Some aspects of legislative roll call behavior in the House of Representatives of the twenty-third legislative assembly of the State of Montana (1933-1935) by Richard L Pastega

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Abstract:
Legislative research in other states suggested the need for studies of an empirical nature on Montana legislators. Because tools and materials were available, legislative roll calls were selected for a pioneer attempt to probe legislative behavior in the state.

Following the collection of a wealth of data, several hypotheses were constructed to provide a theoretical framework for systematic analysis. Owner occupancy was used throughout as an index to socio-economic variables that might have been affecting public and legislative behavior. Further, co-efficient of significance and party competition were used, as means for determining the significance of roll calls, one goal in the employment of these two variables was to be able to reflect on their usefulness in the type of research undertaken here.

Following the testing of the hypotheses, the results were organised and assessed. Some of the more significant conclusions were: (1) that Democrats in the Montana House of Representatives tend to cross party lines more freely than Republicans; (2) that a high coefficient of significance on a roll call may indicate that the decision on an issue is taking place at the time the roll call is taken; (3) that coefficient of significance appears to be a useful tool in studies of this type; (4) that some index of socio-economic variables other than owner occupancy should be sought, despite its apparent usefulness in this study and; (5) that further studies of this type should be conducted on other legislative groups in Montana.
SOME ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE ROLL CALL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
TWENTY-THIRD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF
THE STATE OF MONTANA (1953-1955)

by
Richard L. Pastega

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ABSTRACT

Legislative research in other states suggested the need for studies of an empirical nature on Montana legislators. Because tools and materials were available, legislative roll calls were selected for a pioneer attempt to probe legislative behavior in the state.

Following the collection of a wealth of data, several hypotheses were constructed to provide a theoretical framework for systematic analysis. Owner occupancy was used throughout as an index to socio-economic variables that might have been affecting public and legislative behavior. Further, coefficient of significance and party competition were used as means for determining the significance of roll calls. One goal in the employment of these two variables was to be able to reflect on their usefulness in the type of research undertaken here.

Following the testing of the hypotheses, the results were organized and assessed. Some of the more significant conclusions were: (1) that Democrats in the Montana House of Representatives tend to cross party lines more freely than Republicans; (2) that a high coefficient of significance on a roll call may indicate that the decision on an issue is taking place at the time the roll call is taken; (3) that coefficient of significance appears to be a useful tool in studies of this type; (4) that some index of socio-economic variables other than owner occupancy should be sought, despite its apparent usefulness in this study and; (5) that further studies of this type should be conducted on other legislative groups in Montana.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In an undertaking of this sort, particularly with its "pioneering" aspects, the author quickly becomes indebted to a great number of people.

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Duane W. Hill for his role as director and supervisor of this project, especially for his tireless efforts and his willingness to permit this researcher to mine his large store of experience and information about methodology and content.

A word of further acknowledgment is due the members of the History, Philosophy, and Government Department for the encouragement they provided during the four terms that I attended Montana State College.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to Mr. Larry Johnson and Mr. David Knappi who often supplied the much needed extra pairs of eyes and hands. At a later stage of the study Miss Margaret Palmer gave particularly valuable assistance by lending her office and electronic computer. And, then, there is the typist, Mrs. Dorothy Maridith, whose willingness to labor long at odd hours made possible the successful completion of the project.
A question of paramount concern to political analysts has been the relation between the legislator and his constituency. How does a representative, in fact, represent the district which elects him? A classical presentation of the question seems to attack the democratic tradition of popularly elected representative government itself.\textsuperscript{1} This attack stems from the argument that voters will elect legislators who share similar socio-economic interests and views. Presumably these elected officials will in time become so mediocre as to reflect the majority of voters who elect them. The counterargument is that voters elect officials representing a socio-economic status the voters wish to achieve, and therefore popularly elected representatives will not become mediocre but will continue to represent the better elements of the society. An adequate answer to the above question with its many facets and numerous political implications would easily involve the research of a lifetime and the work of many scholars. The purpose of this paper is to deal with only one very small segment of this question, the behavior of the legislators on selected roll call votes.

In a study published by Julius Turner in 1951, \textit{Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress},\textsuperscript{2} it was shown that the similarity or


dissimilarity between party policy and the presumed interest of constituency exerts an influence on the tendency of a legislator to cross or not to cross party lines. Turner worked with the Congress of the United States. Also in 1951 Duncan MacRae, Jr. conducted a similar study on the Massachusetts House of Representatives for the years 1931, 1941, and 1951. MacRae's study had two primary aims: (1) to test the applicability of Turner's proposition to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and (2) to test whether the state of political competition in a district has any influence on a representative's voting pattern on legislative roll calls.

MacRae drew several conclusions from his study. All of his conclusions were qualified as follows: He pointed out that findings, descriptions, and generalizations applicable to one type of legislation, for example, legislation which reflected socio-economic class differences, should be applied to another type of legislation or to other legislative bodies only with caution. The author further concluded:

(1) "Republican and democratic districts tend to be differentiated by per cent owner occupancy of dwelling units. This percentage serves as a rough index combining the rural-urban dimension and socio-economic status."

(2) "Those representatives who come from districts which are most typical of their party tend to show highest party loyalty on roll call votes." This point agrees with the results of Turner's Congressional study.

(3) "Those representatives whose previous election margins were close tend to reflect constituency characteristics in their votes more closely than do those with wider margins. This confirms the original hypothesis and this may reflect a heightened sensitivity to constituent's wishes resulting from anxiety about reelection."
(4) "The tendency of a two-party system to produce moderate parties, at least as it operates in Massachusetts, can be understood in more detail than hitherto. This study indicates that the moderating influence is most pronounced in those constituencies where political competition prevails...."

(5) "Our analysis indicated that there are certain types of representatives who might be approached most effectively by lobbyists and other interested parties."

Needless to say, analysis of the previous studies stimulated an interest in the Montana legislature to see just how Montana legislators do behave on roll calls and, if possible, within limits of time and effort, to compare legislative behavior in Montana to legislative behavior in other states such as Massachusetts.

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CHAPTER II

REFLECTIONS ON THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1933

This report and the study upon which it is based has been limited to the Montana House of Representatives, Twenty-Third Legislative Assembly, largely because this body has a larger membership than the Senate and the larger number of legislators increases the probability that figures with greater significance can be obtained for the House than for the Senate. Furthermore, the entire House was elected in the general election held November 6, 1932, whereas the Senate was a continuing body and had only one-half of its membership standing for election in 1932. Finally, Massaso used the lower house in Massachusetts. Thus, any comparison will involve similar types of chambers.

On November 6, 1932, 102 house solns were elected to the Twenty-Third Legislative Assembly. Of this number 72 were elected under Democratic Party designation, and 30 were elected under the Republican Party designation. John Safring of Musselshell, a Republican, was later disqualified on the grounds of not being a resident of the district which elected him. This action reduced the Republican membership to 29 and the total membership to 101. These figures remained constant during the regular and special sessions of the Twenty-Third Legislative Assembly.

