THE GOLDEN SPY-MASTERS & THE DEVOLUTION OF THE WEST IN BRITISH
ESPIONAGE FICTION

by

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| 1.       | FREEZE FRAMING                                                                 | 1 |
| Endnotes |                                                                                           | 9 |
| 2.       | COLD WAR SPACES & BRITAIN’S SECRET WEST                                                    | 11|
| Endnotes |                                                                                           | 22|
| 3.       | THE BOND EMPIRE: THE WEST & THE GOLDEN AGE OF ESPIONAGE                                   | 25|
| Endnotes |                                                                                           | 45|
| 4.       | TRUTH & DISILLUSSIONMENT IN LE CARRÉ’S COLD WAR WEST                                      | 47|
| Endnotes |                                                                                           | 68|
| 5.       | THE LIMINAL FRONTIER                                                                       | 70|
| Endnotes |                                                                                           | 75|
| BIBLIOGRAPHY                                   |                                           | 76|
ABSTRACT

The action of espionage has a tradition historically spanning millennia, reaching its peak of its public interest in the 20th Century when the spy went from state villain to international hero. With the support of the multinational public’s explosive interest in spies and their politics, the literary world heralded the entrance of the professional provocateur into the numbers of the greatest literary figures ever known. But as the wars of the 20th Century and the role of the spy changed, cracks began to show in the edifices of state political morality through the cloak and dagger heroes of espionage fiction.

Between two of the genre’s most eminent authors, Ian Fleming and John Le Carré, the separation of representations of the West reveals the unique presence of an unspoken contradiction between the ethics of the British state and the ethics of the Western para-global societal alliance. Utilizing the heroism and liminality of the spy figure, these two authors portray the British state diametrically differently: one staunchly avoiding the friction and disillusionment of postwar Britain as a geopolitically ambiguous Western power, and the other embracing it. The differences in their Wests characterizes a series of evolving worldviews and perspectives on Britain’s place within the Western hierarchy during the Cold War, emphasizing the growing social distance within the Anglo-American alliance and the development of the secret agent as a means of both reinforcing and subverting implicit societal ideals. By bringing into question not only what the West is to Britain, but why it can still be identified as a political entity even as it changes upturned perceptions of unity for the Western façade. The upheaval of this implicit perception highlighted the difference in the needs of two different generations of authors, readers, and spies to grapple with the ubiquitous presence of the West. For as in the clandestine world of real spies and their masters, nothing sacred, not even the West, can hold.
FREEZE FRAMING

Good fiction can educate us as case studies can, by providing moral exemplars who embody our values and aspirations. We can study the individuals portrayed and discover models of character or patterns of loyalty that can educate us about the qualities that sustain or threaten the ideals of liberal democracy in a corrosive world. These novels illuminate a world of ethos and characters, not law or neat theories, as the key to pursuing this form of activity.


The most general understanding of espionage is as a profession that monopolizes on opportunism, and that it engineers itself and its triumphs based on the ability of its participants to find the microscopic cracks through which intelligence slips. Even as general as this understanding is, “[espionage] is an old and elemental human art, susceptible to endless permutations, which is why it is always hard to generalize about spying.”¹ The expansivity of factors able to influence espionage poses a constant challenge to those in the intelligence field, considerably more so than even to those trying to compile assessments of it without being in the professional know. In the intellectual vacuum generated by institutionalized clandestinity, espionage perpetuates its own mystique and exclusivity by remaining unwilling and unable to answer the question of just what makes it tick.² Books on the subjects of intelligence and espionage, both its history and its literature, commonly cleave to the writings of Sun Tzu and Biblical precedents for a foundation to the common knowledge that the need to spy on one’s neighbors and enemies is neither new nor unique to the modern age.³ Historically contextualizing the clandestine’s presence within the obvious and known underscores the niggling perturbation and fascination the masses have with the world of intelligence lying
just beyond sight – it reminds that the secret world is observable within the non-secret world, and plays consumers into the common dilemma of paranoid curiosity that makes the knowledge that the spies are among us, and always have been, a profoundly dubious but nonetheless tantalizing tiding. Something within the secrecy of espionage thus resonates with the analytical curiosity of the intelligence age, for in spite of ancient Chinese and Biblical base texts being relevant to certain sects of their cultures, they did not shape their societies to love spies as well as the the events of the 20th Century groomed global masses to appreciate the master-spy archetype.

Without being able to truly penetrate the secret world, readers, consumers, and analysts must therefore rely on facsimiles of it – imitations of spooks, where spooks themselves avoid intersection with the non-secret world at all costs. By fortune of the exceptional modern popularity of espionage fiction there is no shortage of mimicries to choose from, but the inchoate nature of the boundary between semi-informed fiction and non-explicit reality plagues the genre. “Now, after a hundred-year absence, literature has returned to history... demanding that historians accept her mocking presence right at the heart of what they had once insisted was their own autonomous and truly scientific discipline,” and for espionage, where fiction was often far more available than historical fact, the incursion of fiction into understandings of the profession was impossible to avoid.⁴ Therefore, understanding espionage as a phasic system of exchanges between the secret and non-secret worlds allows the external analyst to manage the intricate interplays between espionage fiction and reality as they act out societal, historical, and personal perspectives. Seeing representations of espionage not just as “phases” – a kind of chronological scene change fading into and out of each other – but as “phasic” – able to
be layered and blended with the myriad of factors at play – accommodates separation as well as interconnectedness, independence as well as overlap. “Phasicity” compliments espionage’s inherent multiplicity even beyond the fiction/history boundary, and also opens up means of identifying its most vital characteristic, in that nothing about it is insular.

To work in conjunction with this complexity rather than against it, I will take two snapshots from espionage’s literary history for a comparative analysis between illustrations of political schema. This thesis will compare evolutions of espionage politics between two of the genre’s most popular spymaster authors – Ian Fleming and John Le Carré – as phasic representations of evolving professional and social realities. By comparing their versions of the roles of the geopolitical Western alliance within narrative spaces, these authorial snapshots will function as partial portraits of two “phases” of espionage that share a multitude of similar traits but are separated by the evolution of certain ideological and aesthetic shifts. The purpose in doing so is to incorporate espionage fiction into the phasic framework of espionage itself, connecting it to the real professionalization of intelligence work and the development of public involvement with political structures. Those features being highlighted in their literature will be read to understand their characterization of espionage as cultural reflections of their placements within espionage history.

[Understanding] that our predecessors’ preconceptions and prejudices have shaped historical accounts might lead us to conclude that we have a responsibility to investigate possible alternative histories. This is especially so in the instance of literary biography, where the personal history we accept for the author has a significant bearing on our interpretation of the texts they left behind.
—Rosalind Barber, “Exploring biographical fictions: The role of imagination in writing and reading narrative” (166).

Rather than emphasize a strictly textual or even a strictly historical comparison, the understanding gained through this “possible alternative histories” approach is to contrive the existing relationship between popular espionage fiction and the relevant political pulses of the 20th Century so that the boundary between fiction and reality may be interrogated to reveal where historical and political reality’s changes “phase” into the metamorphoses of fictional ethe.

Because this thesis will examine social constructs within the contents of espionage literature, it will banter very little over those hierarchical qualities by which good and bad literature are judged. As many have noted, espionage fiction has always had something of a tawdry and variable reputation, and there are many valid arguments in the genre for authors who express more focused styles and criticisms in their writing than the two selected for this analysis. The reason the authors and texts are being considered is not because of their speakably outstanding capacity for philosophical, ethical, or societal importance, though that is also not to say that they can claim none. Espionage itself is not engaging solely because of its propensity for high intellectual demands or austere academic quality, though it involves pursuits which are inclusive of such. Within or without the context of loftier moral values and introspective pursuits, the purpose of this project understands that the products of culture which are prominent are that way for any number of reasons. As analysts such as Eco and Hepburn note, collective interpretations of figures and structures, in this case such as the importance of culture on espionage and espionage on culture, stem from a centralized understanding of the
motivations and relationships they provide in society and in the products of society. In Hepburn’s examination of the structure of ideology, he identifies the utility of tacit beliefs as “[downplaying] contradictions” while “[permitting] degrees of individual dissent.”6 This elision of contradiction while providing for individualism furthers Eco’s assessment, for whom “[the] novels of Fleming exploit in exemplary measure that element of foregone play which is typical of the escape machine geared for the entertainment of the masses” that allowed spy novels their place of access and profusion while also founding a genre discourse critical of its own forms.7 Intelligence culture and the professionalization of espionage to this end participate in both the perpetuation and evolution of their own public norms.8 Because this thesis is designed to consider espionage literature as indicative of social difference between the two authors’ generations, it monopolizes on their visibility and accessibility, to the end of tapping them as publicly contributive sources of espionage culture which best exemplify the phasic boundary between their generational political realities and those political realities represented in their fictions.

The first, Ian Fleming, has come under constant censure and scrutiny by those readers and analysts defensive of more legalistic standards of “literature.”9 Many of these same critics are just as pejorative regarding the merits of thriller and espionage fiction, and have perpetuated the impression that “the spy novel causes apoplexy in literary purists because it is so often a mixed form,” which is a prominent opinion the style of Fleming’s works oblige.10 Nonetheless, Fleming was a substantially public figure and one vital to the genre in spite of being one of the figureheads for the debate on the literary merit of two-penny publications. The integrality of his role in the genre is in fact
impossible to deny when his franchise, though the lion’s share of its profits have come from its films instead of its books, has been responsible for more than $7 billion in gross worldwide profits over the course of its long life.\textsuperscript{11} It is quite clear by now, with the Bond empire having celebrated its semi-centennial, that the public considers espionage media as more than just a phase.

John Le Carré’s works, on the other hand, have successfully stood up to various tests of literary scrutiny. In a genre whose repute has always been in question, being accepted as a passably shining example of what espionage fiction can be when done “right” makes a strong case for Le Carré as a literary spymaster “superior” in skill to Fleming. Even from one of espionage fiction’s most devoted but acerbic reviewers, Leroy Panek remarks that Le Carré, “gives us the most thorough, the most realistic, the most thoughtful, and therefore the most disturbing, portrait of the secret world found in spy fiction.”\textsuperscript{12} Comparatively, Panek describes Fleming as “only [possessing] meager talents” and “failing to render more than cartoon reality with his characters.”\textsuperscript{13} The nuance Le Carré’s literature provides the genre has brought up its standards, including the standards of the Bond franchise, but the overall perception of espionage fiction’s quality remains beneath what most critics are willing to waste their time on.

These criticisms, however brave of intent, fail to consider both Fleming and Bond for their relationship to social concerns. As the genre became increasingly capable of addressing larger and larger audiences, the mainstay of its survival in the public sphere became its phasicity. As many who have read into the history of espionage have noted, the profession is a cascade of tales which is scarcely lacking in a great number of colorful stories, and though perhaps not as grand, as equally mad as those featured in the likes of
the Bond films and novels. The dramas forming the shambling saga of espionage truths are amusing for the fact that they challenge the lines present between fiction and reality, and perforate the sense of separation which the “reality” of spying often implies.\textsuperscript{14} However, while Bond’s franchising has made billions from exploiting the willful suspense of disbelief – not following the ludicrous history so much as creating new in light of the truth very often being stranger than fiction – the heart of Le Carré’s narratives and stories employ vastly different tactics. Rather than taking aim at cheap gags, a method often employed in the spy fiction and franchises of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century and the intelligence field itself, Le Carré is one of a relatively small number to take the genre and its latently obscene history serious enough to make it gruesome and believable enough to challenge the comfort of the phasic boundary between reality and fiction. Le Carré’s spies are ugly in their familiarity, and their work frightening in its relatability because unlike Bond, Le Carré’s spies could be and are anywhere and everywhere, doing what they have done now for centuries while only rarely raising public suspicion. This type of interplay between espionage fiction and the public sphere opens up the genre as a channel for cultural and geopolitical developments within the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. Understanding these authors as denizens not only of the secret world of espionage but as mouthpieces for the changes occurring in non-secret culture elicits insights about the social evolution occurring between their times.

Using the framing sketched here, I will compare these authors and their interpretations of Western constructs of heroism to analyze the evolution, or in this case devolution, of cultural attitudes toward the West. Because the West plays important roles in the dramas constructed by both of these authors, the differences in its representations
will serve as an area of phasic overlap at which two understandings of the West to its liminal heroes can be examined. Their representations of the espionage tradition in and around the political involvement of the West will be used to characterize the changing image political relationship between British and American intelligence agencies and cultures. This comparative analysis will in doing so argue for the validity of analyzing the West as a critical entity within espionage studies. Both authors and their shared genre have more going for them than just their clever provocateurs, and while as will be discussed the West does not provide unilateral meaning, analyzing understandings of the West nonetheless provides cultural insight into the phasic interests of espionage generations.
Endnotes


2. Up until relatively recently a great deal of governmental files regarding secret service activities in Western countries had remained unavailable for public viewing. Some of the books and materials cited for this thesis were written before many these documents were made available, which is important for understanding what shifts in interest with clandestinity have occurred within the last two to three decades. Some of the perspectives provided in books written before these releases are noted as lacking these resources which have since become available, and are therefore shaped by conclusions not necessarily supported by complete official documentation. Most relevant to this analysis, in 1997, MI5 and MI6 began to release previously sealed documents to public archives after increasing pressure for covert establishments to no longer be exempt from the Public Records Act. (See: Andrew, *Defend the Realm*, p. 753-768.) Also relevant to modern intelligence is the Mitrokhin Archive, produced by Vasili Mitrokhin after his defection to the United Kingdom from Russia in 1992. (See: Ibid., p. 434.) This influx of documents provided a vast amount of previously unavailable information on KGB, MI5, MI6, and CIA operations and intelligence records, and have since had a profound effect on the studies and fiction written regarding espionage and intelligence. Even as of 2015, new records are still being released and are scheduled to for the foreseeable future. As they do, the image of espionage in the 20th Century has continued to change.

