Class Connections: Congressional Classes and the Republicans of 1994

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**Abstract:** Large partisan classes in the House of Representatives are, in important ways, products of the congressional politics of preceding years. The class of 1994 is an example: understanding its origins requires a look at previous classes, especially the often-overlooked class of 1978. The class of 1994 did have a major impact on American politics, but as the fresh-faced outsiders became insiders, their power waned and their personal fortunes darkened.

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**Introduction**

It has now been 20 years since the 1994 midterm election, when Republicans took the majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years. Neither major party had ever lingered in the minority in either chamber for nearly as long. At the time, Republicans hoped—and Democrats feared—that the new majority would transform the institution and bring about major changes in public policy. And the class of 1994 was indeed consequential, though the consequences were not entirely what lawmakers expected when they took the oath on January 4, 1995. In fact, later cohorts of House Republicans came to see the class of 1994 as less a role model than a cautionary example. To understand where it came from, and where it went, we should step back and look more broadly at congressional classes.

Most entering classes in the House lack a strong sense of identity. Even as new members form personal bonds, the gravitational forces of party and committee tend to overwhelm class solidarity. But large partisan classes can be

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different. Especially when they come in during a midterm election – and thus are not in the shadow of presidential coattails – they can develop an *esprit de corps*. They might have distinctive preferences for certain policies or political strategies, and they may reinforce one another in the belief that they are “change agents.” Attention from the media or outside groups can stoke their ardor and self-regard.

Nevertheless, classes do not land on Capitol Hill like invading forces from alien planets. In important ways, they are products of the congressional politics of the preceding years. One thing that usually unites them is opposition to the other party’s issue positions or institutional practices. Sometimes, they think that their own congressional party has not been fighting back hard enough, or that their “old bulls” have been collaborating with the other side. They may also draw inspiration from factional leaders in Congress who recruit them or court them as allies. Examples from previous classes are illuminating.

**Programmatic Liberals and Watergate Babies**

As a starting point, consider the Democratic class of 1958. By the time of this midterm election, liberal Democrats in Congress had endured frustration for several years. Republicans had won the presidency and control of both chambers in 1952. Democrats had regained congressional majorities in the 1954 midterm, but the conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had kept the upper hand on Capitol Hill. Under the leadership of Representative Eugene McCarthy, House liberals coalesced in an informal group that developed policy proposals, albeit with little legislative success.

In 1958, a Democratic midterm landslide brought in dozens of new House liberals, a key episode in what James L. Sundquist called “the rise of the programmatic liberal Democrats.” The newcomers joined with “McCarthy’s Mavericks” to form the Democratic Study Group (DSG), which became the template for House legislative service organizations. (McCarthy himself had left for the Senate.) By providing its members with policy information and political intelligence, the DSG

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helped liberals gradually win more and more victories on House procedure and issues such as civil rights.³

The 1964 Johnson landslide augmented liberal ranks, resulting in landmark laws such as Medicare and the Voting Rights Act. Still, conservative Southern committee chairs could continue to thwart liberals, especially after Democratic losses in the 1966 midterm. Although many of those losses hit the freshmen of 1964, enough remained to leave the junior ranks with a distinctly liberal character.⁴ Accordingly, the DSG instigated internal party reforms to shift power from the chairs to the caucus, where liberal ideology could trump seniority.⁵

The 1974 election swept in the huge class of “Watergate babies.” The new members met frequently and even summoned committee chairs to explain to their class why they should keep their posts. The caucus voted down three of the chairs, though not solely because of the new class members. As Barbara Sinclair put it: “In the deposing of several committee chairs, the most dramatic event of the reform process, the 1974 freshmen did play an important role, but as foot soldiers, not as generals.”⁶

By the mid-1970s, successive waves of new members had sealed liberal dominance among the House Democrats. Reacting not only to the recalcitrance of committee chairs, but also to perceived power grabs by President Nixon, the resurgent liberals sought to strengthen the hand of party leaders. Among other things, they supported reforms that authorized the speaker to appoint the chair and majority party members of the Rules Committee. Such changes meant that the speakership could now be a strong force for progressive policy change, provided that its occupant was a liberal. And in 1977, Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (MA) assumed that post. In his memoirs, he recalled: “To many of the new members, of course, Tip O’Neill was an old fogey, a symbol of the established system they were so eager to bypass. At the same time, I had their respect: they knew I had taken a strong stand against the Vietnam War, and that Tip O’Neill had been an active backstage player in the Watergate drama.”⁷

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While all of these developments were taking place, the burden of frustration was shifting to the Republican side. The Democratic triumphs of 1958 and 1964 were, of course, GOP wipeouts. And just as the 1966 midterm was a setback for Democratic liberals, it was a boost for the Republicans, quieting the doomsayers who had predicted the party’s death after the Goldwater defeat. This election brought in 59 new House members, nearly a third of the party’s total strength.8 Party leaders encouraged their new colleagues to work up policy ideas with a distinctive House GOP stamp, but their moment in the sun was brief. After the presidential election of 1968, GOP policy would come from the Nixon White House, which cared little about the proposals or interests of congressional Republicans.

