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dc.contributor.authorGallagher, Justin
dc.contributor.authorFisher, Paul J.
dc.identifier.citationGallagher, Justin, and Paul J. Fisher. 2020. "Criminal Deterrence When There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12 (3): 202-37. doi: 10.1257/pol.20170674en_US
dc.description.abstractNumerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries.en_US
dc.titleCriminal Deterrence when There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safetyen_US
mus.citation.journaltitleAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policyen_US
mus.relation.collegeCollege of Agricultureen_US
mus.relation.departmentAgricultural Economics & Economics.en_US
mus.relation.universityMontana State University - Bozemanen_US

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