3. Even within the small selection of books used for this thesis, a notably large number mention Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* as the primary textual evidence for the historical age of espionage. Only by a slim margin does Biblical allegory come second in number of references. (See: Andrew; Carlston; Cavelti and Rosenberg; Davies and Gustafson; George and Bruce; Hepburn; Knightley; McCormick and Fletcher; Price; Thompson; Tucker; Woods.)


5. See: Ambler; Cavelti and Rosenberg; Denning; Hepburn; Hitz; McCormick and Fletcher; Merry; Panek; Snyder; Thompson; Woods.


8. Terms such as “culture,” “modernity,” and “literature” are all being considered socially rather than in the context of the critical literary tradition. Theorists such as Mikhail Bakhtin and Arjun Appadurai lend understandings on cultural involvement in media, and Paul Giles for framing on phasicity, but these are abstractions relying on otherwise publicly implicit wholes. “[I]n terms of popular culture... these concepts are
largely what we have perceived them to be, whether based on fact or not,” which as detailed above allows them both functional specificity and flexibility (Britton, *Beyond Bond*, p. 34). “[Culture]... means the nexus of narratives, institutions, practices, values, spaces, habits, and customs that shape human activities in material and symbolic forms” (Hepburn, *Intrigue*, p. XV). The historical gradient for modernity, which can be generally characterized as sliding between the poles of More Modern and Less Modern, confounds the literary movements of modernism and post-modernism, and for this analysis the historical will be a lesser determining factor. When one thinks of it as a tertiary lens to espionage’s primary features (task, geography, time period, cultural context, professional infrastructure, ideology, and personal standing), it is capable of eliciting data. Without this positioning, chronological modernity is not on its own a viable independent constituent. When references to the theory of modernity and modernism are made, the analyses will reflect this critical focus. Lastly, “literature” within this project has a slightly more technical and political grounding than “culture” and “modernism.” This stems from the inevitable involvement of literary standards when discussing works of fiction. While the merits of literature are complicated and political as will be discussed in later chapters, literature will more broadly be used to refer to those works produced by these authors which are neither autobiographical or historical in nature. Rather than attempt to pass any sort of judgment on meritoriousness or “quality,” so long as there is a verifiable boundary between historical fact and the products of these authors, the products themselves will be considered “literature.” Though this thesis takes care when considering the politicality of “literature,” it will not delineate on the semantic difference between “texts” and “literature.” When the authors’ texts/literature/works/etc. are being referenced, the terms will in this case be considered connotationally interchangeable.

9. For the course of this thesis Fleming will often be referred to as the “first” of the two authors being compared. This is simply a reflection of his chronology predating Le Carré’s entrance into the espionage genre. “First” does not imply any other measure of merit or importance.


13. Ibid., p. 201.

14. Grey, *The New Spymasters*, p. 23. “Despite their failures... [the early] generation also helped to established the myth of espionage. Their amateur-style, action-man heroics created a potent, enduring and largely false idea of the intelligence officer as a ‘mastery spy.’ It was a myth that endured – and still does – partly because it was useful. It has been exploited ever since to recruit spies and expand budgets.”
COLD WAR SPACES & BRITAIN’S SECRET WEST

For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.
—King James Bible, Ephesians 6:12.

In espionage fiction, spaces are integral identity markers for the character of secret conflicts, and inform the audience of more than traditional dialectic factors. Whether figurative or real, they can be static, riddled with sources of friction, or filled with dynamic upheaval. Spaces also often house the very truths being sought in espionage novels, and in doing so take on their own agency. They contain the parts of our world and the worlds of the characters which are secret: they ripple with the unspoken dialogs of invisible political climates; they offer no loyalty to the spy or their enemies; they resist the subtle machinations driving the spy’s presence and efforts. For espionage, public settings form a crossroads where the secret and non-secret world meet, as well as where the real world and the fictive overlap. The demi-neutrality and un-governability of these spaces both generates and chafes the persistent urgency of where the polarized but co-dependent tension between the secret and non-secret worlds, the figurative crossroads, phase together. All of this allows spaces to inform on the status of the spy within their world, for it is into the unknown and their fictive secret worlds that literary spies must go in spite of inherent risk so as to accomplish their goals.

The unknown – that information which is known to other places, parties, and players in the secret world – makes the spaces of spy novels dangerously neutral to the spies within them. Regardless of ideological “side,” all spies are equally influenced by the threat of spillage into the non-secret world inherent at these intersections: “[what] any
person does not know may hurt him, contrary to the adage.” The impossibility of predicting and monitoring the complexities of the unknown in the secret world leaves spaces figuratively neutral but nonetheless dynamically active territory which much like the non-secret world are acted upon by nothing less than the full gamut of human action, making “[the] grist for the analysts’ intellectual mill, as ever, a mix of usually incomplete and frequently contradictory fragments of information”. “It is thus a part of the nature of espionage that a potential insecurity spreads at all levels,” and as is most often the case, insecurities lead to risk when they threaten to cross boundaries of ideology, practice, and secrecy. Though the secret world is one often assumed to be beyond sight or other perception, the motions of bodies and ideologies in it are often what causes the boundary between the secret and the non-secret world to become perforated, and for secrets and other covert intelligence to leak through into other non-controlled, non-secret spaces. In the spy novel, the spaces being traversed, used, or destroyed help visualize the relationship non-secret physical bodies of spies have with the secret world, and the tug-of-war played on those bodies by the threats of the known and unknown.

The drive to produce intelligence products in spite of the latent impossibility of completely secure operations pushes spies, their masters, and their governments into influencing spaces which are by nature insecure – in which no amount of fielding, preparation, and bamboozling can affect the demeanor or favor of the location itself. The cardinal and fatal sin of the spy is to fail to maintain their own anonymity, which destroys their agency in the secret world and all chances of gaining access to intelligence product. The true ability of successful spies and spy networks is to act with respect for the damage neutral spaces can inflict. “The raison d’être of the spy as collector of information lies in
this scenario of struggle, and his role is to be a tool for one of the agonists of the battle waged. This is constituted above all by possessing preemptive acuity – an ability to conjecture as accurately as possible so as to insure some measure of agency in the unpredictable secret world, and in doing so not disturb the non-secret world. The non-secret world depends on not knowing the secrets of the secret world in order to maintain its ignorance, while at the same time depending upon the intelligence the secret world draws out to keep its institutions and morals in place. Symbiotically, the secret world depends on the non-vigilance of the non-secret world so that it may try to conduct its business without interference, all the while still dependent on the plebeian world providing the reasoning for its infringements and indeed its existence. This is not the symbiosis of two parasites attached to one another so much as the symbiosis of two worlds which mirror each other and prefer never to have to acknowledge it – opposite phases of the same moon. “It is this juxtaposition of historical adventure with moral, political, and social ratification that provides a seminal example of the seesaw relationship: each exerts its own force, but neither escapes the pull of the other.” In doing so, “[spy] fiction repeatedly challenges the idea that action determines character since actions are undertaken not because of personal conviction but because of necessity.”

Without the moderation of the non-secret world, the ideologies and cultures of the secret world are able to stretch themselves into monolithic proportions, making the actions that take place in them larger than life as well. The excess of drama in espionage spaces nonetheless often bleeds through to audiences thanks to the understanding that “[we] all experience the necessity of making ourselves believed; the spy does it in the context of life and death.” And though the secret world may have room aplenty for
players and parties of every stripe, the physical locations in spy novels winnow down the infinite complexities of the secret world to scenes that codify participating ideals and cultures into simple trinaries: Yes, No, Maybe; Win, Lose, Draw; Dead, Alive, Hollow; Good, Evil, Ambiguous. The way espionage authors handle the trinary logics within espionage spaces shapes the image of the practices, cultures, and ideologies present. The more or less logic, or for literary purposes, narrative support, applied to the results of these trinaries form patterns of authorial production, and therefore patterns of what reflective expectation readers may have from their experiences with various literature. By establishing unique measures of logic for their events, espionage authors grant their readers near-algebraic means of interpreting their perspectives on fictive happenings in secret worlds that even their characters do not possess.8

Fleming and Le Carré both have vastly different ways of establishing their algebras, and the number of instances their trinaries differ could form a study all its own. A prolific number of scholars and reviewers have already catalogued these writers’ authorial experiences, rhetorical backgrounds, and political perspectives.9 The qualitative comparison of Fleming and Le Carré’s writing styles such as has been hashed and rehashed countless times in these studies is relatively irrelevant for mapping the Western regime as it is portrayed in their fiction. These authors’ Britishness, their experiences with espionage, and their generational concerns are expressed also in how they navigate the entity of the West in their fiction, regardless of the quality of their syntax or their plots, as have been the primary points of examination for other studies. In fiction, settings and characters are capable of expressing authorial experience and perspectives on the West as well as allow for moral exploration, and for this analysis, the data provided by
each author’s leanings within narrative trinaries will be compiled from their portrayals of settings and the nature of their characters in them. “No characters, however, exist as absolutes; rather, they succeed or recommend themselves relative to the values they embody, the functions they enable, and the situations where they are required,” and to this end the characters and the character of settings will not be considered for syntactic purposes, but for cultural relationship. Given Western culture has shaping power and rhetorical weight, how these two different authors felt about its involvement in espionage culture and the culture surrounding their characters and narratives develops their differing representations of the West.

Though most everyone from the academic to the everyman knows and has an opinion of the West, placing the West within fiction would require reconciliation of this pedestrian term full of evocative power. The West’s most common uses, rather than encompassing the complexity of its history and its values, rely instead on implicit cultural understandings. Inclusive of everything from the rollicking adventures portrayed in Westerns to the socio-economic and ideological presence of the Western powers, it is a didactic cultural fixture that has blossomed in usage from politics to pop and engendered global public access to the untenable but commonly accessible set of aesthetic mores associated with “the West.” The West encompasses a gamut of theoretical axioms – geography, history, society, culture, economy, ideology. Much like the quandary of what is means to us to spy and be spied upon drives espionage research, the question of what the West really does and is does not and cannot have a unitary definition. While the patchwork fabric of “the West” is deeply connected to American interests and influences, on a global whole “West-ness” has come to represent more than just one country’s
agendas or characteristics, and is far more than just an iconization of prevailing Yankee crusades.

Rather than a rigid label, “The West” is instead an umbrella term – one politically rooted in agendas contributive and perpetuative to its ideology. The collection of countries that supplement Western ideology – inclusive of pre-democratic imperial allies such as in the case of Europe’s “Westernized” powers to the very source material from which Western culture came, IE Britain – makes the argument for any definition of an insular, singular West realistically implausible. The West therefore has a global presence not because America holds sway in so many different strata, but because of a complex series of relationships existing between the different sources and participants of Western culture. “But the position of sovereignty in democracies is precisely located in the secret services and the (most often small) central parts of the political elite controlling them,” making the “special relationships” assumed within the purview of the Western espionage alliance in the immediate aftermath of WWII – Fleming’s primary period of literary production – caricatured as idyllic, powerful, and promising. As the century wore on and disassembled the naïve and saturated figures of the postwar period, the Western facade of Cold War politics, especially under Le Carré’s magnifying glass and those of others like him, began to look more and more plastic.

It is right, to see two traditions in the spy story... The first is conservative, supporting authority, making the implicit assertion that agents are fighting to protect something valuable in society. The second is radical, critical of authority, claiming that agents perpetuate, and even create, false barriers between “Us” and “Them.” Fleming belongs to the first tradition, le Carré’s early work the second.

—Julian Symons in Rosanna Cavallaro, “Licensed to Kill: Spy Fiction and the Demise of Law” (647).
Both internal of the West and external of America, Britain had to juggle its “special relationships” with care. With the British Empire decaying in the 20th Century, there emerged a series of messy interplays between war and postwar, colonial and post-colonial, and changing Western influences. The concussive effect of these previously long-standing influences devolving in roughly the same series of decades left Britain on amazingly unstable footing – a harsh contrast to the might and solidarity it had been favoring at the end of the last century. Imperialism was therefore not the only force influencing the complex political schema plaguing Britain at the time, though the post-colonial period was one homogenously harmonious with the more conservative Western values at play in other political spheres. “West-ness” in this time was able to marry itself to pre-existing social strata and ethics systems within British culture and society, latching on through “The Great Game” and “Clubland Hero” archetypes which had in previous generations defined generations of style and interest in the spy thriller genre.15 “The broadest and most nebulous bonds are those of societal perceptions of shared or antagonistic attitudes and culture which divide or draw allies closer together,” and in the postwar period the Anglo-American “special relationship” encouraged a sense of sharedness within their Western attitudes to compensate for the instability Britain’s other issues were causing in different areas.16

The foundations of the Anglo-American alliance also shared in an important historical victory that softened the ground for the superspy hero – the success and valorization of cryptographic innovations during WWII heightened the hype and appreciation for the spy enough to serve as a bridge between the two services in the postwar period. Britain’s history of institutionalizing intelligence in the 20th Century
granted it a presence and supremacy, at least for a short time, within the growing Western intelligence economy. According to one former SIS officer, Britain had created a ‘cult of intelligence’ that would serve it well, ensuring ‘invitations to the top table’ of world affairs, even as it lost its empire and declined as a world power. This functional harmony Britain was granted formed a golden moment for its Western status, and in turn a British author produced the perfect hero in just the right genre to fit its needs: James Bond. The British lead in the intelligence department founded though did not necessarily maintain the relationship Western espionage agencies had during the Cold War, but it was enough to allow an extension of formerly imperial ideology and chic Western participation to climb to the pole position of a genre ripe for the picking. After the witching hour had passed, and the struggles of post-colonialism, the Cold War, and even the Anglo-American alliance began to test the patience of the public and the intelligence field, the British lead began to falter.

