Theorizing the decision-making process for 
divorce or reconciliation
Authors: Sarah Allen and Alan J. Hawkins
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [Allen, Sarah, and Alan J. Hawkins. 
"Theorizing the decision-making process for divorce or reconciliation ." Journal of Family Theory 
& Review 9, no. 1 (March 2017): 50-68. DOI: 10.1111/jftr.12176.], which has been published in 
final form at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12176. This article may be used for non-commercial 
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Made available through Montana State University’s ScholarWorks 
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Sarah Allen Montana State University
Alan J. Hawkins Brigham Young University
Theorizing the Decision-Making Process
for Divorce or Reconciliation
Divorce is commonplace in the United States,
with an abundant scholarship on the phe-
nomenon. Most research has focused on
predictors of divorce, associations between
divorce and family member well-being, and
interventions and policies for divorcing couples
and children. Although this scholarship tells us
much about why couples get divorced and the
impact divorce has, it has little to say about how
individuals think about and couples talk about
and make meaning of their decision-making
process regarding divorce or reconciliation.
The purpose of this article is to examine and
critique existing theoretical frameworks used
to understand decision-making processes both
generally in the field and specifically in the
context of divorce ideation. Our goal is to pro-
pose future research and theory directions that
are better suited to capturing the complexity of
decision-making processes within the liminal
space of the lives of individuals who are married
but facing the proximate possibility of divorce.
Demographers estimate that half of marrying
couples in the United States will divorce, a
trend spurred over the past 30 years by breakups
among individuals older than age 35 and in
longer-term marriages (Kennedy & Ruggles,
Montana State University, 211 Montana Hall, Bozeman,
MT 59717 (sarah.allen7@ecat.montana.edu).
Key Words: Decision making, divorce, reconciliation, theory
construction.
2014). Today an estimated 50% of American
children will experience their parents’ divorce at
some point during their childhood, an event that
affects more than 1 million American children
per year (National Center for Health Statistics,
2008).
Scholarship on divorce is abundant. For
instance, Amato’s (2010) decade-review arti-
cle summarized research on the interpersonal,
demographic, and economic predictors of
divorce. There is also voluminous work on the
effects of divorce on the well-being of children,
with recent work having become more method-
ologically sophisticated (Amato & Anthony,
2014). Some scholarship has focused on factors
that affect children’s adjustment to divorce
(Emery, 2006). Another line of research exam-
ines adults’ variability in divorce adjustment
(Hetherington & Kelly, 2002). Scholars also
have analyzed interventions and policies for
divorcing couples and children, such as the
impact of divorce education on postdivorce
outcomes (Fackrell, Hawkins, & Kay, 2011)
and court-ordered shared-parenting agreements
(Warshak, 2014). New conceptual perspectives
have been explored as well, such as fram-
ing divorce as a multiple-family transition or
chronic strain rather than a single event or
crisis (Cherlin, 2009), or as an opportunity
for personal growth (Hetherington & Kelly,
2002).
Despite the volume of research and a wealth
of knowledge, Amato (2010) pointed to sev-
eral gaps. The research gap most relevant to
our line of inquiry here is the psychologically
and socially ambiguous state of being “not quite
married and not quite divorced” (Amato, 2010,
p. 661). Many questions arise within this liminal
space of betwixt and between for couples who
are seriously considering or engaged in the pro-
cess of divorce but still not officially such. What
catapults couples into considering divorce?Why
do some couples reconcile and others divorce?
Our primary focus is less on the what and why of
this complex process and more on the how. How
do couples navigate this territory andmake sense
of their experience? How do they talk about their
decision-making process regarding divorce or
reconciliation? How do family researchers, prac-
titioners, and professionals theoretically frame
this process? The purpose of this article is to
critique existing theoretical frameworks used to
understand decision-making processes both gen-
erally in the field of family studies and in the
context of divorce ideation and decision making.
Our goal is to propose future research and the-
ory directions that are better suited to capturing
the complexity of decision-making processes in
the liminal space of the lives of married individ-
uals who are facing the proximate possibility of
divorce.
Why Theorize About Divorce or
Reconciliation Decision Making?
Deciding whether to divorce is not only one of
the most stressful decisions one may encounter
over the life course but also one of the most
difficult. The Holmes and Rahe (1967) Stress
Scale ranks divorce stress as second only to the
death of a spouse. The behavioral economists
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) argued that the kinds
of situations in which individuals perceive deci-
sions as difficult and are least likely to make
good choices are those that (a) involve choices
that have delayed effects (choice and conse-
quences are separated in time); (b) are infre-
quent and rare; (c) provide poor, unclear, or
not-prompt feedback; and (d) involve ambiguous
or confusing relationships between the choice
alternatives and experience. Deciding whether to
divorce meets all of these criteria. Ideally, indi-
viduals who possessed complete information on
past, present, and future events; had unlimited
cognitive abilities; were not physically, men-
tally, and economically stressed; and exercised
full self-control would not make poor decisions
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). However, as decision
makers are human, their probability of creating
these circumstances is low, and so the decision
remains difficult.
In addition to the decision to divorce being
stressful and difficult, it is also common. As the
statistics cited earlier make clear, millions of
individuals have or will face a divorce decision.
Yet these statistics substantially undercount
those affected by divorce ideation. A recent
study of a national sample of married Ameri-
cans found that 25% had recent thoughts about
divorce, and another 28% reported having
thoughts in the past but were still married, indi-
cating that many more people than those who
actually divorce face these kinds of decisions
(National Divorce Decision-Making Project,
2015). Consequently, a better understanding of
the divorce or reconciliation decision-making
process may help family professionals assist,
support, and guide millions of individuals
through a difficult decision and potential
transition in the life course.
It is important to note from the outset the
limitations of the phrase “divorce or recon-
ciliation decision-making process.” Using the
term divorce or reconciliation could be inter-
preted as a somewhat arbitrary polarization of
the many possible choices, actions, and trajecto-
ries embedded in the process that move beyond
the choice of staying in or leaving a relation-
ship. Using the term reconciliation to capture
the broad range of “not divorce” choices that
result in staying together does not capture the
processes of resignation, denial, coping, toler-
ance, or convenience that may lead to staying
together and does not represent a process of mar-
ital repair. As such, although the phrase “divorce
or reconciliation decision-making process” is
used throughout, it does not suggest an either–or
choice, but rather a range of choices that fall
between the two polarities.
Theorizing about divorce and reconciliation
decision making matters because many of our
past models and assumptions about how individ-
uals, families, and couples make decisions are
heavily influenced by paradigms of rationality
that may not fully reflect the lived experience of
most families. According to basic economic the-
ory, the individual is a rational and selfish agent
expected to know his or her preferences (both
present and future) and whose logic of choice is
based on elementary rules of reason (Kahneman,
2011). Individuals are expected to make good
decisions that will maximize those interests.
Rational agents are assumed to make important
decisions carefully, have adequate information
on which to base rational decisions, and use all
the available information.