For Nixon and then Ford, domestic policymaking consisted largely of compromising with congressional liberals. Indeed, this period marked the culmination of what Matt Grossmann calls “the Long Great Society,” when the course of policy moved leftward.9 Conservative House Republicans were now as frustrated as the liberal Democrats of the 1950s. Explicitly using the Democratic Study Group as their model, they created their own legislative service organization, the Republican Study Committee.10 Lacking the resources available to the majority party, it had a rough start.

The Watergate midterm of 1974 made things even tougher for House Republicans, whose ranks crashed to 144 members, the lowest level since the 1930s. Their spirits shriveled. Outnumbered by an energized Democratic majority and still tarred by Nixon, they could accomplish little. Minority Leader John Rhodes (AZ) summed up their feelings with the title of his book, The Futile System.11 Despite Ford’s late rally in the 1976 election, Republicans lost the presidency and took a net loss of one seat in the House. Pundits started speculating that the GOP might go the way of the Whigs. Then their fortunes made a modest recovery.

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The Overlooked Class of 1978 and the Rise of Newt Gingrich

At first glance, the 1978 elections may seem a trifling episode in the history of the House Republicans. The GOP’s net pickup of 15 seats fell below the average gain by the out-party in midterm contests since 1946. On the other hand, the 1978 Republican freshman class totaled 36 members, nearly one-quarter of GOP strength in the House. Like the Democratic class of 1974, these newcomers would make a difference. Its best-known member was Dick Cheney (WY), who had served as President Ford’s chief of staff.

One of the inspirations to the class was Representative Jack Kemp (NY), who had won his seat in 1970. He was championing the then-novel idea of supply-side economics, which stressed the role of tax cuts in spurring economic growth. In 1977, he and Senator William Roth had introduced a bill to slash income taxes across the board. Although Kemp-Roth seemed to be a fringe proposal, it later became a fundamental part of Reaganite economic policy. The 1978 election also saw the surprise victory of California’s Proposition 13, which cut property taxes. Many of the freshmen had based their campaigns on support for tax cuts, which previously had not been a core GOP issue. (Kemp frequently cited the Kennedy tax cut as an exemplar, though when that measure had come up for a vote in 1963, House Republicans voted against it, 48–126.)

Notwithstanding the small net gain in the House, then, the election marked a significant shift to the right for the party, especially on economic policy. In the autumn of 1978, the new members assembled near Washington for their GOP freshman orientation. It soon became clear that many of them scorned the “get-along-go-along” posture of the House Republican leadership, headed by Rhodes. Their blasts at the leadership got so hot that Minority Whip Bob Michel (IL) broke off a golf game to tell the freshmen that the leadership would heed their concerns. As their class chairman, they elected Ed Bethune (AR), who said: “I didn’t come here to be in the minority for 25 years. I came here to be in the majority.” And as their class secretary, they chose a former history professor from Georgia named Newt Gingrich.

Following the example of the Democratic Watergate babies, the GOP freshmen held more than 40 class meetings in their first 18 months.\textsuperscript{15} A former Bethune aide remembered, “The class was in perpetual meeting.”\textsuperscript{16} They made their first move in January 1979, when they pushed to expel Democrat Charles Diggs (MI), who had been convicted of mail fraud and false vouchers. Gingrich took a lead role in that effort. In two earlier, narrowly-losing races, Gingrich had wounded his incumbent opponent by tying his alleged corruption to ethics controversies involving House Democrats.\textsuperscript{17} Although the expulsion move failed, the House did censure Diggs, who then quit. Years later, the militants would return to the ethics issue in their fight against Speaker Jim Wright.

The class of 1978 seized the budget issue. They worked with Kemp and Representative David Stockman (MI) to devise “The Budget of Hope,” an alternative to the Democrats’ “Budget of Despair.” The young militants proposed domestic spending cuts and a $20 billion tax cut, which they assumed would shrink the deficit by spurring economic growth.\textsuperscript{18} Although it did not pass, it won the support of 187 members, including 39 Democrats. Whatever its merits as economic policy, the Budget of Hope boosted Republican morale: for the first time since the Class of 1966, the House Republicans had united behind a substantial policy initiative of their own.

This new spirit prompted several freshmen to join with some sympathetic senior members in an informal group known as the Project Majority Task Force, which aimed to change the House Republican mindset. Whereas the Rhodes leadership coped with minority status, the Task force tried to breed new strategic and tactical ideas for winning control of the House. Significantly, the group took its cue from parliamentary conservative parties. A Gingrich staffer recalled:

Thatcher was elected in May of ’79. Joe Clark of Canada was elected in May of ’79. There was a sense of a tide out there. So our office not only brought in [GOP pollster] Bob Teeter to tell these members how to build a majority but also brought in people who’d worked with British Conservatives [to tell them]: Here’s how you run a national campaign, a party-wide campaign from top to bottom, not just the president up here and a bunch of little congressional candidates running around. Here’s what a unified party message would look like.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 1144.3
\textsuperscript{17} Mel Steely, The Gentleman from Georgia: The Biography of Newt Gingrich (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2000), ch. 3–4.
\textsuperscript{18} Congressional Record (bound), September 19 (1979), 25363.
\textsuperscript{19} Frank Gregorsky, quoted in Pitney, “The Conservative Opportunity Society.”
Task Force jam sessions also pointed to future tactics on the House floor. In June of 1979, Bob Teeter told the members that television coverage of the Canadian Parliament’s Question Hour had bolstered Joe Clark and the Progressive Conservatives by putting them on an equal footing with Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government. At that point, C-SPAN had been broadcasting House proceedings for just 3 months. Gingrich wondered aloud how the Canadian opposition’s television tactics might apply in Congress. Such musings would eventually give rise to GOP use of House floor speeches to reach the cable TV audience.