The Western idyll of the postwar period was not, therefore, to last. Geopolitically positioned on many fronts between the Americans and the Communists, from its mainland in Europe to its soon-to-be former colonies in Asia, Britain could not escape involvement with its Western intelligence allies as they too began to dirty their hands and their morals in the throes of the many conflicts in the last half of the 20th Century. This period was where Britain’s ideal Western citizenship was put to the test. In light of the trials Britain was struggling to survive, the means it accepted as being worth the cost to get it through were not complimentary to the overarching Western ideals which had favored them in the postwar period, much like those of the rest of the Western allies themselves. With their own imperial resources dwindling in the post-colonial period, the
continued relationship with a larger network of close moralistic allies was a survival mechanism Britain elected to implement against the problems it was facing both from within and without, but it was not one without its own sacrifices.

The first steps toward identifying the tension with its Western political ideals Britain had came from the dawning realization that “West-ness,” and what America was willing to do to protect it was nowhere near as sanctimonious as claimed. Britain, which had reason enough for remaining on America’s good side, suffered intelligence losses during the Cold War due to the Western agendas America was tending to personally in global spheres. The “special relationships” Britain was supposed to have with American intelligence agencies decayed under the weight of the disparagement between the “ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility” being inspired by Western political movements.20

The evolution of intelligence analysis in the United States parallels the mid-twentieth century emergence of the American concept of national security. That concept drove the mushrooming transformation of the United States into a national security state in response to World War II and, especially, to the Soviet superpower threat to America’s survival that emerged in its aftermath. America’s loss of innocence at Pearl Harbor was a watershed, bringing a realization that the United States was vulnerable to attack from a distant foe and that developments anywhere in the world could directly affect U.S. interests – and lives. Pearl Harbor and the dawning of the cold war propelled a change in America’s understanding of intelligence and of national security as a term encompassing the complex mix of diplomacy, military strength, and intelligence that now would frame and equip America’s central role in international affairs. Global threats to U.S. national security would require global information; intelligence, heretofore thought of essentially in terms of military operations during war, would need to cover not just enemy military forces but also political and economic developments worldwide.

The forward relationship established in light of the nuances of Western citizenship – such as being expected to uphold “special relationships” while only sparingly and conditionally sharing agendas or intelligence – tinged Cold War espionage. The agendas being pursued both internally and externally during the Cold War period inspired a prodigious amount of distrust between the two countries as well as considerable competition between their intelligence agencies, reflective of the overarching competition existing between their bureaucracies.

The special relationship evidentially became so unclear that (one) could argue on one hand that “since the 1970s Anglo-American relations, considered by themselves, have ceased to be very important or very interesting,” while at the very same time with the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the special relationship seemed to expand beyond merely being an anti-communist barricade to an ideological economic challenge to the socialist world.


Particularly within the world of intelligence, it became increasingly apparent that there was no such thing as a trustworthy ally in spite of the potential the Western allies had for sharing specific ideologies. And though the separate American and British regimes wound themselves up on similar tangents, in the intelligence world there was only as much fellowship as was mutually beneficial to be found. Within the apocryphal history of espionage, however, such potential was always doomed to degrade, “since all alliance members are known to be trying to increase their own capabilities even at the expense of alliance partners, [and] there cannot be any assumption as to the constancy or trustworthiness of any ally.”

“The individuality of the West means the world is open-textured and tainted. It takes a very different faith to accommodate such a real world and defend it. But without absolute idealism, it becomes very difficult for professionals to
suffer the squalor of their task.” By locating the pinnacle of the Western period where the membership to the Western “club” was still comfortable for Britain in Fleming’s period and the devolved West, where membership in the alliance of countries yoked to Western interests became a morally and practically uncertain station for Britain to occupy in Le Carré’s, the comparison of these authors’ perspectives can illustrate the algebra each has being reflective and interpretive of Britain’s relationship with its Western status during their times.

Thus, while the two authors in question are from generations not far removed from one another, there still exists a substantial and important change in social ethos between the spies which Fleming wrote about so shortly after WWII and the ones Le Carré characterized during the Cold War. Identifying key ideals and how they have changed within the 20th Century marks out various steps in the decay of traditionally Western values outside of the United States in its periphery participants. Though these two authors are the most well-known and accessible of their genre, the pattern of a devolution of trust in Western allies grew between their highly visible works, and can be found in their fictions through the ways settings and characters highlight different material and social values. Where Fleming’s spy fails to interrogate his purpose and his surroundings, Le Carre’s characters consistently worry the line between the implicit and the actual. Each portrays different means of how “[intrigue] plots create and manage crises of belonging,” in this case the crisis brought on by the devolution of the West illustrated in the decay of trust in the Western allies as represented by these publicly available figures. For the pervasively popular genre of espionage fiction produced during the Cold War, this is an important a reflection of its evolving social temperament.
Endnotes


2. Hedley, John H., Chapter 1: “The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis” in George, Roger Z., and James B. Bruce (Eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, p. 32.


4. Ibid., p. 138.


8. Though many authors have mapped narrative elements in espionage and thriller fiction, Umberto Eco numerically charted Fleming’s narrative constructs and mapped how Fleming utilized the “knowable” factor of his plot structures to the advantage of engendering comfort and entertainment value for his readers. (See: Eco, “Narrative Structures in Fleming,” p. 160-165.)

9. See: Cawelti & Rosenberg; Denning; Hepburn; Hitz; McCormick & Fletcher; Merry; Panek; Snyder; Thompson; Woods.


11. Though seemingly arbitrary, the quintessentially political and ideological framework of this analysis makes the capitalization of the term “West” important, especially to the genre of espionage media. Though many fields find it suitable to leave “west” un-capitalized when describing the political entity, the lack of specificity between the geopolitical entity of the West and the directional “west” is not necessarily suitable for this examination. The west un-capitalized comes most prominently from two sources, these sources do not hold enough inference to justify perpetuation in this case. The first source is the “westward expansion” of many former European empires and even the American historical tradition. This series of *en masse* explorations gave the Western genre its name, and permissibly holds particular sway in American Westernist studies. The second source is the American capitalist influence, along with other allies such as the UK and Canada, being geographically “west” of the Soviet Union. These geographical understandings do not appropriately mark what the West came to represent socially, culturally, and ideologically. The very fact that the West
became synonymous with capitalist and Anglo-American ideology, and many other
democratized nations’ interests as well, is extremely telling in this regard. The non-
capitalized “west,” considering these factors sequesters itself to directional non-
specificity. The West as a theoretical body, one which is no longer bound by
directional means but by ideological means, is more aptly attached to the well of
complex concepts it has come to identify, and is for espionage studies a more
pertinent expression of its prominent political role. While the fact of capitalization
itself is a relatively minor issue, it is symptomatic of the lack of consistency and
exploration of just what role the West plays in espionage exchanges which the field
has as yet not addressed. The purpose of capitalization for this analysis is as simple as
needing to be able to distinguish between a direction and an ideological icon. The
infrastructural and ideological independence of the identity of the “West” is
fundamentally separable from the direction in this study, thus earning it the right to
claim status as a figurative proper noun. The West is no longer a directionally isolated
phenomenon, and therefore is deserving of some specificity which separates it as
such.

12. What “the West” means in the field of American Studies where it is a strong presence
is not, however, limited to the genre that shares its name. The genre of the Western is
most commonly considered to focus on narratives based out of the stories and
problems generated in the geographic area of the North American west. Some basic
constructs of the Western, such as conflicts with indigenous tribes, cowboy culture,
and political environmental corruption tend to be the most inferred features of the
genre. In such a way, the Western is easily identified as separate from the features
which the West as a complex cultural body exhibits. Though, as noted, many of the
features of the Western are sourced from Westernist constructs, the presence of North
American western geopolitical concerns is not required for considering Westernist
constructs and issues overall. While this analysis is well within the field of genre
exploration, the implication of a Western lens is not intended to superimpose a link
between the genres of espionage thriller and traditional Western. “West-ness” is being
carefully considered separate, though not inextricably, from the Western genre for the
sake of its function as a literary and cultural lens. The West, like espionage, functions
in phasic stages, allowing for systems of espionage to overlap with systems of
Western values without implying codependency.

that the English-speaking nations have not only formed a distinct branch of Western
civilization for most of history, they are not becoming a distinct civilization in their
own right... This civilization is marked by a particularly long record of successful
constitutional government and economic prosperity. The Anglophone’s continuous
leadership of the Scientific-Technological Revolution from the seventeenth century to
the twenty-first stems from these characteristics.”

15. As described by Hitz, the foundational differences between these sub-generations of the espionage genre regard the Kipling-era “Great Game” category, which “depicts espionage in defense of the empire,” when of course the empire was still in existence and was in need of political defense from its clandestine heroes. (See: Hitz, The Great Game, p. 6.) An offshoot on this theme, the “Clubland Hero” stories emphasize espionage as an extension of imperial sportsmanship and honor codes, though with a far less martial bent. (See: Panek, The Special Branch, p. 56.) Both genres, populated by authors of desultory standing compared to Fleming and Le Carré, emphasize strictly imperialist motifs.


17. Though British intelligence efforts emerged at the beginning of the 20th Century in response to both German and Russian threats, the development of legitimate intelligence methods on behalf of Britain took most of the first third of the century to accomplish. (See: Andrew, Defend the Realm, Section A: “The German Threat, 1909-1919” – Section B: “Between the Wars,” p. 3-213.) Given when the United States entered World War II with little to no intelligence service of its own, it relied on Britain’s precedents, by then having developed into relatively viable tradecraft. (See: Hedley, John H. “The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis” in George, Roger Z., and James B. Bruce (Eds.), Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, p. 19-20; Price, “Popular Perceptions of an Ally,” p. 53.) For the Western allies, British espionage methods were the building blocks from which many services were later built, in spite of many international services growing to match and in fact out-matching British intelligence efforts. (See: Andrew, Defend the Realm, Section D, Chapter 3: “VENONA and the Special Relationships with the United States and Australia,” p. 367-381.) Nevertheless, Britain’s original contributions perpetuated the public perception of its expertise, and was to the benefit of Britain’s allied relationship during WWII and the espionage genre when it emerged after the war.


24. Hepburn, Intrigue, p. 11.
(James Bond’s) identity is so fixed as to defy contemporary experience, providing a consoling antidote to the anxiety associated with shifting and ambiguous identity. The certitude of his character is a touchstone for and counterpoint to the existential doubt that has come to define late twentieth century fiction and philosophy. But this certitude must operate in the realm of fantasy.


The spy must always be capable of inhabiting those spaces in the secret world which are neither for nor against them. For the likes of James Bond, these spaces are supposedly home. Yet the irony of the most well-known spy in history functionally existing almost completely outside of the secret world is impossible to ignore. Though supposedly a trained professional, Bond is realistically abysmal about maintaining the cover and covert identities designed to shield him in the spaces of the secret world.

“Arguably, no-one personifies the heroic individual as boldly, as brashly, and as downright sumptuously as 007,” and though all of these features have made Bond his fortune, they are nonetheless dangerous traits for real spies to possess.¹ He gambles, kills, and consumes too well to be invisible, and maintains his iconic status both in and out of fiction as the secret agent everyone knows the name of – a paradox which punches a hole straight through the tenuous boundary between the secret and non-secret worlds. No other real spy ever could manage such non-duplicitiousness as to survive being both secret and non-secret.² Being a fictional figurehead thankfully exempts Bond from the real tangles of the age of intelligence, and is to the imminent advantage of his figurative, literal, and literary lifespan. This fortune is one nonetheless pressured by the constant perception of phasic overlap between espionage fiction and reality, often bringing Fleming under fire
for perpetuating falsity rather than truth, even if he was doing so to meet the demands of a desperate public. Many scholars of intelligence and espionage media have put forth opinions on the matter of the James Bond “institution,” and many of these opinions are fraught with just and well-founded criticisms of Fleming’s lack of technical literary skill or social awareness, and have argued the ways Bond manages his demi-secrecy in his texts as reflecting only his shallow and fantastical staged existence.³

The disparity between the hyper-saturated reality James Bond exists in and the dingy mundanity of real intelligence work is not lost on the literary critics, intelligence analysts, or even the everyday audiences who nonetheless so avidly consume it. However, even those within the intelligence field who have pointed out the glaringly obvious separation between the reality of espionage and the aggrandized world of make-believe James Bond inhabits have also been serviced by the sheer popularity and interest in intelligence work James Bond and the consecutive spy phenomenon inspired.

No matter how many times you repeat the obligatory repudiation of Bond and all he stands for, there is not a spy alive who did not sign on without a Bond complex, the vaguest fantasy that he or she would not have something of the same experience, nor a rookie recruit who does not have to curtail a swagger mimicked from Sean Connery... You can denigrate him all you want, but there is no denying his place as a cultural icon with resonance far beyond the domain of espionage. There is not another profession that can point to a single fictional representation that is so universally recognized.

—Todd Hoffman in Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (99).

Larger than any judgment of depth, the very naïve and chauvinistic nature of Bond’s fictional version of the “secret” world illustrates the constant influence of Fleming’s cultural biases on the shape of his progeny. While notions of self-insertion, self-aggrandizement, and ignorance may indeed be in play on Fleming’s part, Bond’s consistent disregard for assuming secrecy in the secret world, paired with continued
survival in spite of this otherwise unerringly fatal inability, reveal much of their shared internalized algebra of Western privilege. “Through his novels, Fleming presents a familiar, traditional, and somewhat patronising British perception of UK-US cooperation,” and it is so because it is shaped out of the most basic and childish diplomatic building-blocks. Because Bond’s original texts are built from structures of social conservativism shared by Western mindsets, the necessity of considering Fleming in spite of subjective literary arguments opens up room to evaluate the role of the West within his espionage literature. While Fleming may not be an author for whom the connoisseurs of literature hold any fond feelings, nor even largely responsible for the continued success of his own franchise, he is not a man whose involvement in the reception of the genre in popular culture can be swept under the rug, and whose rhetorical voice does actually have something to say about more than just Bond’s vodka preferences. And while perhaps lacking the talent or drive to really evolve the genre, Fleming nonetheless contributed a not inconsiderable something to its popularity and most certainly to its circulation, even if many – such as Panek who closes his chapter on Fleming with the line: “[it] is, then, historical accident which has made a public figure out of a muddled hero created by a third-rate hack” – credit Fleming with only really providing an impossible but detailed travelogue of what to eat, drink, and shag when out saving the world with impossible derring-do.

