_3903 6 1.570935118 1938_3087 2 3.582339777 1938_3902 2 1.862090851 1938_3901 6 2.168744405 1938_0084 6 3.503453252 1938_3931 6 2.576647406 1938_3934 6 1.090219669 1938_2177 5 2.583333489 1938_3282 6 2.111292375 1938_3179 5 1.39216347 1938_3933 6 3.74781983 1938_3177 5 1.342858934 1938_3935 6 2.061827514 1938_3937 6 1.212373392 1938_3929 6 1.760012626 1938_3936 5 1.97169096 1938_3932 6 0.658663202 1938_0015 5 0.754060999 1938_3012 5 0.470219205 791 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1938_3930 6 2.116747834 1938_3938 6 0.91830745 1938_9001 2 6.572976792 1938_0095 5 0.679119626 1938_0247 5 5.329647671 1938_0265 5 2.999013089 1938_0185 2 1.062065216 1938_2079 6 3.812895093 1938_0025 6 2.680530939 792 APPENDIX G LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST ADMINISTRATIVE SITES AND FIRE CONTROL POINTS, 1938 793 POINT NAME REL PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0003 AUGUSTA ADMIN SITE 4 PT_0004 BEARTOP LOOKOUT 10 PT_0005 BENCHMARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0006 BLACKLEAF ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0007 CABIN CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0008 CHOTEAU ADMIN SITE 4 PT_0010 EAR MOUNTAIN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0011 GATES PARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0012 HANNAN GULCH ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0013 MT WRIGHT LOOKOUT 10 PT_0015 WELCOME CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0016 WEST FORK TETON ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0017 WILLOW CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0018 WRONG CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0046 STEAMBOAT LOOKOUT 10 PT_0049 PRETTY PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0057 INDIAN POINT ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0059 GREEN FORKS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0060 WRONG RIDGE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0074 ELK CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0081 FALSE SUMMIT_UPLANDS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0098 PATROL CREEK LOOKOUT 10 PT_0115 PRAIRIE REEF LOOKOUT 10 PT_0140 HALF DOME CRAG ELECTRONIC SITE 10 PT_0353 DEADMAN HILL LOOKOUT 10 PT_0355 LARCH HILL LOOKOUT 9 794 POINT NAME REL PT_0359 SCAPEGOAT MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0360 CAMP WELLMAN 12 PT_0361 BM 8580_WHITETAIL CREEK 9 PT_0363 BM 8250_CIGARETTE CREEK 9 PT_0364 BM 8677_SUGARLOAF MT 9 PT_0366 BM 7475_LIME RIDGE 9 PT_0367 BM 8094_GREEN TIMBER CREEK 9 PT_0368 BM 8214_BLACKROCK CREEK 9 PT_0370 CAMP TODD 12 PT_0372 BM 8135_DEER CREEK 9 PT_0373 BM 8086_ELLIS CREEK 9 PT_0374 BM 8105_PEARL BASIN 9 PT_0375 BM 6060_GIBSON 9 PT_0377 FAIRVIEW 9 PT_0378 BM 6865_DEER CREEK_SUN 9 PT_0379 BM 6968_GOAT CREEK_SUN 9 PT_0380 CAMP ALLAN 9 PT_0381 BM 8030_ SHEEP MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0383 SLATEGOAT_WHITERIDGE 11 PT_0384 BM 8100_SALT MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0385 CLIFF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0386 BM 8535_ BLACKTAIL GULCH 12 PT_0387 BM 8285_DEEP CREEK 9 PT_0388 BM 5720_BRIDGE CREEK 9 PT_0389 ROCKY MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0390 BM 8108_ROUTE CREEK 9 PT_0392 BM 7235_MIDDLE FORK TETON 1 9 PT_0393 BM 7835_MIDDLE FORK TETON 2 9 795 POINT NAME REL PT_0394 BM 8210_WRANGLE CREEK 9 PT_0395 BM 8065_MOONLIGHT PEAK 9 PT_0396 BM 8327_MOUNT FRAZIER 9 PT_0397 BM 7585_SOUTH FORK MUDDY 9 PT_0398 BM 8450_BOWL CREEK 9 PT_0399 BM 8625_MOUNT PATRICK GASS 9 PT_0401 BM 7810_WALLING REEF 9 PT_0402 BM 8237_OLD MAN OF THE