Meanwhile, the Project Majority Task Force had evolved into an outfit called the Republican Strategy Group. In its weekly meetings, the Group brought together lawmakers, legislative staff, and political operatives for freewheeling talks about GOP campaigns for Congress and the presidency. In June of 1980, Kemp proposed that the Group sponsor “Governing Team Day,” an event where Ronald Reagan and GOP candidates for both chambers would stand together and make specific policy pledges, including a 30% cut in income tax rates. Gingrich ran the project. His press release stated its purpose boldly: “GOVERNING TEAM DAY IS A STEP TOWARDS A DE FACTO PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM.” In a floor speech, fellow freshman Dan Lungren (CA) said: “Our message must clearly be brought home to the American people. They must know that, like the British worker voting for his representative in the House of Commons, they have a clear choice. They have a choice between a team that is responsible for the present state of affairs and the team that has ardently worked to reverse the situation.”

The Reagan camp balked at embracing specific proposals at the event. Instead, they opted for vague statements about economic growth and military strength. So when Reagan joined the congressional candidates on the Capitol steps on September 15, Gingrich later told Kemp, the upshot was “a public relations event that boosted candidate morale and communicated a little but not much of our ideas.” Nevertheless, it did gain favorable reviews in the press. David Broder of The Washington Post wrote that its implicit message was that if voters wanted Reagan to lead the government effectively, “they have to go all the way with the GOP. That is an honest statement, and it is as commendable for the Republicans to dramatize it as it is risky.” Even more important, Governing Team Day was a forerunner of the 1994 Contract with America.

21 Congressional Record (bound), September 8, (1980), 24684.
In any case, the 1980 election results seemed to wash away any sense of setback. Reagan’s electoral vote landslide, the GOP Senate takeover and the 34-seat pickup in the House all led the Republican militants to think that their day had come. Throughout the middle of 1981, Reagan’s victories on tax and budget cuts nourished their optimism. By 1982, however, the economy had soured. The prospect of swelling deficits spurred Senate Finance Chairman Bob Dole and other fiscal traditionalists to back a 3-year, $100 billion tax increase. Reagan agreed to it.

Although the measure passed, there were 89 Republicans nays, mostly from the classes of 1978 and 1980. These members had won their seats in the wake of Kemp-Roth and Proposition 13, so a reversal on the tax issue was a serious matter to them. In expressing disappointment with President Reagan, Gingrich spoke for his classmates: “The fact is, on this particular bill, the president is trying to score a touchdown for liberalism, for the liberal welfare state, for big government, for the Internal Revenue Service, for multinational corporations, and for the various forces that consistently voted against the president.”

Just as disappointment with Nixon had spawned the Republican Study Committee, the 1982 tax bill gave rise to yet another grouping of House Republicans. Early in 1983, about a dozen lawmakers committed to attend weekly meetings on strategy and tactics. The group’s most active members included Gingrich and Bethune, along with Vin Weber (MN) from the class of 1980. With Weber as organizer and Gingrich as idea-monger, they called themselves the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS). The new group did not focus on the traditional legislative process because committee chairs were becoming more partisan, and House rules increasingly restricted the minority party’s ability to offer amendments on the floor.

Instead, they used C-SPAN to bring their arguments directly to the television audience. In addition to taking part in regular legislative debate, COS would use the 1-min speeches that begin the day on the floor, as well “special orders,” hour-long blocks of time for lawmakers to speak after the day’s business. After one set of COS special orders attacked the Democratic foreign policy record, Speaker O’Neill struck back. When Robert Walker (PA) was delivering a special order speech, O’Neill ordered the House TV cameras to cut to a long shot, showing that Walker was orating in a near-empty hall. Until that moment, House cameras had focused only on the member speaking and not the whole chamber. O’Neill gave no warning: he sought to make Walker look foolish.

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24 Congressional Record (bound), August 17, (1982), 21416.
26 O’Neill, Man of the House, 354.
Angry COS members grew even more bitter a few days later when O'Neill chided them on the House floor. The next day, Gingrich raised a point of personal privilege against O'Neill, who stepped down into the well to answer. O'Neill called the attack on Democratic foreign policy “the lowest thing that I have ever seen in my 32 years in Congress.”\textsuperscript{27} Republican whip Trent Lott (MS) demanded that “the Speaker’s words be taken down.” The parliamentarian advised that O'Neill had broken House rules against personal insults, so the chair ruled him out of order – the first such rebuke for a Speaker since 1797.\textsuperscript{28}

Comity in the House was breaking down. Democrats pointed to harsh verbal assaults by Gingrich and his allies, but there was plenty of invective on both sides. Democrats aimed their fire at President Reagan, who still held the affections of House Republicans in spite of their conflict over the 1982 tax bill. Contrary to the myth that Tip O'Neill and Reagan had a warm friendship, he often attacked the president on a personal level, most vividly in 1984: “The evil is in the White House at the present time. And that evil is a man who has no care and no concern for the working class of America and the future generations of America, and who likes to ride a horse. He’s cold. He’s mean. He’s got ice water for blood.”\textsuperscript{29}