The fantastical fabric of Bond’s life and experiences, though as Fleming himself claimed all containing an element of truth no matter how slim, is woven from from the threads of Fleming’s own experiences and preconceptions of the methods and point of espionage. Though far from an unremarkable officer during the Second World War,
Fleming’s history and personality were hardly penned for a philosopher-writer which became the role he was most well-known by and transversely the most argued over. Characterized as a wandering and materialistic person, the extent of Fleming’s philosophical make-up was that he was not ruthless enough to work in finance and not obedient enough to manage military service the first time around. Even as a spy, Fleming’s experiences with espionage were conducted in the single moment in time where the work was indeed as exciting, chic, and dangerous as the conflicts that would later appear in his novels. The spaces Fleming was exposed to in his career were suitably dangerous, but he failed to correlate the importance of isolated, secret space to the agendas of the secret world. That is, to Fleming, no good deed went un-rewarded, even if the rewards were disproportionate for the reality of the postwar British economy. The same ideologies of British imperial grandeur and wealthy mobility he himself was so enculturated in were the same ones his characters displayed, with little to no ethically interrogatory counter-argument provided save for that used to contextualize villainy. Though far from inexperienced with navigating the secret world, Fleming’s interest in analyzing it only went so as far as cataloging its most colorful and attractive aspects. Regardless of the very real and harrowing plots that occurred in World War II and beyond, the boilerplate ethics and outlandish flourishes flavoring his stories only managed to further saturate already un-subtle fiction rather than lend them any sense of deeper background or history.

Though James Bond became a debonair figure of different expressions of British culture when out of Fleming’s reach, there is a great deal in the original Bond literature which speaks to Fleming’s exclusion of nuance for the reasoning behind clandestinity and
secrecy in espionage space and politics. Bond’s character itself is under-stated – relying on an experienced consumer’s gaze and aptitude for action to ground his identity. Bond’s internal dialog is snappy, direct, and focused, as Eco notes, on soliciting credulity toward the region of the possible and the desirable in spite of the grandiosity of his narratives. The trouble with this approach is that it dodges actual characterization, which for most writers “is an essential step towards constructing a plausible narrative, and in the absence of sufficient documentary evidence to support characterization, it is necessary to turn to the works. Determining character from [actions], however, is problematic.” The problem with establishing character patterns based on action comes from its illumination of only one half of the character’s life – similar to the non-existence of a stage character once they have disappeared beyond the curtain, though the actor is still present behind the scenes. Bond’s “character,” the actor behind the curtain, can be located in part in the fervor of his emotions, though rationale or reflection is often limited to shallow binary logic: the woman disappoints Bond therefore she is a bitch; the villain is of shady ethnic background therefore they are grotesque; and his allies’ usefulness makes them acceptable and therefore worth defending.

Bond’s “character” can thus be found in slightly less melodramatic terms within his gaze – those extensive, winding, pamphlet-esque asides Fleming is spurned for – and in his actions – those heroic endeavors that the Bond franchise is so known for. The character of Bond within his franchise thrives on the “What Would James Bond Do” standard of action, supplemented by the luxury-oriented nature of his “gaze.” In Fleming’s narrative, extensive “gazes,” which can be in the form of Fleming’s infamous travelogue style or Bond’s dialog with his superiors and peers, and “actions” are the only
windows into Bond’s character he supplies. It is difficult to distinguish where Fleming’s materialism ends and some professional practice of field observation begin in Bond’s “gazes,” and Bond’s actions are often so quick that expertise and irresponsibility are equally impossible to separate. Though his audiences came to know so much about Bond – his favorite drinks, cars, women, suits, cigarettes – the philosophy and rhetoric of Bond’s place in his world remains a relatively under-sung theme. Bond’s politics are a near-complete lack of redress as his “philosophy” does, and must be traced within his “gazes” and his actions for it to be found at all. Somehow, Fleming managed to create the perfectly knowable enigma by providing only what his audiences wanted to know of Bond, which confounds perceptions of whether Bond is a failure or in fact a fantastic success as a secret agent.

Markedly, Fleming electing not to elaborate on the political and infrastructural complications that bring about international espionage and the secret world says more than Bond’s recalcitrant characterlessness. Fleming’s relationship with the secret world in and out of his fiction was one limited to the energy he was willing to invest in its philosophy, which is to say very little. Between Bond’s rare philosophical grapplings and his infrastructural dealings, Fleming paints an image of how little espionage bureaucracy does for him and for the efficaciousness of Bond himself. This can be seen even in Casino Royale, where Fleming’s idealism was at its strongest and Bond at his least developed. The most meditative Bond gets is in his first novel, where he has a momentary breaking of faith, is quickly remanded by his fellow operative Mathis, and is a scene not repeated even in the likes of You Only Live Twice. This scene in Casino Royale is one of the few places where Bond has a crisis of faith so intense, but like many
of his weaker moments, he overcomes them in fiery rebirth like the phoenix thanks to the hard-boiled dialog Mathis provides him that reveals the “truth” of the demands of their profession.

Well, when you get back to London you will find there are other Le Chiffres seeking to destroy you and your friends and your country. M will tell you about them. And now that you have seen a really evil man, you will know how evil they can be and you will go after them to destroy them in order to protect yourself and the people you love. You won’t wait to argue about it. You know what they look like and now what they can do to people. You may be a bit more choosy about the jobs you take on. You may want to be certain that the target really is black, but there are plenty of really black targets to go around. There’s still plenty for you to do. And you’ll do it. And when you fall in love and you have a mistress or a wife and children to look after, it will seem all the easier... Surround yourself with human beings, my dear James. They are easier to fight for than principles... But don’t let me down and become human yourself. We would lose such a wonderful machine.

—Ian Fleming, *Casino Royale* (164).

His conversation with Mathis, taking place after trying to rescue his love interest Vesper, having been tortured by Le Chiffre, and ironically saved by SMERSH, is the closest Bond ever gets to displaying a soul that is appropriately troubled by his experiences, which makes the quick turn-around from the conversation he has so stark. Mathis nonetheless turns out to be correct, and very shortly after this exchange Bond loses his love interest and thrusts himself back into his secret world, quashing every trace of his previous qualms and returning to the realm of “gaze and action” morality – a realm fitting the title of “wonderful machine” Mathis knights him with. Bond’s swift recovery of certitude is enhanced by a renewed and swarthy hatred of his moralistic enemies upon the death of his Vesper, returning the sense of moral normalcy he was on the verge of questioning for this one moment. “His adventures with identity do not create anxiety because the tone of the novels assures us that there will be no unpleasant surprises,” and
in this way the Bond “character” is firm not in its provision of moral definites, but in its profusion of actionable definites. Instead of giving sway to navel-gazing which might upset the image of the master-spy’s nature, Fleming preferred most often to remain centered in the dramatic nitty gritty of his genre, leaving a pattern of absence to form a part of his and Bond’s algebra: the lack of exploration on topics such as social assumptions, political agendas, or cultural forms reify the blind faith offered in installments of the Bond saga. For the algebraic question of whether Fleming considers challenging moral and social constructs within Western society or espionage culture, the consistent answer is: No. So long as his own needs were met, the need to delve into sophistry was a task Fleming remained disinterested in, and Fleming’s needs extended only to civilizational certitude and material provision.

Especially when considering tradecraft in its dull reality, Fleming choosing to write about the insulated world of luxury and inductive morals over dragging his readers laboriously through the actual pretenses of intelligence work shapes the expectations he had of espionage as well as his understanding of the wants of his readers. The overwhelmingly luxurious interpretation of espionage supplied by Bond’s ventures is practically a part of the character’s genetic makeup, and is certainly a characteristic the Bond commercial empire has profited on for half a century.

Meticulous attention to details of dress, along with appreciation of a specific cuisine and cellar lies at the heart of [Bond’s] life. One of the most remarked upon features of Bond’s characterization is his fastidious adherence to personal custom and etiquette. Bond insistent on comforting rituals of dress and consumption, and the books’ occasional carping about the degeneration of modern life comes from [his] affection for his safe Edwardian hidey-hole.

Bond’s high society interests are impossible to avoid even when he is in the field and should be focusing on considerably more important matters than the fashion of women, the habits of club bartenders, or the stakes at the local horse races. The unfortunate souls tasked with working with Bond, whatever women even happen to be breathing in his general vicinity, and Fleming’s own readers, cannot be spared from the weight and importance of his ability to master his surroundings, and his mastery is overwhelmingly catalogued by the scope and range of his consuming “gaze.” In casinos, clubs, resorts, beaches, or even London itself, what Bond takes in of his surroundings is not just regurgitate for the amusement of his readers, but consumed and taken into his social and material values. This makes the photographic lists, such as this one out of Moonraker, not just a visual menu, but a reflection of what Bond focuses on within his space.

At the far end, above the cold table, laden with lobsters, pies, joints and delicacies in aspic, Romney’s unfinished full-length portrait of Mrs. Fitzherbert gazed provocatively across at Fragonard’s Jeu de Cartes, the broad conversation-piece which half-filled the opposite wall above the Adam fireplace. Along the lateral walls, in the centre of each gilt-edged panel, was one of the rare engravings of the Hell-Fire Club in which each figure is shown making a minute gesture of scatological or magical significance. Above, marrying the walls to the ceiling, ran a frieze in plaster relief of carved urns and swags interrupted at intervals by the capitals of the fluted pilasters which framed the windows and the tall double doors, the latter delicately carved with a design showing the Tudor Rose interwoven with a ribbon effect.

The central chandelier, a cascade of crystal ropes terminating in a broad basket of strung quartz, sparkled warmly above the white damask tablecloths and George IV silver. Below, in the centre of each table, branched candlesticks distributed the golden light of three candles, each surmounted by a red silk shade, so that the faces of the diners shone with a convivial warmth which glossed over the occasional chill of an eye or a cruel twist of a mouth.

—Ian Fleming, Moonraker (50-51).
In this case, it is on luxury and pithy social interaction that relies on Bond’s mastery over the space. If Bond, like most agents, had to grapple with the insecurity of space, such lists of dining fare and the nuance of decor would be useless compared to the behavior and characteristics of guests. But for Bond, the spaces he inhabit offer no threat to him given he is the most experienced, dangerous, and capable man in the room at all times. For the likes of Bond the world is just one more playing field on which to make his conquests, be they physical or conquests of opinion.

There is... a ritual frivolity about (Bond’s) style which establishes him as a gentleman sportsman and a representative of an ideal of elite superiority, an expression of the prime myth of the British upperclass, the delusion that it is a genuine elite, distinguished by an “effortless superiority.” It does everything better, with no trouble, than the lower orders do with great effort. —John G. Cawelti & Bruce A. Rosenberg, *The Spy Story* (128).

These conquests reinforce Bond’s status and “style” as not only the iconic Empire man, but also the iconic Western man – refined by old British snobbery and made Neapolitan by his tastes and company – whose opinion and presence are made trustworthy and laudable for reasons assumed but never explained in his fictions.

The spaces Bond inhabits in the novels are most often areas of gross multi-cultural overlap, which brings to attention the already competitive charge his superiority brings into them. The knowledge of the multicultural nature of other players, whose ethics and habits are most often put in the context of their own cultural origins and stereotypes, grounds much of how Fleming and Bond view the status of the British empire and the British spy. Bond’s manner of effortless superiority circles around Fleming’s algebra for Britain’s postwar political role. “Despite being generally positive about the CIA and its crucial role in the defense of the West, Fleming is nonetheless extremely careful not to
have the agency steal Bond’s thunder.”¹⁵ The proud and unflappable nature of Fleming’s hero underscores his interpretation of the need for British special relationships.

Given strength and valor were still to be found in British imperial society, Fleming saw no need in considering American interests as superseding his own. Fleming pointedly provides consistent excuses for why British involvement in his grand espionage ventures overshadows American concerns and interests. Britain’s concerns seem to take center stage even beyond what could geopolitically be considered conceivable or even likely. “Only in fiction could Britain be the center of events, and Bond was thus both a means for national propaganda and a source of commercial revenue.”¹⁶ The notion that Britain was anything other than a glorious empire and political power was not something either Bond or Fleming ever gave credence to. To Bond espionage is most accurately the sport Britons are inherently best at because of their place in the world. At times the very suggestion of other multinational agencies or agents being capable of out-showing British mastery in the art of espionage is met with understandable scrutiny and in fact skepticism.

When bantering with his American cohort Felix Leiter on the matter of the world-threatening letter sent by SPECTRE in Thunderball, Bond doubtfully reprimand’s his fellow agent’s care for not wasting American tax dollars on their mission in the Caribbean, in lieu of his far more professional prioritizing of cracking the problem at hand. “Perhaps it’s just that in England we don’t feel quite as secure as you do in America. The war just doesn’t seem to have ended for us. There always seems to be something boiling up somewhere.”¹⁷ Bond knows the myth as well as most others that the British invented the modern tradition of espionage, and therefore cannot be bested. Their
place, given Bond’s imperialist mindset, is at the top of the dogpile, and not at the bottom, quashed under the heels of the Americans such as was the view Le Carré later took of the complex relationships Western countries formed in the latter half of the century. In response to a letter of threat issued by SPECTRE to the British Prime Minister in *Thunderball*, Bond queries as to why SPECTRE might not have simply sent the letter, inclusive of instructions to pass it onto the American President, to the American President first – M’s response, in Fleming’s thinking perfectly naturally, responds logically about SPECTRE’s desire to upset the British first so as to incite British unease and inquiry.\(^{18}\)

The need of Fleming’s villains to pose a global threat implies the esteem they hold for Britain a world power on par with America. It of course is up to Britain and her secret services to save all of them from destruction at the hands of these megalomaniacal fiends, a task which Bond and the Crown thereby provide for in dashing style. For Bond and for Fleming by proxy, the experience of engaging in espionage is little more than a different kind of sporting event, which rings true of the common British association with war and espionage by extension as “the great game.”

