Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorRedwood, Susanne M.
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-04T21:12:19Z
dc.date.available2023-01-04T21:12:19Z
dc.date.issued2022-11
dc.identifier.citationSusanne M. Redwood (2022) Personalism and the politics of central bank independence under authoritarianism, Review of International Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2022.2127118en_US
dc.identifier.issn0969-2290
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/17579
dc.descriptionThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed,or built upon in any way.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a domestic explanation for variation in de jure central bank independence (CBI) in nondemocracies. I argue that there is a nonlinear relationship between personalism and CBI: regimes with very low and very high levels of personalism tend to have lower CBI compared to states with intermediate personalism. Where personalization is low, autocrats face greater constraints and more frequent political challenges, leading to increased contestation over political institutions. In these states, leaders choose lower CBI to signal their control over monetary policymaking and prevent dissent over economic policy. In contrast, in strongly personalist regimes, leaders face few risks associated with CBI, but they discount the benefits of CBI and thus prefer not to implement costly central bank reforms. Nondemocracies with intermediate levels of personalism tend to have the highest levels of CBI. I support these arguments using recent data on CBI from 1970–2012.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nden_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.subjectCentral banksen_US
dc.subjectauthoritarianismen_US
dc.subjectmonetary policyen_US
dc.subjectregime typeen_US
dc.subjectpolitical economyen_US
dc.subjectpersonalismen_US
dc.titlePersonalism and the politics of central bankindependence under authoritarianismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
mus.citation.extentfirstpage1en_US
mus.citation.extentlastpage27en_US
mus.citation.journaltitleReview of International Political Economyen_US
mus.identifier.doi10.1080/09692290.2022.2127118en_US
mus.relation.collegeCollege of Letters & Scienceen_US
mus.relation.departmentPolitical Science.en_US
mus.relation.universityMontana State University - Bozemanen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

cc-by-nc-nd
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as cc-by-nc-nd

MSU uses DSpace software, copyright © 2002-2017  Duraspace. For library collections that are not accessible, we are committed to providing reasonable accommodations and timely access to users with disabilities. For assistance, please submit an accessibility request for library material.