Said Representative Geraldine Ferraro (NY), the party’s vice presidential candidate: “The President walks around calling himself a good Christian, but I don’t for 1 min believe it because the policies are so terribly unfair.”\textsuperscript{30} House Majority Leader Jim Wright (TX) took to the House floor to accuse the president of lying. Referring to Reagan’s account of private meetings on deficit reduction, Wright argued: “He says at one point that we offered no ideas or suggestions at all. That is a lie. It is untrue.” Wright repeated the word “lie” seven more times in his brief statement.\textsuperscript{31}

As the decade went on, other issues roiled the House. A 1985 fight over a contested Indiana seat was especially nasty: when a near-party-line vote declared the Democrat as the winner, House Republicans walked out of the chamber. In 1987, Wright (who had succeeded O’Neill as speaker) pulled sharp procedural maneuvers to pass a reconciliation bill by a single vote, increasing

\textsuperscript{27} Congressional Record (daily), May 15, (1984), H3843.
\textsuperscript{31} Congressional Record (bound), March 13, (1984), S197.
Republican resentment and causing Dick Cheney to say: “We want his head.” In 1988, Gingrich filed ethics charges that led to an investigation of Wright, which ended in his resignation. In the meantime, Gingrich’s ethics battle had won him many supporters among the House Republicans, who elected him as whip.

More and more, Democrats saw the Republicans as obstreperous, who in turn saw the Democrats as heavy-handed. The majority party kept turning the procedural screws by means of restrictive rules limiting floor amendments. In the 97th Congress (1981–1982), 25% of special rules were restrictive, but by the 102nd Congress (1991–1992), that figure had risen to 66%. These rules fostered majority-party unity by curbing the minority’s ability to force tough floor votes. Every year between 1982 and 1992, House Democrats had higher average party-unity scores than House Republicans. Aside from sustaining vetoes by President George H.W. Bush, House Republicans could accomplish little on the floor, so the customary vote-gathering duties of the minority whip were usually an exercise in frustration.

Yet Gingrich saw his leadership role as something much larger. He also headed a political committee called GOPAC, which spent millions on candidate recruitment and training. GOPAC’s audiotapes and print materials spread Gingrich’s gospel of confrontation to the next generation of Republican congressional contenders. Among other things, he kept firing away on the issue of ethics – and House Democrats handed him plenty of ammunition. Misconduct in the House was serious enough to result in felony convictions for several top Democratic staffers and lawmakers, including Ways and Means Committee chair Dan Rostenkowski. (The prosecutor who put “Rosty” behind bars was an ambitious young US attorney named Eric Holder.)

As long as a Republican was in the White House, however, Gingrich faced serious constraints. In order to advance its legislative agenda, the administration had to make deals with the majority Democrats, whether the minority Republicans liked it or not. There was scant prospect of gaining Republican seats, since presidential parties typically lose ground in Congress over time. Paradoxically, Bush’s defeat in the 1992 election opened the door to GOP victories in Congress. In 1993, Gingrich frankly celebrated the party’s “liberation from the tentacles of

the Bush administration." With the announced retirement of Bob Michel (R-IL), he was now the House Republicans’ de facto leader.

The political troubles of the early Clinton administration encouraged Republicans to think that they might make major gains in the 1994 midterm. Drawing on his 1980 experience with Governing Team Day, Gingrich and his allies devised the Contract with America. In this document, House Republican incumbents and candidates pledged that if the voters gave them a majority, they would bring a specific set of proposals to the House floor within the first 100 days of the next Congress. The Republicans signed the contract in a much-publicized ceremony on the steps of the Capitol. Gingrich believed that the election would vault him to the speakership, where he could carry out the Contract and do much more. Skeptics dismissed his talk as typical Gingrichian hype.

They were in for a surprise. In the years to follow, Gingrich and the Republicans would be in for some surprises, too.

The 1994 Election and the “Revolutionary” 103rd Congress

The 1994 congressional elections represented an earthquake on the Washington political landscape. Among midterm congressional elections since 1945, perhaps only the 1974 “Watergate” election has had such a dramatic influence on Congress as an institution and on the direction of national public policy. The election saw the Republican Party take control of the House for the first time in 40 years, so this effect is hardly surprising. The Republicans have controlled the chamber for 16 of the 20 years since 1994 and the advent of Republican predominance in House elections has had considerable implications for the operations of the institution and of the federal government generally. Yet by and large, the individual members of the Republican class of 1994 did not ascend to long-term national political influence for a variety of reasons all related to the relative political “inexperience” (at least at the federal level) of the class and the “revolutionary” nature of their political agenda.