Because to Bond Americans are simply extensions of the Empire and moralistic as well as bureaucratic allies, the special relationship between them is not adversarial or polluting but is in fact complimentary and productive for both sides. Though Bond looks down on his American cousins for being coltish in their espionage efforts and heavy-handed in their luxuriousness – a sin which he commits as regularly as they – he does not exhibit the same tension of motivation and ideal which Le Carré critically does. Fleming, being of the mind and of the experience that Allied espionage efforts were a united front against non-Western ways of ruling and life, found no reason to distrust the agendas of
American presidents, bureaus, or agencies. According to a piece of popular Fleming apocrypha, both John F. Kennedy and former director of the CIA Allan Dulles had a fascination with Fleming, an shared conversations with Fleming as well as kept copies of his books. With friends in such high places praising his work, Fleming’s ego certainly had no reason to bemoan the alliance.19

In the field, the presence of American agents is a hindrance to Bond not because American agendas are overpowering and obnoxious, but because American spies can be catty, mawkish, and inexperienced when compared to British spies. In Thunderball, not knowing that his to-be assistant F. Larkin is in fact Felix Leiter, Bond hopes of his to-be Yankee partner that “he wouldn’t be a muscle-bound ex-college man with a crew-cut and a desire to show up the incompetence of the British, the backwardness of their little Colony, and the clumsy ineptitude of Bond, in order to gain credit with his chief in Washington.”20 The scorn and impatience packed into that list is only lifted by the pleasure Bond feels at knowing the Americans at least have good equipment. The supremacy of the British over the creation of espionage methods wins them superiority in the field, though references to American resources nonetheless surreptitiously imply that such are areas where British espionage institutions are lacking. “One of the chief virtues of the C.I.A., in Bond’s estimation, was the excellence of their equipment, and he had no false pride about borrowing from them.”21 All the same, Fleming would later create Q Branch to compensate for this deficit, which was taken so seriously by Dulles as to engender the actual creation of “Q Branches” within intelligence agencies the world over.22 With the exception of Felix Leiter, Bond observes the Americans’ espionage efforts with a mix of donnish judgment and brotherly association. For Leiter, Bond
maintains a fair respect for the demographic of American agent he represents, which is not surprisingly the most stereotypical American possible.

It turned out Leiter was from Texas. While [Leiter] talked on about his job with the Joint Intelligence Staff of NATO and the difficulty of maintaining security in an organization where so many nationalities were represented, Bond reflected that good Americans were fine people and that most of them seemed to come from Texas.


In Fleming’s eyes and through Bond’s treatment of his American cousins the books’ pattern implies that without British espionage efforts supporting the victory of the Allies in WWII, no other espionage agency would have such a thrilling handbook to go by when building their methods and habits. Bond shows none of the hesitation or skepticism toward his American cousins Le Carré’s spies exhibit so strongly largely because, in Fleming’s algebra, they are not a threat but an ally as devoted to the cause of respecting the British empire as the rest of the British are. Though Bond has a far more adversarial relationship with his multinational gamut of villains, he does not overtly consider American involvement as corrupting or disreputable to the extent that Le Carré does – in fact, Bond considers collaborating with the Americans less negatively than he considers working with other domestic departments.

Bond, though above matters of political opinion, maintains this startling and stereotypically naïve relationship with the Anglo-American politic in the character he has when interacting with them as well as within the spaces he interacts with them. Bond’s espionage treats higher politicality with a complete lack of deference or interest, showing how much he doesn’t believe espionage to be dependent on the ministries which run them. Bureaucracy is a nuisance to Bond’s grand narrative, and to the role of the spy as
the knight in the postwar period, and when he is forced to deal with it he valiantly resists the pull of its mundaneness and confusion. When tasked with an investigation in *Moonraker*, Bond is sullen like a child at having to service a domestic matter and not be able to stretch his legs out in the field where he feels he belongs. “He still couldn’t see what all this had to do with the Secret Service whose jurisdiction runs only outside the United Kingdom. It seemed a job for the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, or conceivably for M.I.5. He waited.”23 “Bond felt dispirited. He was getting tangled up with strange departments. He would be out of touch with his own people and his own Service routines.”24 In this we can read England’s participation in the West as reinstating and perpetuating the perception of the empire as having a globally dominant role as well as needing to function on bases of action and consumption rather than service. The romanticism involved with heroically saving Britain, and Europe, and thereby the world in Fleming and Bond’s pattern of thinking as good as entitled them to the luxury, frivolity, and apoliticality that would pragmatically pass out of the genre’s style in later generations. Thanks to his career Bond has no shortage of opinion or money to spread around using this assumed privilege, but he remains entitled to a seemingly principled but largely fickle parsimony of view. If the drinks aren’t strong enough for the price, the women fail to meet his standard-of-the-day, and his enemies’ heritages even slightly connoting of any manner of villainous history, his amazing standards come to the fore to emphasize that all is not lost for the British public. So long as they are patriotic, reckless, and wealthy, they too may retain their right to judgmentality.

During the heyday of the spy craze, such thinking had a chic that fed into the fervor of his literary and cultural successes, allowing many spy franchises to take on
some of Bond’s “cloak and swagger” during the spy renaissance of the 1960s. Bond’s opinions come from the privileged position white men from colonial countries occupy in even demi-global consumerist markets, allowing their presence an at times unfortunate sense of familiarity. “(Fleming’s) novels act as an escapist antidote to a postwar society of limiting divisions and scant pleasures.” Though Britain was loping headlong into decolonization, for Fleming and Bond the Empire remained in the privilege it allowed over the rest of the world. The unease that settled over Western powers in the wake of the World Wars drew out heroic figures like James Bond because they represented a way back to the simplistic world of open and public warfare, and in Bond’s case all the while veering safely away from the clandestine spy politics that upset so many democratic Western values. “Bond indicated that the existing social system could still be cleaned up rather than being discarded. This is the overall message of the Bond formula.” At the perfect time to commercialize on the eminent importance of the spy figure as established in WWII, Fleming reinstated the imperial ideology of his espionage predecessors, and in doing so smoothed a strong atmosphere of public fear. Rather than a traitor to their societies’ moral structure, the work of the 20th Century spies flung them into the realm of heroism. After the war having proven the worth of the spy and the act of espionage on a multinational scale and the looming post-imperial period inciting both anxiety and nostalgia, the time for a figure like Bond was never better. The spaces in which Bond defends the Crown and the Western way of life are transparent and assuaging to the audiences they were originally published for – reinforcing the image that the secret world was not working against them but for them. The resort in Casino Royale is crawling with allies like Mathis and Leiter who help maintain its European balance and neutrality;
Thunderball takes place in the familiar territory of a former colony and is similarly chocked with American access and resources; and Moonraker allows Bond mastery over his natural habitat to reinforce that England too is well defended. Thus, the dramatic flair Fleming made use of in his fiction was not just a by-product of a consumerist ethos he’d long desired to pass on to Bond.

Fleming’s position in life and fiction was a channel for the Western privileges he came to thrive in. Therefore he did not need Bond to address and dismantle West-ness or make the anti-hero of the modernist age and in doing so potentially challenge US/UK diplomatic relationships because Western privilege allowed him his career. Without the society already geared toward perpetuating the success of the privileged, and most especially without the presence of the special Western cultural relationship between Britain and the United States, Fleming’s message of Anglo-American solidarity would have fallen on deaf ears and robbed Bond of his opportunity at globalization. Fleming rather sought to reinforce those relationships with a hero to fit the mythos of the time while keeping his own political card neatly neutral.

Reflecting this shift in outlook, the 007 films... didn’t exploit the cold war themes of Western versus Soviet spheres but diverted us from them as all the world’s intelligence agencies battled technologically crazed pirates capitalizing on the rift between East and West. Bond and his ilk, especially in the films, were a new mythology, a reassuring presence on the cold war scene... The entire spy genre acted as a “safety valve” for tensions after the years dominated by the dueling personalities of Stalin, McCarthy, and all they represented.

—Wesley Britton, Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (96).

By not interrogating the realities of the Anglo-American alliance, Fleming conceded to the value of the implicit understanding of the West that allowed it to eventually eclipse the role of the empire. Fleming should likely have been of a time and mind to have
moved beyond his fanciful obsession with British superiority and the allure of espionage. Instead of having moved beyond it, Fleming became a mascot for a generation desperately clinging to its old schools in the hopes of recovering their glory. In declining to challenge or explore the nature of the Western alliance or British imperialism, Fleming perpetuated and profited off of the West’s mythos.

This ideological aversion, coming from a spy whose entire existence functions on analysis and liminality, is not just a fault of Fleming’s shallow relationship with espionage and his demi-post-imperial world. It is, as seen in the fact that it is reproduced in all of his novels, not just an isolated incident but an inertial theme. The idea that anything in the secret world should be permitted to be implicit breaks down the need for the boundary between the secret and non-secret worlds, and is a problem which took Bond decades to outgrow, if he even has at all. The aspect of being known and therefore being knowable is something the references to the West which permeate espionage analysis have banked on because implicitness is foundational in understandings of the West, and is what in part kept its rhetoric circulating even after its reputation understandably came into question. Bond’s implicit familiarity, the closeness to standards of imperialism and West-ness Bond provided spurred on his alchemical success when it did take off because it did not challenge social discourses – it iconized him, made him attractive, and made him comfortable to cohabitate with.

[What] made the Bond phenomena most remarkable was the speed at which James Bond permeated popular culture. Like Elvis Presley and the Beatles, Bond uniquely enjoyed a “transformed significance” by passing through the cycle of person to hero to phenomenon to institution without taking decades to become so integrated in our collective consciousness.

—Wesley Britton, Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (97).
Without the mass, popularized Western heroes, the perception of spy culture as being demeaning and subversive to the morals of the democratic state would have lingered. In an entirely different sphere than the likes of John Wayne, Bond offered confirmation for the idea that there was nothing wrong with the Western world much like there was nothing wrong with spying precisely because it could produce trustworthy but roguishly attractive guardians such as himself.

The figure of Bond yet remains prevalent to our understanding not only of espionage, but of modern heroism and how heroics, though not nearly as aggrandized as Bond advertises, are acted out behind closed doors. The boundary between the secret and the non-secret world is next to nonexistent in Fleming’s novels - the same exotic locations which any privileged tourist visited in the ‘50s, ‘60s, and ‘70s were the same ones where Bond had his duels over the health and fate of the world. Though plots in the Bond novels are all behind closed doors and out of public view, the manners Fleming uses to resolve those problems are not plausibly private at all. Fleming, while never having the chance to see it acted out in full given his death during the 1960s, was not positioned to absorb or appreciate the complexities of the secret world still to come over the course of the Cold War. The way in which Fleming’s imperial naïveté and Le Carré’s cold liberalism stand as opposite ends to the spectrum of intelligence ideals highlights the role of Western society on those who seek to uphold it, or in turn, nonetheless undermine it. The Western-ness of Fleming’s spaces therefore comes out of the implicit presumption that the public would have no reason to intersect with the secret world so as to interfere with Bond’s yarns. Much like the presumption that the Anglo-American alliance was just a partnership, one which like between Bond and his American counterpart Leiter was
companionable and useful for the monetary support it provided, the exotic spaces Bond moves in, though much more plausibly a part of the non-secret world than the secret world, offer up no challenge to the premise of his missions in the same way Fleming offered up no challenge to the imbalance forming between America and Britain that was nonetheless forming. “Bond’s style could barely conceal the diminished British political and military presence in Cold War confrontations,” and in fact was not enough to keep it from being exposed in time. This exposure drove authors like Le Carré to play devil’s advocate against the shallowness of the Bond standard, and break down the assumption of privilege within espionage spaces Bond posited. The spaces in Fleming’s novels do not threaten Bond as they do Jerry Westerby, George Smiley, or Alec Leamas, because they are being dominated by the imperial Western man, and for the Western man, the world is but his oyster.

Though as a matter of point, Bond prefers beluga caviar with grated egg to oyster.
Endnotes


2. There is some dissent among espionage scholars on the case of Rodger Hollis, a former head of MI6 who is postulated by some as having possibly been a Soviet spy. (See: Pincher, Treachery, Chapter 23: “A High-Level Culprit,” p. 176-182.) Between Pincher and famed MI5 and MI6 historian Christopher Andrew, there is a disparity between whether Hollis was a spy or was simply a victim of the institutionalized paranoia that afflicted so many in the periphery of the secret world. If Pincher is to be believed, only Hollis ever managed a position similar to Bond’s assumption of visibly dual citizenship between the non-secret and secret worlds, though it was notably from behind the protective barrier of a desk job, and not the life of a gun-toting loose cannon. It is noted that while Pincher has a considerable career in writing about espionage, he did not, as Andrew did, have access to the government records that could either prove or disprove his theory. The truth of the matter is yet undetermined.

3. “Bond is an impossible cartoon, an agglomeration of traits that no real individual possesses.” (See: Cavallaro, “Licensed to Kill,” p. 664.); “Ian Fleming cannot be compared to the serious novelists of his era.” (See: Cawelti & Rosenberg, The Spy Story, p. 155.); “Fleming’s adventures are really tales of leisure.” (See: Denning, Cover Stories, p. 101.); “The cult of James Bond has given rise to a lot of nonsense.” (See: Merry, Anatomy of the Spy Thriller, p. 57.); “[Rather] than being exercises in craftsmanship, Fleming’s novels are exercises in self-indulgence. Bond’s habits are Fleming’s habits, the filler in the books comes from material picked up on journalistic jaunts, and the villains emerge from fiddling with popular psychology.” (See: Panek, The Special Branch, p. 218-219.)