Of the 101 members in the chamber, 36 professed allegiance to the Roman Catholic Faith. All 26 were elected under the Democratic Party designation. Of the 75 Democratic Party legislators, then, 36 were Roman Catholics. Forty-eight of the 101 legislators were closely tied
to agricultural and farming interests and pursuits. Sixty-nine per cent of the Republicans were so connected, while 39% of the Democrats allied themselves to these interests. Thirty-eight per cent of the legislators claimed an urban (2,500 or more population) residence at the time of election. Sixty-two per cent of the legislators claimed a residence of less than 2,500 at the time of election and were therefore classified as rural members. At least 41 of 72 of the total 72 Democrats, or 58%, were serving their first term in the chamber; while 23 (and this figure may be slightly inaccurate) of the 29 Republicans, or 45%, were having their first try at legislating for Montana's citizenry. Only 13 of the 72 Democrats, or 18%, were native sons; and no more than 6 of the 29 Republicans, or 21%, were born and reared in Montana. On the average, the Democrat tended to be older than the Republican. The average age for 99 of the total 101 members was 51 years. The 29 Republicans averaged 48 years, and 70 of the 72 Democrats whose ages were ascertainable averaged 52 years. One Democratic colon from the County of Gallatin was a mere 23 years of age.

There are, naturally, many more interesting figures, facts, and exciting tidbits of information that could be developed. A number of these have a great deal of bearing on this study. However, it is probably best to consider those factors directly at the junctures where the study demands their inclusion after the problem has been stated. In this regard it is important to note that a great deal of the highly significant socio-economic data was not fully obtainable within the limits of time and financial possibilities.
A process of empirical investigation requires purpose, continuity, and direction. This, in turn, requires that selection of objects be made for investigation, and choices of this sort inevitably involve the assignment of value. Therefore, it should be underlined at the outset that empirical investigations like the nonempirical are encumbered with values and subject to everyone of the severe limitations attached to that fact.

Objects for investigation are best given focus by a statement of the problem that is bothering the investigator. In short, the investigator should state precisely what he wants to know. You, just what kind of knowledge is obtainable and desirable at this point? Ultimately, the world wants a storehouse of reliable and valid data and generalizations about the behavior of humans. Data and accompanying generalizations gathered by means which are as objective and non-arbitrary as persons can make them will be available for use in future investigations, and they will also have great practical value. Hence, the problem investigated here must be limited in scope to make possible the collection of reliable and valid data and generalizations. This means that the study will also have to be limited in the terms of the available tools and the competence of the investigator.

Briefly, the expansive desire to know may be wholesome but it cannot be permitted to destroy validity and reliability in order to satisfy
the appetites of the curious. Therefore, the problem here is approached with full realization that there is a dearth of information about the actual behavior of Montana legislators. It is true that there is a large fund of facts, figures, journalistic assessments, shrewd guesses, and extremely valuable historical accounts and insights. But all of these are scattered, largely unrelated, and have never been analyzed in a systematic manner. This study then is merely an attempt to establish meager beginnings. In short, the study is no more than a pioneer attempt to investigate legislative activity in the State of Montana.

It is admitted quite frankly that the availability of roll calls invited the investigator to undertake the present study. The bias is clear. However, the selection of roll calls for investigation can be justified on the basis that roll call studies elsewhere have proved fruitful as a starting point for further analysis of legislative behavior. The problem here then is further limited to legislative roll call behavior.

Still a further limitation involves restriction to the Regular and Special sessions of the Twenty-Third Legislative Assembly, and specifically, to the personnel in the House of Representatives of that body. The reason for this selection is rather curious. The author had been asked to do an historical study of the Twenty-Third Assembly and the manner in which it treated New Deal measures. When interest was aroused in the legislative cohesiveness, a decision was reached to continue with this assembly. Some of the material gathered was transferable, of course.
More important, however, if legislative behavior is to be explained in Montana a wide number of analyses will have to be conducted on a large number of legislative assemblies. Therefore, the 1933 assembly was as legitimate an object for investigation as any other.

Another frank admission is in order, namely, that the investigator believed that legislative behavior in Montana should be compared with legislative behavior in other states. Hence, the objects selected for investigation were closely related to objects selected in other states, and this meant that limits of the foregoing study were partially established by what was done elsewhere.

Since one investigation builds on another it was first necessary to know the actual roll call patterns of the legislators. Therefore, a complete tabulation was made of a majority of roll calls taken during the regular session and all of the roll calls taken during the extraordinary session. Secondly, socio-economic data was gathered on the individual members of the body. This tabulation was made as complete as possible within the limits of time available. However, as noted earlier, a great deal of work remains to be done in this vital sphere before the data can be used with confidence. Third, a complete tabulation of the 1932 election returns was compiled through an inspection of Montana dailies and county weeklies. All information of this sort had potential usefulness for the subsequent study to be undertaken.

After an inspection of the data revealed that the socio-economic data was still too incomplete for use, a decision was made to determine first what legislators were voting together in groups on particular types
of issues and significant roll calls. Differentiating legislators into group voting blocs enables the investigator to examine a number of variables that may be causing certain blocks to be cohesive. In fact, possibilities for investigation become almost limitless. Following the preliminary inspection of a few roll call patterns, the major problem was structured.

Briefly stated, the problem involves the following elements:

1) antecedent to all steps, to determine how legislators tend to pattern themselves on selected types of roll calls; 2) to make some initial inroads into the question of just how useful occupancy is as an index of expectancy for electoral behavior of Montana voters when they cast their ballots for members of the House of Representatives; (3) to make the first inroads into a similar question about the usefulness of occupancy as an index of expectancy for legislative roll call behavior in Montana; (4) to ascertain the extent of political party cohesiveness on selected roll calls in the House of Representatives of the Twenty-Third Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana; (5) to compare the findings in Montana with those in Massachusetts; and (6) to block out possibilities for future research. In order to provide a theoretical and structural framework for meeting the above problem, the following hypotheses were constructed:

Hypothesis I

a) Those house members elected under Democratic Party auspices to the Twenty-Third Assembly by a margin of 57.5% or more of the popular vote in the election of November 8, 1932 were elected from districts with a low rate of owner occupancy.

b) Those house members elected under Republican Party auspices to the Twenty-Third Assembly by a margin of 57.5% or more of the popular vote in the election of November 8, 1932 were
elected from districts with a high rate of owner occupancy.

Hypothesis II
a) That those legislators elected under Democratic Party auspices who represent constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines on significant roll calls than those Democratic representatives elected from constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices.

b) That those legislators elected under Republican Party auspices who represent constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines on significant roll calls than those Republicans elected from constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices.

Hypothesis III
a) On roll calls involving more than nominal party competition those persons elected under the banner of the Democratic Party and coming from districts with lower indices of owner occupancy will tend to deviate less from their party majority on party competition issues than Democrats coming from districts with higher indices of owner occupancy.

b) On roll calls involving more than nominal party competition those persons elected under the Republican Party banner and coming from districts with lower owner occupancy indices will deviate more from their party majority on party competition issues than Republicans coming from districts with higher indices of owner occupancy.

Hypothesis IV
a) On roll calls involving labor issues those representatives elected under Democratic Party auspices who come from constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines than will those Democratic representatives elected from constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices.

b) On roll calls involving labor issues those representatives elected under Republican Party auspices who come from constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines than will those Republican representatives elected from constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices.
Hypothesis V
a) Those persons elected under the auspices of the Democratic Party by a wide margin (57.5% of the popular vote) will tend to cross party lines less on issues involving party competition than those Democrats elected by a close margin (less than 57.5% of the popular vote).

b) Those persons elected under the auspices of the Republican Party by a wide margin (57.5% or more of the popular vote) will tend to cross party lines less on issues involving party competition than those Republicans elected by a close margin (less than 57.5% of the popular vote).