36 James G. Gimpel, Fulfilling the Contract: the First 100 Days (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), ch. 2.
Like most congressional election landslides (1974, 2006) the Republican victory in 1994 stemmed from a “perfect storm” of short-term political events. These included the political missteps of the Clinton administration in its first 2 years – particularly the failure of Congress to adopt the Clinton health care plan; Gingrich’s savvy political leadership; the effects of the 1990 congressional reapportionment and redistricting, which helped precipitate an unusually large number of Democratic retirements in 1992–1994; the recruitment of a much-better-than-usual class of Republican challengers in swing districts; and, perhaps most important, a widespread disgust with Congress as an institution. Gingrich and the Republicans capitalized on congressional scandals and the belief that congressional Democrats could not even work effectively with a President of their own party.\footnote{John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, \textit{Congress as Public Enemy} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).}

The Republicans made a net gain of 52 House seats and secured 230 seats overall in 1994. Among the 230 Republicans was an exceptionally large freshman class of 74, almost one third (32\%) of the total House Republican caucus. Any freshman class this large was bound to have a disproportionate impact on the conduct of House business, but in addition to their size it was soon apparent that the newcomers saw themselves as having a distinctive role, most particularly as representatives of what they interpreted as the “Republican Revolution of 1994.” For most of the freshmen, the 1994 results represented a mandate for a reduction in the size and scope of the federal government and for greater openness in the conduct of Congress and in the processes of the federal government in general. Given that many of them believed they had been elected to “change Washington,” freshman class members tended to be suspicious of those who had been in Washington a long time, including senior GOP colleagues.

The freshmen also thought that they had a natural ally in Gingrich. Like them, the new speaker was leery of the prevailing organization of the House established by the 40-year Democratic majority, based on a relatively weak leadership and a decentralized system of specialized committees whose leadership was based on seniority that had hitherto played the predominant role in drafting legislation. This system had eroded since the mid-1970s because of the influence of the 1974 Watergate class, who like their conservative Republican counterparts in 1994, had a vested ideological interest in strengthening the party leadership at\footnote{John J. Pitney, Jr., and William F. Connelly, Jr., “Permanent Minority’ No More: House Republicans in 1994,” in \textit{Midterm: The Elections of 1994 in Context}, ed. Philip A. Klinkner (Boulder: Westview, 1996).}
the expense of the more traditionally-minded committee chairs. Still, the seniority system and committee chairs as the key players in the passage of legislation generally prevailed among the House Democrats up to their loss of power in 1994. Many senior Republicans on major House committees had cultivated good relations with the Democratic committee leadership in order to get some voice in the policy process. Given their distrust of the prevailing House organizational structure and their strong programmatic objectives as set out in the Contract, however, Gingrich and the 1994 class of Republican freshmen had a mutual interest in changing the House power structure, and particularly the committee system. As a result, the changes in the House committee system even before the 104th Congress had taken office were quite dramatic.\footnote{Nicol C. Rae, Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and the Lessons of the 104th Congress (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 67–74.}

The new majority abolished three full committees and 31 (27%) of House subcommittees, the total number of committee staff shrank by one third, and ten of the 28 remaining committees were renamed to align with the Republican policy agenda of reduced government. Gingrich more or less handpicked the House committee chairs, disregarding seniority in several instances: most notably in the case of the critical Appropriations Committee, where the fifth-ranking Republican, Robert Livingston, became chair. The new House majority also banned proxy voting—a practice by which committee chairs controlled the votes of absent members, thereby ensuring a party majority even when most committee members were absent. To protect them electorally and to demonstrate his commitment to their agenda, Gingrich also named freshmen to the three most important committees: Appropriations (7), Ways and Means (3) and Rules (1). Finally the new Republican House regime imposed a 6-year term limit on committee chairs and an 8-year limit on the Speaker.

The Republicans delivered on their promise to bring all the items in the Contract to the House floor in one hundred days, including major welfare reform and significant tax cuts. (In the latter case, the lasting impact of the class of 1978 was still evident.) Except for a space-based missile defense system and a proposed constitutional amendment limiting congressional terms (which failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds House majority for passage) all of the Contract measures passed the House.\footnote{Ibid., 74–81.} In these votes, the solid support of the 74 GOP freshmen was critical and, at least as far as the House was concerned, they had delivered on their conservative agenda.

A major component of that agenda was a balanced federal budget. The House’s constitutional amendment mandating a balanced federal budget failed
by one vote to receive the required two-thirds majority in the Senate. But Gingrich and the House Republican freshmen were determined to address the budget deficit, and in May of 1995, they adopted a budget reduction package intended to eliminate the deficit by 2002. The final congressional budget proposal adopted by both chambers in June of 1995 contained $245 billion in tax cuts and $270 billion in reductions in the rate of increase for the popular federal Medicare program. The final omnibus reconciliation bill passed in November of 1995 also included the Republicans’ welfare reform legislation.

At the start of the budget process in the spring of 1995, the Republicans had believed that their agenda was popular and that unpopular Democratic President Clinton would ultimately sign their reconciliation bill rather than risk a federal government shutdown. But Clinton’s approval rating had been rising since his decisive and empathetic response to the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in April of 1995, while the approval ratings of Gingrich and the Republican Congress had been on the decline. Clinton also reckoned that the Republicans’ proposed $245 billion “cuts” in anticipated spending increases for Medicare would prove unpopular, particularly when combined with their proposed $270 billion reduction in taxes concentrated at the upper income brackets.