HILLS 9 PT_0406 BM 7316_KILLEM HORSE CREEK 9 PT_0407 BM 8095_FAMILY PEAK 9 PT_0412 LOST HORSE CAMP 12 PT_0413 BM 7435_CONTINENTAL DIVIDE 4 9 PT_0416 LITTLE PLUM PEAK 11 PT_0417 BM 7230_ELK MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0418 ELK CALF MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0419 BM 7000_LITTLE BADGER 9 PT_0420 MOUNT PABLO 9 PT_0423 BM 8290_STEAMBOAT MTN 11 PT_0424 BUNYAN POINT 9 PT_0425 BM 8400 AHORN BASIN 9 PT_0426 PRETTY PRAIRIE AIRFIELD 7 PT_0427 BM 5245 INDIAN POINT 9 PT_0428 BM 8083 THREE SISTERS 9 PT_0429 SPOTTED BEAR PASS 9 PT_0430 GATES PARK AIRFIELD 7 PT_0431 BM 8184_LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN 9 PT_0432 BM 5104-NORTH FORK DUPUYER 9 PT_0433 BM 5220-SOUTH FORK DUPUYER 9 796 POINT NAME REL PT_0435 CHOTEAU AIRFIELD 7 PT_0482 PENTAGON CABIN 6 PT_0483 BUNGALOW LOOKOUT 10 PT_0484 LIMESTONE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0485 GARNET PEAK LOOKOUT 10 PT_0486 LIMESTONE CABIN 6 PT_0487 SCHAFER ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0488 LODGEPOLE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0489 GREEN MOUNTAIN LOOKOUT 10 PT_0490 THREE FORKS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0491 RED PLUME LOOKOUT 10 PT_0492 PUZZLE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0493 SILVERTIP CABIN 6 PT_0494 SALMON FORKS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0494 BIG PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0495 BLACKBEAR ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0495 TILLSON LOOKOUT 10 PT_0496 BLACKBEAR LOOKOUT 10 PT_0496 SHALE PEAK 9 PT_0497 PAGODA LOOKOUT 10 PT_0497 DANAHER ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0498 MUD LAKE LOOKOUT 10 PT_0498 SENTINEL LOOKOUT 10 PT_0499 JUMBO MOUNTAIN LOOKOUT 10 797 APPENDIX H LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS, 1965 798 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0001 1 4.177083853 1965_0002 10 3.44363226 1965_0002 1 8.847143415 1965_0002 1 15.22542787 1965_0003 1 10.92989194 1965_0004 1 7.088405827 1965_0005 1 17.1110499 1965_0007 1 7.087340923 1965_0008 1 20.87355921 1965_0009 1 5.70615076 1965_0010 1 6.303914402 1965_0011 1 9.673495132 1965_0012 1 1.520429508 1965_0013 1 5.644710942 1965_0014 1 4.974513203 1965_0015 1 2.426822475 1965_0016 1 2.648693179 1965_0018 1 8.229807823 1965_0019 1 11.15287908 1965_0020 1 13.12034256 1965_0021 1 5.579118314 1965_0022 1 3.052153287 1965_0023 1 3.570190174 1965_0024 1 11.46415773 1965_0025 1 6.59344248 1965_0026 1 5.996984857 1965_0027 1 6.917168654 1965_0028 1 1.33771719 799 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0031 1 1.590454715 1965_0033 1 13.3502333 1965_0034 1 15.56468797 1965_0035 1 2.891342125 1965_0036 1 4.579346882 1965_0037 1 8.817134446 1965_0038 1 8.262311924 1965_0039 1 9.635396774 1965_0040 1 7.083329883 1965_0041 1 3.546602123 1965_0041 1 0.888009277 1965_0042 1 4.384431934 1965_0043 1 13.21659242 1965_0044 1 5.884689863 1965_0045 1 2.827511828 1965_0046 1 3.973790987 1965_0047 1 3.1112186 1965_0048 1 7.343035292 1965_0049 1 3.038971433 1965_0050 1 3.339296705 1965_0051 1 1.710896622 1965_0053 9 0.648567312 1965_0054 1 16.48759341 1965_0056 1 12.07370604 1965_0057 1 5.337702273 1965_0058 1 4.230292101 1965_0059 1 3.296529548 1965_0060 1 0.694353655 800 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0060 1 12.45590821 1965_0061 1 6.429669048 1965_0062 1 1.912607152 1965_0063 1 8.866529889 1965_0064 1 14.97102254 1965_0066 1 4.586860272 1965_0067 1 11.53732444 1965_0068 1 5.169512743 1965_0069 1 3.144397269 1965_0070 1 8.217315054 1965_0071 1 11.51171197 1965_0072 1 11.34636565 1965_0072 1 