Abundant research from other disciplines,
however, suggests that humans are neither fully
rational nor completely selfish. To account for
the ways in which human decision makers devi-
ate from the rules of rationality, Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) proposed an alternative to
the economic mainstay of rationality that views
humans as guided by the immediate impact of
gains and losses. Their assertion of the failure
of rationality in the field of economics presented
a deep challenge to two long-held assumptions
about human nature: (a) that humans are gener-
ally rational and their thinking normally sound,
and (b) that emotions such as fear, love, affec-
tion, and hatred explain most of the occasions
when people depart from rationality (rather than
being an integral part of the decision-making
process itself). Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981)
work asserted that distinctive and systematic
errors or patterns in the everyday thinking of nor-
mal people recur predictably. The overwhelm-
ing evidence that reasonable humans cannot be
deemed rational by the standards proposed by
economists and decision theorists does not mean
that humans should be branded as irrational crea-
tures. The biases and heuristics in our thinking
recur predictably and are a normal and expected
part of our humanity that can be traced to the
machinery of cognition rather than to the corrup-
tion of thought by emotion (Kahneman, 2011).
Also important to note are the physical, social,
and economic contexts that can constrain human
decision making, creating what economists call
bounded rationality. The goal in our theoretical
models of decision making, therefore, should be
to recognize and engage rather than ignore this.
Ignoring biases in our process, or pretending we
operate otherwise by constructing models that
emphasize our rationality at the expense of our
emotions, negates our humanity.
Daly (2003) argued that much of what appears
in academic journals is rooted in positivist sci-
ence that has resulted in a set of theoretical
assumptions and explanations that accept that
families act in rational and predictable ways.
Many of our surveys and interview protocols
are thoughtful, rational documents that demand
reasoned, consistent, and coherent answers, and
which consequently portray the families we
study as rational entities. Incompatible experi-
ences, clashing meanings, and difficult concepts
often recede to the background of our research
reports, if they are mentioned at all. The result is
that reason in family life tends to dominate the
other, less recognized human characteristics of
emotion, intuition, will, and experience within
family process (Daly, 2003). This imbalance
is often so great that the importance of reason
obscures all else and distorts our conclusions
from empirical research. For example, belief,
inspiration, intuition, gut feelings, instinct, and
superstition each play an important role in how
families make a wide variety of daily decisions,
but these elements are largely unaccounted for
in our theorizing about family decision-making
processes (Daly, 2003). Perhaps we could
benefit from Lynott’s (1983) advice: “Formal
model makers … with analytic interests in
decision-making … would do well to take
everyday practice more seriously and build
models accordingly” (p. 573).
The entrance and exit to marriage are not
entirely rational processes. Nobel Prize–winning
economist and decision-making theorist Kah-
neman (2011) maintained that emotions are an
important part of human reasoning. He argued
that people can reason and deliberate indefi-
nitely, but if there are no emotions attached
to the options, they will never reach a deci-
sion, because convictions typically do not come
through cool rationality. Instead, they require
caring about others and intuitive feelings about
right and wrong. Family experiences are imbued
with many feelings (e.g., goodness or badness,
urgency or lack of urgency) that influence indi-
viduals on fundamental and emotional levels
to approach or avoid certain situations. These
emotions play a crucial role in decision mak-
ing and typically unconsciously bias the rea-
soning process with somatic markers before it
even begins (Slingerland, 2014). Thus, it may
be only after a decision is made that the rational
mind is called on to construct a logical explana-
tion for one’s primarily emotional response and
assessment of a situation. In fact, the psychol-
ogist Jonathan Haidt (2001, 2012) has argued
that moral judgments and decisions are typi-
cally the result of hot, fast, and visceral emo-
tional reactions to social scenarios, suggesting
a decision-making process driven in large part
by emotions rather than the slow, deliberate,
effortful, and conscious workings of a ratio-
nal mind. Likewise, Garrett-Peters and Burton
(2015) recently argued that “human beings are
not so much rational or fully planning actors,
but rationalizing actors, necessarily responding
to situations and events after the fact and mak-
ing sense of their actions and those of others”
(p. 248).
Overall, creating better theorizing on divorce
decision making matters for three main rea-
sons: (a) the decision to divorce is stressful
and difficult and many people may need help;
(b) divorce ideation is common, and millions
will face a decision with powerful conse-
quences for themselves and their families; and
(c) scholarship needs to humanize rather than
sanitize or rationalize the process. Addressing
these points has theoretical utility and value.
If our decision-making models and theories
better reflect the very human ways in which
we make sense of the world, family scholars
not only can better understand, and hence
represent, lived experience but also can better
design interventions that account for the pre-
dictable and inherent biases embedded in the
decision-making process.
Recent Research and Theory in Family
Studies on Decision Making
The discipline of family studies has used sev-
eral theoretical approaches to understanding
decision-making processes in a wide variety of
substantive areas. A systematic review of schol-
arship from 2000 to the present in relevant, top
family journals in the field (Journal of Marriage
and Family, Journal of Marital and Family
Therapy, Family Relations, Journal of Family
Issues, Family Process, Journal of Divorce and
Remarriage, Journal of Family Psychology,
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships,
and Journal of Family Theory & Review) with
the term decision, decide, or deciding in the title
produced 48 articles (Table 1). Decision making
was explored in a variety of substantive areas,
including reproductive issues (e.g., childbearing,
parenthood, infertility, adoption, childlessness),
household decisions (e.g., purchasing decisions,
household maintenance), life course decisions
(e.g., retirement, migration, caring for aging
parents), health decisions (e.g., life-sustaining
treatment, breast-feeding duration, institution-
alizing family members with a mental illness
or Alzheimer’s), and institutional decisions
(e.g., workplace policies; judicial decisions on
contested custody, family visitation, and foster
care).
Decision-making scholarship with a rela-
tional focus explored a range of intimate
relationships. Most research related to the
decision to enter into marriage focused on
cohabitation issues. Scholarship on decision
making relating to exiting marriage tended to
focus primarily on characteristics of the initiator
of the divorce, factors that influence the decision
to divorce, or decisions relating to custody,
mediation, postdivorce living arrangements,
how children are informed of a divorce, or
women’s postdivorce surname choices. When
scholarship addressed decision making to recon-
cile and stay married, the focus was on women
in abusive relationships or men and women
in involuntarily celibate relationships. Only
one study (Kanewischer & Harris, 2015) gave
partial attention to the divorce decision-making
process and experience. Overall, most of our
research on decision making in family studies
has not necessarily been about decision-making
processes at all, but a rendering of family judg-
ments about decision-making outcomes, an
exploration of the types of decisions made, or
the characteristics of who the decision maker
was (Bell, Baron, Corson, Kostina-Ritchey, &
Frederick, 2014).