Before the hypotheses are considered some definitions must be made to clarify various terms which will be used throughout the remainder of this study.

**Owner occupancy.** All figures concerning owner occupancy were derived from those presented in the Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930. The definition of owner occupancy offered in the introduction of Volume VI of the census will be the one used in this study. Since a home is defined as the living quarters occupied by a family, the number of homes is always the same as the number of families. In the classification by tenure a home is counted as owned if it is owned wholly or in part by any related member of the family. A home owned by a lodger, however, is classified as rented. A home is counted as rented if it is not owned by any member of the family even though no specific cash rental is paid. Living accommodations received as a part of a man's salary or wages or occupied rent free under any other conditions are thus counted as rented.4

**Election margin.** As has been mentioned previously, election returns were gathered from the Montana dailies and county weeklies. From this data percentages of popular vote were computed for all candidates.

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4See Vol. VI, p. 6.
Since each county in Montana constitutes a district no great problem was involved in determining constituency boundaries. For those districts which elected more than one representative, the total vote for all candidates was computed and divided by the number of seats. The resulting figure was used as the base figure in determining percentages for the candidates.

The dividing point between close and wide margin seats was arbitrarily set at 57.5% of the popular vote. All representatives receiving 57.5% or more of the popular vote were defined as "wide margin" representatives. Representatives receiving less than 57.5% of the popular vote were considered "close margin" representatives.

Roll call. The tallied and recorded vote, absence, pass or pair on a motion while the house is in session.

Having listed the hypothesis and defined the various terms which will be used throughout the study, each hypothesis will now be discussed individually in the light of the data gathered.
CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESES I

a) Those representatives elected under the Democratic Party auspices to the Twenty-Third Assembly by a margin of 57.5% or more of the popular vote in the election of November 6, 1932 were elected from districts with low indices of owner occupancy.

b) Those representatives elected under Republican Party auspices to the Twenty-Third Assembly by a margin of more than 57.5% of the popular vote in the election of November 6, 1932 were elected from districts with high indices of owner occupancy.

Figure 1, p. 18, shows the percentage of seats each party captured in the range of per cent owner occupancy in Montana, and Figure 2, p. 19, shows the distribution of "wide margin" seats garnered by the respective parties over the same range. The election year, 1932, was Democratic in most of the United States. Franklin Roosevelt was elected to his first term of office handily. Since Republican candidates as a whole were faring so poorly in many parts of the country, those types of constituencies that tended to give a great advantage to the G.O.P. ought to be watched rather closely in an assessment.

Figure 1 reveals that the Democratic Party obtained only 14% of its seats from constituencies in which more than 60% of the homes were owner occupied, while the Republican Party obtained about 34% of its seats from constituencies of the same type. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Democrats obtained 63% of their seats from constituencies ranging from 45% to 55% owner occupancy, and Republicans 35% of their seats within the same range. There are, of course, many more seats to be captured at
Figure 1

Distribution of Party Representative
Districts by Per Cent Owner Occupancy*

Per Cent Owner Occupancy

- Owner Occupancy statistics taken from
Figure 2

Distribution of Party Seats
57.5% of Popular Vote or More
November 8, 1932

Number of Seats

Per Cent Owner Occupancy

- Democrats
- Republicans
the lower end of the spectrum — a fact that must be weighed into the assessment. Nevertheless, merely a casual glance at the graph indicates that the Democratic Party was experiencing a good deal more difficulty in the higher owner occupancy constituencies than in the lower. For example, of all seats from districts with more than 60% owner occupancy, the Republicans tallied victories in exactly one-half of them (50%).

Hence, the great bulge in the Democratic majority that was sent to the House of Representatives in 1933 was sent there by the voters from districts having low owner occupancy.

Figure 2, which illustrates the results of the investigation undertaken to test the above hypothesis, buttresses some of the tentative conclusions which may be drawn from Figure 1. A brief review of the statistics indicates that 37% of the Democratic membership was elected by a wide margin, i.e., 57.5% or more of the popular vote, while 21% of the Republicans reaped a like advantage. It is significant to note, however, that not one of the 26 Democrats who won by "wide margin" majorities came from a district of more than 60% owner occupancy. The 10 Democratic seats in counties of more than 60% owner occupancy were won by narrow margins and the Republicans captured the other 10, several of them handily. Conversely, no Republican was elected by a wide margin in any district below the 55%-60% range of owner occupancy.

Unfortunately, the findings must be left in the category of "somewhat inconclusive," even though they appear quite indicative. First, data on no more than one election are involved. If the hypothesis is tested subsequently for earlier or later elections, and if the findings
illustmate the same trends and tendencies, the results here will seem a
good deal more. Secondly, it is somewhat unfortunate from the standpoint
of the investigation that the range of owner occupancy in Montana during
the decade 1930-40 was rather narrow. Actually, the range was between
45% and 85%. However, for purposes of investigation, the usable range
had to be narrowed to a 45-70 range because so few representatives came
from constituencies of more than 70% owner occupancy. This means that
conclusions are based on a range of 25 percentage points. MacLean's usable
range for Massachusetts was about 40 percentage points (approximately-
ly 10-50). The limited range in Montana for the same period not only
raises serious doubts about comparisons between Montana and Massachusetts,
but it also reflects further doubt on findings based on owner occupancy
within the State of Montana. Therefore, the findings on Hypothesis I
must be considered as no more than indicative. Yet, they are indicative,
particularly when similar results exist in other states such as Massa-
chusetts. It can be concluded, then, that good indications exist that
owner occupancy may be an index to some socio-economic or other variables
which may be affecting election outcomes for seats in the Montana House
of Representatives.
CHAPTER V
HYPOTHESIS IX

a) That those legislators elected under Democratic Party

surfaces who represent districts with higher owner occupancy
indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross

party lines on significant roll calls than will those Demo-

cratic legislators from districts with lower owner occupancy

indices.

b) That those legislators elected under Republican Party

surfaces who represent districts with lower owner occupancy
indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross

party lines on significant roll calls than those Republican

legislators elected from districts with higher owner occupancy

indices.

A little reflection on the results gleaned from the previous
chapter stimulated this investigator to continue along the course originally
planned. True, the results were only suggestive, but in many
respects they were more than moderately suggestive, despite the severe
problems connected with owner occupancy. Furthermore, proceeding to a
direct examination of some of the roll calls often helps unravel a few
of the mysteries that have eluded or plagued literary observers for almost
thirty years. If nothing else, one can determine who votes together on
important roll calls, and one can also determine which party's members
are most apt to deviate from their party lines, and by how much. The
analysis of voting groups that are cohesive on particular roll calls or
types of roll calls may suggest what sort of variables may be affecting
roll call behavior, and thus provide future researchers with some sug-
gestions for more reliable indices of differentiation than provided by
owner occupancy. This is, after all, a legislative roll call study, not
The fact that legislative roll calls are the primary target needs to be underlined. This is not a study of the content of the issues involved, the opinions about the issues, the newspaper commentaries, economic conditions, or anything of a literary nature. This is a report of the research conducted on the behavior of legislators on certain types of roll calls, nothing more. A deliberate attempt was made to keep the study within these limits so that it would not be encumbered with a number of variables which are significant at other stages of investigation, but serve only to confuse at this juncture.