2.528018166 1965_0075 1 13.90039088 1965_0076 9 28.0197045 1965_0076 9 3.505318341 1965_0077 9 26.468212 1965_0078 10 4.844847611 1965_0080 1 5.392851544 1965_0081 9 19.74948395 1965_0082 1 2.41819351 1965_0082 9 16.22395938 1965_0082 9 11.80558086 1965_0082 1 0.425263284 1965_0083 1 8.582638741 1965_0083 9 1.875598907 1965_0083 1 0.522843604 1965_0084 1 3.503453252 801 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0085 1 10.58598031 1965_0086 1 3.93176531 1965_0087 1 19.64622488 1965_0089 1 6.873962527 1965_0090 1 2.399545364 1965_0091 1 1.372268478 1965_0092 10 1.562269551 1965_0092 9 8.935768509 1965_0093 1 7.260618529 1965_0094 1 2.655193258 1965_0095 1 5.740236776 1965_0099 1 3.404075148 1965_0100 1 4.702673419 1965_0101 1 3.857509675 1965_0102 1 1.135593221 1965_0103 1 1.763987477 1965_0103 1 2.901019426 1965_0106 1 3.521558038 1965_0108 1 7.810299864 1965_0112 1 4.559793976 1965_0114 1 11.17801369 1965_0114 1 14.56032342 1965_0115 1 2.556029731 1965_0116 1 3.601486217 1965_0117 1 4.816787307 1965_0119 1 1.984612138 1965_0120 1 0.191715716 1965_0122 1 3.359610419 802 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0125 10 2.440797694 1965_0126 9 0.73388807 1965_0127 10 0.201507391 1965_0129 10 0.420973698 1965_0136 9 1.29313593 1965_0137 9 0.15731923 1965_0140 1 0.496303621 1965_0143 1 0.770303131 1965_0145 1 1.358128773 1965_0146 1 0.375681235 1965_0147 9 0.454155199 1965_0148 1 0.581910074 1965_0152 1 4.761302101 1965_0153 1 0.742760296 1965_0159 9 2.099018568 1965_0163 9 0.724646196 1965_0164 1 0.443300688 1965_0166 9 0.472972356 1965_0167 9 0.445880096 1965_0172 1 1.284847045 1965_0173 9 1.17699821 1965_0173 1 2.777893389 1965_0175 1 4.832237138 1965_0177 10 6.486838984 1965_0178 7 24.32331857 1965_0179 10 8.820041731 1965_0181 1 2.476651374 1965_0181 1 1.404988292 803 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0181 10 1.418826953 1965_0182 10 1.328075595 1965_0183 10 5.517519408 1965_0183 1 1.105568448 1965_0184 10 1.655394613 1965_0185 10 1.062065216 1965_0186 10 6.65186706 1965_0187 10 20.2183297 1965_0202 9 0.881819403 1965_0204 9 0.680406601 1965_0206 9 1.255346155 1965_0206 9 9.346552695 1965_0207 1 1.705482199 1965_0216 1 1.983833546 1965_0218 10 1.823834668 1965_0218 1 1.823834668 1965_0219 10 1.790791945 1965_0220 1 2.556481931 1965_0222 10 2.843987539 1965_0223 10 2.163696646 1965_0225 1 6.925996864 1965_0231 1 6.851028839 1965_0232 1 1.748535038 1965_0233 1 4.155242839 1965_0236 1 9.808804333 1965_0237 1 0.245342992 1965_0238 1 0.894377519 1965_0239 1 3.119322798 804 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0243 1 1.1547883 1965_0244 1 0.452659928 1965_0249 1 0.823195444 1965_0249 1 8.768443967 1965_0252 1 5.8223219 1965_0253 1 5.249461947 1965_0255 1 1.602023407 1965_0256 1 9.155565579 1965_0257 1 2.82801474 1965_0258 1 11.39387804 1965_0259 1 6.398645104 1965_0260 1 2.057570686 1965_0261 1 2.144818702 1965_0262 1 3.171254939 1965_0264 1 0.677322261 1965_0266 1 3.105730897 1965_0267 1 4.175303631 1965_0268 1 10.33671838 1965_0269 1 5.134281805 1965_0270 1 3.925113122 1965_0271 1 0.514768935 1965_0272 1 3.873843169 1965_0274 1 5.140437551 1965_0277 1 7.97099071 1965_0278 1 5.583319018 1965_0280 1 2.040890174 1965_0281 1 7.477175338 1965_0282 1 2.771434214 805 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_0282 1 3.577713703 1965_0282 1 2.111292375 1965_0283 1 1.764690657 1965_0283 1 1.636141304 1965_0284 1 3.787685243 1965_0285 1 9.889611384 1965_0286 1 3.359110788 1965_0286 1 3.202028089 1965_0289 1 1.090219669 1965_0289 1 5.203927101 1965_0290 1 1.836233994 1965_0292 1 1.11999497 1965_0298 1 2.041724421 1965_2013 1 1.813374822 1965_2067 