The broad theoretical frameworks used to
frame decision-making processes in many of
these substantive areas often included social
exchange theory (Donnelly & Burgess, 2008),
rational choice theory (Shu, Zhu, & Zang, 2012),
resource theory (Szinovacz & Davey, 2005),
bargaining models (Abraham, Ausburg, & Hinz,
2010), or the theory of utility maximization
(Shu et al., 2012), although more interpretive
frameworks—including symbolic interaction-
ism (Garrett-Peters & Burton, 2015), dialogical
theory (Bell et al., 2014), and relational dialectic
theory (Baxter, 2010)—have also been used to
understand decision making.
Theorizing About Divorce or
Reconciliation Decision-Making
Processes
In the next several sections we examine and cri-
tique the dominant decision-making approaches
and theories used both generally in family
studies and specifically within the substantive
domain of divorce ideation and decision mak-
ing, with the goal of proposing future avenues
for research and theory that more closely align
with lived experience. Before engaging in
Table 1. Articles in the Systematic Review of Decision Making
Author(s), Year Focus Decision-Making Area
Theory, Framework,
or Perspective
Abraham, Ausburg, & Hinz, 2010 Life course Migration, dual earners Bargaining
Allen, Baucom, Burnett, Epstein,
& Rankin-Esquer, 2001
Relational Marital, first marriage vs.
remarried
Power, autonomy,
communication
Allen, Husser, Stone, & Joral,
2008
Reproductive Sexuality, adolescent Critical feminist, developmental
Ansay & Perkins, 2001 Institutional Visitation, risk evaluations Family bonding
Bell, Baron, Corson,
Kostina-Ritchey, & Frederick,
2014
Relational Parent–adolescent issues Dialogical, narrative
co-construction
Branden, 2014 Life course Migration, couples Gender ideology and behavior
Burkemper, 2002 Institutional Ethics, therapist Critical evaluative, ethical
decision making
Castaneda, Zambrana, Marsh,
Vega, Becerra, & Perez, 2015
Institutional Work–family policies Intersectionality, family impact
analysis
Ceynar & Gregson, 2012 Institutional Legal name change Narrative, identity
Chabot & Ames, 2004 Reproductive Lesbian motherhood Ecological, feminist
Charvoz, Bodenmann, Bertoni,
Lafrate, & Giuliana, 2008
Relational Divorce initiation Social exchange, equity, dyadic
process
Donnelly & Burgess, 2008 Reproductive Celibacy, stay or leave Social exchange
Few & Rosen, 2005 Relational Dating violence, stay or leave Risk and resilience, vulnerability
Gierveld & Merz, 2013 Household Living arrangements, postdivorce
or death
Ambivalence, boundary
ambiguity, life course
Gumina, 2009 Relational Divorce communication,
parent–child
Narrative
Hank & Kreyenfeld, 2003 Reproductive Child care, fertility Multilevel
Hardesty & Ganong, 2006 Institutional Custody, coparenting, abusive
partner
Narrative, feminist
Hewitt, Western, & Baxter, 2006 Relational Divorce Gender ideology, feminist
Hiller & McCaig, 2007 Life course Migration, couples
Bargaining, decision-making
power
Himmelweit, Santos, Sevilla, &
Sofer, 2013
Household Resource allocation Rational choice, bargaining,
collective
Holtzman, 2011 Institutional Custody Legal, judicial
Ishizawa & Kubo, 2013 Reproductive Adoption Mate selection, endogamous
Jacobson, 2014 Reproductive Adoption, international Media framing
Johnson & Johnson, 2009 Reproductive Infertility Health behavior, help seeking
Kanewischer & Harris, 2015 Relational Staying married Narrative
Kpoor, 2014 Household Maintenance, single parent Systems
Lee & Zvonkovic, 2014 Reproductive Voluntary childlessness Narrative, dyadic process
Lowenstein, 2011 Institutional Child custody; contact Legal, judicial
McWey, Henderson, &
Alexander, 2008
Institutional Foster care Ecological
Mills & Wilmoth, 2002 Health Treatment, life-sustaining medical Life course, intergenerational
transmission
Morison, 2013 Reproductive Parenthood Gender-relational
Newfield, Newfield, Sperry, &
Smith, 2000
Institutional Ethics, therapist Moral reasoning, justice vs. care
Pecchioni, 2001 Life course Family caregiving Implicit decision-making style
Table 1. Continued
Przybyla-Basista, 2008 Relational Divorce mediation, spousal Mediation choice
Rempel & Rempel, 2004 Health Breast-feeding duration Multilevel
Rose, 2008 Household Child care Consumer choice
Schweingruber & Kalil, 2000 Life course Teen-parent families Life course, multigenerational
Sheinberg & True, 2008 Institutional Treatment, relational trauma Recursive decision dialogue
Shu, Zhu, & Zhang, 2012 Relational Power, marital Gender, resource, utility
maximization
Shuey & Hardy, 2003 Life course Assistance, aging parents Kinship system, gender ideology,
resource allocation
Smith & Moen, 2004 Life course Retirement, couples Life course, gender ideology
Smock, Manning, & Porter, 2005 Relational Marrying Economic
Stanley, Rhoades, & Markman, 2006 Relational Marrying Commitment
Stamps, 2002 Institutional Child custody Legal, judicial
Szinovacz & Davey, 2005 Life course Retirement Resource
Tach & Halpern-Meekin, 2012 Relational Cohabitation; childbearing,
pre- and nonmarital
Marital quality
Wallace & Koerner, 2003 Institutional Child custody Legal, judicial
Ziol-Guest, 2009 Household Purchasing Gender ideology
that analysis, however, it is important to be
clear how various levels of theory construction
and research continuously interact. Lavee and
Dollahite (1991) have identified systemic inter-
actions among three components of scientific
activity: (a) broad theoretical frameworks (e.g.,
social exchange theory), (b) midrange theories
rooted in specific substantive areas (e.g., a
theory of marital dissolution), and (c) specific
empirical research. These three levels repre-
sent key components of an ongoing dynamic
interaction between the theorizing and research
activity necessary for scientific progress, which
can begin at any level—whether in the form
of building and refining general theoretical
approaches, building better midrange models,
or conducting empirical research. This arti-
cle examines the interaction between broad
theoretical frameworks identified as rational or
interpretive and the midrange theoretical models
they produce.
Broad Theoretical Frameworks That Inform
the Creation of a Midrange Theory
The intellectual roots of much of what we
know about the divorce or reconciliation
decision-making process can be traced to
two overarching theoretical frameworks or
paradigms for thinking about family process:
rational and interpretive. Both make certain
fundamental assumptions about the social world
as being either rationally explainable or inter-
pretively understood. Rational approaches often
assume that social life can be measured indepen-
dent of context in ways that are replicable and
comparable, whereas interpretive approaches
tend to emphasize constructed meaning and
subjective experiences, and seek to understand
how people give meaning to their experience
(Goodsell & Zvonkovic, 2015). The midrange
theories about divorce decision making that flow
from these rational or interpretive frameworks
often fall into similar categories, although the
lines may not be as rigidly demarcated. Some
research and theory work may not be read-
ily classified as either entirely interpretive or
entirely rational and may already demonstrate
elements of theoretical integration. As such,
identifying two distinct theoretical frameworks
is a somewhat arbitrary and clumsy intellectual
classification, because crossover does exist.