The premise is that one must know how the legislator behaved in certain contexts before one discovers why he behaved as he did. And we have before us, one small but very important segment of that behavior. The second hypothesis leads directly to the basic question: Who was voting together on the most significant roll calls, and to what extent?

This, in turn, poses the critical problem that has assailed legislative roll call analysts for years. Just how does one select the most significant roll calls? The easy road is to treat all roll calls as if they had equal significance, i.e., assign equal weights to all votes cast. Some researchers have done exactly that, their assumption being that if the issue is important enough for someone to demand a roll call, that in itself is a sufficient measure of significance. In brief, the legislator solves the problem completely. The crude method of differentiation is:

(1) motions deserving roll call; (2) motions not deserving roll
call. This seems a bit naive, to say the least. Very possibly it works out the most insignificant, but do not motions deserving roll call in the mind of the legislator vary considerably in significance? There is a rather high probability that they do.

Despite some of the heavy criticism leveled at Turner for his extensive employment and defense of the above method of selection, the process does have one salient virtue too long ignored by most scholars. The legislator does the selecting. He, not the investigator, assigns the values or weights the motion. For centuries scholars have been imputing their values to the acts of others. Although it may be true that some arbitrary evaluation on the part of the investigator is inescapable (after all, the investigator chooses the objects for consideration and every selection of this sort involves the assignment of value), each successful attempt to avoid involvement of this type lends greater validity to the results and the investigation as a whole. No matter how intelligent and informed an investigator may be, his subjective assessment will be colored deeply by the time and circumstance in which he is making the evaluation. He is a different personality, living in a different age, and viewing matters in a different perspective. Even the legislators themselves, as a group and as individuals, assign widely differing assessments to the significance of a roll call at various instances before and after the roll call is taken. If "process analysis" in the field of economics has proved anything, it has proved dramatically that changes in:

--- See Julius Turner, loc. cit. ---
time produce astounding variations in individual and group valuation. Changes are considerable even within short spaces of time—minutes before or after a roll call, for example. Therefore, if the goal is to measure actual roll call behavior at the moment a roll call occurs and the few minutes beforehand, even the verbal or written assessments given by the legislators themselves are suspect, whether it be days or hours ahead of time or days, even moments, after the roll call is taken.

The search then is for some measure that will permit the actors themselves—in this case, the legislators—to select the most significant roll calls at the times they vote, or moments before. Each roll call must be viewed as a reflection of the combined judgment of significance passed by the legislators themselves. The search for such a measure has been underway for sometime, and not without some degree of fruition. Two factors have been singled out as indicative of combined legislative judgment. First, the combined judgment of legislators is reflected in the degree to which they participate in a roll call, providing proper allowances are made for those who are unavoidably absent. Secondly, combined judgment is reflected in the degree to which the outcome is contested.

These measures partially establish a definition of significance, namely, significance is the degree of participation coupled in some manner to the degree of contest, irrespective of what the content of the issue may be. Obviously, the ancient and honored practice of scanning newspapers and news releases, evaluating outbursts of individual legislators

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or members of the public, searching the content of legislation for possible hidden meaning, interviewing legislative experts, and other common methods are not useless, but they leave the investigator in danger of making the evaluation rather than allowing the actor to make it. All such methods are very fruitful in their proper perspective and place, and ultimately must be employed in the analysis of legislative behavior. However, they are apt to do no more than confuse at this juncture. Therefore, they are probably best left to become backdrops for comparison and future analysis to aid in the determination of the discriminating powers of the measure developed.

The measure of significance developed below is not presented as the "true" measure which must be defended before all comers. Status and reputation are not at stake. The developed measure is presented to see if it discriminates and measures in a reliable and valid manner. Is it a measure that leads ultimately to better explanations of what goes on? If the answer is negative, then it should be discarded; and whether discarded or not, the search for better methods or improving this one should continue.

The measure referred to above, the one which combines the degree of contest with the degree of participation has been elaborated by William Riker. Riker's premises are that the most significant roll call measuring degrees of participation and contest is the one in which all members vote (allowing for the absolutely necessary absences), and the one

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on which the members are most closely divided. Conversely, the least important roll call would be one in which a bare quorum voted and in which the outcome is unanimous. Briefly, the most important roll call in the house under consideration is one in which the vote is 51-49 (or 46-55 if ten members are unavoidably absent), while the least significant roll call would be 51-0. All other possible voting combinations can be ordered within a matrix of outcomes, column and row, between the two extremes. The most significant vote is in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix of outcomes. Graphically, the closer a vote is to this corner the greater the significance. Without encumbering the explanation with lengthy details of mathematical analysis, it suffices to state that Riker's final formula (or recipe) is as follows:

\[ V(A_{ij}) = n - q_{ij} - m + 2 + \frac{n - r_i}{t} \pm \frac{1}{2} \]

Where:
- "A_{ij}" = any possible outcome
- "n" = number of house members (minus any that were unavoidably absent)
- "r_i" = number voting on the particular roll call
- "q_{ij}" = number on the losing side of the particular roll call
- "m" = the minimum necessary for victory when \( r_i \) participate
- "t" = a quorum for the legislature
If: \( V(a_{ef}) \) is greater than \( V(a_{ij}) \)

Then: \( a_{ij} \) is more significant than \( a_{ef} \)

The above formula is applicable only to legislatures of the same size. Due to unavoidable absences in some instances the size of "n" or the potential number of voting legislators shifts. The Montana legislative journals, happily, record the excused absences and in many cases the specific reasons for the absences. However, one must be careful about assessing the excuses since many legislators are as ingenious as school children at the art of dreaming up good reasons for voting with their feet. Nevertheless, certain excused absences can be assessed as legitimate on the basis of information gleaned from the legislative record, the newspapers of the time, and elsewhere. If the excused absence cannot be assessed as legitimate, it is probably best to treat it as a regular abstention since degree of participation is one of the two critical elements in what has been defined as significance. Actually, if the roll call is one that appears serious enough, even serious illness will not keep legislators away. In the past, many individuals who were sick and dying have put in an appearance on critical motions.

