Theses and Dissertations at Montana State University (MSU)
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Item Unconscious thought and stereotypes: how posteriori stereotype activation biases unconscious thought(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2019) Reiter, Lucca Aleksandr; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Ian M. HandleyUnconscious Thought Theory (UTT) proposes that people can actively process goal-relevant information when they are distracted from consciously thinking about it (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Further, unconscious thought (UT) is purported to process the information in an aschematic bottom-up manner (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2008). Supporting this claim is experimental evidence that UT is less susceptible to stereotype use compared to the top-down schema-driven process of conscious thought (CT; Bos & Dijksterhuis, 2011). Based on these findings, UTT has proposed that UT does not utilize stereotypes when forming impressions. However, other research suggests that participants may form biased impressions in experimental contexts arguably suitable to the operation of UT if a stereotype is non-consciously activated during distraction periods following information acquisition (van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996). Further, goal-relevant information is actively integrated during UT, therefore stereotype activation during UT could lead to more biased impressions compared to conditions where negligible thinking occurs. The aim of this thesis was to compare how the active processes of UT and the passive process of being merely distracted are differentially impacted by stereotype activation. In the present experiment, participants were presented with information about a hypothetical person, 'Person 1,' some of which implied traits that are consistent and inconsistent with the stereotype of African-American men. Then, they either received an evaluation goal (UT) or no goal (MD) prior to being distracted for 3min. During distraction, some participants were primed with the stereotype of African- American men. Then, accessibility of the stereotype-consistent and inconsistent traits were measured using a lexical decision task (LDT). Lastly, participants provided their impressions' of 'Person 1' on various trait dimensions. Results supported the hypotheses that among participants in UT conditions, stereotype activation inhibited the accessibility of stereotype-inconsistent concepts relative to consistent concepts. However, this biased accessibility did not impact impressions of 'Person 1.' Possible limitations, implications, and future directions are discussed.Item The search for moderation: does anxiety enhance the unconscious thought advantage?(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2017) Whillock, Summer Rain; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Ian M. HandleyWhen people face a large amount of information on which to base a decision, common sense suggests that they should slowly and deliberatively think about that information. However, Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) suggests that a slow yet unconscious mechanism can process complex information and output decisions that rival, and perhaps exceed, the quality of decisions that result from deliberative thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). However, this idea is controversial and research into UTT reveals that an unconscious thought advantage (UTA) over conscious thinking is small and manifests unreliably (Nieuwenstein et al., 2015; Strick et al., 2011). The aim of this thesis was to identify and test a potential moderator of the UTA. Logically, situations that hinder conscious thought but leave unconscious thought relatively unaffected should enhance the UTA. The Attentional Control Theory (ACT) offers one such situation, that anxiety compromises conscious processes that rely upon attentional control and working memory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Because conscious thought relies heavily on working memory relative to unconscious thought, experiencing anxiety may lead the two thought processes to diverge. Specifically, anxiety should negatively influence conscious thought but not significantly influence unconscious thought. In the present study, participants viewed information about roommate candidates and made judgments after a period of either distraction or focused deliberation, while under calm or anxious conditions. Results did not support the hypothesis that the experience of anxiety would increase the UTA; participants performed comparably in the conscious thought and unconscious thought conditions. Further, participants in the conscious thought condition performed better under anxious compared to calm conditions. Exploratory analyses and future directions are discussed.Item Evidence for unconscious thought in complex decisions : the result of a methodological artifact or of an active thought process(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2009) Runnion, Brett Matthew; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Ian M. HandleyPrevious research has suggested that a period of unconscious thought can result in judgments that are equal or superior to those of conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, 2004). The existence of unconscious thought as a decision-making process is controversial. In fact, it has been suggested that unconscious thought is not a process rather the evidence supporting it is the result of a methodological artifact (Lassiter et al., in press) that only occurs when participants can retrieve online judgments. This thesis attempts to resolve this controversy. Participants received information describing 4 cars (acquisition stage) that were described by twelve dichotomous attributes (e.g., good/poor mileage). The best car possessed mostly positive characteristics and the worst car had mostly negative characteristics. Participants were told before or after the information was presented, that they would be forming an impression of the four cars. They were then allowed to think about the cars consciously for 4 minutes, were distracted for 4 minutes (unconscious thought), or were asked to make an immediate decision without thinking. When the instructions to form an impression were received before acquiring the information, the participants could form online judgments during acquisition. These could later be retrieved when participants reported their attitudes. When the instructions to form an impression were received after participants acquired the information, they could not form online judgments, but could form only memory-based judgments after the information was presented. Without online judgments, participants are forced to rely on memory-based judgments. Thus, if participants in the unconscious-thought condition formed more favorable attitudes toward the best car relative to the attitudes formed by the participants in the other two conditions, a thought process must be occurring. Additionally, these attitudes should transfer to choosing the best car as well. However, the results of this thesis failed to replicate previous research (Lassiter et al., in press) as the dependent measures failed to reach significance.