However, it remains a useful way to organize
major trends at the meta-level in our theorizing
and helps trace midrange theory construction
back to its intellectual roots. This process also
has the advantage of revealing potential blind
spots in our thinking. Inadvertently invoking
or employing the unquestioned assumptions
regarding reality that exist at the broad level
of the theoretical framework when engaging
with midrange theories can unintentionally and
unnecessarily place blinders on family scholars
and consequently influence how they represent
family processes at the midrange level. These
blind spots could potentially be ameliorated if
a hybrid theoretical approach to the divorce or
reconciliation decision-making process at both
the meta-level and the midrange levels were
more explicitly explored and developed.
In this article, we do not argue for the superi-
ority of one broad theoretical approach over the
other. Rather, we identify some links between
broad theoretical frameworks and the specific
midrange theories and models of divorce pro-
cesses and decision making they produce in
order to propose a theoretical hybrid that bet-
ter represents the complexity of divorce ideation
and decision making. We hope that finding cre-
ative ways to compare diverse theoretical frame-
works and applying that analysis to ourmidrange
theorizing will create theoretical pluralism com-
mensurate with the complex experiences of real
families as they make decisions about the future
of their marriage. Thus, our goal is to build a
case for a theoretical hybrid model by emphasiz-
ing the limitations of both rational and interpre-
tive theoretical frameworks of understanding the
divorce or reconciliation decision-making pro-
cess as they are used at the level of midrange
theorizing. From this critique, we propose key
elements of a preliminary midrange theoretical
model to better capture the complexity of the
divorce or reconciliation decision-making pro-
cess and move research and theory forward in
this domain.
Rational Theoretical Frameworks
Meta-Level Theorizing on Decision-Making
Processes
By far, the most common theory used to under-
stand decision-making processes within the
rational theoretical framework has been some
variation of social exchange theory. The central
premise of social exchange theory is that indi-
viduals act in utilitarian ways that seem rational
to them. In any social interaction, individuals are
considered primarily motivated by self-interest
in the pursuit of maximizing rewards and min-
imizing costs to obtain the most profitable
outcome. In the context of a couple relationship,
rewards and costs are evaluated using several
reference points—comparing what individuals
believe they should get from a relationship
to what they believe they could get from an
alternative relationship, as well as comparing
whether the distribution of rewards and costs is
fair between themselves and their partner (Byrd,
2009; Donnelly & Burgess, 2008).
If the relationship is distressed, or the balance
of rewards is too heavily weighted in the part-
ner’s favor, individuals may bargain or negotiate
for a new balance by attempting to limit costs,
seek rewards, find alternative satisfactions, or
leave the relationship. Perceptions of rewards
and costs vary from person to person and may
shift over time. This may explain why some peo-
ple stay in a relationship that, according to this
model seems inequitable, because the long-term
investment of time and resources may shift the
perception of costs and benefits. In this frame-
work, marital commitment, or lack thereof, can
be seen as a subjective assessment of three key
elements: attraction (the rewards associated with
a particular relationship), alternatives (compari-
son points—the potential rewards of a different
relationship), and barriers to marital dissolution
(costs) (Levinger, 1980). In a satisfying relation-
ship, barriers to marital dissolution may carry
less weight, but they can become significant
in troubled relationships, possibly compelling
people to stay in unhappy or even unhealthy
relationships (Byrd, 2009; Donnelly & Burgess,
2008). Decision-making models informed by
social exchange theory often divide the process
into sequential stages: (a) appraising the chal-
lenge, (b) surveying alternatives, (c) weighing
alternatives, (d) deliberating about commitment,
and (e) adhering despite negative feedback (Janis
& Mann, 1977).
In summary, research and theory grounded
in rational frameworks tend to privilege or
center the decision-making discourse on min-
imizing costs, maximizing rewards, individual
self-interest, comparisons, alternatives, bar-
gaining or negotiation patterns used to gain
power, investments of time and other valued
resources, resources accrued, distributions of
costs and resources, perceptions of fairness,
relative power or authority, structural and
normative bases of power relating to cultural
norms and gender roles, strategies used to
maximize the overall, combined, and common
welfare of the family members, and individual
preferences, satisfaction, and motivation, as well
as individual, systemic, societal, and cultural
barriers or supports. Although these ideas are
firmly rooted in a social exchange perspective,
elements of this way of thinking can also be
found in similar approaches, including rational
choice theory (Shu et al., 2012), resource theory
(Szinovacz & Davey, 2005), bargaining models
(Abraham et al., 2010), and the theory of utility
maximization (Shu et al., 2012).
Midrange Theorizing on Divorce or
Reconciliation Decision-Making Processes
Currently, little research has focused on the
decision-making process involved in divorce
ideation (Kanewischer & Harris, 2015). Conse-
quently, no midrange theories or models unique
to divorce or reconciliation decision-making
processes exist within the rational theo-
retical frame. As such, there are simply no
midrange models to critique. A high number of
stages-of-divorce models produced between the
late 1960s and early 1990s were formative in
mapping the overall general uncoupling process
of divorce itself, but not the actual decision
making embedded in that process. Much can
be learned, however, from this midrange theory
work of uncoupling found in the general stage
models of divorce that can inform future con-
ceptualizations of the divorce or reconciliation
decision-making process.
The foci of the divorce stage models vary.
Some focused on the period, factors, or condi-
tions leading up to the decision to terminate the
relationship (Levinger, 1980); others described
the critical events of the uncoupling process
itself and the move toward singlehood (Lee,
1984; Vaughn, 1990). Likewise, some models
focused on sequences of an extended process
that go far beyond the decision to leave (Rollie
&Duck, 2006), and others focused on one aspect
of the process, such as strategies for handling the
breakup or the types of consequences following
relationship endings (Bohannan, 1968).
Challenges and Considerations for Theory
Development in the Rational Theoretical
Framework
Many critiques of the stage models of divorce
exist on which future theory development can
build. For example, most stage models represent
the divorce process as a linear progression
through a series of events (beginning from
initiation of the divorce to coping and moving
on) but say virtually nothing about the internal
decision-making process that catalyzed the
movements from stage to stage. Because most
stage models reduce relational processes to their
most basic and universal components, they also
tend to lose their ability to describe complex
processes adequately. As such, it is likely that
the portrayed linear dissolution progression may
simply be a function of the reporting of the pro-
cess rather than the actual experience (Rollie &
Duck, 2006). In fact, Lynott (1983) argued that
“the rational model is not as representative of
the decision-making process as it is a practical
artifact” (p. 559).