Since the assessment of excused absences has caused the size of the factor "n" in the above formula to vary by two or three points on some roll calls, it is necessary to introduce a second formula that will
make it possible to treat all roll calls on a comparable basis (as if 
"n" were equal). The measure for adjustment is to let significance 
equal one (1) minus (-) the fraction of the value of the specific roll 
call being evaluated minus (-) the value of the most significant roll 
call possible divided by (‡) the value of the least significant roll 
call minus (-) the value of the most significant roll call, provided that 
the value zero (0) is less than or equal to significance (S) and signifi­
cance (S), in turn, is less than or equal to the value one (1.00). Use 
of this ancient and valuable formula results in the desired adjustments.
In proper mathematical notation, an example of the formula would be:

$$S = 1 - \frac{V(a_{ij})}{V(a_{d3})} - \frac{V(a_{ij})}{V(a_{11})}; 0 \leq s \leq 1;$$

The very suggestion that such a measure be employed raises some 
doubts about its validity. Since doubts are a stimulus to necessary 
correctives and new developments they should be aired, providing the air­
ing does not result in futile emotional rivalries. First, it is obvious 
that consideration of the underlying motivational factors in absenteism 
is uppermost in any discussion of the possible limitations of the for­
mula. Absenteism affects the coefficient of significance markedly.
Tragically, the studies of absenteism (or no response) have been scant 
and many are of the sort that would not bear on the question at hand. A 
great deal more information on the subject is needed for a great many 
purposes, including the one here. For example, what type of persons tend
to abstain? Do the chronic abstainers have certain personality traits in common? To what extent is abstention a function of indecision? What sort of conditions produce states of indecision? How do desires for status, economic rewards, or friends affect abstention? Are abstainers less gregarious or more gregarious than other voters on roll calls? Are the regular voters able to tolerate more tension than the abstainers? Suppose that the chronic absentee cannot tolerate high tension. Then absenteeism may be a function of evaluation of significance which is exactly opposite of that defined by the formula above. When tension is high, the legislator becomes indecisive, feigns illness, or finds a way to vote with his feet. Thus absence in some cases would indicate a roll call involving high tension for him, and as such, his absence would be a gauge of how significant he felt the roll call was. Of course, it should be recognised that absences on many roll calls are the direct function of low evaluation. After all, every legislative body faces a high number of roll calls on petty and unexciting motions. Absenteeism tends to be high on most of these.

Therefore, it must be admitted that on a few select issues, abstention by particular individuals may be an indication that the legislators abstaining might be placing a high significance on the roll call. In the huge majority of instances such will not be the case, however. But what about this huge majority of instances? Could not some of these accidentally acquire a high significance as a result of timing? That is, when a petty or otherwise insignificant roll call occurs shortly before or after a hotly contested one, many persons who would normally absent
themselves participate in the lesser roll call merely because they happen to be present. It is possible, although it is not very probable, that the lesser roll call would gain a high significance. However, it does tend to increase significance to some degree in these instances, but not enough to give the roll call real high significance. This is true because the total on the losing side on these issues is almost always small, which, according to the formula, leaves the roll call still relatively insignificant. In short, such instances do not involve situations in which the outcome is seriously contested.

All questions about the validity of employing absenteeism as a partial measure for significance must recognize a very important fact. As long as one accounts properly for those persons who were unavoidably absent, it is almost incontrovertible that the abstainer values his uncommitted position more highly than a positive or negative declaration at the time the vote is taken. This evaluation is a reflection of the many pressures, his own personality traits, and a host of other variables. These factors should be reflected in the measure since they are components of the legislator's evaluation. They are not the evaluation of the investigator. The legislator made the decision. He voted not to vote on the roll call.

There are, then, three votes—a vote "for", a vote "against", and a vote to "remain uncommitted". Each is a choice that affects the possible outcome. A vote to remain uncommitted is just as much a vote, as a vote "for" or a vote "against", and it should be studied in conjunction with/latter two. There are actually two major means of voting to
remain uncommitted. The most common type is the vote to remain uncommitted through absence when the roll call is taken. The other is to "pass". This involves either of two possibilities. Either the man found himself trapped in the chamber when the vote was taken, or he voted to let everyone know that he was deliberately abstaining and uncommitted.

Abstention is tied to the outcome. This is important and has too long been ignored or given no more than token consideration. If abstention is closely tied to outcome, then it logically follows that measures of significance should account for it in a proper way. What are the possible outcomes that can be affected by deliberate abstention? Does the formula account for them adequately? First, are those abstainers who would have been on the winning side had they voted. The formula accounts for these persons rather neatly. On the one side, significance declines by reasons of lessened attendance and increases by reason of narrowing the margin between the majority and the minority. Now, what about those who would have voted with the minority, or those whose vote with the minority would have turned it into a majority? Obviously, the formula does not compensate for these people as it does for those who would have voted with the majority. In those instances that the dissidents cannot turn the minority into a majority, the minority members tend to be aware of their strength and their probabilities for victory. Legislators can count too, and news travels fast. Therefore, in those instances abstention is a measure of evaluation of the worth of contesting the vote. This does not mean that the abstainers are overcome with a feeling of futility. That may be. But they also may be silently and,
in some cases, almost unconsciously acting in accordance with their assessment of the facts of reversals in everyday life. Most important, however, a choice not to vote must be viewed in light of the fact that whatever the underlying reasons for the choice at the moment the vote was taken, an abstention and uncommitted position was valued more than action "for" or action "against".

Absentees whose votes could change losers into winners present the greatest problem. They are the ones who cause the most serious doubts about the usefulness of the formula. There is only one answer—the one given above. They valued their abstention more than the effect of their vote. Why persons do make such choices when they know the contest is close ought to be a subject of intensive investigation. Although the number of these persons happens to be very very small, the fact is that they do exist. Actually, their choice is most significant, and it is almost inescapable that they value their uncommitted position more than their committed vote. This being so, the measure of significance should devalue the vote on which they choose to absent themselves. The above formula does just that.

To test the hypothesis stated in the initial part of this chapter, all tabulated and untabulated roll calls for both the regular and special sessions were scrutinized carefully. An important decision followed. If possible, no roll call with a coefficient of less than .900000 would be used. There were solid grounds for this decision. Although all roll calls can be weighted according to their respective coefficient of significance, roll calls with low coefficients are highly suspect for reasons cited
earlier in this chapter. If a roll call with low significance happens to fall close to a significant one, persons voting on the more significant one might just be around to vote on the less significant one. The result would not affect the roll call with a high coefficient, but it would distort the value of the one with the lower coefficient. In such a case, the use of the less significant roll call would distort results. Moreover, a roll call which would ordinarily be very low might end up with a higher coefficient than one that would be higher on the scale but was a victim of unfortunate timing. In brief, a roll call having a coefficient of .366793 might obtain an increased value if it followed a highly significant one. In this case it might obtain a value of .511342 and thus be weighted at greater worth than another which was legitimately .360629.

An even more important decision involved the introduction of another control factor. Since the same personnel was involved in two sessions, it was believed that enough significant votes could be located that also involved party competition. Under conditions involving no more than one session this might not have been possible. Another inspection of the roll calls produced twenty-eight motions involving pronounced party competition. Coefficients of significance were determined after obtaining five significant roll calls on the first pass, a thorough search of all roll calls produced two more. Unfortunately, one of them, S. B. 177, involved no more than moderate party competition. The results of the above operations are contained in Tables I and II.
## TABLE I