1 0.37282197 1965_2177 1 2.072699391 1965_2285 1 2.096256211 1965_3087 10 1.664696076 1965_3087 9 1.917643701 1965_3099 1 1.895554802 1965_3177 1 1.342858934 1965_3902 10 1.862090851 1965_3922 1 0.738498185 1965_3923 1 4.719198504 1965_3924 1 5.17501815 1965_3930 1 2.116747834 1965_3931 1 2.576647406 1965_3933 9 3.74781983 806 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_3936 1 0.899913321 1965_4902 1 1.317925663 1965_4903 1 5.802742459 1965_4904 10 0.52003643 1965_4906 10 3.941218452 1965_4909 9 2.552638595 1965_4910 1 1.350349588 1965_4913 1 1.060716407 1965_4913 1 1.055709514 1965_4914 1 2.713603455 1965_4915 1 1.023545436 1965_6901 1 4.162873666 1965_6902 1 0.804774616 1965_6903 1 3.653604251 1965_6904 1 0.83420868 1965_6905 1 3.184235003 1965_6906 1 2.634869755 1965_6907 1 0.433375377 1965_6908 9 0.305184915 1965_6909 9 0.906658851 1965_6910 1 0.713398393 1965_6911 1 0.377362855 1965_6912 1 0.615592514 1965_6913 1 4.628960426 1965_6914 1 0.30678129 1965_6915 9 3.60935619 1965_6916 1 1.495475779 1965_6917 1 0.929139645 807 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1965_6918 9 2.878255248 1965_6919 1 1.240595743 1965_6920 1 0.62604913 1965_6921 1 2.212125532 1965_6922 1 0.301185782 1965_6923 10 5.71067238 1965_6924 1 5.541583579 1965_6925 1 0.258012587 1965_6926 18 1.888707549 1965_6927 18 5.643737985 1965_6928 18 28.1121161 1965_6929 18 1.969854996 1965_6930 18 0.770442575 1965_6931 18 6.916051149 1965_6932 18 9.035711417 1965_6933 18 0.390303328 1965_6934 18 3.331546893 1965_6935 18 3.872531992 1965_6936 18 1.010181009 1965_6937 18 3.92319692 1965_6938 18 4.219298744 1965_6939 18 1.260623626 1965_6940 18 4.433432545 1965_6941 18 3.892834889 1965_6942 18 2.888729255 1965_6943 18 2.16141967 1965_6944 18 2.353264483 1965_6945 18 5.887204343 808 APPENDIX I LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST ADMINISTRATIVE SITES AND FIRE CONTROL POINTS, 1965 809 POINT NAME REL PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0003 AUGUSTA ADMIN SITE 4 PT_0004 BEARTOP LOOKOUT 10 PT_0005 BENCHMARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0007 CABIN CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0008 CHOTEAU ADMIN SITE 4 PT_0010 EAR MOUNTAIN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0011 GATES PARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0012 HANNAN GULCH ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0013 MT WRIGHT LOOKOUT 11 PT_0015 WELCOME CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0016 WEST FORK TETON ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0017 WILLOW CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0018 WRONG CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0046 STEAMBOAT LOOKOUT 10 PT_0048 ROCK CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0049 PRETTY PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0057 INDIAN POINT ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0059 GREEN FORKS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0098 PATROL CREEK LOOKOUT 10 PT_0100 BENCHMARK AIRPORT 7 PT_0115 PRAIRIE REEF LOOKOUT 10 PT_0132 MOUNT BALDY ELECTRONIC SITE 11 PT_0140 HALF DOME CRAG ELECTRONIC SITE 10 PT_0359 SCAPEGOAT MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0361 BM 8580_WHITETAIL CREEK 11 PT_0362 BM 8215_OBSERVATION POINT 11 PT_0364 BM 8677_SUGARLOAF MT 11 810 POINT NAME REL PT_0371 BM 8355_TWIN PEAKS 11 PT_0375 BM 6060_GIBSON 11 PT_0377 FAIRVIEW 11 PT_0383 SLATEGOAT_WHITERIDGE 11 PT_0385 CLIFF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0389 ROCKY MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0391 BM 8385_CHOTEAU MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0407 BM 8095_FAMILY PEAK 11 PT_0423 BM 8290_STEAMBOAT MTN 11 PT_0430 GATES PARK AIRFIELD 7 PT_0435 CHOTEAU AIRFIELD 7 PT_0436 REDHEAD PEAK 11 PT_0437 EAR MOUNTAIN PEAK 11 PT_0438 BM 8570 NINETEEN CREEK 11 811 APPENDIX J LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST ADMINISTRATIVE SITES AND FIRE CONTROL POINTS, 1988 812 POINT NAME REL PT_0001 BADGER CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0003 AUGUSTA ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0004 BEARTOP LOOKOUT 10 PT_0005 BENCHMARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0007 CABIN CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0008 CHOTEAU ADMIN SITE 4 PT_0010 EAR MOUNTAIN ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0011 GATES PARK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0012 HANNAN GULCH ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0013 MT WRIGHT LOOKOUT 11 PT_0015 WELCOME CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0016 WEST FORK TETON ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0017 WILLOW CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0018 WRONG CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0046 STEAMBOAT LOOKOUT 11 PT_0048 ROCK CREEK ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0049 PRETTY PRAIRIE ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0052 MOOSE RIDGE LOOKOUT 11 PT_0057 INDIAN POINT ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0059 GREEN FORKS ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0060 WRONG RIDGE LOOKOUT 11 PT_0098 PATROL CREEK LOOKOUT 10 PT_0100 BENCHMARK AIRPORT 7 PT_0115 PRAIRIE REEF LOOKOUT 10 PT_0132 MOUNT BALDY ELECTRONIC SITE 11 PT_0140 HALF DOME CRAG ELECTRONIC SITE 11 PT_0354 HALFMOON LOOKOUT 11 PT_0359 SCAPEGOAT MOUNTAIN 11 813 POINT NAME REL PT_0360 CAMP WELLMAN 11 PT_0361 BM 8580_WHITETAIL CREEK 11 PT_0364 BM 8677_SUGARLOAF MT 11 PT_0377 FAIRVIEW 11 PT_0383 SLATEGOAT_WHITERIDGE 11 PT_0385 CLIFF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0389 ROCKY MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0391 BM 8385_CHOTEAU MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0403 BM 8405_CONTINENTAL DIVIDE 1 11 PT_0407 BM 8095_FAMILY PEAK 11 PT_0409 BM 8385_MORNINGSTAR MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0411 BM 8195_GOAT MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0415 HEART BUTTE 11 PT_0418 ELK CALF MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0423 BM 8290_STEAMBOAT MTN 11 PT_0436 REDHEAD PEAK 11 PT_0437 EAR MOUNTAIN PEAK 11 PT_0438 BM 8570 NINETEEN CREEK 11 PT_0439 DUSTY 11 PT_0440 LITTLE BADGER ADMIN SITE 5 PT_0441 MONITOR 11 PT_0444 RENSHAW MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0475 SIGNAL MOUNTAIN 11 PT_0476 SOUTH VABM 11 PT_0477 CASTLE REEF VABM 11 PT_0478 GIBSON 7735 11 PT_0479 ALICE 7277 11 814 APPENDIX K LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS, 1988 815 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0001 12 4.177083853 1988_0002 13 5.487399006 1988_0002 12 15.0863746 1988_0002 16 6.942429944 1988_0003 16 10.92985484 1988_0004 11 6.091861275 1988_0004 14 0.996544552 1988_0005 11 11.27507525 1988_0005 14 1.819119565 1988_0005 11 4.016855086 1988_0006 1 0.993071782 1988_0007 11 7.087340923 1988_0008 11 20.87355921 1988_0009 15 5.70615076 1988_0010 11 6.303914402 1988_0011 11 9.673495132 1988_0012 1 1.946543624 1988_0012 12 2.748595213 1988_0012 10 0.241688639 1988_0013 11 5.644710942 1988_0014 11 4.974513203 1988_0015 1 1.66374798 1988_0015 14 0.683127287 1988_0016 1 2.517528827 1988_0016 10 0.392417805 1988_0017 1 2.204934373 1988_0018 11 8.229807823 