Assuming a linear progression in marital dis-
solution also tends to present divorce as a sin-
gular event (with its subsequent focus on the
causes leading up to or predicting the event)
rather than a process that moves far beyond legal
recognition that the relationship has been ter-
minated (Rollie & Duck, 2006). Relationships
with former partners rarely truly end or fully
dissolve. Rather, they change, transform, and
are redefined under different relational rules and
expectations as part of their development over
time. Therefore, many arguably dissolved rela-
tionships reemerge in different forms, such as
a coparenting relationship, and some divorced
couples eventually reconcile (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1993; Wineberg, 1994). This kind of
long-term fluidity and complexity in relationship
trajectories is rarely captured in stage models.
Another limitation of the stage models of
divorce is their tendency to focus on a single end
point (divorce) that ignores an alternate outcome
that is also possible within divorce ideation,
such as staying together. Perhaps models that
minimize or ignore nondivorce trajectories are
focused only on trying to understand divorce and
not the decision-making process of whether to
end or continue a marriage. If so, then it may
be unfair to criticize them for the singular focus.
However, the lack of attention in stage models
of divorce on the possibility of reconciliation
means that family scholars and practitioners are
missing a crucial dynamic that is also important
to understand. Knowing how couples come back
from the brink of divorce may be just as impor-
tant as knowing how divorced couples got there.
Models open to the reality of reconciliation
may better inform actual decision-making pro-
cesses because they move beyond descriptively
outlining the stages of marital dissolution. Thus,
models that can accommodate alternate out-
comes and shed light on how individuals and
couples choose them are as important as mod-
els that begin with a predetermined outcome
and detail how people get there. Placing those
who stay together outside our models leaves the
models applicable only to those who decide to
end a marriage and limits our ability to under-
stand and help those who do not. Moreover,
these models should be open to the decisions
or actions involved in the outcome of stay-
ing together when it may not include repair
or reconciliation. Models should accommodate
alternative trajectories where individuals and
couples decide—actively or passively—to stay
in the relationship without resolving problems.
Interestingly, many empirical studies also
leave out those couples who decide to remain
together, although a large proportion of those
continue to engage in divorce ideation (National
Divorce Decision-Making Project, 2015).
Exceptions to this are the work done by
Kanewischer and Harris (2015) on married
women who were considering divorce but
decided to remain married, as well as a vari-
ety of articles on individuals who decide to
stay married in challenging marital contexts
such as abusive relationships (Few & Rosen,
2005; Khaw & Hardesty, 2009), or involuntary
celibacy (Donnelly & Burgess, 2008).
Another limitation of divorce stage models is
that they tend to focus on the decision-making
spouse and do not account for the reality that
many divorce decisions are not mutual. That is,
in many cases one spouse is making a decision
to terminate the marriage while the other spouse
is resisting that outcome. Current models can-
not accommodate well the reality that some
spouses are not deciding to divorce but rather
are receiving a spouse’s decision to end the mar-
riage. Hence, for a large number of people, “the
divorce decision-making process” is a poor way
to describe what they are actually experiencing.
Similarly, relational dissolution tends to be mod-
eled from the perspective of the individual initi-
ating the breakup, with the assumption that both
individuals are at the same stage at the same time
and move through the model at the same speed
(althoughmost models simply ignore the nonini-
tiating spouse). Consequently, most models may
poorly depict relational and couple processes
(Rollie & Duck, 2006). Finally, Rollie and Duck
(2006) also argued that reliance on data from
heterosexual college romances or established
White, middle-class marriages places severe
limitations on the generalizability of the stage
models of divorce these samples produced.
In summary, it is paramount to recognize that
much of the midrange theory work done on
divorce modeling has much more to do with
describing a general process of uncoupling and
much less to do with the actual decision mak-
ing involved in the uncoupling (or recoupling)
process. This oversight cannot be emphasized
enough, and future research and theory con-
struction in this domain could benefit from a
better understanding of what people are think-
ing and how they make decisions when consid-
ering divorce, because midrange stage models
have little to say explicitly about the divorce
or reconciliation decision-making process. The
implicit conceptualization of decision making
that attempts to reduce uncertainty, increase
predictability, and create the idea of a linear,
somewhat rational relationship over a short-term
period has clear limitations. In addition, the
models’White, middle-class bias tends to ignore
the ways in which decisionmaking is profoundly
influenced by values and identity firmly located
in the social context perpetuated through race,
class, and gender relations. The primary critique
of the available midrange theories informed by
a rational framework on divorce decision mak-
ing, however, is the paucity of theory on the
decision-making process itself.
Interpretive Theoretical Framework
Meta-Level Theorizing on Decision-Making
Processes
Some family scholars have chosen to exam-
ine general decision-making processes within
a more social constructionist or interpretive
theoretical framework. Helpful approaches
include dialogical theory (Bell et al., 2014),
relational dialectic theory (Baxter, 2010), and
symbolic interactionism (Garrett-Peters & Bur-
ton, 2015). The main assumption of dialogism
is that sense making is dynamic. Thus, deci-
sion making must be viewed as composed of
actions rather than states, and as being inher-
ently social, interactive, and intersubjective. As
such, decisions are considered constrained or
afforded within a dynamically changing con-
text and interdependent with discursive worlds
mediated by language, perceptions, habits, and
artifacts (Linell, 2009). Relational dialectic
theory is similar to dialogism in that it focuses
on relationship processes, the mutuality and
individuality of meaning construction in rela-
tionships, the dialectical tensions in meanings,
and the interchange between meanings and the
larger context. It highlights a decision-making
process driven by multiple individuals (e.g.,
partners, religious and family groups, siblings,
possible affair partners) in active collabora-
tion and communication with one another, in
an attempt to create an understanding of the
situation by incorporating multiple, poten-
tially conflicting points of view (Baxter, 2010).
Important within any dialogical or dialectical
examination of decision making is positioning
(Davies & Harré, 1990). Who initiates the dis-
cussion? How is information gathered? What
strategies are used to obtain goals? Positioning
helps keep the focus on the decision-making
process and a relational co-construction analy-
sis rather than the outcome. The emphasis on
transactional processes and emergent meanings
within the interaction between partners and
among interested parties shifts the questions
from the what to the how of decision making.
Similarly, symbolic interactionist theory views
decisions as ongoing, negotiated, and socially
constructed interactional accomplishments that
take place in everyday interactions and adap-
tations to constraining social circumstances
(Garrett-Peters & Burton, 2015).
In summary, interpretive decision-making
theories tend to emphasize a socially interactive
and intersubjective meaning, real and imagined
dialogues, multiple and potentially conflict-
ing points of view, incongruence, particular
decision-making contexts, and the importance
of positioning.Most important to the interpretive
framework in understanding decision making is
the idea that narration itself is a type of decision
making. For example, the ways in which people
choose to narrate and make sense and meaning
out of events helps them understand events,
justify actions, and negotiate identities, which
is integral to the decision-making process itself.
As such, how individuals choose to tell the story
of their marriage to themselves and others may
closely mirror the embedded decision-making
process.