**ROLL CALLS INVOLVING PARTY COMPETITION AND HAVING COEFFICIENTS OF .9 OR MORE FOR THE MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TWENTY-THIRD ASSEMBLY, 1933, REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient of Significance</th>
<th>Session Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.972587 (S.B. 54)*</td>
<td>State furnishing textbooks to children free for public and private schools (motion to reconsider and save the bill).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.972206 (S.B. 22)*</td>
<td>Override veto of act regulating salaries of state liquor officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.946835 (H.B. 49)*</td>
<td>Classification of Land for tax purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.944895 (S.B. 54)</td>
<td>(See above) motion to reconsider and save bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.944336 (S.B. 16)*</td>
<td>(See below) vote to reconsider or in this case to save the bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.932396 (S.B. 91)*</td>
<td>Amendments to laws relating to reporting Supreme Court decisions and fees therefor (motion to segregate from Committee report and save bill).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.932125 (S.B. 16)</td>
<td>Act fixing salaries of Governor and chief state administrators (Vote was to segregate from committee report recommending killing the bill).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.931585 (H.B. 177)*</td>
<td>Motion to save by segregating from committee report of bill for evaluating railroads and public utilities for taxation purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.913943 (H.B. 146)*</td>
<td>Providing penalties for use of explosives in taking game fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.888246</td>
<td>Motion to impeach the Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.877772 (S.B. 16)</td>
<td>(See above) Attempt to segregate bill from committee report and save it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE II
PARTY DIVISION ON SIGNIFICANT ROLL CALLS FOR MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Bill</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 54)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>2-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>44-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 22)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>1-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>50-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H.B. 49)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>9-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>38-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 54)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>5-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>47-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 16)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>6-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>49-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 91)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>12-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>43-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 16)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>8-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>46-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H.B. 177)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>13-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>38-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H.B. 146)*</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>11-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>36-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No number</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>2-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>48-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.B. 16)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>8-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>48-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No doubt for those who are only casually acquainted with legislative research, the most striking aspect in the table of coefficients is the fact that both impeachment votes failed to make it into the select group (.9000000 or above). Impeachment issues are exciting and rare
affairs. They stimulate public and journalistic interest and attention. Motions to impeach and motions to override an executive veto are the two important American examples of what constitutes votes of confidence in the British House of Commons.

This is an excellent juncture at which to explain why the significance of the roll call on a particular issue must be discriminated sharply from the significance of the content of an issue. It is obvious to the most uninitiated person that a different set of factors may be affecting a vote of confidence than would be affecting another type of issue. To get to the most critical point in this study, consider the following:

The significance of the content of an issue may be so great that it affects the significance of the roll call dramatically. For example, in those instances where an issue is hot, the decision may be reached in advance of the roll call and, in many cases, if interest is high the outcome will be generally known among the actors long before the roll call is taken. It is not necessary that it become generally known publicly. All that is necessary is for the legislators themselves to have some inkling. If the outcome is already known, then the significance of the roll call is apt to decline, in some instances markedly, in the minds of legislators who necessary is know. All that is for the known winners to make sure that the proper numbers for the majority decision attend and vote. This, in fact, is what has been observed in Britain when a vote of confidence is hanging in the balance. As is known in professional circles, many votes of confidence in Commons are preceded by "test votes" that indicate which way Commons will go on the confidence measures. It is not surprising that
the "test vote" often has a higher significance rating than the vote of confidence itself. If the outcome is known, it makes a difference in how the actors assess the roll call.

Why discriminate between the significance of the content of the issue and the significance of the roll call on the issue? The reason is precisely this: Political scientists are interested in locating decision-makers and determining how decisions are reached. They want to know where decision-makers come from, what makes them tick, and how they conduct their affairs when the decisions are being made. Economists and sociologists are interested in this too. To locate the decision-makers, one must know when the decisions take place and also when they do not. There has been a wealth of misinformation on these matters for centuries. There has also been some seemingly good, but very unreliable conclusions drawn and sanguine history written as a result.

The coefficients above may be indicating whether the decisions were in doubt or whether they were known at the time the roll calls were taken. If so, the coefficient is extremely useful. It may also indicate expectancy of decision on issues which have a high content significance, despite their rather mediocre significance on roll calls. For example, issues that are affected heavily with the public interest may be of the sort that get pushed to a decision long before the roll call is taken.

It is not surprising, then, that the impeachment motions missed the

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select group. One, the second, barely missed, however. But the experts strongly recommend that votes of confidence be dropped even when they are of high significance. Such votes involve a different set of variables that introduce strong biases. On votes of confidence an ordinary maverick may feel obliged to go along with his party, and thus, the inclusion of such roll calls distorts the true picture of his normal behavior. For such the same reasons, the inclusion of the party-division control factor in the study may bias the results.

Further examination of the coefficients shows that several roll calls on the same issue were of high significance, irrespective of when the issues arose for vote. When the decision was in doubt, the voters were there, even some of the chronic absentees. This points toward the fact that the coefficient is indicating something rather important.

Another observation that emerges is that Senate bills have the limelight over House bills when it comes to significance. The Senate was heavily populated with Republicans, and as will be seen later, there were a host—about twenty-five or twenty-six—Democratic members in the House that lacked cohesiveness. Moreover, after a bill has passed one house, members of the second house know that there is no one to stop it save the governor should they approve the measure. What bearing some of these factors have on cohesiveness, attendance, and the like remains to be discovered. Most of the information now extant is the product of sheer guess and impression.

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Fischer, op. cit., p. 362.
One further observation is in order. The regular session produced legislative roll calls that were of higher significance than was produced by the special session. The reasons should be investigated by some later researcher. Of course, the bulk of roll calls during the regular session was overwhelmingly larger.

In selecting roll calls for weighting the following criteria was employed. If two roll calls on the same measure had high significance (above .90000000), then only the roll call with the highest significance was selected. Secondly, it should be noted again that votes of confidence tend to bias results. In the present instance, both motions for impeachment were ruled out by virtue of their lower significance. However, one vote to override a gubernatorial veto came out second high in significance (S. B. 22). This was included despite the hope that some other issue could be found which would have sufficiently high significance and sufficient degree of party competition to warrant a substitution. The possible bias should be noted. The seven roll calls selected are starred in Table I, p. 35.

Following the selection of the seven (?) significant roll calls, the data was organized and processed. The few absences on the selected roll calls distributed themselves somewhat randomly through the entire group of legislators. Therefore, a decision was made to employ the short-hand operational method of weighting each absence in accordance with the legislator's voting pattern on the remainder of roll calls. After determining the proper weight for each absence, it was assigned and added into the weighted score of the legislator on other roll calls. To the extent
that this method of weighting absences assumes that each legislator will continue to respond in a pattern that he himself has established, there is introduced a small amount of bias. But in a total pattern including more than 100 persons and 700 individual responses, less than 3% abstention randomly distributed through all individuals and responses will not bias the results profoundly, especially if one considers the probability that factors will tend to balance one another as total numbers increase.

A survey of the statistics leads to a rather firm conclusion that Democratic Party legislators in Montana cross party lines rather freely—much more freely than do Republicans. This conclusion is in full accord with widely current popular beliefs and should come as no surprise. In terms of total weighted vote, the 72 Democratic members of the 1933 House of Representatives voted with their own party only 61% of the time, while Republicans voted with their party 72% of the time. In actuality, the figures are low for both parties. Per cent party line vote (or index of party cohesion) often reaches 80% in many areas. Of course, this is just one group of legislators acting in two sessions. Analyses of later sessions may show higher indices of cohesion. But, it is significant that the popular assessment is borne out in the 1933 assembly.