Clinton thus vetoed the reconciliation bill, and much of the federal government shut down for most of December, 1995. While the Republican freshmen had thought they would win the deficit reduction argument, Clinton and the Democrats responded that the Republicans were cutting Medicare to cut taxes for the wealthy. Republican poll numbers plummeted. Facing the prospect of losing control of Congress if the shutdown continued, the Republicans agreed to a continuing resolution to reopen the government in early January of 1996, and essentially conceded defeat on budget reduction for the rest of the 104th Congress.41

The political fallout from the shutdown left the Republicans in serious danger, and the party leadership realized that Congress had to pass some popular legislation to show that Republicans could govern responsibly. The initiative shifted to the more bipartisan Senate under the leadership of Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), who succeeded to the position of Senate Majority Leader after Robert Dole resigned his Senate seat in May of 2006 to run for president. The summer of 1996 saw a flurry of bipartisan legislation passed in Congress and signed by Clinton that worked to the electoral benefit of both.42 These measures included a stopgap 1997 budget that was closer to the President’s policy

42 Rae, Conservative Reformers, 182-190.
preferences than those of the House GOP freshmen, a major welfare reform bill (basically the Republican bill minus the proposed cuts in Medicaid), a raise in the federal minimum wage, an immigration reform measure, a bipartisan measure on health insurance “portability,” a renewal of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the passage of a federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prohibiting federal recognition of same-sex marriages.

In the fall campaign, the Republican freshmen also had to focus increasingly on the traditional incumbent norms of fundraising, pork barrel ing, and constituent politics rather than the conservative ideology espoused in the Contract with America.\textsuperscript{43} The change in direction worked, as the Republicans retained their House majority in the November elections even as Dole lost to Clinton. Of the 70 House freshmen who ran for reelection, 58 (or 83\%) were reelected. In the absence of the legislative compromises negotiated by Senator Lott and the freshmen’s change of focus to a more constituent-oriented politics in 1996, the freshmen reelection figure would surely have been lower and the Republicans might well have lost control of the House.

\textbf{Slow Decline}

Even though the Republicans retained control of the House in the 1996 elections, the bloom was clearly off the rose for the class of 1994. In the first session of the 105th Congress in 1997, it was evident the 1994 Republican freshmen were no longer in the driving seat in the House, as Lott and Gingrich worked with the reelected Clinton administration on a compromise bipartisan long-term budget deal to eliminate the deficit. Gingrich, too, remained damaged by the government shutdown and barely survived a coup attempt supported by several 1994 freshmen (principally Lindsey Graham of South Carolina), along with some senior members including his deputy, Majority Leader Richard Armey (TX).\textsuperscript{44} In 1998, the political landscape was dominated by the Monica Lewinsky affair, Kenneth Starr’s investigation, and the subsequent House impeachment proceedings against President Clinton. The controversy scuttled secret talks between Gingrich and Clinton to achieve a “grand compromise” on Social Security and Medi-

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 176–182.
\textsuperscript{44} On Gingrich and the first session of the 105th Congress see Ronald M. Peters, Jr., “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The Case of Newt Gingrich,” in New Majority or Old Minority: The Impact of Republicans on Congress, eds. Nicol C. Rae and Colton C. Campbell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
care, an agreement that might have radically altered the politics of subsequent years.  

In the short run, the decision to pursue impeachment proved damaging to the House Republicans, whose majority narrowed further in the 1998 midterm elections that took place in the middle of the impeachment proceedings. Republican House losses led to the end of Gingrich’s speakership and the continuing fallout from the impeachment led to the downfall of his likely successor, Bob Livingston. The outcome for the GOP was the rise of a new House Leadership led by Speaker Dennis Hastert (IL) and his tough-minded Majority Whip Tom DeLay (TX) that was more focused on maintaining and expanding the GOP House majority in an era of intense partisan conflict on Capitol Hill as opposed to pushing a conservative ideological program.  

This tendency was reinforced after Republican George W. Bush became president in 2001. With the GOP controlling the presidency and Congress from 2001 to 2006 (apart from a Democratic Senate interlude due to a party switch in 2001–2002) for the first time since the 1950s, the House Republicans became more or less voting fodder for the priorities of the Bush administration at home and abroad. With the exception of two Supreme Court appointments, Republican control of the federal government during this period did little to fulfill any conservative ideological agenda similar to the Contract with America. Indeed, George W. Bush’s presidency yielded a huge new government bureaucracy in the form of the new Department of Homeland Security, and a massive new federal entitlement program in the Medicare Prescription Drug program, which was forced through the House by Hastert and DeLay with Republican votes.  

The President’s “No Child Left Behind” education reform (co-authored with Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy) created a greatly expanded federal role in K-12 education. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush in the 2000 campaign had argued against a foreign policy based on “nation building,” but in reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration pursued costly and prolonged US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001 and 2003, Bush and the Republican Congress passed significant cuts in income and corporate taxes, but these, combined with the post-911 expansion of the

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federal government, revived the federal budget deficit that had vanished amid the spectacular economic growth of the late 1990s.

The squandering of the surplus by a Republican administration and Congress, and the revelation of widespread corruption due to the influence of lobbyists within the GOP, along with the debilitating military stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan, alienated the American electorate, including many limited government fiscal conservatives from the GOP and contributed to the loss of the Republican House majority in the Democratic wave election of 2006.\(^{48}\)

By 2006, then, the remaining Republican members from the class of 1994 appeared as part of a discredited Washington establishment – exactly the reverse of what they believed they represented in the wake of the 1994 victory. And like the Democratic majority in the early 1990s, the House Republican majority of 1994–2006 became afflicted by scandal in its latter years.\(^{49}\) The major victim was Tom DeLay, who had to resign his House seat and was later convicted by a Texas grand jury of election law violations, though an appeals court later overturned his conviction. The excesses of lobbyist Jack Abramoff tainted several Republican members and discredited the entire congressional “earmarking” process by the time of the 2006 elections.