Midrange Theorizing on Divorce or
Reconciliation Decision-Making Processes
Only a few family scholars to date (Honeycutt,
1993; Hopper, 2001; Kanewischer & Harris,
2015) have used interpretive approaches to
explore, albeit somewhat indirectly, divorce
decision-making processes. All three used inter-
pretive approaches where the establishment of a
socially, as well as personally, valid account of
the ending or reconciliation of one’s marriage is
important. Because of their qualitative method-
ologies (grounded theory or phenomenological
study), they do not argue for the same level of
generalizability found in the midrange stage
models of divorce critiqued earlier. However,
they remain midrange theories because they
include abstract renderings of specific social
phenomena grounded in a systematic analysis of
data particular to a specific substantive area. For
example, Hopper (2001) used grounded theory
analysis to explore the transition from believing
marriage is a sacred institution to dissolving
the sacred, to constructing the marriage that
never was, and ending with the idea that the
marriage was a lie. Hopper’s analysis focuses
primarily on the symbolic origins of conflict
in divorce, and Kanewischer and Harris (2015)
used phenomenology to explore the role of
therapy in women’s decisions not to divorce.
Honeycutt (1993), in contrast, took a more theo-
retical approach to exploring the ways in which
individuals organize cognitions about relational
change either toward growth or toward decline.
None of these authors explicitly attempted to
build a midrange theory of the divorce or recon-
ciliation decision-making process, but they all
produced midrange theories regarding marital
dissolution that certainly could benefit such an
endeavor.
Challenges and Considerations for Theory
Development in the Interpretive Theoretical
Framework
Despite the strengths of interpretive and narra-
tive approaches in pursing paradox, contradic-
tion, and nuance (Goodsell & Zvonkovic, 2015;
Holmberg, Orbuch, & Veroff, 2003), many chal-
lenges present themselves for consideration in
future theory development. Many of these chal-
lenges remain theoretically abstract in that they
could be applied to a number of studies that use
an interpretive approach. One such clear limi-
tation in narrative approaches is the centrality
of the self as the storyteller and the inherent
biases that presents. The self, for example, may
choose to rework and reframe potentially stig-
matic elements in one’s past relational life in
ways that can present the self as a valuable and
viable future partner for someone else (Honey-
cutt, 1993). Likewise, differences in story con-
struction may depend on whether one was the
initiator of the divorce. Hopper (2001) found that
for the initiators of the divorce to neutralize their
culpability for the violation of their marriage,
they had to come to see their marriages as being
bad from the start, fundamentally and irrevoca-
bly flawed, and suffering from long and deeply
rooted structural issues. The story can also shift
depending on the audience for the story and the
storyteller’s assessments of that audience’s val-
ues, investment, and relationship to the story.
Overall, this renders the story less stable and
more fluid as the individual narrative changes
over time and is dependent on the intended audi-
ence (Honeycutt, 1993).
The need to make sense of one’s experience
also profoundly shapes retrospective, individ-
ual narrative constructions of divorce because
of the tendency to leave out or diminish ambi-
guity, inconsistency, contradiction, and turmoil
experienced throughout the process (Rollie &
Duck, 2006). This omission tends to smooth out
the confusion and report with certainty things
that were much more unclear when they hap-
pened, which creates an illusion of a somewhat
linear relationship between events and charac-
ters from beginning to end. As Garrett-Peters
and Burton (2015) observed, this propensity to
be “rationalizing actors” allows one to respond
to situations and events after the fact and make
sense of what happened through the telling of a
story. The “peak end rule” often ensures that the
story is represented by markers of a clear begin-
ning, peak, and end (Kahneman, 2011) rather
than the more convoluted way it was actually
experienced.
Retellings of narratives are often selective.
For example, when asked to reconstruct former
beliefs, people often retrieve current ones instead
(an instance of substitution) and have a hard
time reconstructing past states of knowledge or
beliefs that have changed (Rollie & Duck, 2006;
Kahneman, 2011). Thus, when an unpredicted
event occurs (e.g., the discovery of an affair),
people tend to adjust their view of the world to
accommodate the surprise and lose much of their
ability to recall what they used to believe before
their mind changed, making it hard to recall what
the marriage was like before the affair happened.
Similarly, when telling a story, it is much eas-
ier to remember the bad, difficult, and stressful
experiences instead of the positive ones, because
these emotions are more thoroughly processed
and most readily available for recall when asked
for a narrative of the divorce (Kahneman, 2011).
Consequently, individuals often give the good
and bad parts of their marriage equal weight,
even though the good part may have lasted 10
times as long as the bad.
Likewise, we tend to pay attention to large
and memorable events rather than the small non-
events when telling a story. This kind of “dura-
tion neglect” is normal and means that elements
of “non-choice-making” and “non-events” are
often rendered invisible because of their pro-
saic nature (Kahneman, 2011; Morison, 2013;
Morson, 2010; Murdoch, 1970). The seemingly
insignificant choices made over the duration of
a marriage can carry tremendous cumulative
weight, although they may rarely be recalled as
pivotal moments when deciding whether to get a
divorce. Thus, “at crucial moments of choice …
most of the business of choosing is already over”
(Murdoch, 1970, p. 37). This may not mean that
everything leading up to a major life decision
was passive but simply that decision making is
a “small piecemeal business, which goes on all
the time and [is] not a grandiose leaping about
unimpeded at important moments” (p. 36). This
suggests that decisions to dissolve a marriage
may occur within the scope of the numerous
nonevents embedded in pedestrian behaviors and
prosaic communications that may never garner
the attention of participants or researchers (Rol-
lie & Duck, 2006).
Finally, individual narratives always take
place in a much larger social context. Morson
(2010) argued that it is impossible to tell one’s
own story about love and marriage because
much of what one says depends on what soci-
ety has taught one to say and the language
available to express it. Thus, individual sto-
ries of marriage often refer to much larger,
more powerful, and culturally accepted scripts
for love, marriage, and marital dissolution.
Honeycutt (1993) found these scripts to be
helpful in organizing the chaotic experience
of marital dissolution in a way that conforms
to societal beliefs and expectations. But he
also argued that the reports given to researchers
about marriage may tell less about the process of
dissolution andmore about how participants pro-
cessed the event according to accepted, socially
scripted means of sense making inflected with
already-spoken traces of the broader cultural
narrative of marriage (Baxter 2010; Honeycutt,
1993).
Several scholars (Baxter, 2010; Cherlin,
2009; Morson, 2010; Swidler, 2001) have
explored these macrocultural discourses on love
that govern the entrance, engine, and exit of
marriage. They argue that these broad cultural
narratives not only powerfully shape, guide,
and frame the appropriate or approved story
of marriage (and its potential dissolution) but
also create a cross-current of multiple and con-
flicting perspectives that present simultaneously
competing and conflicting viewpoints.