The above contention takes on greater luster when the reported findings on Hypotheses II and III are analyzed. A full consideration of Hypothesis III is contained in the following chapter. For the moment, an analysis of Figure 3, p. 42, will suffice to clarify the point. The observer will note that the Democratic Party curve slopes sharply upward, while the Republican Party curve slopes in exactly the opposite direction.
Figure 3

Per Cent of Deviation of Front Party Majority on Seven Significant Roll Calls
although the slope is much more gentle. Whatever can or cannot be said of owner occupancy and the effect of the variables that index may be representing, it is rather certain that Democratic deviation from the typical Democratic Party voting pattern is pronounced. Furthermore, the results indicated that every Democratic legislator coming from districts with 45 to 55 per cent owner occupancy cast at least one vote with his party majority. In brief, one does not find a Democrat who voted 100% of the time with the Republican Party until the 55 per cent owner occupancy mark has been passed.

It has long been a popular pastime among Montanans to speculate about the reasons for the pronounced Democratic deviation from party lines. One explanation that seems to have won favor among those who feign to know on the basis of shallow examination is the simple phrase, "company influence". As everyone knows, the copper and utility interests in the state make a convenient "whipping boy" whether they deserve it or not. At the very least, such assertions may be specious, especially when the public is searching for ready answers and are more than willing to accept "reasonable" or "common sense" explanations. Unfortunately, the analysis of content of the issues is beyond the scope of this investigation. It is stretching the limits of the undertaking to do more than validate empirically in one legislative assembly that Democratic deviation is very pronounced and far greater than Republican deviation.

However, certain data emerged from the investigation that may be of value to those who desire to carry out an investigation on the underlying reasons for Democratic deviation. As incomplete as the socio-economic
data on the individual members happen to be at this juncture, it has been firmly established that 48 members had close connections with agriculture. Of these, 28 were Democrats and 20 were Republicans. The index of cohesion on the two groups is revealing, to say the least. Republican farmers voted with their party (according to the weighted vote) 79% of the time, while Democratic farmers voted with their party only 50% of the time—actually 49.9% of the time. One can only conclude that farmers tended strongly to be Republican, even when they were elected under the Democratic banner. It is also noteworthy that the 45 districts/from the 45-55 per cent owner occupancy range sent but three (3) persons with agricultural ties to the lower chamber. Of course, several of the seats were from Silver Bow, Cascade, and Yellowstone counties. But several were also from almost completely rural counties. Evidently, Democratic voters in low range owner occupancy districts tended not to nominate farmers for seats in the house in 1933.

Another interesting figure involves the Catholics. Of the 26 members who were identified as Catholics, not one was a Republican. But seven (7) were farmers or had close agricultural ties. The Catholics as a group voted with their party—the Democratic Party—72% of the time. But Catholic farmers voted with their party as a group only 57% of the time, and Catholic non-farmers voted with their party—again, the Democratic Party—78% of the time. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that Catholic members—especially, Catholic non-farmers—were lending cohesion to the Democratic party, while the agricultural members were taking it away.
Returning once again to the hypothesis under consideration, it appears that the findings substantiate the initial "hunch". It should be remembered, however, that the owner occupancy range is too short to make the findings very conclusive. And again, this study involves but one house in one Montana assembly. Finally, the curves do move in opposite directions, a rather significant fact, and they move at a rather sharp rate. They also resemble the curves in the Massachusetts surveys. However, this too may not be very conclusive, because the ranges of owner occupancy in Massachusetts and Montana differ markedly.
a) On roll calls involving more than nominal party competition, legislators elected under the Democratic Party banner and coming from districts with lower indices of owner occupancy will tend to deviate less as a group from their party majority on party competition roll calls than will Democratic members from districts with higher indices of owner occupancy.

b) On roll calls involving more than nominal party competition, persons elected under the Republican Party banner and coming from districts with higher indices of owner occupancy will tend to deviate less as a group from their party majority than Republicans from districts with lower indices of owner occupancy.

The twenty-eight (28) party line roll calls selected initially during the processing of data for Hypothesis II were employed as a basis for testing the above hypothesis. This involved more than 2,300 individual tallies and abstentions collectively. Each roll call showed party competition, i.e., a majority of Republican legislators voting against a majority of Democratic legislators. Coefficients of a significance varied widely over the roll calls. Votes were weighted equally for processing. The results are shown in Figure 4, p. 47.

A comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 3 in the previous chapter indicates that the results were quite similar in practically all respects. Even conclusions about farmers and Catholics would be identical. Again, it is significant to note that the two curves indicating deviation from party line run in opposite directions at about the same rate of incline and decline. Nevertheless, despite the fact that no conclusions could be
Distribution of Deviation From Party Majority (Twenty-Eight Roll Calls)

Per Cent of Deviation

Democrats

Republicans
From Figure 4 that could not be drawn from Figure 3, two important observations are in order.

Applying MacRae's measure to either Figure 3 or 4, the lower indices of owner occupancy would presumably reflect districts which are typically Democratic and atypically Republican. If this is true, this accounts for the steadily increasing deviation of the Democrats as they approach Republican type districts and the steadily increasing deviation of the Republican legislators as they approach typically Democratic districts. However, no such attempt to label districts should be made at this time, or possibly at any time for the reasons cited in earlier chapters.

Secondly, examination of the data revealed that abstentions tended to be clustered. The chronic absentees were not difficult to locate. Although every legislator voted on about one-half of the roll calls, and although each legislator's score was determined in terms of the number of times he actually voted, there is a good possibility that some future investigator might obtain spurious results and conclusions from the employment of the method used here. In short, absenteeism that is not randomly distributed raises problems. Furthermore, why should an investigator go to the laborious task of tabulating a large number of roll calls and individual responses when it is shown, time after time, that use of the coefficient of significance will give, not only similar, but more reliable results?

One final question about Figures 3 and 4 should be answered. How did the persons from the highest per cent owner occupancy districts (70% for the Democrats; 75% for the Republicans) behave? The number of
districts in each case was so small that reliable figures could not be obtained for these categories. For what probably are the same reasons, Mackie had to sever his graphs at an arbitrary point. But, most unfortunately, he failed to note what was happening beyond his "cutting point". In the Montana instance, both party's members tended to become moderately more cohesive. There were so few legislators, however, that nothing can be said beyond this remark.
CHAPTER VII
HYPOTHESIS IV

a) On roll calls involving labor issues those representatives elected under Democratic Party auspices who come from constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines than those Democratic representatives elected from constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices.

b) On roll calls involving labor issues those representatives elected under Republican Party auspices who come from constituencies with lower owner occupancy indices will, as a group, show a greater tendency to cross party lines than will those Republican legislators elected from constituencies with higher owner occupancy indices.

It is frequently contended that roll calls on issues involving subject matter and content that affects labor and labor problems constitute a basis for discriminating among various legislative behavior patterns. For one thing, roll calls with labor content are presumably indicators of just how legislators allocate values.10

Working with the above hypothesis taught the investigator that enthusiastic endorsement on his part of a "tried and true" formula does not always turn out as expected when the glib conclusion is put to a test. Needless to say, many newspaper editorials on legislative voting records on labor issues tend to evaluate individuals and assign motive on the above assumption. The assumption may be correct in a great many instances, but it is likely to be specious in others.

In the present undertaking, roll calls involving content issues about wages and hours, as well as other progress affecting labor in 1933 were selected. In each case, the only other criterion employed was that a minimal amount of opposition (7 votes) be cast against the motion. Ten such motions were selected (H. R. 28; H. R. 69; two votes on H. R. 133; H. R. 155; H. R. 137; two votes on H. R. 166; H. R. 274; H. R. 296).