The 1994 freshmen were not immune.\(^{50}\) As early as the 104th Congress, four freshmen – Wes Cooley (OR), Jim Bunn (OR), Enid Waldholtz (UT), and David Funderburk (NC)-became entangled in scandals that either caused them to resign their seats or contributed to their election loss in 1996. Robert Ney (OH) was heavily involved with Abramoff and ended up in prison. Mark Foley (FL), another member of the class of 1994, had to leave Congress in 2006 (in the middle of the congressional election campaign) after the revelation of his inappropriate text messages to congressional pages. Two 1994 freshmen who had graduated to higher office-Nevada Senator John Ensign and South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford-later resigned in disgrace as a consequence of extra-marital affairs.

When the 114th Congress convenes in January of 2015, it is likely that only five of the 74 House Republican freshmen from 1994 will have served continuously in the US House since their election: Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ); Walter B. Jones (NC); Frank LoBiondo (NJ); Mac Thornberry (TX); and Edward Whitfield (KY). Three more 1994 freshmen returned to the House after leaving their seats.


\(^{49}\) Ibid., 124–125.

Steve Chabot (OH) regained his seat in 2010 after a reelection defeat in 2008. Matt Salmon (AZ) gave up his seat to run for governor of Arizona in 2002, lost to Democrat Janet Napolitano, but regained a seat in the House in 2012. In a 2013 special election, voters in South Carolina’s first district forgave Mark Sanford’s gubernatorial sins and sent him back to the Hill.

These eight members (with the exception of Sanford) were among the less visible and less ideological members of the freshman class in the 104th Congress. Except for Chabot, they all represent safe Republican districts. None of these surviving members has reached a major leadership position or a full committee chairmanship in the House, although it is likely that Thornberry will chair the House Armed Services committee in the 114th Congress if the Republicans hold the majority in the 2014 elections.

The highest leadership position reached by a member of the Republican class of 1994 was that of Chair of the House Republican Conference (the 3rd ranking leadership position) which was held by J. C. Watts (OK) from 1999 to 2003. Another 1994 Republican freshman, former Rep. Tom Davis (VA), chaired the Republican House Campaign Committee from 1998 to 2002. No member of the class attained a major committee chairmanship in the House. Tom Davis chaired the House Oversight Committee from 2003 to 2007, and Rep. Richard “Doc” Hastings (Washington) is the current Chair of the House Natural Resources Committee and previously chaired the House Ethics Committee from 2005 to 2007. Hastings is not seeking reelection in November, 2014.

Several members of the GOP class of 1994 left the House to seek higher office. A total of seven members were subsequently elected to the US Senate: Sam Brownback (KS); Richard Burr (NC); Saxby Chambliss (GA); Tom Coburn (OK); John Ensign (NV); Lindsey Graham (SC); and Roger Wicker (MS). Brownback served only one term in the House and won the Kansas Senate seat vacated by Robert Dole in 1996. He was reelected in 1998 and 2004, ran briefly for president in 2008, and then successfully for governor of Kansas in 2010. Burr was elected in 2004 and reelected in 2010. Chambliss was elected in 2002 and reelected in 2008. He did not run for a third term in 2014. Coburn retired from the House after three terms in 2001. He ran successfully for the Senate in 2004 and was reelected in 2010. Coburn will leave Congress early after the 2014 elections for health reasons.

Lindsey Graham was elected to the Senate in 2002 and reelected in 2008. He is favored to win reelection in 2014. John Ensign ran unsuccessfully for the Senate in 1998 and successfully in 2000. He was reelected in the difficult Republican electoral year of 2006, but quit the Senate in 2011 due to scandal. Roger Wicker was appointed to his Senate seat after the resignation of Mississippi Senator Trent Lott. He was elected for the remainder of Lott’s term in 2008 and reelected for a
full term in 2012. Of the group, Graham has been by far the most visible member – particularly on foreign policy issues, where he has adopted strong interventionist positions and has been a close ally of Republican Senator John McCain (AZ). Senator Coburn earned a reputation as a strong fiscal conservative and budget hawk during his time in the Senate. Burr, Chambliss, and Wicker have maintained a relatively low profile in Washington.

In addition to Brownback, two other members of the 1994 GOP freshman class—Robert Ehrlich (MD) and Mark Sanford (SC)—were also elected governor of their states. Mark Sanford was elected governor of South Carolina in 2002 and reelected to a second term in 2006. He was widely regarded as a rising star in national conservative circles and for a time was seen as a likely Republican presidential candidate in 2012. Sanford bolstered his credentials with conservatives by rejecting federal stimulus money from the Obama administration for his state in early 2009. Later in the year, however, Sanford’s political rise was arrested by the revelation of an extra-marital relationship, which led to a messy public divorce and censure by the South Carolina legislature.