In summary, despite the many strengths
of interpretive approaches, inherent biases
embedded in the way individuals tell stories
provide considerations for future research and
theory development. Narrative explorations of
the divorce or reconciliation decision-making
process are vulnerable to the ways in which indi-
viduals reframe, reinterpret, and retell events
in ways that make sense with their current
understanding of the situation and the audience
to which they are telling the story. This might
mean leaving out potentially stigmatic elements,
reframing events, shifting foci, reducing or
removing ambiguity and inconsistency, not
including small issues or nonevents, or being
unaware of how broad cultural scripts are dic-
tating what is being said. It is imperative that
future theory development in this domain be
able to understand and account for these very
human ways in which we make sense of our
experiences.
Where Do We Go From Here?
Future Research and Theory: Proposing a
Preliminary Model
Thus far, we have (a) provided a rationale for
understanding why the divorce or reconcil-
iation decision-making process matters, (b)
explored how decision-making processes within
family studies (both generally and specifi-
cally in the context of divorce ideation) have
been researched and theorized, and (c) exam-
ined numerous challenges and considerations
embedded in these approaches for future the-
ory development in divorce or reconciliation
decision-making processes. Our critical review
of the research and theory guiding the field
in this domain suggests that to move forward,
future theory development needs to be atten-
tive to the possibility of alternative choice
trajectories, including deciding to stay together;
interpretive, interactive, and intersubjective
relational dialogic and narrative processes in
individuals and between partners; complex
processes of relational change that evolve over
time; and the role of emotions, incongruities,
and bias in decision-making processes. This
analysis suggests the need for a midrange theory
that not only is aware of the limitations of both
rational and interpretive theoretical frameworks
but also address them by using the strengths of
divergent approaches.
Interestingly, this challenge requires both
methodological and theoretical innovation.
From a methodological standpoint, to model
complex relational change over time, one needs
to collect data at multiple points in time. Using
a longitudinal qualitative design not only would
facilitate theory development that retains the
strengths of interpretive approaches but also
could address some of the challenges associ-
ated with the narrative constructions that can
be traced back to the inherently retrospective
nature of the study design. For example, in a
typical qualitatively designed study, participants
are often asked to make sense of something
that has happened to them in the past and as
such, the narrative they construct is susceptible
to the predictable biases of hindsight, affect
availability, focusing illusions, and the peak-end
rule discussed earlier. In contrast, a methodolog-
ical design that is more prospective in nature
(e.g., a longitudinal qualitative design) allows
for researchers to move beyond contextualized
snapshots of processes and people to a more
continuous mapping of changes in process,
emotions, beliefs, and actions in real time. The
latter has the advantage that participants have
less time to retrospectively construct a narrative,
because they are asked at multiple points in
time to construct that narrative. Of course, those
accounts are subject to distortion due to inherent
narrative biases, but having a record of what
a participant shared at Times 1 and 2 on the
same topic may better enable researchers to
detect and inquire about the distortion. This
methodological practice would address many
of the existing challenges in the interpretive
approach.
In addition tomethodological innovation, the-
oretical innovation is also needed—particularly
innovation that addresses the identified limita-
tions of the rational framework. We propose
that adopting a fundamentally dialectical struc-
ture to future theory building will help rem-
edy this problem. Several scholars have used
dialectical thinking to better understand pro-
cesses relevant to family life (Allen, 2008; Bax-
ter, 2004, 2010; Baxter & Montgomery, 1996;
Blume & Blume, 2003). The central premise
of dialectical theory is that encounters with
contradiction and opposing perspectives cre-
ate a state of constant negotiation and change.
Dialectical modeling tends to bring to the fore-
ground underlying tensions, ambiguities, disso-
nance, uncertainty, and ambivalence, and com-
plements the identified limitations of the rational
framework.
Hegelian dialectics often use dualities where
movement from thesis to antithesis is resolved
with a synthesis. More recent critiques and
scholarship by Baxter (2004) and Blume and
Blume (2003), however, suggest that these
paradoxical elements cannot easily be reduced
to dualities or resolve in synthesis, because their
intersections are unstable and indeterminate.
Therefore, rather than focusing on a resolu-
tion of tensions, one can only hope to “create
fleeting moments of wholeness in which com-
peting fragments and disorder are temporarily
united” (Baxter, 2004, p. 186). This dialectical
framework is well suited to better understanding
the strategies used in negotiating and man-
aging tensions over time and the emergent
meanings and practices that arise as tensions
within the decision-making process interact and
challenge each other. In addition, this “messy
dialogue of competing discourses” (Baxter,
2004, p. 186) may allow for our theorizing
on divorce or reconciliation decision making
to capture a more complicated, inconsistent,
unpredictable, irregular, incoherent, fluid, and
changeable process than previous theories could
demonstrate.
Dialectical Tensions Embedded in the
Divorce or Reconciliation
Decision-Making Process
To explore the potential of dialectical mod-
eling within the substantive area of divorce
or reconciliation decision making, examples in
this section are drawn from a qualitative study
derived from the National Divorce Decision
Making Project (2015).1 Preliminary findings
1The study involved in-depth interviews with a subsam-
ple of 30 participants from the Wave 1 survey respondent
pool (N = 3,000) regarding their divorce decision-making
process. Analysis of the interviews followed principles of
general qualitative thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006),
as well as elements of Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) coding
suggest that the experience of divorce or recon-
ciliation decision making emerges from a dialec-
tical interaction among a number of polarities
that are in parallel and simultaneous process
with each other. These tensions are the catalyst
for constant balancing and rebalancing behav-
iors that act as a mechanism for marital change
toward growth, entropy, or status quo. Although
the dialectical elements of the decision-making
process are woven from multiple threads, we
have identified four key interdependent strands
ofmeaning that animate the process: time, space,
logic, and dialogue (these four strands are the
result of grounded theory data analysis using
open, axial, and selective coding). These are
modeled in Figure 1, along with some of their
corresponding dialectical elements. Strauss and
Corbin (1998) argued that when building the-
ory, one needs to examine not only the repre-
sentativeness of key concepts but also how the
concepts vary dimensionally. Thus, although we
discuss each of these strands separately, they
comprise multiple dialectical tensions that pro-
vide dimension to the concept and form an over-
all interdependent whole.
Time
The divorce or reconciliation decision-making
process operates within the constraints of time,
and as such, it evidences multiple contradictory
experiences of time that include recurring issues,
patterns of difficulty, temporary issues, chronic
issues, and future forecasting of the relationship.
Divorce ideation, therefore, unfolds in reflec-
tions on the past, present, and future of the rela-
tionship, with special attention to the timing or
pacing of particular events or actions and their
consequences. For example, participants often
explored questions that were time based, such as,
“Where am I in my life? How much time have
I spent in this relationship? How much longer
can I stand to be in it? Should I wait (for major
life events such as when the children leave)
before making a decision to end this marriage?”
Dialectical tensions within the temporal dimen-
sion could explore these diverse experience of
time—for example, tensions between time as
protocol for grounded theory 1-year follow-up interviews
with this subsample currently are underway. Please contact
the authors for complete details regarding study design and
methodology.
Figure 1. Dialectical Tensions Embedded in the
Divorce or Reconciliation Decision-Making Process.
being circular or linear, chronic or acute (see
Figure 1 for other possible tensions).