1988_0019 11 11.15287908 816 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0020 14 13.12034256 1988_0021 11 5.579118314 1988_0022 11 3.052153287 1988_0023 11 3.570190174 1988_0024 11 11.46415773 1988_0025 1 6.59344248 1988_0026 11 5.996984857 1988_0027 14 6.917168654 1988_0028 1 1.33771719 1988_0029 1 3.010839541 1988_0030 11 2.16879321 1988_0031 11 1.590454715 1988_0032 1 5.449095662 1988_0033 11 13.3502333 1988_0034 11 15.56468797 1988_0034 11 15.56468797 1988_0035 11 2.891342125 1988_0036 11 4.579346882 1988_0037 11 8.817134446 1988_0038 14 8.262311924 1988_0039 14 3.225024991 1988_0039 14 6.720208764 1988_0040 11 7.083329883 1988_0041 11 3.546602123 1988_0041 11 0.888009277 1988_0042 11 4.384431934 1988_0043 15 11.78553174 1988_0043 14 1.431060678 817 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0044 11 5.884689863 1988_0045 11 2.827511828 1988_0046 11 4.776496894 1988_0047 14 5.76289261 1988_0048 15 7.343035292 1988_0049 14 3.038971433 1988_0051 11 1.710896622 1988_0054 11 16.48759341 1988_0055 11 1.327844534 1988_0055 11 2.472489438 1988_0056 11 12.07370604 1988_0057 11 5.337702273 1988_0058 11 4.230292101 1988_0059 14 2.139967038 1988_0059 11 1.15656251 1988_0060 11 12.45590821 1988_0061 11 6.640244979 1988_0062 11 3.432437088 1988_0063 11 8.866529889 1988_0064 11 14.97102254 1988_0066 11 4.586860272 1988_0067 14 11.53752816 1988_0068 11 5.169512743 1988_0069 11 4.393947168 1988_0070 14 1.761902649 1988_0070 12 6.455412405 1988_0071 11 11.51171197 1988_0072 14 1.645371474 818 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0072 11 11.68096612 1988_0073 11 1.361004049 1988_0074 11 1.525699319 1988_0075 11 9.266901404 1988_0075 14 4.633489474 1988_0076 9 36.24606242 1988_0077 9 26.468212 1988_0078 16 2.052263155 1988_0078 10 4.147170946 1988_0079 10 12.63908127 1988_0080 11 4.93476519 1988_0081 9 19.74948395 1988_0082 9 34.48431545 1988_0083 14 9.113954815 1988_0084 14 3.503453252 1988_0085 14 9.57301061 1988_0085 1 1.0129697 1988_0086 1 3.93176531 1988_0087 11 4.902347532 1988_0087 11 12.53457661 1988_0088 11 2.147547266 1988_0089 11 6.873962527 1988_0090 11 2.399545364 1988_0091 15 1.372268478 1988_0092 10 4.951867463 1988_0092 9 8.917395842 1988_0093 11 1.772028414 1988_0093 1 2.044495409 819 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0093 1 0.817178533 1988_0093 11 2.626916172 1988_0094 1 2.655193258 1988_0095 11 6.67704021 1988_0096 11 1.441501194 1988_0099 11 3.404075148 1988_0100 11 4.702673419 1988_0101 11 3.857509675 1988_0102 11 1.135593221 1988_0103 11 2.884659981 1988_0104 11 2.495210139 1988_0106 11 3.521558038 1988_0107 11 1.450766868 1988_0108 11 4.537350226 1988_0108 14 3.272949638 1988_0112 14 4.559793976 1988_0114 11 9.232226475 1988_0114 11 3.665813649 1988_0114 11 11.82508537 1988_0115 11 2.556029731 1988_0116 14 3.601486217 1988_0117 14 4.816787307 1988_0119 9 1.984612138 1988_0122 11 3.359610419 1988_0123 10 2.663190567 1988_0126 9 0.73388807 1988_0140 11 0.496303621 1988_0145 11 1.358128773 820 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0146 11 0.375681235 1988_0148 11 0.581910074 1988_0149 11 1.420015933 1988_0150 11 3.104267292 1988_0151 11 1.057932073 1988_0152 14 4.761302101 1988_0153 14 0.742760296 1988_0154 14 2.81351335 1988_0159 9 2.099018568 1988_0164 11 0.443300688 1988_0166 9 0.472972356 1988_0167 9 0.445880096 1988_0172 11 0.978711741 1988_0172 9 0.306135304 1988_0173 10 6.335981246 1988_0174 11 0.108450767 1988_0175 11 4.832237138 1988_0177 10 6.486838984 1988_0178 7 24.32331857 1988_0179 10 10.18852918 1988_0181 10 6.320338516 1988_0181 14 1.727266787 1988_0182 10 1.328075595 1988_0184 11 1.655394613 1988_0185 