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dc.contributor.authorCarrera, Mariana
dc.contributor.authorRoyer, Heather
dc.contributor.authorStehr, Mark
dc.contributor.authorSydnor, Justin
dc.contributor.authorTaubinsky, Dmitry
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-01T19:05:20Z
dc.date.available2022-09-01T19:05:20Z
dc.date.issued2021-09
dc.identifier.citationCarrera, M., Royer, H., Stehr, M., Sydnor, J., & Taubinsky, D. (2022). Who chooses commitment? Evidence and welfare implications. The Review of Economic Studies, 89(3), 1205-1244.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0034-6527
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/17046
dc.descriptionThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Economic Studies following peer review. The version of record [Who Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications. The Review of Economic Studies (2021)] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab056.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether offers of commitment contracts, in the form of self-imposed choice-set restrictions and penalties with no financial upside, are well-targeted tools for addressing self-control problems. In an experiment on gym attendance (N = 1,248), we examine take-up of commitment contracts, and also introduce a separate elicitation task to identify actual and perceived time inconsistency. There is high take-up of commitment contracts for greater gym attendance, resulting in significant increases in exercise. However, this is take-up is influenced both by noisy valuation and incorrect beliefs about one’s time inconsistency. Approximately half of the people who take up commitment contracts for higher gym attendance also take up commitment contracts for lower gym attendance. There is little association between commitment contract take-up and reduced-form and structural estimates of actual or perceived time inconsistency. A novel information treatment providing an exogenous shock to awareness of time inconsistency reduces demand for commitment contracts. Structural estimates of a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and gym attendance imply that offering our commitment contracts lowers consumer surplus, and is less socially efficient than utilizing linear exercise subsidies that achieve the same average change in behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.rightscopyright oxford academic 2021en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://web.archive.org/web/20191107025238/https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/access_purchase/rights_and_permissionsen_US
dc.subjectcommitment welfareen_US
dc.titleWho Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implicationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
mus.citation.extentfirstpage1en_US
mus.citation.extentlastpage98en_US
mus.citation.issue3en_US
mus.citation.journaltitleThe Review of Economic Studiesen_US
mus.citation.volume89en_US
mus.identifier.doi10.1093/restud/rdab056en_US
mus.relation.collegeCollege of Agricultureen_US
mus.relation.departmentAgricultural Economics & Economics.en_US
mus.relation.universityMontana State University - Bozemanen_US


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