Dimensionalizing time in a dialectical man-
ner moves decision-making processes outside
the traditional frame of clock time flowing for-
ward in a linear, incremental, and sequential
fashion to a much broader array of possibilities.
This more dynamic conceptualization of time
fits with Kanewischer and Harris’s (2015) find-
ing that the decision not to pursue a divorce
and remain married did not occur at a specific
time. Rather, it involved a gradual process that
slowly evolved as participants felt themselves
and their spouse changing but also cycled back-
ward to thoughts about divorce when things got
difficult. Thus, continued thoughts about divorce
were common, although participants learned in
time to trust the changes they were seeing in
themselves and their partner.
Likewise, decisions relating to relationship
dissolution are likely nonlinear processes that
double back, returning to earlier stages, or
go over the same ground multiple times in a
non-recursive pattern. The decision whether
to divorce, therefore, is made multiple times,
because the outcome of that decision is, in many
instances, to stay together, although that deci-
sion is not final. Consequently, an individual
may have to decide multiple times whether
to divorce before the formal legal divorce is
finalized or the marriage is stable.
Space
Bakhtin argued that social life can be fully
understood only locally and concretely and
that contradictions are best understood in situ
(see Baxter, 2004). Grounding decision mak-
ing in time and space, therefore, is important.
For example, when Garrett-Peters and Burton
(2015) explored low-income mothers’ decisions
to marry, they found that research often pre-
sented a “relatively static, one-dimensional and
often atheoretical perspective of low-income
mothers divorced from their everyday inter-
actions and adaptations to constraining social
circumstances” (p. 246). The social and physical
environment and context can profoundly affect
how people make decisions regarding the future
of their marriage and cannot be ignored. For
example, in our research, spatial issues, such as
shared versus separate bedrooms, the logistics
of shuttling children between two residences,
switching school districts, and the availability
and affordability of adequate separate living
arrangements and household furnishings were
all important spatial considerations.
In addition to the social and contextual loca-
tion of the decision-making process, spatial con-
siderations can also refer to the metaphoric and
figurative emotional geography of marriage. For
example, in our research participants referred to
being in “a better place,” getting to the “other
side,” going through a “rough spot,” or get-
ting “out of a rut” to signify moving to a new
place in their marriage. Figure 1 suggests poten-
tial dialectical tensions embedded in the spatial
dimension.
Logic
The decision-making process simultaneously
engages a rational and emotional logic that is
in constant dialectical tension. In our research,
negative emotional experiences and percep-
tions often prompted a rational examination
of the future of the relationship that involved
participants listing the reasons their marriage
appeared to be in trouble. Reasons included
the dialectics of soft–serious, prosaic–pivotal,
simple–extensive, and moderate–severe. Partic-
ipants were often caught between a rational and
an emotional logic when attempting to under-
stand their situation. For example, participants
rationally weighed rewards, costs, alternatives,
fairness, and investment in the relationship
(as the major tenets of social exchange the-
ory suggest) against other powerful emotions
less conducive to such calibrations, such as
love, happiness, rejection, and betrayal, and
they struggled with how to make sense of
it all. Dialectical tensions important in this
domain would include rational–emotional and
soft–serious.
Dialogue
Divorce ideation is marked by several internal
and external dialogues. For example, in our
research, participants did much of the thinking
about divorce internally, without sharing any
of their thoughts with others, including their
spouse. Internal dialogues included affirm-
ing or questioning commitment, identifying
areas of dissatisfaction, repetitively running
through possible future scenarios, evaluating the
relationship, engaging in self-reflection, exam-
ining personal identity and values, and having
imagined conversations with others. In contrast,
external dialogue involved a conversation (either
real or imagined) with something outside the
self—either proximal (e.g., friend, coworker,
family member, clergy member, therapist) or
distal (e.g., imagined conversation with the
much broader cultural narrative on love and
marriage) to the participant—and represented
a variety of significant reference points (e.g.,
a parent’s or friend’s marriage). Elements of
thinking, reflecting, evaluating, and question-
ing are also found in the external dialogues,
the only difference being that one dialogue is
private and the other, public. Figure 1 suggests
some dialectical tensions important within this
domain.
Navigating Dialectical Tensions:
Balancing Act
This proposed theoretical modeling sug-
gests that the divorce or reconciliation
decision-making process can be typified as
an attempt to simultaneously balance contra-
dictory dimensions as they constantly shift
and interact. Part of the balancing involves a
constant examination of what one thinks and
what one feels, a consideration of the needs of
the self and others, a reflection on the weight of
the past on the present and future possibilities
of the relationship, and a number of internal
and external conversations. Attempting to find
the perfect balance helps identify thresholds
or tipping points that can pull the dialectical
tension so far out of line that it necessitates or
catalyzes strategies for change.
Potential Pathways Forward
The process of navigating dialectical tensions
embedded in the decision-making process acts
as a catalyst for change resulting in the selection
of strategies for marital growth, entropy, or
maintenance. This process is not unlike the
Garrett-Peters and Burton (2015) finding that
low-income women’s decision to marry often
waxed, waned, and wavered. Likewise, strate-
gies to navigate dialectical tensions and attempts
to resolve or balance them (if only temporarily)
can put partners on transient, unstable, and
fluctuating trajectories of growth (typified
by further investment in the relationship),
entropy (typified by lessened investment in
the relationship), or further ambivalence (typ-
ified by maintaining a limited status quo). In
addition to using terms such as waxing, wan-
ing, and wavering to represent pathways of
growth, entropy, and maintenance, other terms,
such as leaning in, leaning out, and holding
on, or approaching, avoiding, and ignoring,
also capture a similar process. Dialectical
tensions active in this domain include using
strategies that are active–passive, overt–
covert, conscious–unconscious, intentional–
unintentional, and direct–indirect.
Conclusion
A midrange model of divorce or reconciliation
decision-making processes grounded in dialec-
tical tensions can help remedy some of the
challenges found in previous theorizing that
was situated in primarily rational or interpre-
tive paradigms. If family scholars want to bet-
ter understand how individuals make decisions
within the liminal space of beingmarried but fac-
ing the proximate possibility of divorce, we need
to create theoretical frameworks that can capture
the process’s evolving complexity in ways that
are attentive not only to its many rational ele-
ments but also to the nonrational, nonlinear, and
emotional—that is, fully human—ways inwhich
individuals make sense of their lives.
Although many challenges still remain,
methodological and theoretical innovations
can lead to the creation of midrange theoret-
ical models that reflect the decision-making
process and incorporate the voice of reason
found in rational theoretical frames as well as
the inherently social, interactive, intersubjec-
tive, and sometimes conflicting elements of
narrative construction. Despite the numerous
difficulties embedded in the stories we use to
make sense and meaning out of our lives, a
longitudinal qualitative design that explores
dialectical tensions in the divorce or reconcil-
iation decision-making process is perhaps our
best window on the messy and fleshy ways
in which families live out their complicated
lives.
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