6. Dorril, MI6, p. 610.


9. In Moonraker and Thunderball, the only negative examination of the Western powers and democratized world come from trope-ridden villains. Hugo Drax and Ernst Blofeld, whose collective interests extend as far as money, revenge, and evil for its own historical sake, reify Fleming’s ideological stereotypes by polarizing the moral stakes. In doing so, Fleming never actually puts his moral framework at risk. (See: Price, “Popular Perceptions of an Ally,” p. 57.)


12. The introduction of personal and moral issues in Bond’s character are at their most transparent in *Quantum of Solace* and *Skyfall*, which are both films that concurrently raise the Bond standard by challenging the boundaries of bureaucratic corruption. In navigating his own moral ethe in these films, Bond also provides new means for audience agencies with bureaucratic structures that are different but no less corrupt than those that came before.


18. Ibid., p. 80.


21. Ibid., p. 81; p. 124.


24. Ibid., p. 89.

25. As Britton details, other spy franchises such as *The Man From U.N.C.L.E.*, *I Spy*, *Mission Impossible*, and *Get Smart*, all benefitted from the Bond-induced craze. (See: Britton, *Beyond Bond*, p. 106-110; Matthijs, “The Intelligence Life of Ian Fleming.”)


27. Moniot, “James Bond and America,” p. 32.

TRUTH & DISILLUSION IN LE CARRÉ’S COLD WAR WEST

In my time, Peter Guillam, I’ve seen Whitehall skirts go up and come down again. I’ve listened to all the excellent arguments for doing nothing, and reaped the consequent frightful harvest. I’ve watched people hop up and down and call it progress. I’ve seen good men go to the wall, and the idiots get promoted with a dazzling regularity. All I’m left with is me. And thirty years of Cold War without the options.

—Alec Guinness as George Smiley, in *Smiley’s People* (“#1.4”).

In stark contrast to Fleming’s ambivalent if doting relationship with American spies, Le Carré’s reception of them paints a very different picture than that of the ideally cooperative espionage brotherhood of the early postwar period. Fleming’s ideal, and the concurrent spy-craze in the 1960s, were stymied and garish fantasies compared to the dangerous reality of espionage and covert geopolitical affairs. The height of the Cold War offered cruel and violent conditions to real agents, and while supposedly a “cold” war, provided heat enough in the cloak and dagger exterminations of spies wherever they were discovered, determined of no use, or graded as too high of a risk. The severity of this reality became more and more present in the genre of espionage fiction as it matured, but Le Carré was one of the first to put it in the gruesome detail he later became known and loved for. Le Carré’s most well-known character, George Smiley, is surrounded by a secret world continually sabotaged by the non-poetic realities of clandestine violences, who each put in their own experiences and agencies as Le Carré shifts between their perspectives, illustrating the multiplicity of perspective and knowledge which makes secret space so dangerous and difficult to navigate. Smiley’s right hand man, Peter Guillam, at the end of the Smiley saga in *Smiley’s People* recalls:

[He] had done his Berlin stint, he had been part of it a dozen times. The telescopes and cameras, the directional microphones, all the useless
hardware that was supposed to make the waiting easier; the crackle of the radios, the stink of coffee and tobacco; the bunk-beds. He imagined the co-opted West German policeman who had no idea why he had been brought here, and would have to stay till the operation was abandoned or successful – the man who knew the bridge by heart and could tell the regulars from the casuals and spot the smallest bad omen the moment it occurred: the silent doubling of the watch, the Vopo sharpshooters easing softly into place.


Within settings like this, Le Carré gives his audiences sketches of the real drudgery of espionage and the danger present even in quiet moments. Even among diplomatic “friends,” the para-illegality of real Cold War espionage strained what countries could risk and even more so what they could put up with. All this, occurring in and around decolonization, various wars, exchanging regimes, and nuclear brinkmanship made the secret world a very dangerous place for the spy to get caught with his silk trousers down, and is a reality Le Carré articulated with frightening clarity. “While many literary and film spies of the 1960s created the illusion that the good guys always won in the end, the actual intelligence community was frequently more disturbing than THRUSH, KAOS, and SPECTRE combined.”¹ The secret spaces in the Cold War were, as depicted in Le Carré’s revealing novels, much more than just an extension of the vacuum of imperial privileges Fleming preferred, and were where the implicitness of the West and Western alliances were disassembled by the minute forms of violence perfected in clandestine practices.

Britain’s particular brand of Western membership, both coming about and being dismantled in this period, therefore, was a complex affair from its onset all the way to its end. With so much at stake and so many factors requiring careful management, no one, not even secret agents, was exempt from the interference of America’s efforts in global
spheres.² The competing agendas between British and American intelligence efforts across the globe fed into the systematic disillusionment of British participation in the Western alliance. Due to the lack of stability and trustworthiness being offered by its closest of allies, this lead to a decay of belief in diplomatic relationships as well as the “special relationships” they were supposed to have with other national intelligence agencies as the boundary between the “ethic of ultimate ends” and the “ethic of responsibility” strained the already taxed British public mind.³ The distrust in the state and in the institution socially and organizationally inspired by this problem led to there being no bastion of idealism left with which Britain could view their American cousins with only blind favor. Especially for intelligence agencies, who made the task of seeing what went on behind closed doors their business, there was nowhere to hide the ugly truth that the Western ideal was not so ideally defended or defensible. In this space riddled with political complexity, Le Carré offers up a different perspective where we can read the interrogation of the Anglo-American alliance and his deep probing of espionage’s tradecraft as disestablishing Britain’s image of ideal espionage and the West.

Le Carré, having to suffer through working in and around the crooked regimes of the Cold War knew the reality of the gruesome exchange of morals in far better detail than his well-known counterpart, as seen in his lack of trust in the ideology of the nations spies were tasked with serving. In 1955 in the first face-to-face meeting between Smiley and his grand nemesis Karla, Smiley’s task is to recruit him before he returns to Russia to be presumably killed for disgracing Moscow by being caught by the Americans in Delhi. Having run out of arguments and gleaned no response for his appeals, Smiley in
desperation turns to the only kinship spies on opposite sides can offer one another: honesty, if cruel honesty at that.

I believed, you see, that I had seen something in his face that was superior to mere dogma, not realising that it was my own reflection. I had convinced myself that [Karla] ultimately was accessible to ordinary human arguments coming from a man of his own age and profession – well, durability. I didn’t promise him wealth and women and Cadillacs and cheap butter; I accepted that he had no use for those things. I had the wit by then, at least, to steer clear of the topic of his wife. I didn’t make speeches to him about freedom – whatever that means – or the essential goodwill of the West; besides, they were not favourable days for selling that story, and I was in no clear ideological state myself. I took the line of kinship. ‘Look,’ I said, ‘we’re getting to be old men, and we’ve spent our lives looking for the weaknesses in one another’s systems. I can see through Eastern values just as you can see through our Western ones. Both of us, I am sure, have experienced ad nauseam the technical satisfactions of this wretched war. But now your own side is going to shoot you. Don’t you think it’s time to recognize that there is as little worth on your side as there is on mine?’

—John Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (219).

Le Carré exemplifies the juxtapositions of secret work being used to support non-secret ideology by allowing his characters to explore and exploit their morally gray existences within privileged Western citizenship. In this passage, the necessity of getting the end result – recruiting Karla – incites the negotiation of what is really being offered in compensation. As Smiley realizes, and as Le Carré provides, what exactly the West can offer is not a superiority, but an equality of disparagement. This takes the best of Britain’s spy tropes and lets them put themselves on their heads. “In the 1980s, defectors, moles, and traitors no longer seemed to be motivated by ideology. Ironically, real-world spies followed the course set by fictional spies, who had long been battling the forces of greed and ego, more so than East/West philosophic differences.” The detachment from the Western alliance Le Carré developed was not simply out of frustration with wasted time and broken promises such as flustered the validity of Bond’s original standard and
many real espionage efforts during the time. Rather, disparagement with the ideology of the West grew directly from the West being willing to undertake the actions it perceived as necessary to the defense of its ideological superiority, while in doing so breaking down said ideological superiority.

The two primary facets of Le Carré’s algebra for clothing this critical commentary comes from the spaces he uses to house his espionage dramas and the characters he sends into these spaces. Their characters, as they both morph and remain frigid to meet the needs of their surroundings, play into the demands of the circles of the secret world they must go into to do their work. Unlike the showiness of Fleming’s exotic casino and resort dramas where Bond need not bend in order to maintain his agency, for Le Carré the office is the spy’s greatest stronghold, and skepticism and distrust his greatest weapons even in the field to ward against the possibility of error and observance. Unlike the Western understanding of espionage as an extension for public gallantry, Le Carré’s model not only to defends the spy’s realm from the ideological other, but from the actions of their allies as well, which is charged with forethought and complexity Fleming never built into his settings or characters.

It’s a ubiquitous presence in modern technological culture – much like the spy, a constant figure which is often seen but seldom observed. A space whose design has been refined to the point of both artistry and industry in the 20th Century, for the purpose of enclosing and iconizing the age of mass intelligence. It is where regimes have been made, unmade, and spied on, and arguably the one true home of the intelligence agency as well as of the sprawl of post-modern corporate disillusionment. The office is symbolically and functionally a place of broken heroism, a space in which the clacking of keyboards and
the shuffling of papers replaces the hustle and bustle of the ideal rollicking Western lifestyle, or that of the ballad-worthy heroic standards of canons and ethe previous.

Le Carré’s offices, unlike the dissected spaces whose minutiae Fleming reveals so as to secure them, offer up only the details which reveal the known, emphasizing in opposition to Fleming’s standard the absence of all that information that might be unknown but nonetheless useful to the safety of those characters within them and the readers seeking to understand them. The most prominent office space featured in Le Carré’s main saga is the Circus, a hulking structure in central London described as “an Edwardian mausoleum,” and a cavernous and half-deserted building. As the center of operations for all of the stories written in Smiley’s intelligence circles, the Circus takes on a character of its own, but it is a character that, even as the refuge for the spy agency, threatens those inside it because of the information it hides within its deepest recesses. Even its archives, which are predictably where it houses what it knows, are described in ways that betray easy access.

The Circus Archives were not accessible from the main entrance. They rambled through a warren of dingy rooms and half-landings at the back of the building, more like one of the second-hand bookshops that proliferate round there than the organised memory of a large department. They were reached by a dull doorway in the Charing Cross Road, jammed between a picture-framer and an all-day café that was out of bounds to staff.


To Alec Leamas the Circus, housing all of the intelligence work behind *The Karla Trilogy* and *The Spy Who Came In From The Cold*, is nothing but “that anonymous government building in Cambridge Circus,” where there are desk jobs he “could have taken and kept till he was God knows how old.” The office is a place where wars are not waged, shots are not fired, and heroes are not made, at least insofar as the modernist era
and any understanding of action needing to occur in real time characterizes requirements for heroism. The actions conducted in the office space are cerebral, minute, and sparing in their motion, yet their compounding influence on matters of economy and society are profound. As much as they do not move heaven and earth, they are in their own ways very much responsible for the planning and the actualization of these drastic forces, though in a way which is considerably less concrete than the actual laying of concrete. The institutions that boxy, gray offices hold contribute more than the sum of their meager, cubiced parts to this world where planning has not only become an art, but a fixture of productivity and the modern economy.

Offices and institutional spaces are also the locations Le Carré employs most frequently for staging his espionage cabarets. Unlike the realms Bond’s adventures inhabit most comfortably, Le Carré offers his spies only sparing hints of the luxury Bond’s pantheon rarely do without. Unlike the casinos and luxurious bars Fleming lavishly lets his spies inhabit, Le Carré more realistically houses the true legwork, or rather, brainwork, of espionage in the contained, stodgy atmosphere of the offices where they most realistically occur. This realism demands a respect from the agents that venture into them, and brings out those tiny details of *mise en scène* that transport any office-goer into the place of the intelligence agent while at the same time imparting the tension spies feel in living with the paranoiac demands of the secret world. Even two of the most capable agents, as they ascend to the Fifth Floor to undertake planning for the uncovering of a Soviet gold seam in *The Honourable Schoolboy*, silence themselves in the presence of the highest echelons of espionage office culture.
They had reached the fifth floor. They trod quietly now, no more romping, English subalterns called to order. The corridor turned left, then right again, then rose by a few narrow steps. A cracked fish-eye mirror, steps again, two up, three down, till they came to a janitor’s desk, unmanned. To their left lay the rumpus room, empty, with the chairs pulled into a rough ring and a good fire burning in the grate. Thus to a long, brown-carpeted room marked “Secretariat” but in fact the ante-room, where three mothers, in pearls and twin sets, quietly typed by the glow of reading-lamps. At the far end of this room, one more door, shut, unpainted, and very grubby round the handle. No finger-plate, no escutcheon for the lock. Just the screw holes, he noticed, and the halo where one had been.


