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Item Investigating working memory capacity in an online nature intervention(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2022) Charbonneau, Brooke Zauner; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Keith A. HutchisonViewing natural stimuli has shown to have beneficial effects on cognition. However, for those in urban areas, nature may not be as accessible. An online intervention may allow them to receive such cognitive benefits. However, specific cognitive processes that may benefit from nature are still not well understood. This study aimed to investigate which cognitive processes could benefit from an online nature intervention. Two hundred and nineteen participants were recruited from Montana State University and completed two tasks that measured either Working Memory Capacity, attentional control, or memory. Within each task, 40 nature images and 40 urban images were randomly presented before each experimental block in the two tasks. Results revealed higher performance after viewing nature images compared to urban images across attentional control tasks but not for Working Memory Capacity or memory. When controlling for preference for natural settings and nature images, the effect became marginal for attentional control tasks. Exploratory analyses revealed that this effect of nature became nonsignificant when controlling across dimensions of fascination and mystery. These results indicate a small, but significant, benefit of viewing natural settings for attentional control, an essential component of Working Memory Capacity. Future research should investigate if benefits increase with longer or more comprehensive interaction with nature, individual differences in the degree of benefits nature can provide, and characteristics that natural settings possess which may increase attentional benefits.Item The role of working memory capacity and cognitive load in producing and detecting deception(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2016) Maldonado, Ted; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Keith A. HutchisonThe purpose of this study was to examine the effects of age, working memory capacity (WMC) and cognitive load on people's ability to tell and detect lies. The literature is inconsistent on what individual characteristics are critical to being a good liar. Zukerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981) suggested that lying is cognitively demanding. Therefore, WMC might provide an advantage for some when telling a convincing lie, such that higher WMC individuals can handle the high cognitive load associated with lying. I examined this across two experiments. I predicted that individuals with higher WMC would be able to better tell more convincing lies, because such individuals are better at suppressing prepotent, but goal irrelevant information, such as the truth. Additionally, higher WMC individuals are better equipped to focus and tune out distraction that accompanies a high cognitive load. I also predicted that younger individuals will have an easier time telling convincing lies than older adults. As we age, cognitive functioning, like WMC, declines, and with this decline, so does our ability to deceive others. In Experiment 1, young adult dyads took turns telling truths and lies, under high and low cognitive load. The detector tried to determine whether their partner was truthful or deceitful. In Experiment 2, younger and older adults told truths and lies into a camera and two young adult detectors tried to detect the truths and lies, at a later time. I found a positive relationship between WMC and telling lies such that higher WMC individuals had fewer of their lies detected when under high load. I also found that a higher WMC improved the ability to comply when asked to tell a truth or lie. I also found that when responding to questions, participants found it easier to comply when asked to lie or when under high cognitive load. In regard to age differences, older adults found it more difficult to tell lies than truths. Issues within deception could involve specific memory processes and require more research to understand what aspects of memory are involved in telling a convincing lie.Item Exploring associations between proactive and reactive control(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2016) Begnoche, John Patrick; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Rebecca BrookerCognitive control is the act of regulating, coordinating, and sequencing mental processes in accordance with internally maintained behavioral goals (Braver, 2012; Norman & Shallice, 1986). The Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) theory argues that variations in cognitive control are driven by two distinct operating modes, proactive control and reactive control (Braver et al., 2007). Proactive control is defined as an anticipatory and effortful attentional strategy that actively sustains task-relevant information before the occurrence of a cognitively demanding event (Miller & Cohen, 2001). In contrast, reactive control is an automatic process that is passively maintained and relies upon high-conflict, or trigger, events to reactivate task-relevant information after the occurrence of a cognitively demanding event (Jacoby, Kelley, & McElree, 1999). Traditional models of cognitive control focus on reactive control initiating proactive control (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). Yet, recent research suggests the possibility of shifting to a predominantly proactive strategy with less reliance on reactive processing (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Schmid, Kleiman, Amodio, 2015). However, little work has analyzed a direct relation between continuously sustained proactive control and reduced input from reactive control. In addition, affective variables might impact the ability to shift between proactive and reactive modes of control (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Individuals high in trait levels of worry exhibit heightened reactive control and reduced proactive control compared to controls (Moser, Moran, Schroder, Donnellan, & Yeung, 2013). In the current study, participants performed a cognitively-demanding task while neural correlates of proactive and reactive control were measured. Self-reported levels of trait worry were also collected. In agreement with a proactive model of cognitive control, the results of this experiment indicated that greater levels of sustained proactive control predicted decreased reactive processing. However, this relation was moderated by trait-worry such that enhanced proactive control only predicted decreased reactive control when levels of trait worry were low.Item Inducing proactive control using a Stroop cueing paradigm(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2014) Olsen, Mariana Rachel; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Keith A. HutchisonCognitive control refers to the relative ability to attend to relevant stimuli while ignoring irrelevant stimuli in service of a goal. Braver, Gray, and Burgess (2007) have proposed two complementary forms of control: proactive, which is preparatory in nature, and reactive, which is engaged after a stimulus or imperative event. The ability to use proactive control is often tested using the Stroop task; however, what is usually thought of as evidence for proactive control can be confounded with item-specific effects, sequential effects, and speed-accuracy trade-offs. To remedy this issue, the current study utilized a modified version of the Stroop task to examine the use of proactive control on a trial-by-trial basis. Two experiments tested participants' ability to flexibly engage proactive control in which participants were given 80% predictive EASY or HARD cues indicating whether an upcoming stimulus would be congruent or incongruent, respectively. I hypothesized that participants, especially those high in working memory capacity, would use the HARD cues to engage top-down control to suppress word-reading, leading to a) reduced Stroop interference following HARD cues, b) impaired recall and recognition for neutral words following HARD cues, and c) greater pupil dilation following HARD than EASY cues. In Experiment 1, participants showed reduced Stroop interference for stimuli following HARD relative to EASY cues. This effect was replicated in Experiment 2, with reduced Stroop interference in both reaction times and errors following HARD cues. However, neither recall or pupil dilation differed reliably as a function of cue or WMC. Together, these experiments demonstrate the utility of using a cueing procedure when examining proactive control in the Stroop task. Limitations and future directions in cueing research are discussed.Item Semantic activation without awareness : still no reliable evidence(Montana State University - Bozeman, College of Letters & Science, 2005) Bengson, Jesse Jon; Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Keith A. HutchisonThree experiments were conducted to examine whether semantic association contributes to unconscious priming. Experiment 1 used exclusion instructions in which participants were told to avoid completing the stem (e.g. mo---) with a word related to a masked prime (e.g. cash) flashed for 0, 38, or 212 ms. Significant semantic priming was found only in the items analysis when data was averaged across participants. In the subjects analysis, this performance was moderated by participantsα ability to report the prime. Experiment 2 used a free association task to examine unconscious semantic priming. Participants were instructed to respond to a target homograph (e.g. pupil) with the first word that came to mind that is not related to the meaning of the flashed word (e.g. student). No significant unconscious semantic priming was found. Experiment 3 replicated the conditions previously used to demonstrate unconscious semantic priming and show that such priming is due to methodological problems. The same methodology as Experiment 2 was used except participants were given inclusion instead of exclusion instructions. Significant priming was found across all trials; however, this priming dissolved when only the trials where participants failed to report the prime were examined. The results of all experiments suggest that unconscious semantic priming from word stimuli is a result of residual conscious awareness of the prime.