An attempt was made to scale the votes according to the Guttman technique. This useful technique invented by Louis Guttman about 1944 was employed in its traditional sense according to the typewriter method of scaling in order to discriminate among voting blocs. The upshot of the entire attempt was inconclusive results. The coefficient of reproducibility, a Guttman method for indicating the percentage of errors in the total number of responses for all patterns scaled, was below .999999, which indicated that the scale was not a reliable instrument.

Subsequent examination of the roll calls indicated that labor bills were not being contested severely. Republicans and certain wings of what may have been a farm bloc were either voting for the bills much of the time or absenting themselves. A certain nucleus of Republicans maintained a steady anti-labor response, as did a small handful of Democrats. Other votes were scattered in what appeared to be a rather random manner. Actually, the coefficient of significance was very low for most votes. This would indicate that roll calls on labor questions were not being contested severely. It also would indicate the low significance that many

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legislators probably attached to such roll calls. Very possibly the Democratic national election landslide may have affected the entire picture. Whatever the reason, labor roll calls did not prove to be discriminating factors in the Montana House of Representatives, 1933, as far as this researcher could determine.
CHAPTER VIII
HYPOTHESIS V

a) Those persons elected under the auspices of the Democratic Party by a wide margin (57.5% of the popular vote) will tend to cross party lines less on roll calls involving party competition than those Democrats elected by a close margin (less than 37.5% of the popular vote).

b) Those persons elected under the auspices of the Republican Party by a wide margin (57.5% or more of the popular vote) will tend to cross party lines less on roll calls involving party competition than those Republicans elected by a close margin (less than 37.5% of the popular vote).

In MacRae's study the above hypothesis was borne out in the years 1931 and 1941. During these years the Massachusetts legislators elected by wide margins tended to cross party lines less than did those legislators who were elected by close margins. At one point of high percent occupancy wide margin Republicans deviated slightly more than close margin Republicans. MacRae points out that two factors may have caused such behavior: (1) individual conscience, or (2) influence of pressure groups and lobbyists. It might also be added that in the years of slight Republican deviation the Republicans were in control of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

In 1951 the Democratic Party gained control of the Massachusetts House. During this session the Democratic legislators elected by wide margins deviated more than close margin Democrats. At one point on the occupancy range Democratic deviation was sharp. A similar situation occurred in the legislature under consideration here. Within the 50-54.9 per cent range of occupancy, the wide margin Democrats deviated from
their party majority to a greater extent than did their close margin party colleagues. (Note Figure 5, p. 55). On the other hand, the wide margin Republicans, who were part of the minority party, deviated less than their close margin brothers.

It appears that the results of the investigation provide a negative answer to the stated hypothesis—at least in part. This should disturb no one. After all, negative results frequently are as significant as positive ones.

Whatever its value for future research, one observation deserves to be noted. Both the 1933 Montana and the 1951 Massachusetts houses experienced changes in party control. In both cases it was wide margin Democrats who deviated more than close margin Democrats, while wide margin Republicans had more closely to their party line than did the close margin members of the Republican family—seemingly a normal Republican pattern of behavior.
Figure 5 - Per Cent Owner Occupancy

- **Wide Margin Legislators**
- **Narrow Margin Legislators**

Wide-Close Margin Seat Deviation

DEMOCRATS

REPUBLICANS
CONCLUSIONS

There were, so the researcher thought, sound reasons for undertaking this study. In many respects the results have been none too gratifying. Yet, it may be that the ground broken here will provide stimulus and guideposts for those who follow: the historian, the sociologist, the student of decision-making, or just any interested person. The following conclusions resulting from this study constitute but a small microcosm of the rather broad subject called legislative roll call behavior. Nevertheless, hope springs eternal in the human breast. The hope here is that the foregoing set of conclusions will be of some value to later investigators, no matter what happens to be their field, objective, or methodology.

1. There are indications that owner occupancy may be an index to certain socio-economic or other variables that will aid in discriminating between legislative districts that are more likely to elect Republicans than Democrats and other districts that are more inclined to elect Democrats than Republicans. (Note: There is no attempt to go as far as MacRae did in calling districts typically Democratic or typically Republican).

2. There are also strong indications that owner occupancy may be useful for establishing expectancy on how legislators may behave on significant roll calls.

3. There is the third suggestive factor that owner occupancy may be used to discriminate among those districts which will elect legislators by wide margins of the popular vote (more than 57.5%).
4. Coefficient of significance appears to measure, at least more than nominally, the combined judgment of legislators on the significance of roll calls.

5. Coefficient of significance may prove to be useful as a tool for determining whether there is an actual decision occurring during a roll call.

6. Those roll calls which have a high coefficient of significance appear to be as useful as "party competition" for measuring deviation from party lines. In fact, there are indications that high coefficient roll calls are a somewhat better gauge.

7. It appears that roll calls on labor legislation, although discriminating factors for measuring party cohesion in some legislatures and legislative sessions, may not be a useful measure in other legislatures or legislative sessions.

8. Tentatively, the common practice of employing indiscriminately a series of labor measures, issues, or roll calls as an index for socio-economic conditions or attitudes may not always be sound.

9. Examination of the significance of the party line votes suggests that certain journalistic and public assessments in the State of Montana to the effect that party lines mean very little may be totally in error. This investigator's examination of the House Journals for 1933 showed that the bulk of significant votes were party line votes. By the time that party line votes had been selected, without any conscious effort to choose them, those for significance, the majority of significant votes were already in hand.

10. It appears that owner occupancy is not always a successful
measure for establishing expectancy of how legislators from wide and narrow margin seats will deviate from their party lines.

11. In those states wherein the range of per cent owner occupancy in narrow another measure for variables that affect election outcomes and legislative roll calls behavior should be located. This definitely applies to the State of Montana for the decade 1930-40.

12. The well-known adage so often expressed by political observers in the State of Montana to the effect that Democrats are more inclined to deviate from their party line than Republicans has been established for the members of the Montana House of Representatives of 1933 beyond all reasonable doubt. This appeared in every examination made, even those examinations not reported in this study.

13. According to McKenzie's formula, the area of most prominent party competition seems to occur in the owner occupancy range of 55 to 60%. It is in these districts that the most over-all party deviation occurs on the part of both parties.

14. During the 1933 sessions, Democratic farm legislators were lowering party cohesion while urban Catholics were adding to it.

15. The doubts and problems encountered during this investigation imply a need for more study on the personalities, socio-economic backgrounds of living legislators, as well as more intensive study of the subject of absenteeism.

Another purpose of this study was to block out areas for future research. The following suggestions are the basis of such an attempt.

1. More studies of absenteeism and its effects should be undertaken.
2. Testing of the hypothesis that political parties in Montana are more cohesive when they are the minority party would be beneficial and en-lightening.

3. A further investigation of all possible indices of party divisions and deviation is needed.

4. A fuller investigation of the use of party competition as a means of measurement of legislative behavior and roll call selection is a need with genuine merit.

5. Finally, socio-economic data on the individual legislative members should be completed to see if various socio-economic groups have any effect on the cohesiveness of parties.
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