Agricultural Marketing Policy Center
Permanent URI for this communityhttps://scholarworks.montana.edu/handle/1/2942
The purpose of the Agricultural Marketing Policy Center is to provide applied research and education, including extension education on agricultural marketing and related policy issues for informed decision-making by farm and ranch managers, public decision makers in rural communities and in local and state agencies, state legislators, and congressional delegations in Montana and the Northern Plains and Rockies Region.
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Item Group Risk Income Protection(MSU Extension, 2006-07) Johnson, James B.; Hewlett, John P.Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) is a federally-subsidized risk management tool to insure against widespread loss of revenue from an insured crop in a county. Crop producers whose yields are highly correlated with county yield are most likely to use this product to insure that the combination of yield and price results in a particular level of revenue. Unlike the related Risk Management Agency-approved Group Risk Plan insurance, either a price or yield decline may result in a producer being indemnified. If total revenue (price times yield) in county is less than a producer’s trigger revenue, the producer will be indemnified for revenue losses due to insurable causes. But producers need to recognize that they could incur reduced revenue from the insured acres of a crop and not be indemnified if there is not a commensurate decline in county per acre revenues for the crop.Item Regulating State Trading Enterprises in the GATT: An Urgent Need for Change? Evidence from the 2003-2004 U.S.--Canada Grain Dispute(MSU Extension, 2006-02) Smith, Vincent H.State Trading Enterprises (STEs) are one of the bete noirs of agricultural and other trade relations and trade negotiations. An STE is a government enterprises or quasi government enterprise that operates with special protections and/or privileges granted by its country’s central authority. STEs generally exist for one of two main reasons. Sometimes, as with many African parastatals, they are created to tax the domestic industry and/or imports for government revenue generation purposes (or income transfers to members of ruling elites). Alternatively, an STE’s mission is often to increase revenues or profits (though not necessarily both) from sales for domestic producers and/or processors and other marketing chain operations. In pursuing these revenue or profit objectives, STEs create trade distortions by implicitly levying tariffs on imports, taxing domestic sales, and subsidizing (or, on rare occasions, taxing) exports to different countries at different rates. They may also be vehicles through which domestic subsidies are more or less discretely funneled to producers, with corresponding implications for the effectiveness of disciplines on domestic supports. Hence, STEs are problematic in the context of trade negotiations.Item Harvest-Time Protein Shocks and Price Adjustment in U.S. Wheat Markets(MSU Extension, 2005-06) Goodwin, Barry K.; Smith, Vincent H.Dynamic relationships between three classes of wheat are investigated using threshold VAR models incorporating the effects of protein availability. Changes in the stock of protein are found to generate significant impulse responses in the price of hard red spring wheat and hard red winter wheat but not soft red wheat. These impulse responses to identical changes in protein stocks are larger when the absolute deviations of protein stocks from normal levels are large. Shocks to the prices of individual classes of wheat result in complex impulse responses in the prices of the other wheats. Notably, however, a shock to the price of hard red winter weak appears to result in little or no impulse response in the price of hard spring wheat, though, importantly, the opposite is not true.Item Agricultural Chemical Prices in Canada and the United States: A Case Study of Alberta and Montana(MSU Extension, 2004-12) Smith, Vincent H.; Johnson, James B.Differences in retail prices for similar or identical agricultural chemicals have been a source of controversy in the Prairie Provinces of Canada and the Northern Great Plains States of the United States since the mid-1990s. Such differences may exist because of differing pesticide regulations between the United States and Canada. Different regulations may inhibit trade between the two regions and isolate markets from one another. If this is the case, then regulatory harmonization that allows Canadian and U.S. agricultural producers to purchase agricultural chemicals in Canada or the United States would generally lead to harmonization of agricultural chemical prices.Item The Canadian Wheat Board: Government Guarantees and Hidden Subsidies(MSU Extension, 2004-07) Goodloe, CarolThe operations of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), a state trading enterprise, have generated controversy over the years, partly because of an alleged lack of transparency in its operations. This study examines one aspect of operations that is not well understood – the government guarantee of CWB borrowing and export credit sales. The CWB is able to take advantage of this special privilege to generate a “financial cushion,” or non-market based revenue, that it can use to enhance returns to producers, discount export prices, or pay administrative expenses. Current WTO negotiations should build on U.S. and EU proposals on STEs and export credit guarantees to address potential trade-distorting practices of STEs such as the CWB.Item Marketing Assistance Loans, Loan Deficiency Payments and Marketing Loan Gains for Minor Oilseed and Pulse Crops(MSU Extension, 2003-11) Johnson, James B.Marketing assistance loans are available to Montana producers of minor oilseed and pulse crops. The USDA differentiates county-level loan rates from national rates for minor oilseeds and dry peas. County-level lentil and small chickpea loan rates for all pertinent counties throughout the United States are differentiated at the multi-state, regional level from the national loan rates. For each of the pulse crops-- dry peas, lentils, and small chickpeas the county-level loan rates are the same in all Montana counties. Loan deficiency payments are available on all or a portion of harvested production when posted-county prices for a loan commodity are below county-level loan rates. Similarly, marketing loan gains are available when posted-county prices are less than county loan rates at the time marketing assistance loans are settled.