10 1.062065216 1988_0186 10 6.65186706 1988_0187 10 20.2183297 1988_0201 15 0.883764625 821 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0206 9 9.346552695 1988_0207 9 1.697137495 1988_0208 10 1.344688519 1988_0213 1 0.625895849 1988_0215 1 1.808151419 1988_0217 9 3.412018623 1988_0218 10 1.823834668 1988_0219 10 1.790791945 1988_0220 10 2.556481931 1988_0221 12 1.316403813 1988_0222 10 2.192741463 1988_0223 10 2.163696646 1988_0224 14 1.989568307 1988_0225 11 5.018144435 1988_0225 14 1.907852429 1988_0231 11 6.851028839 1988_0232 11 1.718282399 1988_0233 11 4.155242839 1988_0235 10 1.534080709 1988_0236 14 1.88619829 1988_0236 11 7.922606043 1988_0237 11 0.245342992 1988_0238 11 0.894377519 1988_0239 11 3.119322798 1988_0243 11 1.1547883 1988_0244 11 0.452659928 1988_0246 11 1.101495665 1988_0247 11 5.329647671 822 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0249 11 8.768443967 1988_0250 11 0.799703125 1988_0251 11 2.736988448 1988_0252 11 5.8223219 1988_0253 11 5.249461947 1988_0255 11 1.602023407 1988_0256 16 9.165206755 1988_0256 1 3.299105508 1988_0257 11 2.82801474 1988_0258 11 3.68454108 1988_0258 14 7.709336963 1988_0259 9 0.316277304 1988_0259 16 6.082367799 1988_0260 14 0.205888447 1988_0261 14 2.144818702 1988_0262 14 3.171254939 1988_0263 1 1.013907522 1988_0264 11 1.561789567 1988_0265 11 2.950129278 1988_0266 11 3.105730897 1988_0267 11 4.175303631 1988_0268 11 10.33671838 1988_0269 11 5.134281805 1988_0270 11 3.925113122 1988_0271 11 0.514768935 1988_0272 1 3.873843169 1988_0274 16 5.140437551 1988_0275 11 0.629352783 823 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_0277 16 6.729493551 1988_0277 12 1.241497159 1988_0278 16 5.583319018 1988_0279 16 4.27951134 1988_0280 16 2.040890174 1988_0281 16 7.477175338 1988_0282 16 3.577713703 1988_0283 16 2.283534564 1988_0283 16 1.636141304 1988_0284 16 3.787685243 1988_0285 14 9.889611384 1988_0286 1 5.688508914 1988_0286 16 3.395511882 1988_0289 12 5.203927101 1988_0290 1 1.836233994 1988_0291 14 1.403655215 1988_0296 12 1.008565445 1988_0298 10 2.041724421 1988_0306 15 1.195087224 1988_2177 1 2.583333489 1988_2183 10 3.750539062 1988_2249 11 3.647554891 1988_2282 16 1.125300979 1988_3012 1 0.470219205 1988_3087 9 3.582339777 1988_3103 11 1.763987477 1988_3177 1 1.342858934 1988_3257 9 1.255346155 824 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_3902 10 1.862090851 1988_3922 10 0.658663331 1988_3922 11 0.757404608 1988_3923 1 1.018456407 1988_3923 11 2.820067011 1988_3924 1 5.17501815 1988_3930 1 2.116747834 1988_3931 1 2.576647406 1988_3934 1 1.090219669 1988_3936 1 1.97169096 1988_4906 10 2.972502701 1988_4910 11 1.350349588 1988_4915 11 1.023545436 1988_6901 10 4.162873666 1988_6902 1 0.804774616 1988_6903 1 3.067242384 1988_6905 14 3.184235003 1988_6910 11 0.713398393 1988_6912 11 0.615592514 1988_6913 1 4.628960426 1988_6917 1 0.929139645 1988_8901 11 3.373135222 1988_8902 11 1.440040305 1988_8903 15 0.505613706 1988_8904 11 3.377280496 1988_8905 1 3.242662275 1988_8906 11 3.341943621 1988_8907 11 0.530404719 825 EVENT_NAME REL LENGTH 1988_8908 11 2.551782593 1988_8909 11 1.760659561 1988_8910 11 1.729641335 826 APPENDIX L LEWIS & CLARK NATIONAL FOREST RECREATION IMPROVEMENTS, 2000 827 POINT NAME REL PT_0066 MORTIMER SETTLEMENT 14 PT_0082 DEARBORN TRAILHEAD_FT 206 15 PT_0084 BLACKTAIL CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0085 WHITETAIL CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0086 LOST CABIN CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0087 WOOD LAKE CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0088 WOOD LAKE PICNIC AREA 14 PT_0089 CIGARETTE CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0090 OBSERVATION PASS SPIKE CAMP 26 PT_0094 LITTLE WILLOW TRAILHEAD_FT 282 15 PT_0101 BENCHMARK CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0102 STRAIGHT CREEK PACKER CAMP 14 PT_0103 SOUTH FORK SUN TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0104 SOUTH FORK SUN CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0106 BEAVER TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0108 HOME GULCH CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0109 HOME GULCH BOAT LAUNCH 27 PT_0110 WAGNER BASIN TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0111 MORTIMER GULCH TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0112 GIBSON BOAT LAUNCH 27 PT_0113 GIBSON OVERLOOK 28 PT_0116 BLACKLEAF TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0117 WEST FORK TETON CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0119 WALDRON CREEK SNOWMOBILE PARKING 18 PT_0121 MIDDLE FORK TETON TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0122 CAVE MOUNTAIN CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0123 SOUTH FORK TETON TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0124 GREEN GULCH TRAILHEAD 15 828 POINT NAME REL PT_0133 SUMMIT TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0135 SUMMIT CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0136 BASIN CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0137 WRANGLE CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0138 SWIFT RESERVOIR DAM TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0141 LONESOME CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0142 TWO MEDICINE BASE CAMP 26 PT_0143 MILL FALLS CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0144 GATES CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0145 WEST FORK TETON PACKER CORRALS 25 PT_0146 WEST FORK TETON TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0147 CIRCUS CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0148 GATEWAY GORGE BASE CAMP 26 PT_0149 STRAWBERRY CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0150 SWITCHBACK CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0151 WAPITI PARK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0176 BLACKTAIL PACKER CORRAL 25 PT_0186 ELK CREEK TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0213 DOUBLE FALLS CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0217 GREEN FORK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0218 OBSERVATION PASS SPIKE CAMP 26 PT_0240 BENCHMARK PACKER CORRAL 25 PT_0241 SOUTH FORK OVERFLOW PACKER CORRAL 25 PT_0242 STRAIGHT CREEK PACKER CORRAL 25 PT_0243 STRAIGHT CREEK TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0250 VAN DEREIT MEMORIAL PILOTS CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0251 RON JANIKULA TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0263 BLACKTAIL CREEK BASE CAMP 26 829 POINT NAME REL PT_0326 DEEP CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0327 LYNK CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0328 BIGGS CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0329 CABIN CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0330 MOOSE CREEK SPIKE CAMP 26 PT_0331 JULIET CREEK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0332 BRUSHY PARK BASE CAMP 26 PT_0339 TETON PASS SKI AREA 18 PT_0345 ELKO CAMPGROUND 14 PT_0454 JONES UPPER CAMP 15 PT_0469 1976 TRAILHEAD_SUMMIT 15 PT_0470 1976 TRAILHEAD_RISING WOLF 15 PT_0471 1976 TRAILHEAD_TWO MEDICINE 15 PT_0472 1976 TRAILHEAD_PALOOKAVILLE 15 PT_0474 1976 TRAILHEAD_SCENIC WATERFALLS 15 PT_0482 SUMMIT TRAILHEAD 15 PT_0483 INDIAN HEAD ROCK TRAILHEAD 15 830