Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorChairperson, Graduate Committee: Ronald N. Johnson.en
dc.contributor.authorGerlach, Andrew Roberten
dc.description.abstractAlpine ski areas worldwide use daily lift-ticket pricing rather than individual ride-ticket pricing. Robert Barra and Paul Romer argue that the ski ride industry is a competitive market and that identical equilibriums and revenues are reached with either pricing method. They also argue that sticky lift ticket prices and lift-line queues are efficient. Lift-ticket pricing dominates because of lower monitoring costs. Tests of their model's predictions, however, do not support their model. A monopolistic ski-lift pricing model is developed. The monopoly model predicts that lift-ticket pricing would dominate the market due to its revenue generating advantages over ride-ticket pricing. Overall the monopoly model predicts the pricing policies that exist in the ski ride market better than the competitive model of Barra and Romer. It is argued that lift-ticket pricing is an indication of the market power most ski areas possess.en
dc.publisherMontana State University - Bozeman, College of Agricultureen
dc.subject.lcshSkis and skiingen
dc.subject.lcshEconometric modelsen
dc.titleTicket pricing in the alpine ski industry.en
dc.rights.holderCopyright 1990 by Andrew Robert Gerlachen
thesis.catalog.ckey272676en, Graduate Committee: Terry Anderson; Mike Kehoeen Economics & Economics.en
mus.relation.departmentAgricultural Economics & Economics.en_US

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

MSU uses DSpace software, copyright © 2002-2017  Duraspace. For library collections that are not accessible, we are committed to providing reasonable accommodations and timely access to users with disabilities. For assistance, please submit an accessibility request for library material.