Where in other spheres the spy might be invisible, in the office the spy is in his element and at his most institutionally powerful, as well as at his most transparent. In the realm of the office, home of the pencil- and paper-pushers James Bond makes a point of scoffing so frequently, the real life portrait of intelligence work can be seen, and when Bond is forced to engage with it he finds himself stalwartly allergic. Upon having read all of two reports at his actual desk in his office, “[suddenly] Bond rebelled. What the hell was he doing reading about all this stuff? When would he conceivably require to know about a Japanese murder-drug called Philopon?” The picture of the spy digging through files is not a portrait those accustomed and enculturated to the drama and flair of the Bond institution find compelling, much like Bond himself. Its lack of ability to inspire grand narratives befuddles those standards established by Bond’s hype, but as Le Carré establishes is nonetheless the mainstay of where actual intelligence work comes from. The office is not a space which even as a member of the community himself Fleming found interest in portraying due to his latent preference for making the world a playing field, rather than making the playing field out of a simple desk as most intelligence agents must in order to show respect for their place in the secret world.
The portrait of the spy Le Carré provides in these official “adventures” is a far more accurate representation of what espionage actually thinks like and does behind closed doors. Spies truly not do well when they are not able to pass in and out of public view with relative ease. Enemy spy catchers would also be tremendously inconvenienced if the lofty circles of luxury such as are Bond’s preferred fare were the only places spies could be located or removed from. Asking someone into the back room of a library, archive, or office is a much more mundane scene than that of forcing someone out of a casino, hotel resort, or public villa. Making an everyman disappear or incite him to change their views is considerably less dangerous than attempting to make social juggernauts change their tack. Practically and practitionally, espionage as a general rule does not engage in high-speed car chases, over-spend on gambling or flagrant luxury, nor find out-of-this world helicopter crashes, embassy bombings, or other highly publicly visible disasters acceptable consequences of field missions. The demi-secret world of Bond, compared to espionage reality and even Le Carré’s fiction, cannot claim that inciting as many public shootings and diplomatic incidents as it does could ever be considered viable tradecraft. The point of espionage is to get what information is needed while remaining undetected – the disaster that comes along with an agent being exposed and killed is tragic enough for Le Carré’s spies. The best place for spies to get collate that information, as everyone knows and as Le Carré points out, is in the place where the least action need be taken in order to accomplish a higher intelligence goal and where the least risk is posed to the safety and success of their operatives and operations. Le Carré is careful to separate the grand heroic epic and its flamboyant trappings to keep intelligence work about intelligence rather than action.
Anonymity and invisibility are the two greatest powers which office spaces functionally hold, and are pillars of successful intelligence tradecraft. Even in the field, these two powers are the primary tools any agent has to maintain or engineer agency in the secret world. There is a realism and a purpose to the mundanity of espionage in Le Carré’s representations which not only refutes but rebuilds the false images which Bond made his imminent fortune out of. His reconstructions of the trade were not purposefully similar to Bond so much as they brought complexity to the understanding of the spy as a character, as seen in how his flawed idols grapple with their work. Those podgy, lost, alcoholic geniuses that clung to their offices and their records to find their way in the modern world, rather than go through it gun-slinging for solutions, while also considerably more true to life, raised the bar for what Bond and other spies could and should be. The character of Le Carré’s heroes speaks to the reality of Britain’s status in the global political affairs of the Cold War as being “inhuman in defense of our humanity, harsh in defense of compassion... single-minded in defense of our disparity.”

Rather than being the hub and founding resource for the Western espionage campaigns, Le Carré’s Britain is realistically floundering under the weight of these paradoxes – starving, desperate for institutional success, and dammingly old-fashioned. Rather than tradition and postwar glory bringing British spies up, the postwar economic trough made the donnish societal luxuries of governmental satellite offices rightly appear out-of-place. Le Carré’s spies, one step removed even from the ministries, inhabit a liminal office space with a stretched budget and diseased by valid and invalid paranoia.

The Circus is most well known for being the progenitor of George Smiley. Smiley, though not an outright ploy on Bond’s brilliance and beauty, is nonetheless the
fictional antithesis of Bond chic. Podgy, overweight, completely incapable of holding a relationship with his wife in spite of better desires, Smiley nonetheless has a much more successful espionage career than Bond could ever hope to have. Smiley appears, for all intents and purposes, as “short and rather plump. He had glasses and wore odd, expensive clothes; he was a kindly, worried little man and [someone one] trusted somehow without knowing why.” Nonetheless, where Bond’s ego and self-image never fails him, Smiley has the self-reflection to realize that, “[it] is sheer vanity to believe that one fat middle-aged spy is the only person capable of holding the world together.” Yet of the two, Smiley is the far superior intelligence agent, and Bond a pantomime soldier by comparison. The ability of Smiley to move in and out of various infrastructural strata, as well as to accomplish espionage goals that are not only more reasonable but more realistic, marks him as both a step below and a step above Bond’s standards. If he were the type of debonair jack-of-all-trades man that Bond is, it would be next to impossible to maintain the liminal, invisible status he employs even within his own institution and governing ministries. Smiley, though in his own way made into an icon with his thick glasses and monkishness, represents the side of espionage feared far more than the openly accessible antics of Bond. Smiley is the man able to be passed on the street and never known as being responsible for funneling thousands of dollars, dozens of lives, and troves of information in and out of the offices of those who control the everyday lives of the commonwealth. He does this in all the books he appears in by thinking around the motions of the bureaucrats – not always by preventing them their spoils, as in The Honourable Schoolboy, but often, as the case rests in Smiley’s People, getting the job the
really needed doing all along completed in full. These ends, however, are never as pretty as the shallow and satisfactory resolutions to Bond’s missions.

Though academic and far from the woes of fieldwork, Smiley is the intellectual whose ability of inference and strength with human patterns proves the age-old adage that brains are better than brawn, and he proves his worth not by bludgeoning the struggles of the field into submission, but by that careful balance of micro-management and paranoia that make the best real secret agents outside of fiction. Le Carré details his character not to keep him a mystery like Bond, but to reveal him so that his audiences may feel kinship with his secrecy and with his failure.

He had the art, from miles and miles of secret life, of listening at the front of his mind; of letting the primary incidents unroll directly before him while another, quote separate faculty wrestled with their historical connection. In his memory, these [connections] were like a part of a childhood: he would never forget them.


Smiley, though a tottering icon, proves in his crossover from the human and into demi-computational realm of human thought that there is more to spying and espionage than the “great game.” Smiley is the answer to even his ministerial controller’s question of, “Who can spy on the spies? Who can smell out the fox without running with him?”

But what Smiley finds in doing so challenges the purpose of espionage itself, and is what challenges blind faith in him from his readership. Before Smiley reaches his finale, he manages the fates of scores of agents, playing god against the threat of magic and other romantic forces – in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* he solves the riddle of his predecessor’s legacy in Operation Testify, revealing in divine insight the traitor within British intelligence leaking vital information through the Anglo-American motivated Operation
Witchcraft. In Operation Rolling Stone, he sabotages the operation Alec Leamas believes himself to have been sent on so as to insure the success of the real mission: to preserve their double agent, an ex-Nazi in the East German Abteilung, and send the only subordinate within the Abteilung capable of deposing him, along with Leamas and his civilian lover, to their deaths. And in the Dolphin case Smiley cracks the secret of a Soviet gold-seam in Hong Kong, revealing a Soviet trained channel into Communist China, and keeps Jerry Westerby from playing the field for the benefit of his dreams by removing Westerby so that the Americans may cannibalize the victory and in doing so restore some diplomatic camaraderie. These operations and operatives, and many others, Smiley engineers from his offices in the Circus, only venturing out to capture the memory of his little victories before delving back into the truly secret world of his internal mind.

Alec Leamas and Jerry Westerby each play into the aspects of the tropes Bond tried to establish as dictum within their profession, and are highlighted against Smiley’s brand of office professionalism with their unique versions of field agent street smarts. Leamas’ most prominent role in The Spy Who Came In From The Cold is to be visible, but for an end far less comfortable and glorious than any that Bond lived through. As a patsy, a drunkard put out to field once his usefulness has been expired, he ruins himself with drink and rebelliousness – habits that Bond maintained as viable. Where Bond takes on a very luxurious role within the history of espionage field men, Leamas is the embittered, suffering spy who has had to serve the grasping hands of his own regime and the regimes of others for so long that his own ability to maintain a personal philosophy is broken and defunct. Where Bond still has surreptitious beliefs in the notions of Empire
and King & Country, Leamas prefers not to remark on any matter of political or philosophical importance beyond not liking Americans and schools – and desiring very much to destroy the man in the Abteilung he believes he has been sent to dispatch with who decimated Leamas’ agent network. To Leamas, the fatigue of moral pressures at the peak of Western thinking, well passed after the 1940s and ‘50s, left him with a moral exhaustion impossible to overcome, save for by a love that is like Westerby’s doomed under the practical auspices of espionage whose ends at times are justified by its means.

For Westerby, war and espionage are his way of life, and though in a much different attitude than Leamas, he resents the volleying between the secret and non-secret worlds field men are tasked with. Westerby, forever the deprecating and ingratiating Englishman, puts on the face of a hard-boiled but plodding and polite newsman – a cover that in The Honourable Schoolboy is common for spooks in foreign theaters. Westerby’s experiences in the Asian theatres pose him as the perfect front man for the intelligence investigation such as he undertakes with the Dolphin case at Smiley’s behest. Westerby is, however, a field man tried and true: his habit is not to make any attempt at the analytical leaps and bounds of the likes of Smiley. Because he is not the cerebral type, when Westerby stumbles upon a wayward love interest in the throes of his mission he succumbs to a grand romantic plot to steal back the life he wasted in the secret world by robbing and bartering the primary target of the Dolphin case for the safety of his romantic interest and himself. Westerby’s chronic statelessness, a personal characteristic that made him such a good field agent up until that point, pushes him to cling to his love interest as an outlet for what he lacks: not a future, for his abilities as an operative and his connections provide him a plethora of possible futures. “[It’s] not for want of a future that
I’m here, he thought. It’s for want of a present.”¹⁵ In assuming too much agency and influence over the secret world and ignoring the depth and breadth of influences at play in the Dolphin case – post-colonial sovereignty, American military interests, British intelligence bartering – Westerby proves by guaranteeing it for himself that the romantic hubris inhabited by Bond at various points in his extensive romantic history realistically only ends in a death certificate and sullied legacy for anything resembling a true field agent. The dreary utility and subtlety of espionage work within Le Carré’s secret world reflects the practices established in our own non-secret world, and reinforces that in spite of Bond-ish claims to the contrary, there are boundaries and limits to what can be accomplished if espionage work is not taken seriously and does not take care to heed its own operational risks.

The reason Smiley outlives so many of his agents and lives to make a crowning achievement is because he fastidiously compiles data so as to avoid these operational risks as best he can from within his office. Working in intelligence tradecraft and in the liminal spaces generated for that very profession by the state yet which are outside the state, the relationship between the search for the truth in relevant information and having to maintain structural and social boundaries is a pressure spy agencies must live with. “Secret agents work inside and outside hierarchical structures at the same time.”¹⁶ Around the world, the limits of what spies are allowed to do based on ethical and diplomatic relationships is one of the most difficult aspects of navigating the spy role in public and official discourse – former colonies have governors and governors possess sovereignty and sovereignty muddies the operational water in both *The Honourable Schoolboy* and *Thunderball*. While spy agencies might socially rebel against their
governing boards and collaborative institutions, there is a necessary dependency between these forces on behalf of allowing intelligence efforts to take place across borders. The state must maintain its liminal citizens to reap the benefits of their work, and for intelligence efforts to take place the spy agencies must kowtow to their governing graces on behalf of their own need for multivalent functionality. The prevalence of office drama in Le Carré is the perfect venue on which to stage the difficulty of competing professional pressures felt by British and American espionage schools during the Cold War because it forces non-action and cultural friction. There is a particular breed and tint of frustration consistent with inter-office idiocy that flavors professional conflicts which most people in the public spheres relate to and which spies themselves are not exempt from. The social characters of the American and the Brit subtly butt heads wherever they meet, whether in ministry meetings or the field. Le Carré takes special care in highlighting the subtle social nuances separating the British concern from the American in the ways British spies must circumnavigate their “allies” in order to keep from being blocked from their work by American political interests. The character of American spies is marked by chauvinism and sustained – if staged – ignorance, bringing out the vicious purposefulness to the ways the Americans sabotage their westernized allies by doggedly chasing their own agendas regardless of other countries’ needs. Both Smiley and Westerby run circles around American ministry and military in *The Honourable Schoolboy*, and as Westerby gets an earful from Major Masters “a paramilitary type of Cousin,”

“I want you to extend to me the hand of welcome, sir. The United States of America has just applied to join the club of second-class powers, of which
I understand your own fine nation to be chairman, president, and oldest member. *Shake it!*

Masters goes on to offer Westerby a half-bottle of scotch and some Playboy magazines they “keep handy for English gentlemen who didn’t see fit to lift a damn finger to help us.”

The intelligence agency, on top of having to deal with its own often inane bureaucracy, also has to deal with the bureaucracies, relationships, and expectations of other foreign powers. When a power struggle, or in the Anglo-American case a blatant power supremacy is in play, the tension between the agencies is at its peak. The broken Western space in Le Carré is frequented by Western problems, and in espionage, these problems are the chronic symptom of the state of their mutual of trust, and of who can be relied upon in certain projects and who cannot. The non-Western value of the tension present in the exchanges between British espionage efforts and American tells in slant but uncertain terms how Le Carré read the involvement of Britain’s near and dear relatives in their shared secret world.

This tension and level of distrust shared by already paranoid members of the intelligence community displays what Britain already knew of the complex exchanges in the Western alliance. With British spies desperate for the resources and products of their brothers at Langley, the necessity of respecting the underhandedly ubiquitous presence of American military and intelligence directives is not an easy crusade for those spies who do not fall under the sway of the Stars & Stripes banner. Characters like George Smiley, Jerry Westerby, and Alec Leamas, as the front-runners of some of Le Carré’s most popular novels, raise the problematic question of just how much the Anglo-American alliance is worth. While the nemesis of the British crown may indeed have been the
Soviets, there are nuances of discomfort between American and British characters that never cease to influence their exchanges. Though they are of the same side and same mind to certain extents, the competition and distrust between them, the institutional race that is decided before it starts, compounds the efforts of spies on all sides to maintain their personal and moral high ground. The English and American spies are different as night and day, but they never venture into the outright black and white adversarial relationship American agents have with non-Western enemies. The separation is felt most severely between American and British agents not because of the lack of difference they have between one another, but because the amount of difference in the small and dangerous space of the secret world causes as much friction as the worlds of difference present between culturally diverse agents from different parts of the world. Their desires to get out of and back in bed with one another, in the Whitehall’s jargon, oscillate over time in *The Karla Trilogy* depending on how fortified America and the West are feeling, as exemplified by Westerby’s experiences with them in Asia in the 1970s – a veritable disaster of a time for American war efforts – but in all cases lead to distrust and drama in ministry offices.