Sanford left the governorship at the end of his term in early 2011, but 2 years later he ran in a special election for his former House seat, and won an upset victory in the GOP primary and the general election. Sanford is unopposed for reelection to the House in 2014. Robert Ehrlich won an upset victory over a daughter of Robert Kennedy – Kathleen Kennedy Townsend—in the 2002 election for governor of heavily Democratic Maryland. He was defeated for reelection by Democratic Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley in 2006. As governor of Kansas, Sam Brownback set out to implement a radical tax-cutting and government-cutting agenda that proved to be controversial even in his heavily Republican state. His reelection in 2014 appears uncertain.

While the Republican freshman class of 1994 had a strong initial impact on the House of Representatives and on the direction of public policy through their close relationship with Speaker Gingrich, it seems that their influence as a class dissipated following the political failure of the 1995–1996 government shutdown. The 1994 freshmen were jealous of their status as “outsiders” who would “clean up the mess in Washington,” To some degree, they succeeded through passing internal House reforms, enacting welfare reform and other Contract measures, and focusing the leaders of both major political parties on reducing the federal budget deficit. But “outsiderism” is not a productive long-term legislative

51 For a highly positive interpretation of their impact, see: Major Garrett, The Enduring Revolution: How the Contract with America Continues to Shape the Nation (New York: Crown Forum, 2005).
strategy, and the 1994 Republicans ultimately faced a choice between increasing irrelevance and accommodating themselves to the norms of the House.

Those who chose the former either abandoned politics or ran for a higher office where they thought they could have more individual political impact. Those who remained had “learned to govern” in Richard Fenno’s terms. Unfortunately, several learned all too well and became identified as examples of a “corrupt Washington establishment” by a resurgent Democratic party in 2006.\(^\text{52}\)

As a consequence, only eleven Republican members of the “class of 1994” (eight Representatives and three US Senators) are likely to return to Congress in January of 2015.

The Class of 1994 in Retrospect

Pound for pound, the smaller GOP class of 1978 produced much more distinguished individual careers than the large class of 1994. The Gingrich and Cheney stories, of course, are well known. But other members of the class also made names for themselves. Gerald B.H. Solomon (NY) went on to chair the House Rules Committee. Jerry Lewis (CA) chaired the House GOP conference and later became chair of the House Appropriations Committee. Ron Paul (TX) ran for president. Olympia Snowe (ME) served eight terms in the House, and three in the Senate, where she became the personification of the “pivotal” vote. Dan Lungren (CA) became attorney general of California and returned to the House several years after an unsuccessful 1998 run for governor. (He lost his seat in 2012.)

Ironically, minority status is one reason why the individuals in the class tended to do so well. As Gingrich said: “If you are seldom covered by the press, which was the case with House Republicans for 40 years, you have a lot of leeway to make mistakes. But when you are in people’s living rooms every evening, your mistakes are magnified.”\(^\text{53}\) As suggested above, many members of the class of 1994 burst into a limelight for which they were not ready. Less power also means less temptation: interest groups seeking to buy influence on the Hill will usually pay far more attention to the majority party, because the minority can do little for them. Gingrich put out his first book in 1984, when he was a minority party backbencher. An obscure press published it, and practically nobody bought it. After


the 1994 election, he accepted a multimillion-dollar advance from HarperCollins, controlled by media mogul Rupert Murdoch. The deal created a wave of criticism that raised suspicions of influence-peddling and forced him to forgo the advance.

Power is also more problematic for conservatives than liberals. The latter forthrightly embrace strong government, while the former say that they want to curb its size and scope. Accordingly, the dilemma for conservatives is not just that they will succumb to individual-level corruption, but that they will abandon the principles on which they first won office. For liberals, supporting an expansion of government may serve narrow political ends, but it also consistent with their avowed philosophy. For conservatives, such a move instead invites charges of hypocrisy. In his memoirs, Tom Coburn wrote:

> What surprised me more than anything else in Washington was the degree to which every decision was run through a political equation. During meetings of the Republican conference it often seemed that the sole purpose of our existence was our own self-preservation. With almost every issue, the overriding question was not “Does this policy make sense?” but, “How will this position affect us in the next election?”

Coburn cited a National Taxpayer Union study saying that whereas 72% of the members of the class of 1994 had agendas to cut spending in the 104th Congress (1995–1997), only 48% retained such agendas by the 106th Congress (1999–2001). Coburn’s classmate, Joe Scarborough (FL), rendered an even harsher judgment: “Republicans are in no mood to be reminded that they seized control of Congress in 1994 by promising voters to cut the size of government, balance the budget, and return power to individual Americans. Sadly, the first draft of history has painted these Republicans as liars.”

Such assessments became conventional wisdom among Republican politicians. When Newt Gingrich ran for president in 2012, he briefly won some support among primary voters, but elected officials were wary. He got endorsements from just ten members of Congress – and only three from the “revolutionary” class of 2010. Just before the 2010 election, Eric Cantor (VA) wrote that the class of 1994 did keep the Contract, “[but] once much of the Contract had been fulfilled, and the votes had been taken, and the promises kept, business in Washington slowly began to revert to business as usual. As the years went by, congressional

55 Ibid., 178.
Republicans began to give in to the temptations that had been the undoing of their predecessors."

Four years later, ironically, Cantor lost his seat in a primary election in which his opponent made that very accusation against him.

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