For the likes of Westerby the “special relationship” with the American Cousins is a grating presence that hampers British espionage efforts. Like a stalking romancer or worse, a diplomatic tumor, the American interest in all things covert subsumes most intelligence endeavors even more so than the typical bureaucratic chicanery that causes spies and government employees so much trouble. The tricky nature of this relationship in Smiley’s eyes comes from a mix of subversive twists on Western ideals, resulting in battling diplomatic and institutional expectations that costs the lives of many of his own
agents on behalf of the vanguard for the usefulness of the Anglo-American “brotherhood” rather than necessarily the moral fortitude of the Western mindset. As he recognizes of the jaded perspectives of American and British society the Karla-planted mole within the Circus has, “[he] took it for granted that secret services were the only real measure of a nation’s political health, the only real expression of its subconscious.”¹⁸ The cost of the West’s upkeep, as Smiley, Leamas, and Westerby all learn, and as Bond seems ever oblivious to, is too great for one man to pay for or prevent, just as it is too great to insure against how the political health of a nation can change based on all the other influencing factors in the secret world to which allies too are subjected.

Leamas and Westerby pay for this lesson with their lives, and Smiley pays for it with his faith. Like all those spies who do dare to defy the operational teachings of the office Mandarins and try to assume some form of the gun-slinging romantic heroics, as Leamas does in trying to smuggle Liz Gold back over into West Berlin and Westerby does as he tries to kidnap the kingpin of the Dolphin case and insure bartering power for his paramour, Leamas and Westerby meet quick and deadly ends where they stand breaching the invisible boundary between the secret and non-secret worlds. For this sin, they are not permitted to return safely to the protection of either. Leamas is shot at the Berlin Wall, unable to will himself to abandon Liz’s dead body and succumb to what remained for him in the West.¹⁹ Westerby is shot by his own allies after having broken ranks and attempted to steal away their intelligence gold seam, never to deliver on his romantic promises of protection and reunion to Lizzie Worth and escape into delusional bliss in the non-secret world.²⁰
Smiley, perhaps with the most disturbing sacrifice of all, is victorious over his long-standing nemesis in Moscow Centre – Karla. In the last of the Karla Trilogy, Smiley’s People, after a lifetime of service and jumping in and out of the frocks of various ministerial regimes, Smiley at long last reels in and captures his nefarious equal, who for decades had sabotaged Western intelligence efforts from behind the Iron Curtain. The victory, while a blind success for the rest of the secret service, is to Smiley a vertigo-inducing event. Without the ivory tower of superior morals to stand on and facing the defeat of the man behind the miseries of Smiley’s Cold War, engineered by the methods espionage had picked up from the handbook of the enemy, Smiley recognizes his enemy within himself as he did all those years ago in Delhi.

He looked across the river into the darkness again, and an unholy vertigo seized him as the very evil he had fought against seemed to reach out and possess him and claim him despite his striving, calling him a traitor also; mocking him, yet at the same time applauding his betrayal. On Karla has descended the curse of Smiley’s compassion; on Smiley the curse of Karla’s fanaticism. I have destroyed him with the weapons I abhorred, and they are his. We have crossed each other’s frontiers, we are the no-men of this no-man’s land.

—John Le Carré, Smiley’s People (395).

And “when good and evil actors can be mistaken for one another and the acts of one can be attributed to another, it is vastly more difficult to condemn or justify either.” This, as the closing and ultimate scene of Le Carré’s trilogy, poses good reason to fear what Smiley has become in the no-man’s land of the master-spy: it is the reason why in civilizations previous spies were considered subversive and detrimental to the state, as Smiley feels he has become subversive to himself: “There is a “death of history” in the sense of the absence of competing grand ideologies,” and in proving his mastery over his enemy, Smiley has only proven his superior opportunism and cruelty, making the death
of his history complete in eradicating the difference between it and the history of his enemy.\textsuperscript{22}

Le Carré was forced to abandon the narrow views of Western glory by a war men could not be proud of, unlike the Great War that formed Fleming’s paradigm.

“Englishmen,” as remarked by a Circus Moscow-gazer, “could be proud then.”\textsuperscript{23} Western influence and the figure of the superspy were taken in hand with more than a few grains of salt, and made to reflect the gruesome reality of espionage work and what it buys outside of Bond’s grand narrative. These spies, in doing the very work of supporting the intelligence and infrastructural health of Britain, cannot in doing so reclaim the Empire, reinforce Britain as a global power, and shelter the superiority of the West. “Among the uncertainties remains an unpalatable truth: With respect to our loves, friendships, and deepest loyalties, entropy conquers.”\textsuperscript{24} They are lucky if they live to see their pensions, and even then, as Smiley remarks, “I never heard of anyone yet who left the Circus without some unfinished business.”\textsuperscript{25} Having had to live and work around the mundane mediocrity of Cold War espionage operations, Le Carré was interested instead in the intelligentsia who would instead wage war in the secret world, not the knights in shining armor (or finely tailored suits) Fleming and the public remain so charmed by. The difficulty with the age of intelligence, as Le Carré proved, is that when the truth emerges, it does not always reveal what is intended or assumed. As Smiley himself says in his closing comments to Karla during their first meeting:

“Look, in our trade we have only negative vision. In that sense, neither of us has anywhere to go. Both of us when we were young subscribed to great visions. But not any more. Surely?”\textsuperscript{26}
Endnotes


2. The Honourable Schoolboy, set in 1974, is one of Le Carré’s best case examinations of the complexity of American military and intelligence interests. Smiley’s half of the narrative explores the thorny issue of dealing with American mouthpieces who do not enforce their side of the Dolphin case bargain. Jerry Westerby’s, through a complex series of locational changes, experiences the American military in the throes of exposure and defeat. As Jerry soundly and summarily notes, “This time, as he now realised, it was the Cousins who were paying the piper, and while Jerry had no particular quarrel with the Cousins, their presence made it a much rougher ball game.” (See: Le Carré, The Honourable Schoolboy, p. 510; Moran, “Ian Fleming and the Public Profile of the CIA,” p. 132-133.)


7. Fleming, Moonraker, p. 77.

8. All of these events being only from Daniel Craig’s run as James Bond (Casino Royale (2006), Quantum of Solace (2008), Skyfall (2012), Spectre (2015)) reveals how quickly the Bond films cycle through epic disasters.

9. Though Le Carré has himself confirmed the he is not anti-Bond, he has specified that rather than being against Fleming and the Bond institution itself, he was more realistically devoted to building up and evolving the understanding of the spy which Bond propagated. His aim was not to unmake the Bond institution, but to raise it to a new level so as to nuance the social understanding of the spies who shaped so much of the 20th Century cultural history. (See: Britton, Beyond Bond, p. 125-126.)


12. Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 80.

13. Ibid., p. 77.
14. The first sixty-seven pages of *Thunderball* are spent laboriously detailing Bond’s experiences at a luxuriant but appallingly restrictive health spa in Sussex where M orders him to recover from his excessive smoking, drinking, and medicating. The time spent at this spa turn Bond into a happily health- and body-conscious individual until he returns to his post to find an international threat from SPECTRE, upon which point his drinking, smoking, and medicating quickly return with no sign of any lingering consciousness toward his prolonged health in sight. Unlike Leamas, who is put out to sea and eventually eaten by the sharks, Bond is allowed to both recover from and then resume his terrible habits in the face of the requirements his grand narratives put on him.


22. Black, “What We Can Learn From James Bond.”


The bad dream turned out to be one that a lot of people in the world were sharing, since it asked the same old question that we are asking ourselves fifty years later: how far can we go in the rightful defense of our Western values without abandoning them along the way?

—John Le Carré, “Fifty Years Later,” in The Spy Who Came In From The Cold (xiv).

The question raised by Le Carré’s quote, which this thesis has sought to provide context if not some versions for is: what are Western values? What makes up the entity he references as having been unsettled by the last half-century of geopolitical chicanery? The non-specific understanding of the Western view slips in and out of the espionage genre’s discourses, crossing borders and invading public perceptions much like the spy or secret agent. And though espionage fiction may come from a tradition cloaked in illegality and of often painted by less than flattering portraitists, it nonetheless has its uses for illustrating its own answers to this question. “In literary representations, spies recall dissonance at the heart of ideological certainty,” and in their own ways, espionage authors and spies have provided answers about what the West has meant in different times and to different generations.¹ By taking the fictions of spymaster authors as products reflective of acute aspects of culture, the living contrast of the West changing shape can illustrated.

Fleming was the final stronghold in popular literature for the manner of old world, Kipling-esque patriotism Britain needed to soothe its nostalgic pangs in the 1950s and ‘60s. The figure of Bond yet remains prevalent to our understanding not only of espionage but of modern heroism, and how heroics, though not nearly as aggrandized as Bond advertises, are acted out behind closed doors. Though at the end of the Cold War
both Bond and the genre of espionage were facing these very serious death threats, events that could neither be predicted nor prevented have left the momentum of both rolling.²

The qualities that sustain the espionage genre, in character with its chameleon skin, are as subject to change as are the needs of its symbiotic, non-secret public. Due to its continued mastery over changing its skin to suit the social mood, it has proven itself able to find all manners of new of social tensions to address through the eyes of the secret world. The adaptability of espionage to keep itself relevant has thus kept it out of the pine box which many literary critics foretold it being buried in at the end of the Cold War. As the decades have passed, James Bond’s success has also relied on his ability to change shape based on the concerns and styles of the various generations, as well as on changing methods and needs for espionage. Le Carré’s precedent for espionage, standing as serious counterpoint to Bond’s frivolity, was one of many sources of inspiration for evolution which spurred Bond to address a different set of issues than those in his original textual provisos.

It took the seasoned wisdom of an analyst such as Le Carré to provide the perspective needed to understand there was a changing of the guard taking place during the Cold War. The intra-imperial dreams posited by the original flair of Fleming’s heroically charming novels were not, therefore, what would make his creation’s institution last. The post-modern attitude introduced by writers like Le Carré, in embracing the belief that simply questioning a thing, sourcing and reflecting on it, can contribute positively to the understanding and agency one can claim with it, is one the Bond franchise has benefitted from in the long run.
The question of “why do we need spies?” stems from the same rhetoric that questions why ancient cultures needed myths to pass on their values. The spy, for our purposes, became the avatar of choice to inhabit the industrialized intelligence culture that has blossomed out of the age of technology and mass literacy. As such, the spy conveys the values the 20th Century learned the hard way: that empires (be they royal dynasties, political reichs, or presidential eras) fade; governments will wheel, deal, and lie on behalf of their Big Pictures; and yet above all that the peoples’ hero cannot survive as a cog of the industrial machine. The desire of the masses to reclaim some agency amid the wash of their governments and institutions pushing agendas disregarding of the common man turned to the liminal hero, those figures within their cultures and regimes that double-handedly function outside of their governance, for their means of reconciliation. “The aesthetic of espionage narrative requires that we acknowledge our identification with the fugitive or the agent who hovers on the borders of legality and who, therefore, best expresses the reader’s uncertainty about living inside and outside the law at the same time.”

The liminal hero, with aesthetic and moral values always touching but never truly held by the vox dei and yet also never wholly grasped by the vox populi, stands in the place of the heroes of old not simply as a continuation of a heroic figure, but as the mouthpiece for the lessons bought and paid for by the failures of the 1900s. Precisely because of the liminal status to legality and statehood spies are granted are they able to air questions modern society has developed about its moralistic systems, serving to both quietly dismantle them and illustrate them more clearly at the same time.
The methods of creative fiction allow us to escape temporarily from our received histories and bring to light the assumptions that underpin their construction. Through fiction, we have license to construct alternative narratives, rethinking histories so widely assumed to be ‘true’ that they have not been properly examined in the light of contemporary scholarship.

—Rosalind Barber, *Exploring biographical fictions: The role of imagination in writing and reading narrative* (166).

The habitus of the spy is to question everything and trust no one. By setting the example for the results this way of life can offer – socially and intellectually more so than professionally – spies have given the public permission and even reason to dissent, and company with whom they can share their deepest misgivings and their most vain societal ambitions.

The public has welcomed this habitus of intrigue in all its forms into the fabric of its social ethos, and so long as the yawning gap between the state and the individual grows ever wider, so is it likely to continue this welcome. What the spy represents is the ability to question the regime from within – even its benevolence, and esteemed morals.

“[The] legal sanctioning of the most profound societal taboo is a centerpiece of the spy novel [that suggests] this genre of fiction may offer broader and deeper critiques of law in the modern era.” The consciously post-modern public cannot abide with a lack of right to deconstruct its structures, not to destroy them, but to understanding the infrastructure’s secrets so as to better understand their own. The gaze of spies, and the fixation of the public gaze on spy media, “mirrors the nation’s view of itself,” and if the popularity of distrust within espionage fiction tells us anything, the nation’s view of itself is understandably skeptical of what it sees.

In a special foreword written for the 50th anniversary of *The Spy Who Came In From The Cold*, Le Carré, a disrupting voice of wisdom as always, supplied, “What have
I learned over the last fifty years? Come to think of it, not much. Just that the morals of
the secret world are very like our own." For good or bad the West, like the Empires
before it, is being dismantled and forced to reveal its darkest treasures and treatises,
leaving an image of an ideology not so different from that of its enemies – a conclusion
wholly intended to leave the inquiring public feeling perturbed. Yet this perturbation is
not altogether doom – it is but another facet of the intelligence age, and of the tradition of
espionage which has now become the public’s own of finding resolutions to questions
only to raise new ones in the stead of the old.

Thus with a tip of our hats and a turn of the page, we pay homage to our unseen
heroes, and put an order to the bar for a fine martini to suit our moral quandaries. Shaken,
of course, not stirred.
Endnotes


BIBLIOGRAPHY


